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INTRODUCTION TO 



PS YC HOLOGY 



BY 



ROBERT M. YERKES 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 




NEW YORK 

HE^RY HOLT AND COMPANY 
1911 



Copyright, 1911, 

By 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 






THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS 



©CI. A 2894 Bb 



(1JQ.S 



To 
HUGO MUNSTERBERG 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Fox* their assistance in the preparation of this text-book 
the author heartily thanks his colleagues Edwin B. Holt and 
Herbert S. Langfeld; L. C. C. Krieger, artist; and his wife, 
Ada Watterson Yerkes. 



CONTENTS 

PART ONE 

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION, LEADING TO A DEFINITION 
OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Plan, Purpose, and Use of This Text-book . 3 
II. The Subject-mattek, Branches, and Relations 

of Psychology 11 

III. The Aims, Tasks, or Problems of Psychology . 25 

IV. The Methods of Psychology ... . . .39 

V. The Values and Ideals of Psychology . . .49 

PART TWO 

PSYCHOLOGY AS DESCRIPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

VI. Concrete Experiences, or Varieties of Conscious- 
ness . .59 

VII. Analysis and the Problem of Psychological 

Elements 73 

VIII. Synthesis: The Building of Complex Experiences 84 
IX. Sensations as Elements of Consciousness . . 93 

X. The Properties of Sensations 103 

XL The Sensations of Sight and Hearing . . .117 
XII. Peculiarities of Other Modes of Sensation . . 136 

XIII. Affections as Elements of Consciousness . . 147 

XIV. Psychic Complexes: Perception . . . .160 
XV. Psychic Complexes: Feelings 173 

XVI. Psychic Complexes: Memory and Imagination . 189 

PART THREE 

PSYCHOLOGY AS THE "HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: 
GENETIC DESCRIPTION 

XVII. The History of Consciousness in the Individual: 

Ontogenesis 211 

XVIII. The History of Consciousness in the Race: 

Phylogenesis 228 

ix 



x CONTENTS 

PART FOUR 

PSYCHOLOGY AS GENERALIZATION 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIX. Observations, Generalizations, Laws, and Prin- 
ciples 245 

XX. Laws of Sensation and Perception .... 256 

XXI. Laws of Affection 275 

XXII. Laws of Attention 292 

XXIII. Laws of Association and Memory .... 300 

PART FIVE 

PSYCHOLOGY AS EXPLANATION AND CORRELATION 

XXIV. Physical and Psychical Explanation . . .311 
XXV. The Explanation of Mental Phenomena: 

Psychical Causation 328 

XXVI. Bodily and Mental Processes: Correlation . . 338 
XXVII. Stimuli, Bodily Processes, and Sensations . . 350 
XXVIII. Physical Conditions, Bodily Processes, and 

Affections 360 

XXIX. Behavior and Consciousness 373 



PART SIX 

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONTROL OF MENTAL LIFE 

XXX. The Prediction and Control of Events. . . . 387 

XXXI. Education and Mental Life 396 

XXXII. Eugenics and Mental Life 409 

Index 419 



LIST OF CLASS EXERCISES 

PAGE 

1. Introspection of a memory consciousness . . . .10 

2. Introspection of a train of associated ideas . . .24 

3. Introspection of an early experience (memory of childhood) 38 

4. Introspection of sensations of pressure, temperature, and 

pain . 48 

5. Introspection of " my psychological traits " ( imagery, 

color associations) . . . . . . . .58 

6. Introspection of perceptual consciousness of a lead pencil 71 

7. Introspection of memory consciousness of a lead pencil 83 

8. Analysis and synthesis of consciousness of (a) lemonade, 

(b) ginger-ale, (c) horse-radish 91 

9. Determination of the upper limit of hearing . . . 101 

10. Introspection of characteristics of sensations of sound . 115 

11. Introspection of after-images of light (brightness) sen- 

sations .......... 133 

12. Introspection of after-images of color sensations . . . 145 

13. Measurement of the affective values of colors . . . 156 

14. Psychological facts and laws as exhibited by advertise- 

ments .......... 170 

15. Measurement of the affective values of advertisements . 187 

16. Introspection of imaginative consciousness (reproductive 

and creative) . . 209 

17. Observations concerning the consciousness of time . . 225 

18. Observation of mind in animals ...... 244 

19. Demonstration of the facts of color mixture and general- 

izations therefrom 255 

20. Introspection of phenomena of visual contrast . . . 273 

21. Introspection of certain sentiments (pronounced likes and 

dislikes) 291 

22. Introspection of attention (span and fluctuations) . . 299 

23. Introspection of simple associations and the classification 

thereof 310 

24. Psycho-analysis: introspection of associations under con- 

ditions of voluntary inhibition (association reaction- 
time experiment) 324 

xi 



xii LIST OF CLASS EXERCISES 

PAGE 

25. Introspection of associative complexes (association reaction- 

time test) 337 

26. Observation of simple reaction consciousness (measurement 

of reaction time) . 348 

27. Observation of discrimination consciousness (measure- 

ment of discrimination reaction time) .... 358 

28. Study of facial expression, and especially of the role of 

the eyes in expression ....... 371 

29. Observation and interpretation of the behavior of a person . 385 

30. Introspection of a thought process . . . . . 394 

31. Introspection of a reasoning process ..... 408 

32. Introspection of consciousness of " meaning "... 417 



INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 



PART ONE 

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION, LEADING TO A 
DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER I 

THE PLAN, PURPOSE, AND USE OF THIS TEXT-BOOK 

" Keep the student doing things, instead of merely listening, read- 
ing, or seeing them done. Fit the course to his capacity. Make 
him feel responsible for every step that he takes. Keep him work- 
ing under pressure for accuracy and detail. Make him sure that 
he has the means for complying with every request. Recognize re- 
sults. Even if he is to be entertained in the course, let it be most 
frequently by his own activity." — C. E. Seashore: On the teaching 
of the elementary course in psychology. Psychological Monographs, 
vol. 12, no. 4, p. 83. 1910. 

This chapter contains prefatory material. It is not called 
a preface, because it is intended to be read! 

This book is an outline of psychology. — There are two 
types of text-books of psychology: the outline and the 
manual. They differ in purpose and content. An outline 
is intended primarily to give students a general view of 
the subject-matter, aims, methods, values, and relations of 
the science. A manual serves, rather, to present the mate- 
rials of the science as a definitely organized body of knowl- 
edge. The former is a sketch of the science : the latter is a 
compendium of facts. Unfortunately, both for them and 
the science, not a few students are introduced to psychology 
by a manual instead of by an outline. This experience is 
unfortunate, because only the exceptionally industrious or' 

3 



4 PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS TEXT-BOOK 

able student ever discovers what the subject really is and 
may mean. The manual so overwhelms the average begin- 
ner that he loses himself in a turmoil of facts, and remains 
unappreciative of the science, because he knows neither its 
aims nor its relations. It is just as important in psychology 
as in forestry that one should see the wood clearly and un- 
derstand its general characteristics before undertaking to 
study its individual trees in detail. 

An outline should be a living skeleton. — A bird's-eye 
view of a subject aids one greatly in appreciating its par- 
ticular facts. Every outline of a science is a skeleton. If 
it is a good outline, it is a living skeleton which insists upon 
being clothed with facts. Indeed, its value may fairly be 
measured in terms of the power it has to impel us to seek 
information. An outline of psychology should offer the 
reader a clear-cut and vivid picture of the science, in which 
the essential features are made so prominent that they 
cannot be overlooked even by the careless and inattentive 
reader. Moreover, the skeleton-picture impressed upon the 
mind of an intelligent reader by such an outline should 
continue to attract to itself facts throughout his life. 

The manual of psychology should follow and supple- 
ment the outline. — A reliable and readable manual is in- 
valuable in any science, for once the earnest and energetic 
student has acquired his skeleton-picture, he is prepared 
to read manuals, source books, monographs, and other re- 
ports of investigations with keen interest and with rapidly 
increasing profit. The point is that in psychology, as in 
other subjects, one must feel the need of information be- 
fore one can seek it with enthusiasm. 

It is true that a manual read with industry and held in 
memory lends one the appearance of knowledge, but it is 
equally true that such information has little value unless 
one really understands the subject. One must have a gen- 
eral knowledge of the aims and ideals of psychology in 



A SKELETON-PICTURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 5 

order to appreciate its facts. It is such a " general knowl- 
edge " that Part One of this text-book is intended to 
provide. 

The plan of a text-book should be obvious. — Too often 
it is either impossible or extremely difficult for the student 
to discover a plan in his teacher's presentation of psy- 
chology. He is aware only of a confused and unintelligible 
collection of facts. Usually the confusion and unintelligi- 
bility would disappear if the plan were grasped. 

What the class-room teacher can do from day to day by 
class-experiments, discussions, conferences, quizes, and writ- 
ten exercises, the writer has only one opportunity to ac- 
complish. If he does not make clear, at the beginning of 
his book, the way in which he is planning to present the 
subject, his work may prove worse than valueless. 

To speak of an outline of an outline seems like undue 
simplification. Nevertheless, it has been necessary for the 
writer to follow a definite plan in working out this book 
and it is equally necessary that the reader should under- 
stand the plan. 

This text-book is intended as a simple skeleton-picture 
of the science of psychology. — Its purpose is two-fold. 
First, to give the reader a definite idea of what the science 
of psychology is trying to do. Second, to make the begin- 
ner realize that he is at the threshold of a subject which 
is as interesting as it is important, and to arouse a desire 
to know it intimately. The book must be considered a 
failure if it does not lead naturally to continued study of 
mental life and to an increase in interest which keeps pace 
with the accumulation of knowledge and development of 
insight. 

The book is divided into six main parts. — The first part 
is introductory and each of the other five deals with one of 
the tasks of psychology. 
■ In Part One the nature of the materials, aims, methods, 



6 PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS TEXT-BOOK 

and values of the science is discussed briefly and simply 
in order that the reader may be helped to formulate a 
working definition of psychology. This part of the book 
is in reality an essay on the subject, What is the science 
of psychology? What does it attempt to do, and how, and 
why? 

The remaining five parts deal respectively with the sev- 
eral tasks of (1) Description, (2) Genetic description or 
history, (3) Generalization, (4) Explanation and correla- 
tion, and (5) Control. 

Part Two considers the task of description in psychology, 
together with some of its results. This task is fulfilled by 
the application of the methods of analysis and synthesis 
to the materials of the science. 

Part Three similarly treats of genetic description or the 
history of consciousness. This is only a special aspect or 
part of the general task of description, but it depends upon 
methods which in certain important respects differ from 
those of simple description. 

Part Four discusses the task of generalization. In this 
portion of the book the principles and laws of psychology 
are presented. A part of the book has been devoted to this 
special topic in order to emphasize the fact that the science 
has a respectable body of generalizations. 

Part Five is concerned, first of all, with the explanation 
of psychological facts. It gives examples of various kinds 
of scientific explanation and offers an account of the na- 
ture of psychological explanation. Secondarily, this part 
of the book discusses the relation of body and mind, and 
attempts to correlate processes in the body with mental 
processes. 

Part Six has to do with the task of control, for psy- 
chology is confronted by a demand for such knowledge of 
mental life as is necessary for the intelligent control of 
consciousness. 



HOW CAN WE BEST STUDY PSYCHOLOGY 7 

The importance of questions concerning an author's 
plan and purpose. — It is well worth while to try to discover 
reasons for the selection of the materials of a text-book 
and for the arrangement of parts. In connection with this 
particular outline the following questions may be suggested 
as pertinent. Why is there no account of either the struc- 
ture or functions of the nervous system? Why is the 
subject-matter of the science presented according to the 
kinds of things done instead of according to the varieties 
of material studied? Why does the book contain a special 
part dealing with principles and laws whereas other text- 
books have no such prominent division? Why does the 
book discuss the correlation of bodily with mental processes ? 
Why are two kinds of description brought into prominence 
side by side ? Why is so much space, relatively, devoted to 
the introductory part? Why are aims and methods made 
more prominent than results? 

These are examples of the kinds of question the student 
should ask during the reading of the book, and be prepared 
to answer in quizes or in written reports. It is readily 
noted that the necessity of answers to such questions forces 
the reader to try to understand the point of view and pur- 
pose of the writer of the text. It is, indeed, an excellent 
practice to get into the habit of reading with definite ques- 
tions in mind. 

How can we best study psychology. — The employment 
of questions as an aid to the intelligent reading of this book 
has been suggested for the following reason. Most of us 
can listen indefinitely to lectures on subjects in which we 
have no special interest, or we can read diligently for hours, 
without gaining information or insight. This seems in- 
credible to some fortunate individuals, but it nevertheless 
is true of the majority of students. 

Now, it is the task of the teacher of psychology to elicit 
or force attentive and intelligent listening and reading. 



8 PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS TEXT-BOOK 

There are many ways of attempting to do this, but best 
among them are those which compel reaction. If things 
are so arranged that we must do something, and if doing 
this something properly depends upon knowing or under- 
standing, we are reasonably certain to strive to know and 
understand. The circumstances of our everyday business 
life constantly force us to react in the light of knowledge. 
Those who act without knowing pay for their ignorance with 
failure. If we are forced to work out problems, write re- 
ports, answer questions, the necessity for action stimulates 
our search for knowledge and understanding. 

It is a matter of common knowledge that those who with 
definite problems in mind study a subject acquire knowl- 
edge and insight with great rapidity. This is simply be- 
cause they are seeking to learn how to do something. The 
teacher of psychology who can get a student interested in 
the solution of some psychological problem, no matter how 
trivial, or in learning how to perform some experiment, 
or even how to answer some simple question of fact upon 
which reaction depends, has achieved success. As students 
we do not wish or intend to waste our time : we simply do 
not know how to avoid wasting it. Hence it is that in- 
struction concerning certain principles of attention and 
methods of work proves both acceptable and' invaluable at 
the beginning of the study of psychology. One excellent 
way to force reaction is to require written answers to ques- 
tions; another is to require the performance of simple ex- 
periments and the writing of accurate accounts of the 
procedure and its results. 

The class-experiment in psychology. — The latter of 
these methods has been adopted in this book, for it has 
been the experience of the writer that it does much to make 
the study of psychology interesting and helpful. 

At the end of each chapter there is given the description 
of an exercise, or class-experiment, not necessarily closely 



USE OF SUPPLEMENTARY READING 9 

related to the topic of the chapter, which may be performed 
by the class as a group, in about thirty minutes. The 
instructor should act as experimenter, controlling the 
physical conditions under which the members of the class 
introspect; and each student should observe, as faithfully 
as he can, what goes on in his consciousness, and write a 
systematic and accurate account of his results. 

The exercises are intended (1) to provide each student 
with a number of favorable opportunities for the study 
of his consciousness, (2) to give him such glimpses of his 
mental life as will lead him to study it thoroughly, (3) to 
furnish valuable training in scientific method, and (4) to 
help to establish valuable habits of working. 

The use of supplementary reading in connection with 
this text-book. — This book is simply an outline of psychol- 
ogy. It is not complete or exhaustive. Therefore, it has 
seemed desirable to give, at the conclusion of each chapter, 
a few references to valuable discussions of special topics. 
These references are sometimes to other text-books and 
sometimes to special papers or monographs. Those students 
who are able to do this additional reading will thereby gain 
a truer conception of the science of psychology and a more 
profitable knowledge of mental life than the reading of this 
outline can give. The attempt has been made, however, so 
to write the book that it shall be intelligible and serviceable 
apart from the use of any other psychological literature. 
In itself the work is complete as an outline of psychology, 
but at every point it should tend to lead the reader beyond 
its narrow limits. 

It is the practice of the writer to use this outline as the 
basis of his presentation of psychology, and to urge students 
to read in connection with it such works as Professor Thorn- 
dike 's " Elements of Psychology " and Professor Calkins' 
" First Book in Psychology," in order that they may get 
the points of view of different psychologists. As manuals, 



10 PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS TEXT-BOOK 

Professor Titchener's "A Text-book of Psychology " and 
Professor Sully 's " A Teacher 's Handbook of Psychology ' ' 
are invaluable. 

Self-observation. — Each chapter opens with a ' ' text, ' ' in 
order that the reader may be reminded frequently that self- 
observation is absolutely necessary if one is to be a psy- 
chologist. It has been the writer's aim to select for quota- 
tion valuable bits of introspection. These " texts " are 
not, in all cases, closely related to the topics of the chap- 
ter, for they are intended merely to emphasize the impor- 
tance of introspection. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspection of a memory conscious- 
ness. Materials : paper and pen or pencil. 

Answer immediately, and without stopping to count, the ques- 
tion, Which is the middle letter of the alphabet? If any student 
in the class has already read this paragraph, the instructor should 
institute a similar question whose answer has not been thought 
out. 

Each member of the class should immediately write his answer 
on a loose sheet of paper, and describe as accurately as possible 
the mental process by which he arrived at the answer. 

After the writing has been completed the instructor may de- 
scribe his own introspection in connection with the question, or 
that of other practiced observers of consciousness, and discuss 
the task and the individual results with the class. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Catkins, M. W. : The teaching of elementary psychology in colleges 
supposed to have no laboratory. Psychological Monographs, 
vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 41-53. 1910. 

Sanfoed, E. C. : The teaching of elementary psychology in colleges 
and universities with laboratories. Same, pp. 54-71. 

Seashore, C. E. : The teaching of the elementary course in psy- 
chology. Same, pp. 80-91. 

Whipple, G. M.: The teaching of psychology in normal schools. 
Same, pp. 2-40. 

Angell, J. R. : Laboratory courses and equipment in psychology 
for colleges and universities. Same, pp. 72-79. 



CHAPTER II 

THE SUBJECT-MATTER, BRANCHES, AND RELATIONS 
OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The Psychologist — " A man keenly interested in mind, with no 
purpose beyond mind; a man enamored of introspection; a man 
to whom the most fascinating thing in the universe is the human 
consciousness; a man to whom successful analysis of an unresolved 
mental complex is as the discovery of a new genus to the zoologist or 
a new river to the explorer; a man who lives in direct companionship 
with his mental processes as the naturalist lives with the creatures 
which are ordinarily shunned or ignored; a man to whom the facts 
and laws of mind are, if I may so put it, the most real things that 
the world can show." — Titcheker, E. B. : The problems of experi- 
mental psychology. American Journal of Psychology, vol. 16, p. 220. 
1905. 

The popular notion of psychology. — To those who are 
ignorant of the true nature of the science, the word psy- 
chology suggests that which is mysterious, hidden, difficult 
to observe, even the spooky and supernatural. And because 
of this popular misconception of the subject, the majority 
of us as students approach the study of psychology either 
with dread of its abstractness or with light-hearted curi- 
osity. This is unfortunate alike for the science and for the 
student, as it tends to cause courses to degenerate into 
utterly unsystematic and unscientific discussions of such 
interesting and bizarre phenomena as illusions, multiple 
personality, and spiritualistic communications. In so far 
as they are genuinely observable phenomena, all these are 
parts of the subject-matter of psychology and they may 
quite properly be examined in any systematic course, but 
they do not constitute the science, and it is a mistake to 
make them prominent. 

11 



12 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

How can psychology be defined? — Just because of the 
many and odd misapprehensions which are prevalent, it is 
urgently important that at the very beginning of our study 
of psychology ive gain a clear working knowledge of the 
materials of the science, of its tasks or problems, of its 
methods, and of its values. It is easy to discover that no 
science can be defined satisfactorily except in terms of such 
knowledge. 

In view of this fact, this text does not offer a conven- 
tional definition to start with, but instead Part One is 
devoted to the presentation of such facts concerning the 
characteristics of the subject as are absolutely necessary for 
formulating or understanding a good definition. The gen- 
eral knowledge of any science which every beginner should 
acquire in an introductory course should enable him to 
answer the questions: What is the subject-matter or ma- 
terial of the science? What does the scientist attempt to 
do with this material? How does he accomplish his tasks? 
What are the values of the results ? Any one who can state 
clearly what psychology deals with, and how, and why, and 
to what purpose has already made an excellent start in the 
study of the science. Such a statement might reasonably be 
expected of any one who intelligently reads the introductory 
chapters of this book. 

What is the subject-matter or material of psychology? 
—It is consciousness or the world of objects and events 
viewed as consciousness. But what is consciousness? It 
is our awareness of things and happenings as about us, 
within us, or of us. It is just what we constantly are talk- 
ing of in terms of sensations, feelings, emotions, ideas, 
thoughts. In fact it is precisely what we mean to designate 
by such words. Up to this point each of us realizes what 
the word consciousness means, but how few of us know 
anything more about it. Inasmuch as the facts of con- 
sciousness are right at hand during the whole of our waking 



THE PSYCHOLOGIST'S POINT OF VIEW 13 

y 
lives, it would seem impossible that we should not become 

expert in observing their characteristics. Nevertheless, it 
is a fact that we do not. In the presence of infinite and 
convenient resources, so far as the facts o\ psychology are 
concerned, we are poverty stricken, for most of us simply 
do not know how to observe our sensations, feelings, or 
emotions. Millions of human beings — unfortunate but all 
unconscious of what they are missing — go through life blind 
to the psychological world. From the point pi vantage of 
the skilled observer of consciousness this.is'jiuite as great 
a loss to the individual as is caused --fey ignorance of the 
world of the physical sciences. The least that any of Us 
can do is to learn to observe psychological processes as accu- 
rately as we observe the processes of the world about us. 
This much we owe to ourselves as educated members of 
civilized races. We may have neither the desire nor the 
ability to become great observers in this field, but we can 
acquire that degree of skill which will render us intelli- 
gently appreciative of the facts and laws of mental life. 
In this sense we should all be psychologists. 

The psychologist's point of view. — Everything which 
comes within the awareness or consciousness of you or me 
or any other being is material for the science of psychology. 
But at the same time it also is material for other sciences. 
The printed page before me which I am now studying as 
consciousness — my awareness of the page — I may, if I 
choose, study as an object of physics or of chemistry. And 
the dog which I am interested in just now as a psychological 
object, both because it is a part of my consciousness and 
because I regard it as possessing consciousness, may per- 
fectly well be studied as material of anatomy or physiology. 
This clearly indicates that psychology differs from the 
sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology, and, indeed, 
from all of the subjects which are usually called natural 
sciences, in its point of view rather than in its objects. 



14 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Upon reflection, we discover that the whole world may be 
viewed either as consciousness or as objects and events ex- 
isting apart from my consciousness. The physical and the 
biological scientists view their objects as existing " out 
there ' ' and as relatively independent of the observer. The 
psychologist views the very same objects as bits of con- 
sciousness, and, therefore, as dependent upon the observer. 
The two points of view are equally legitimate and equally 
useful for science, for the first gives us a description of the 
world as physically existent, as objects and events about 
us ; and the second gives us a description of the same world 
as consciousness or experience, as objects and events within 
us. The physical point of view is called objective ; the psy- 
chological point of view is called subjective. 

Some persons are objectively minded and others are 
subjectively minded. — In all of our bouts with the world 
we take either one or the other of these points of view or 
attitudes. The majority of observers shift frequently from 
the one to the other, and have no strong bent or prejudice in 
favor of either. Such individuals are neither objective 
observers nor subjective observers by natural inclination. 
For them the chemical formula? which the chemist offers 
as descriptive of an orange or a butterfly are quite as inter- 
esting and valuable as the psychical descriptions of the 
same objects which are offered by the psychologist. But, 
on the other hand, there are persons who are by nature 
either objectivists or subjectivists. Typical of the former 
are those physical scientists who insist that only the ob- 
jective attitude toward things, and the descriptions which 
the physical sciences give us, are worth while. This con- 
tention is neither liberal nor broad-minded, yet it is not 
less so than is that of those born subjectivists who can see 
value only in psychological accounts of the world. To the 
unprejudiced observer it seems fairly clear that both points 
of view are profitable, and that we therefore should study 



THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY 15 

things physically and psychically. The anatomist, the 
physiologist, and the chemist may describe the butterfly — 
theirs are purely objective accounts of the object — and so 
may the psychologist, but his is a subjective account of the 
same object. Who may rightfully decide that the phys- 
ical or objective description of this fascinating object 
is more valuable than the account of it in terms of 
your sensations and feelings, emotions and sentiments, 
ideas and associations, thoughts and inferences, or of 
mine? 

For our present purposes, it will suffice if we see clearly 
that the world may be studied scientifically in more than 
one way, and that the psychologist 's way of viewing things 
is as worthy of serious consideration as is the physicist's, 
the chemist's, the anatomist's, or the physiologist's. A 
proper start in psychology demands that one appreciate 
the difference between the attitude of the physical observer 
and that of the psychical observer. Not until one can take 
the psychological point of view is one able to understand 
what psychology is striving to accomplish. 

The scope of psychology. — The world as my conscious- 
ness is the subject-matter of psychology which is nearest 
at hand, and my start in the subject should be gained by 
careful observation of my own experiences. This is true 
for each of us. No one who is unable to observe the won- 
ders of his own consciousness can really enter the kingdom 
of psychology. The characteristics of a sensation of red 
I may observe for myself, if I can take the psychological 
point of view or attitude, but it is utterly impossible for 
you to describe it so that I shall realize its richness of 
content. Each one of us must start in his study of con- 
sciousness by looking inward, by observing the self, or by 
introspecting as the psychologist says. In the light of my 
own experience in the study of psychology, I am convinced 
that one plods along laboriously and unprofitably until 



16 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

one learns how to introspect. Let us, therefore, attempt 
from the outset to observe what is going on in our own 
minds; let us question every statement of text-book or 
teacher until we succeed in verifying it by self-observation, 
for in so doing we shall rapidly and painlessly make psy- 
chologists of ourselves. 

But the science of psychology is by no means limited 
to the investigation of your mental processes or of mine 
at this moment. It includes whatever may at any time be 
studied from the subjective point of view. Any observer 
may study as much of the world as his experience includes. 
He may investigate psychologically inanimate as well as 
animate objects; plants as well as animals; objects which 
are ordinarily described as unconscious and those which 
are generally described as conscious. Any and all of the 
products of human or of brute industry may be studied 
psychologically. Indeed it is a fact that works of art, 
instruments of the chase, and domestic implements are 
intensely interesting as materials of psychology. Toward 
the novel of a human genius or the text-book of psychology, 
I may take the psychological attitude, and I may describe 
both in terms of consciousness. And, further, I may distin- 
guish the consciousness as mine or as that of the author 
of the book, for both the novel and the text-book are on 
the one hand my consciousness and on the other the ex- 
pressions of another being's consciousness. Toward the 
chimpanzee or the dog, the sensitive plant or the amoeba, 
I similarly may take the psychological attitude, and forth- 
with they become for me objects of psychology. 

Again, it is true that I may describe these objects either 
as my consciousness or as conscious objects. This leads us 
to distinguish two classes of psychological objects: those 
which are merely objects of consciousness (e.g., the table, 
the book, the bar of steel), and those which are conscious 
objects (e.g., the child, the gorilla, the horse, the dog, the 



DIVISIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 17 

squirrel, and whatsoever objects we admit to possess aware- 
ness). In so far as we deal psychologically with objects 
of consciousness, we are within the realm of the psychology 
of the self, for it is only as some observer becomes aware 
of these things that they take their place among the ma- 
terials of psychology. But as we deal with conscious ob- 
jects, we extend the psychology of the self until things are 
viewed as sharing the observer's awareness or as having 
something similar to it. Provisionally at least, we may 
profitably think of the material or subject-matter of our 
science as whatever comes within the stream of conscious- 
ness of a self-observing being. 

The natural branches or divisions of psychology. — 
According to the nature or condition of the observer or of 
the object observed we divide the general science of con- 
sciousness into several branches. These are not mutually 
independent, and they serve merely for convenience of 
reference and description. We must first note that as the 
fundamental basis for psychology we have the results of the 
self-observation of the normal, adult, human individual. 
This is what we narrowly designate as psychology. Now, 
taking the four descriptive words, normal, adult, human, 
and individual, we are able to represent the chief branches 
of the science by the following diagram: 

^Normal Adult — Human — Individual 

/ \/ V v 

Psychology of A /\ A 

Abnormal — Young — Plants — Group 
or or 

Old Animals 

This scheme presents eight main divisions of the science, 
namely : 

(1) Normal psychology, as contrasted with (2) Abnormal 
psychology ; 



18 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(3) Adult psychology, as contrasted with (4) Child psy- 
chology or Senile psychology ; 

(5) Human psychology, as contrasted with (6) Plant or 
Animal psychology; 

(7) Individual psychology, as contrasted with (8) Group 
or Collective psychology. 

But there are evidently as many branches of the science 
as there are possible combinations of the four pairs of con- 
trasted conditions named in the scheme. Of these sixteen 
branches, a few may be mentioned to make clear the way 
in which the combinations work out. There is, for exam- 
ple, the psychology of the normal, adult, human individual 
— the basis of the general science — and there is also the 
psychology of the abnormal, adult, human individual; the 
psychology of the normal, young or old, human individual ; 
the psychology of the abnormal, adult, individual animal; 
and so on throughout the possible list of combinations. 

It is to be observed that no sharp and unmistakable dis- 
tinction exists between normal and abnormal. Neverthe- 
less, it is useful to be able to refer to the psychology of 
normal consciousness and of abnormal consciousness. Like- 
wise, the adult condition of the psychological object or 
observer is to be distinguished not from a single different 
condition but from a large number, for the psychology of 
infancy is different from that of childhood, and that in 
turn differs from the psychology of adolescence, of youth, 
of age, or senility. Indeed it is only quite arbitrarily that 
we can divide life into psychological periods. And in the 
case of human psychology, as contrasted with that of other 
beings, there are not two or even three kinds of psychology, 
but instead as many as there are types of living beings 
which possess awareness. Properly we should contrast 
human psychology not with plant and animal psychology 
but with rose and volvox, with amceba and stentor, with 
dog and chimpanzee psychology. Finally, in the case of 



HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 19 

the contrast between the psychology of the individual and 
that of the group, we discover that there are many kinds 
of groups. There is a psychology of the family, the political 
party, the nation, the race. But all of these branches of the 
subject we ordinarily include in the division called social 
or collective psychology, just as we include the psychology 
of all creatures except man in plant and animal psychology. 

Characteristics of the eight main divisions of psy- 
chology. — Each of these divisions is distinguished from all 
of the others primarily by its materials. Normal conscious- 
ness is not material for abnormal psychology, nor is the 
consciousness of the adult being material for child psy- 
chology. This ground of distinction is definitely useful, 
and no other is needed for the identification of the portion 
of the science with which one happens to be dealing. But 
there are certain differences in method which are significant. 
It is impossible to study abnormal consciousness in pre- 
cisely the same way that normal consciousness is ordi- 
narily studied. Again, we can not investigate the dog or 
even our human friend as a conscious object just as we 
investigate our own consciousness. This, however, is not 
an appropriate place for the discussion of the methods of 
psychology and the further consideration of this subject 
must be presented in the chapter on methods. 

The early relations of psychology to other branches 
of knowledge. — In antiquity and throughout the middle 
ages psychology was closely related to, or regarded as a 
part of, philosophy. It grew up with philosophic systems, 
and most philosophers presented as a part of their systems 
theories of knowledge, together with more or less informa- 
tion concerning the facts of consciousness. Gradually, as 
facts accumulated, it tended to assume the place of an 
independent branch of philosophy. And even to-day in 
some quarters it is looked upon as a speculative and teleo- 
logical subject, naturally allied to ontology and epistemol- 



20 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ogy, rather than as a causal science. As mute evidence of 
this we have the divisions of philosophy of many educa- 
tional institutions, including psychology as well as ethics, 
metaphysics, logic, and the history of philosophy. Yet, in 
spite of this evidence to the contrary, we are forced to 
recognize that during the past hundred years a definite 
science of psychology has sprung up, as a result of careful 
and systematic observation of consciousness. During the 
last half century observation under experimental condi- 
tions has entirely changed the nature of the science by 
bringing it within the scope of strictly scientific method. 
Scarcely two generations ago the modern science of psy- 
chology was born, and to-day it is widely recognized as a 
science whose aims and methods are practically identical 
with those of the physical sciences. 

The relation of psychology to the physical sciences. — 
We have already seen that psychology has to do with the 
same materials as the physical and the biological sciences, 
but that it studies its materials from a different point of 
view. It is therefore the point of view which serves to 
separate psychology, and indeed all the psychical or sub- 
jective sciences, from the physical or objective sciences. 
In practice the psychologist has much to learn from the 
physicist because precision in observation and skill in ex- 
perimentation have been developed to a much higher degree 
in the physical than in the psychical sciences. 

The relation of psychology to biology. — There is a 
strong tendency in the minds of physicists and biologists — 
if not of natural scientists generally — to regard psychology 
as one of the biological sciences. This is because it deals 
with something which appears in our experience to be asso- 
ciated invariably with living things. Is not consciousness 
a part of the life of the organism, and must we not study 
it as such? is the natural question asked by one who takes 
this view. This question is answered in strikingly different 



PSYCHOLOGY AND THE BRAIN 21 

ways. On the one hand, there are those who believe that 
psychology is merely a part of the physiology of the nervous 
system, and that it will cease to exist as a separate science 
as soon as we understand fully the processes which occur in 
the central nervous system, and especially in the brain. On 
the other hand, there are those who maintain that descrip- 
tions of bodily processes, whether they be brain processes 
or not, do not satisfy our demands for descriptions of the 
phenomena of consciousness. On the whole, the latter posi- 
tion seems the more satisfactory at present and we may 
therefore say that psychology is not, strictly speaking, a 
part of physiology. It is not even a biological science, for 
it approaches its materials from an entirely different point 
of view than that of biology. 

Psychology and the functions of the brain. — It is 
the avowed business of physiology to study the functions 
of the living organism and of its parts or organs. It 
describes these functions in terms of energy, and, if it is 
consistent, never in any other terms. A physiological ac- 
count of bodily processes which makes use of sensations, 
memory images, ideas, thoughts, or anything else psy- 
chological, is unsatisfactory because it fails to realize the 
ideal of physical science. Consciousness, however, is not 
energy, although it may prove to be a manifestation or 
accompaniment of certain energetic phenomena in the 
body. Hence it can not be described in physiological 
terms. 

The fact is that as psychologists we view things as con- 
sciousness and it makes no essential difference to us whether 
the phenomena happen to be associated with a living organ- 
ism or not. If to-morrow it should be proved beyond rea- 
sonable doubt that consciousness exists apart from living 
bodies, the discovery would in no way modify the concep- 
tion of psychology which this book presents. But obviously 
for those who hold that psychology is simply one braneh 



22 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

of the physiology of the nervous system such a discovery 
would be revolutionary in its effects. However far we may 
carry our study of the changes which occur in the brain, 
or in any part of the living organism, there will remain 
unaltered save by the contributions of a subjective psy- 
chology, the demand for an account of consciousness as 
such. 

Is neurology necessary for the study of consciousness? 
— Neurology is the science of the structures and functions 
of the nervous system. It is not infrequently claimed by 
biologists and by psychologists that the study of this sub- 
ject is essential to the understanding of consciousness. The 
facts of mental life or consciousness can be explained, they 
tell us, only by referring them to changes in the body. As 
one result of this belief, we find that most text-books of 
psychology contain chapters on the structures and func- 
tions of the nervous system. Admitting, as we doubtless 
should, that a knowledge of bodily processes is helpful in 
the study of psychology, we may reasonably contend that 
a text-book of psychology is not the proper place for the 
presentation of neurological facts. 

There are two serious objections to the mixing of psy- 
chological and biological materials in a course. The first, 
and by far the most important, is that the beginning 
student almost inevitably gets the notion that psychology is 
in part at least a study of the nervous system. The second 
is that the presentation of this non-psychological material 
which serves merely as an aid in the study of conscious- 
ness demands time which ought to be devoted to psychology 
itself. // neurology, or any other branch of biology, is 
essential for the study of psychology, then the student 
should have studied the subject with specialists and experts 
in preparation for his work in psychology. Certainly it 
is highly desirable that every student of psychology should 
have taken work in biology and should know something 



CORRELATIONS 23 

about the nervous system and its significance. But he as 
certainly should not have to be given this information in 
his first course in psychology. 

The most profitable attitude for the student of psy- 
chology would appear to be that of whole-hearted and 
enthusiastic attention to the characteristics of conscious- 
ness itself. His aim should be singly and consistently that 
of learning how to live in the psychological attitude toward 
objects. In reading this book he should strive to enter into 
the spirit of psychology, forgetting the fact that conscious- 
ness happens to be observed only in connection with living 
objects. He should endeavor, first of all, to learn the essen- 
tial things about psychological as contrasted with physical 
phenomena or physiological phenomena; about the tasks 
which the science strives to fulfill, and about its methods. 
Once this knowledge of the subject has been acquired by 
a student, he is a psychologist, however ignorant he may 
be of technical neurology or of general biology, and he may 
then with keen insight and profit study the relations of 
mental to bodily phenomena. 

The correlating of psychological and physiological 
facts. — From the foregoing it should not be inferred that 
the study of the relations of mind to body is less important 
than the study of either mind or body. The fact is that 
physiological psychology is a most interesting and impor- 
tant branch of scientific inquiry. Its proper task is the 
correlating of mental processes with bodily changes. From 
the very nature of its task, it is a connecting link between 
psychology and physiology. For pedagogical as well as 
for scientific reasons it is wiser to begin with the study of 
pure psychology or physiology, rather than with the science 
which connects them, if one wishes to gain a thoroughly 
scientific knowledge of mind, body, and their relations. It 
is the sole purpose of this book to aid beginning students 
in the study of pure psychology. 



24 THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY 

CLASS EXERCISE" 

Self-observation. The introspection of a train of (associated) 
ideas. Materials : paper and pen or pencil. 

The instructor should prepare the class for this task by giv- 
ing, from his own introspection or reading, an account of an 
associative consciousness. 

When the class is ready to observe, the instructor should 
announce a word — college, flag, accident, — which shall serve as 
a starting-point and, after the expiration of thirty seconds, he 
should give the signal to begin writing an account of what has 
occurred in consciousness during the interval. 

The value of this exercise depends largely upon the ability 
of the instructor to make clear to the class what is meant by 
a " train of ideas." 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Ebbinghaus, H. : Psychology, " Introduction, a sketch of the history 

of psychology," pp. 3-25. 
Titchenee, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 1, 2, 7, and note p. 43. 
Wundt, Wm.: Outlines of psychology. Third English edition, §§ 1, 2. 



CHAPTER III 

THE AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

" My first concern as psychologist is the accurate analysis of my 
consciousness. For the purposes of this introspective analysis, I may 
seize upon any experience. I am looking out from my window, let us 
say, upon Gloucester harbor and the open sea beyond, happily con- 
scious of wooded shores, rippling blue waves, cloudy horizon, white 
sails, and salty breeze; and the dory moored to the lichen-grown rock 
in the foreground has dimly suggested last evening's sail and the 
sunset light over the harbor. In this conscious experience, I at once 
recognize blueness, greenness, grayness, brownness, saltiness, and 
rippling sound as parts of the experience. Closer scrutiny will add to 
the list distance and form, motion (of the breeze), and further, the 
red, the gold, and the motor sensations which belong to the image of 
the sunset sail. Even now the analysis is far from complete; it has 
left out of account the pleasantness of the whole experience and the 
feeling of familiarity which accompanies the memory of the sail." — 
Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, p. 17. 

What is the general aim of the natural sciences? — ■ 
Preparatory to an examination of the aims of psychology, 
we may profitably seek to discover what the natural sciences 
attempt to do with their materials. Let us take chemistry 
as a typical natural science. We note, first, that it is the 
systematic study of certain kinds of objects and processes. 
This study is carried on by means of observation and ex- 
periment, and by these means the chemist aims (1) to 
describe the things which he observes, so that they may 
be distinguished from one another and from other kinds 
of objects; (2) to discover the principles and laws accord- 
ing to which chemical changes occur; and (3) to explain 
what he sees by giving causes for every occurrence. The 
astronomer, the geologist, the physicist, the anatomist, the 
physiologist — in fact, every natural scientist — attempts to 

25 



26 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

do just what the chemist does. Each of them, in his special 
field, describes his objects, formulates laws, and offers 
explanations. 

Psychology has the same general aim as natural 
science. — The psychologist, from a different point of view, 
seeks the same sort of information about his objects as do 
natural scientists. First he strives to describe psycho- 
logical objects and events ; next he states psychological prin- 
ciples and laws ; and finally, he explains what he observes 
by stating the conditions of events. Although the pro- 
cedure is somewhat artificial, we may, for the sake of clear- 
ness, divide the aims of psychology into five groups of 
tasks. These several tasks may conveniently be designated 
by the words, (1) Description; (2) Genetic description 
or History; (3) Generalization; (4) Explanation and cor- 
relation; and (5) Control. Each of these special aims will 
now be described more fully. 

Description : the first task of psychology is to discover 
the constitution of consciousness. — By procedures which 
are called analysis and synthesis the chemist discovers the 
constitution or composition of the substance which he is 
studying. The anatomist does precisely the same thing 
when he disarticulates the bones of the skull in such fash- 
ion that he has before him each constituent bony element 
of the object, and then, by reversing the process, replaces 
the parts in their proper relations so that they assume the 
shape of the original skull. Similarly the psychologist 
by the process of analysis discovers the constituent elements 
or parts of such psychical objects as ideas or emotions, 
and notes the way in which these parts are related to one 
another. What the molecule, the atom, and the ion are 
to the chemist, the products of analysis — sensations, im- 
ages, affections — are to the psychologist. 

Analysis and synthesis are mutually supplementary 
methods of discovering the constitution of objects. If 



ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 27 

the chemist or the anatomist, after breaking up an object 
into its simple parts, is unable to build up the same kind of 
object by re-combining the parts, he lacks certain essential 
knowledge. Analysis usually precedes synthesis, but it is 
not more important. The analysis of consciousness, and the 
verification of the results of analysis by synthesis, would 
seem to be the initial task of the psychologist. It is this 
task which should yield us what may be called the anatomy 
of consciousness. 

Analysis and synthesis make possible the description 
of consciousness. — It is only in terms of the more or less 
simple parts or qualities of objects that we can describe 
them. Analysis and synthesis, then, are to be looked upon 
as means of obtaining the materials which are needed for 
description. The anatomist may, after a rather superficial 
examination of a skull, describe it by enumerating the vari- 
ous bones which enter into its composition. Again, he may 
continue his analysis, for descriptive purposes, by breaking 
up each bone into its constituent parts; and even these, in 
turn may prove to be still further analyzable. Ultimately 
he may describe the skull in terms of cells instead of bones. 
Having reached a point beyond which his powers of ob- 
servation do not enable him to go, he states that he has 
discovered the simple or elemental constituents of .the 
object. 

Now, the psychologist does exactly the same thing with 
the materials of his science. Starting with a complex 
object called an emotion, he first breaks it up into groups 
of sensations and feelings, into ideas and images. These, for 
the time, he regards as the constituent parts of the object. 
But upon further careful examination, some or all of the 
parts may prove to be complex and therefore further 
analyzable. Thus the process of seeking for the elementary 
parts of things is continued until science can go no fur- 
ther. We have no right, however, to insist at any time that 



28 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

a science has reached the farthest point in analysis, for 
at any moment some physicist, chemist, physiologist, or 
psychologist may discover a way of breaking up what is at 
this moment regarded as an elemental or simple object. It 
is quite certain that psychology has not completed its 
analysis of consciousness. 

Description in psychology involves more than the mere 
enumeration of parts. — Analysis and synthesis reveal the 
relations in which the parts of an object stand, as well as 
the parts themselves. It is well known that the same 
chemical atoms placed in slightly different relations con- 
stitute utterly different molecules, and these, in turn, dis- 
tinguishable substances. Likewise in psychology, the sensa- 
tions, or other fragments of consciousness, which in one 
arrangement give us an object with which we are per- 
fectly familiar, may, in a somewhat different arrangement, 
constitute an object which is wholly new to us. Strictly 
speaking, the relations of parts are not themselves elements 
of an object, but they are essential in our description of the 
object. For it is clear that we can not properly describe 
anything without taking into account both constituent 
parts and their particular relations. And so it comes about 
that in psychology, no less than in the physical and the 
biological sciences, analysis and synthesis are constantly 
being employed to reveal the various ways in which a 
group of elements or parts may be combined. The task 
of describing objects is never ideally completed in any 
subject, for the reason that we may always hope to be able 
to go beyond what other observers have attained. This 
it is that spurs scientists to persistent analytic and syn- 
thetic study of their objects. 

Genetic description or history : the second task of psy- 
chology. — There are two kinds of description in psy- 
chology as well as in the natural sciences. The one is 
simple description of an object as it happens to exist for 



GENETIC DESCRIPTION 29 

the observer at the moment. Examples of this kind of 
description are the chemist's account of a new salt which 
he has analyzed into three known elements; the anato- 
mist's description of a skull in terms of its constituent 
bones ; or the psychologist 's description of an idea in terms 
of images. The other is genetic description. This differs 
from simple description in that it takes account of the 
history of the object in question, and aims to give an 
account of the developmental changes through which it has 
passed in process of becoming what it is. The develop- 
mental or evolutionary descriptions of the chemical ele- 
ments, of living beings, of human institutions, and of con- 
sciousness are genetic. Each of these descriptions presents 
a more or less complete history of some object. 

As it happens, this is an era of genetic description and 
we are prone to lose sight of the value of simple descrip- 
tions of things in our enthusiasm for accounts of the ways 
in which they came to be what they are. It is especially 
desirable that we realize the fundamental importance of 
simple description in psychology, for the starting point and 
the basis for all studies in the history of mind should be 
a thorough knowledge of the present condition of the object. 
We may with profit seek to discover the history of mind, to 
trace its development through the ages in species after 
species and from race to race, or in the individual from 
birth to death, to reveal the progress from the simpler to 
the more complex forms of psychological objects in the 
growth of consciousness, but we must not forget that we are 
trying to describe a present object. In this book it will be 
well for us to separate these two kinds of description rather 
sharply by presenting their respective results in separate 
parts. 

Generalization: the third task of psychology is to dis- 
cover principles and laws. — It has been stated in the 
foregoing paragraphs that psychology, in common with 



30 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the natural sciences, strives by, ( analysis and synthesis of 
its objects to obtain accurate descriptions of them in terms 
of their constituent elements and the relations of these 
elements or parts. But science does not rest satisfied with 
the particular facts which are thus obtained. It seeks 
always wider and wider knowledge of objects and events. 
One of its most prominent aims is to discover common ele- 
ments, properties, or relations in objects so that a general 
statement shall be made to cover or include a number of 
particular facts. This means simply that facts are de- 
scribed as groups instead of individually. Obviously, 
science makes a great step forward when it succeeds in 
describing the class of objects called frogs. For hence- 
forth, without the labor of describing every particular 
object of the class, it offers us a formula by means of 
which we can distinguish a frog from every other living 
thing. 

All sciences seek general statements. By a process which 
is known as generalization particular observations are 
brought under a single statement of fact. "When these 
generalizations are of such a nature as to permit us to 
predict certain events from the presence of certain others, 
we call them scientific laws. The laws of a science are its 
chief value and pride. Indeed, not until the investigation 
of a group of objects has enabled observers to formulate 
a number of important laws are the results accepted as 
together constituting a science. 

A law can ncft be seen. — Unlike the elements and rela- 
tions of objects, principles and laws can not be directly 
observed. They must be discovered by the comparison of 
a number of particular observations. The law of the 
conservation of energy, and the laws of motion were not 
discovered by observation. What was observed, and what 
we are continually observing, are particular expressions of 
these laws. The law itself can not be seen: it must arise 



LAWS 31 

as a generalization in the mind of the observer. Once the 
observing scientist has succeeded in bringing particular 
observations together so that he can make a general state- 
ment regarding them, he is able to see the law exemplified 
in every particular happening. Almost all of us have the 
ability to observe events, but surprisingly few of us can 
discover principles or laws. 

Each of the natural sciences has its body of laws — 
physical or biological as the case may be — and each science 
describes objects or predicts events, prior to the direct 
observation thereof, in the light of its generalizations. Al- 
though psychology is not less keen and persistent in its 
efforts to derive general statements from particular observa- 
tions and to formulate laws than are the natural sciences, 
it is true that most students of the science are ignorant of 
psychological laws. Repeatedly I have discovered that the 
only psychological law which a student who had faithfully 
read some standard text-book of psychology could mention 
was Weber's law of the relation of stimulus to sensation. 
And that, unfortunately, is not, strictly speaking, a psy- 
chological law! Now the truth is that psychology has a 
respectable body of generalizations and laws. The preva- 
lent ignorance thereof is doubtless due in large part to 
the fact that they usually are not labeled as such and 
therefore are not recognized by most elementary students 
of the science. 

We can not too strongly emphasize the fact that psy- 
chology is precisely like the natural sciences with respect 
to the high esteem in which it holds the discovery of laws. 
A special part of this book is devoted to the discussion of 
generalizations and laws in order that the reader may be 
impressed by the fact that our science has already in part 
fulfilled this task. 

The tasks of psychology are closely related. — Already 
we have noted that description, whether it be simple or 



32 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

genetic, is dependent upon analysis and synthesis for its 
terms. We now must note that similarly generalization is 
impossible except in the light of descriptions of objects and 
events. The fact is that whenever we observe conscious- 
ness scientifically we analyze and synthesize in order that 
we may describe, generalize, and explain. The several tasks 
are quite inseparable, and in seeking to further one we 
may quite unexpectedly make important contributions to 
another. 

Explanation: the fourth task is explanation of psy- 
chological phenomena. — In everyday life, as well as in 
science, we are constantly trying to give causes for, that 
is, to explain, what we observe. Rain is caused by the 
condensation of moisture in the air, under certain condi- 
tions; electricity is generated by friction; illness is caused 
by the action of certain injurious substances. These are 
typical examples of cause and effect. We have the habit of 
asking for causes, and most of us are not content until we 
have discovered some reason, some cause, some explanation 
for an occurrence which we have observed. 

The chief difference between science and common sense 
in this search for causes which will serve to explain things 
is that science is more careful, critical, and consistent than 
is common sense. Many of the reasons which are given 
for natural events are not causes at all, for the statements 
rest upon careless or insufficient observation. Extreme 
examples of this kind of popular explanation are our preva- 
lent superstitions. " See a pin and pick it up, All the day 
you'll have good luck." " To allow a child to look into 
a mirror before it is a month old will cause it to have 
trouble in teething." " To thank a person for combing 
your hair w T ill cause baldness." " If one kills a frog his 
cow will go dry." Such are samples of the thousands of 
false explanations of events which are accepted more or less 
widely and quite unscientifically. 



PSYCHOLOGY A CAUSAL SCIENCE 33 

Science seeks the causes or conditions of events in 
order to explain them. — Science seeks causes systematic- 
ally, persistently, critically. Observations have to be re- 
peated scores, hundreds, even thousands of times under 
the same and under definitely varied conditions before the 
reliable scientist can satisfy himself that he has discovered 
the proper explanation of an event. Even then he is not 
likely to be dogmatic in stating his results. 

The fact that the natural sciences explain occurrences 
in terms of cause and effect is unquestioned. Chemistry, 
physics, and biology are obviously causal sciences. Indeed 
their chief value seems to depend upon their ability to ex- 
plain the phenomena with which they are concerned. But it 
is quite different with psychology, for many persons insist 
that this science explains its events teleologically, that is by 
stating purposes, instead of causally. Evidently this is a 
fundamentally important matter. 

Is psychology a causal or a teleological science?— 
It has been shown in the foregoing chapter that psychology 
differs from the natural sciences not in the nature of its 
objects but in its point of view or attitude toward its 
materials. In the present chapter, it has thus far been 
shown that its tasks or aims are also identical with those 
of the natural sciences. In description and in generaliza- 
tion it seeks the kind of knowledge of its objects that is 
sought by physics and by biology. The question confront- 
ing us is, Does psychology also seek to explain its objects 
causally as do the natural sciences? Of the fact that it 
seeks explanations there can be no doubt. Are its explana- 
tions teleological or causal; are they purposes or condi- 
tions? We must answer this question, at least provision- 
ally, before we can proceed. 

A cause in physical science is an event which always 
precedes a given phenomenon. If every time the tempera- 
ture rises, the column of mercury in a thermometer is ob- 



34 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

served to rise, we conclude that there is a causal relation 
existing between these events. What we really observe is a 
definite sequence of events. The one seems necessarily to 
go before the other. Precisely this aspect of things which 
we observe in natural science we call physical causation. 

Do we not observe similar sequences of events in psy- 
chology, and are we not justified in speaking of them as 
indicative of psychical causation ? It is the writer 's belief 
that we do observe psychical causes, and that psychology is 
a causal science. Under certain describable conditions I 
experience a visual sensation called white, which under 
given conditions is uniformly followed by another sensation 
called the after-image. The relation of these two psycho- 
logical events fulfills exactly the requirements of the causal 
relation in natural science, and we may therefore designate 
the original visual sensation as a cause or condition of the 
after-image. It is to be noted that the conditions must 
be constant, in psychology as in physics, if the causal rela- 
tion is to be maintained. 

In the realm of physical things there exists physical 
causation ; in the realm of psychological things there exists 
psychical causation. Common to these two kinds of causal 
explanation is the fact that observation reveals to us merely 
a definite sequence of events. Whenever one occurrence 
always precedes another in our experience we call the first 
the cause, the second the effect. There is no obvious reason 
why this procedure should not be used in psychology as well 
as in the natural sciences. Just as one change in my 
organism may be regarded as the cause of another, so one 
conscious process may be regarded as the cause of a process 
which is observed to follow it uniformly. 

Psychology is eager for causes. — All of the descriptions 
and generalizations of psychology are pressed into the 
service of explanation. Explanation in truth is the chief 
function of science because it enables us to predict events. 



CAUSES IN PSYCHOLOGY 35 

Given the knowledge of a certain cause, we may prepare for 
its effect or effects. This ability to anticipate events and to 
prepare for them is of obvious practical importance to us in 
everyday life. By some scientists it is maintained to be 
the real justification for research. For our present pur- 
poses it is sufficient to realize that psychology seeks above 
all else explanations of its occurrences, that it may offer 
causes or state the conditions of an occurrence just as do 
the natural sciences. 

Closely related to explanation in psychology is the task 
of correlation.— From the point of view of this book, this 
task is psycho-physical rather than psychological, for it 
involves efforts to discover the relations existing between 
bodily processes and consciousness. There are three the- 
oretical views concerning the relation of body and mind 
which are worth considering briefly at this point. The 
first is that neither is the cause of anything that happens 
to the other. This is psycho-physical parallelism. The 
second is that bodily events cause certain conscious phe- 
nomena. And the third is that body and mind act 
on one another, sometimes the one, sometimes the other 
being the cause or source of causes. The most widely 
accepted of these hypotheses is that of psycho-physical 
parallelism. 

Consciousness can not be explained causally by brain 
processes. — On the basis of the theory of psycho-physical 
parallelism, it is evident that bodily events can not be used 
as causal explanations of psychological occurrences. The 
best we can do in the way of relating body and mind is 
to correlate the two series of phenomena and to offer our 
correlations as explanations. All psychologists and physi- 
ologists to-day accept the task of correlating the processes 
of body and mind as important, and many of them work 
at it diligently without assuming that either kind of process 
is the cause of the other. Evidently a process or event in 



36 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

consciousness which is found to occur always in connection 
with a certain process in the brain may be said to be ex- 
plained in terms of the latter. Perhaps it would be even 
truer to say that when two processes, the one physiological 
(in the brain) and the other psychological (in conscious- 
ness) occur together uniformly either may be offered by 
science as an explanation of the other. But it is important 
to emphasize the fact that such an explanation is not 
causal. We have no satisfactory reason at present for 
believing that consciousness can be explained in terms of 
bodily processes, and it therefore seems wiser to hold con- 
sistently to the position which was stated in Chapter II of 
this book. This would force us to regard body and mind as 
the same complex of phenomena viewed differently. Nat- 
urally this precludes the explanation of either in terms of 
the other. For precisely this reason we should maintain 
that psychology explains its events causally just as does 
physiology or any other natural science, and, further, that 
the correlating of bodily and mental processes is, strictly 
speaking, neither a physiological nor a psychological task 
but instead a psycho-physical task. 

The fifth, and las*:, task of psychology is the control of 
mental life. — As will be pointed out more clearly in Chap- 
ter V, the prediction, modification, and direction of psy- 
chological processes is an unescapable task of psychology. 
Simple and genetic descriptions, generalizations, explana- 
tions, and correlations all contribute to the fulfillment of 
this great practical aim of the science. Knowledge can not 
profitably be divorced from action. Hence, whatever we 
learn about the nature of psychological objects and events 
serves to influence our acts. As yet we are far from 
knowing how to guide mental development, but it is 
from psychology that we must expect the facts and 
principles which will ultimately render this possible and : 
practicable. 



SUMMARY OF AIMS 37 

The general aims of our science may be summarized as 
follows. — Psychology attempts to fulfill five important 
tasks. It aims (1) so to describe its objects that they may 
be identified readily and with exactitude, (2) to state their 
histories or to describe their course of development so that 
their different stages may be identified, (3) to formulate 
general statements, principles, and laws, (4) to explain its 
phenomena by indicating their causes and by correlating 
mental processes with bodily processes, and (5) to guide, 
direct, and control psychological events in the light of such 
knowledge of their characteristics, principles, and causes of 
occurrence as the methods of analysis and synthesis reveal. 

Again, these closely related tasks may be described some- 
what differently thus. Psychology first analyzes its ma- 
terials into their simple parts in order to discover the 
structure or constitution of consciousness. Then, by re- 
combining the products of analysis, it tests and verifies its 
analyses. Together analysis and synthesis furnish the facts 
which enable the psychologist to describe his objects. Com- 
parison of different conditions of mind yield those data 
from which the genetic description or history of conscious- 
ness is derived. With a thoroughgoing description of par- 
ticular phenomena in hand, the psychologist seeks to 
formulate general statements which shall apply to wider 
and wider ranges of facts. Such generalizations, when they 
cover a definitely definable group of phenomena and enable 
us to predict certain events, are called principles or laws. 
Constantly in his efforts to fulfill the foregoing tasks the 
student of psychology is on the lookout for causes of events. 
Partly in terms of these causes and partly by stating the 
correlation between mental happenings and processes in the 
body he explains conscious processes. And, finally, he 
brings all of his knowledge to bear upon the problem 
of controlling mental life wisely and for the welfare of the 
race. 



38 AIMS, TASKS, OR PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of a memory of childhood. 
Materials : paper and pen or pencil. 

Observe carefully, and write a detailed and accurate descrip- 
tion of your memory (consciousness) of some event in your 
childhood which you vividly recall. 

Upon the completion of the task, the reading of their intro- 
spective descriptions by two or three members of the class will 
furnish an excellent basis for the discussion of ways in which 
we recall events. The purpose of this exercise is to help each 
student to discover the way in which mind works when we are 
remembering. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 3, 4, 5, and 9. 
Calkins, M. W. : First book in psychology, chap. I. 
Stout, G. F. : Groundwork of psychology, pp. 11-17. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

" One can not be too nice or too careful in experimenting on mind. 
There is no such thing as over-refinement of method. . . . The more 
delicately one analyzes, the more subtle does the mental process reveal 
itself to be." — Titchener, E. B. : The problems of experimental 
psychology. American Journal of Psychology, vol. 16, p. 222. 1905. 

" It does not appear always to be understood that to teach psychol- 
ogy one must make the student psychologize." — Whipple, G. M. : The 
teaching of psychology in normal schools. Psychological Monographs, 
vol. 12, no. 4, p. 25. 1910. 

The characteristics of scientific method. — Scientific 
method involves two things: the systematic observation of 
phenomena, and the examination or control of circumstances 
so that the observation may be repeated. It is often said 
that the scientist observes and experiments. The statement 
is misleading, for experimentation really means observation 
under definitely controlled conditions. It is therefore truer 
to say that he observes under ordinary or natural and under 
experimentally controlled conditions. The usual scientific 
procedure is something like this. The observer attends to 
a certain object or event ; he concentrates his power of 
observation upon some particular aspect of the object or 
event and studies it carefully and persistently; he repeats 
his observations under the same circumstances, if possible, 
in order to verify his former result ; he varies the condi- 
tions, or experiments with his object, in order to study the 
matter in different ways; and, finally, he reports his ob- 
servations as facts and they become a part of science. The 
key-notes of scientific method are careful observation and 
accurate description of the circumstances or conditions 

39 



40 THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

under which the observation is made. Observations under 
experimental conditions are usually more satisfactory than 
those under natural conditions because they can be more 
readily and more accurately described. 

The work of the scientific observer differs from that of 
the unscientific person in that it is more critical, pains- 
taking, circumspect, and more frequently repeated for pur- 
poses of verification. The contrast between popular and 
scientific methods of observation nowhere appears more 
strikingly than in accounts of animal behavior. The casual 
observer seeing a dog several times avoid food which had 
been placed in a yellow dish, while eating greedily what 
it found in red and blue dishes forthwith concludes that 
the animal notices the color of the dishes and for some 
reason stays away from the yellow one. He does not stop 
to ask whether there may not be other reasons for the 
avoidance of the yellow dish ; nor does he question the 
ability of the dog to see colors. The scientist, who had 
observed the same behavior, would hesitate to express a 
like conclusion unless he had succeeded in verifying the fact 
of color discrimination under conditions which enabled him 
to make sure that the dog was not influenced by some other 
factor than color. Thorough study of the behavior of the 
dog might prove that it disliked the food in the yellow 
dish, or that it preferred to go to those dishes which were 
darker than the yellow, or even that it was wholly incapable 
of distinguishing one color from another. A surprisingly 
large number of the statements which we make on the basis 
of fairly accurate casual observation prove, upon more 
searching study, to be either wholly or partially untrue. 

The characteristics of psychological method. — Appar- 
ently there is nothing unique about the general method of 
psychology. It practices observation as do the natural 
sciences, and, as we have already seen, with the same 
aims. It even makes use of experimentation to such an 



INTROSPECTION 41 

extent that the majority of its observations are now 
made under experimentally controlled instead of under 
natural conditions. To the extent to which it lives 
up to its scientific ideal, it is critical, painstaking, 
and rigorous in the verification of observations. To be 
sure, the natural scientists look outward as they study the 
objects of their sciences, whereas the psychologist, just be- 
cause he is dealing with objects which exist as conscious- 
ness, necessarily looks self-ward. But there is another re- 
spect in which the psychical sciences differ from the natural 
sciences. They are less exact in method. It is fair at 
present to say that psychology is qualitative rather than 
quantitative, and that just the opposite is true of physics 
and chemistry. This does not mean, however, that psy- 
chology is not a quantitative science. It means, instead, 
that it has not yet reached a highly exact or quantitative 
state of development. 

Introspection. — The name by which the self-ward look- 
ing of the psychologist is designated is introspection. In 
so far as it tends sharply to contrast physical with psy- 
chological methods of observation this special term is unfor- 
tunate, for as a matter of fact there are no fundamental 
differences in the methods of the two groups of sciences. 
But the word is convenient in that it constantly reminds 
us that we must seek psychological facts by examining our 
own experience. No one can give me as valuable a psy- 
chological description of the hills which I see from my office 
window as I can obtain by introspecting. The very word 
introspection suggests that the heart or basis of the science 
of psychology is the psychology of the self, of you, of me, 
and of every other being capable of self-observation. In- 
deed, self-observation is synonymous with introspection. It 
is by observing my own consciousness that I directly study 
the objects of consciousness. But as in the natural sciences 
we study objects now directly, and now indirectly with the 



42 THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

aid of physical instruments such as the microscope, the 
telescope, the radiometer, or the hygrometer, so in psy- 
chology we observe at times directly and without special 
aids, and again less directly in connection with instruments 
of research. 

There are two types of psychological objects for intro- 
spection. — For the purposes of psychological description 
we separate objects into two large classes: those which are 
conscious, and those which are objects of consciousness. To 
the first class belong all objects which we recognize as 
either conscious or self-conscious ; here we place plants, 
animals, and human selves. To the second class belong 
those objects to which we do not attribute consciousness: 
the things of the inorganic world and all lifeless objects. 
Again, the first class of objects of psychology is subdivided 
into those beings who are self-conscious, and those who are 
merely conscious. The former are capable of introspection 
to a greater or less extent, and the latter are incapable of 
distinguishing self from other objects. Now it is evident 
that the materials of psychology consist in varying propor- 
tions of objects of consciousness and of conscious objects. 
Any self -observing being can study the crystal as an object 
of consciousness or his closest human friend as a conscious 
object. 

Why and how do we recognize certain objects as con- 
scious? — It is important to notice that whether I gain my 
knowledge of the landscape directly or whether you de- 
scribe it to me, it is only by introspecting that I learn 
anything about the matter as psychology. For even your 
words and gestures are merely objects of consciousness. 
They are not psychological facts and they can not directly 
give me a psychological account of any object or event. 
Nevertheless, I recognize that what you say and do has for 
me a psychological value quite different from that of the 
behavior of a musical toy. I acknowledge that you are a 



SIGNS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43 

conscious, or even an introspectively conscious, object, 
whereas I hold that the toy is simply an object of my con- 
sciousness. This distinction is commonplace enough, yet 
it profoundly influences the scientific procedure of the psy- 
chologist. The self, apparently, is the only object which 
I can view clearly and persistently both as a physical and 
as a psychological object. By studying it I discover that 
certain psychological facts are identical with certain 
physical facts. This leads me to translate one kind of fact 
into the other whenever I have need of so doing. When- 
ever I observe a certain physical object or event which self- 
observation has taught me to identify with a certain psy- 
chological object or event, I immediately translate it into 
precisely those psychological terms. This procedure is often 
described as inference on the basis of analogy. What I 
really do is to infer that since a certain physical object is 
equivalent to a certain psychical object in my immediate 
experience of my self it must be equivalent to the same 
psychical object wherever it is observed. Consequently, 
when I observe you to act under the stress of an awkward 
situation as I should act when I am frightened, I at once 
infer that as a conscious object you are experiencing fright. 
And in precisely the same manner we infer that other 
physical objects than human beings are or are not con- 
scious or that they are conscious in particular ways because 
they look or act, write or speak as we should when conscious 
of certain objects or events. The introspective method soon 
leads those who employ it to the use of inference. Indeed, 
for the study of conscious objects as contrasted with objects 
of consciousness, it is indispensable. 

We are wont to say that the varied products of civiliza- 
tion and culture are materials of psychology. Of course 
this is true. But these objects are peculiarly valuable 
psychologically, as compared with natural objects, because 
we interpret them in terms of the consciousness of the 



44 THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

beings who created them. The hieroglyphic, the tomahawk, 
the painting, the novel, are psychological objects which we 
describe as objects of consciousness that are also expres- 
sions of consciousness. It happens that our consciousness 
of such objects is very different from that of objects of 
non-human origin. Every object which is studied psy- 
chologically is interpreted in terms of consciousness. The 
earthworm no less than the lyric poem has its place among 
the materials of psychology. Each can be observed intro- 
spectively by any self-conscious being and the earthworm 
may be described either as an object of the consciousness 
of that individual or as that plus its own consciousness. 

Other selves as psychological objects. — Every self has 
its peculiarities from the psychologist's point of view. The 
man is not like the ape, nor is the ape like the pond-lily. 
Yet one thing all objects have in common, they are objects 
for psychology only as they are introspected. The fact is, 
we find a much greater wealth of psychological detail in 
a fellow-being than in a stick, or stone, or even in a chim- 
panzee. But search as we may for some radical difference 
in these objects, we find nothing which enables us to study 
the one and to ignore the other. Each object is a complex 
of psychological phenomena for psychological study. It is 
both misleading and confusing for us to deal with human 
behavior as though it possessed entirely different psycho- 
logical significance from that of the behavior of the cat, 
the frog, or the plant. "What you do in response to my as- 
sertion that you are stupid may have more psychological 
value for me than what the mouse does when it is stimu- 
lated electrically. But toward your verbal account of your 
experience in avoiding some danger I must take the same 
attitude that I assume toward the behavior of the mouse 
when it avoids an electric shock by choosing to enter the 
lighter instead of the darker of two tunnels. Your words 
are no more directly material of psychology than is the 



WAYS OF INTROSPECTING 45 

act of the mouse. Introspection deals with both as bits 
of consciousness. 

It is a common error to maintain that another human 
being can introspect for us, while a dog, or mouse, or 
monkey can not. Between the procedure of the animal 
psychologist who observes the activities of a monkey and 
that of the human psychologist who permits some person 
to introspect for him, there is no difference, except that it 
is easier to interpret psychologically the behavior of the 
man than that of the monkey. All objective occurrences 
may be viewed psychologically : the human voice, gesture, 
writing activity are neither more nor less capable of being 
studied psychologically than any other occurrences. The 
human scream of horror and the frightened rabbit's cry 
are equally psychological, but neither is describable in 
terms of consciousness until it is introspected. Thus we 
may sweep away the utterly artificial barrier which is often 
set up between human and animal psychology. Much more 
profitably we might speak of the different psychological 
values of objects which are merely objects of conscious- 
ness, and of those which inference leads us to study as 
conscious or self-conscious objects. 

Different ways of using the introspective method. — 
Introspection is really a special name for psychological 
observation. It has been said that observation is of two 
kinds: natural and experimental. More fully stated this 
means that any object — whether physical or psychical — 
may be observed just as one happens to find it, or under 
conditions which have been artificially arranged to suit the 
purposes of observation. The former is usually spoken of as 
observation under natural conditions or as ' ' naturalistic, ' ' 
and the latter, as observation under experimental condi- 
tions or as " experimental." No thoroughly trained sci- 
entist in practice restricts himself to the use of either of 
these methods. The physicist who never experimented 



46 THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

would be as unprofitable to society as the psychologist 
who never introspected except under experimental condi- 
tions. History furnishes us with an admirable illustration 
of the results of limiting one's self to the method of ob- 
servation under natural conditions in the work of the ' ' nat- 
uralistic " students of animal behavior and psychology. 
Their work is interesting, entertaining, of recognized sci- 
entific value, but it has not developed a science of behavior. 
In psychology, as in every science, facts are often ob- 
served under quite informal and uncontrolled conditions; 
their discovery frequently is unpremediated by the ob- 
server. But they are nevertheless valuable. For example, 
as I am walking leisurely through the woods I chance to 
see a raccoon washing something carefully in a stream. 
This serves to whet my curiosity, and I frequent regions 
which are inhabited by raccoons day after day with the 
hope of being able to settle finally the mooted question as 
to whether this animal regularly washes its food before 
eating it. Perhaps my patience gives out before I happen 
to get another opportunity to repeat my observation. In 
this event, I have made little progress. Or perhaps I am 
fortunate enough to witness several performances similar 
to the first. Evidently this would enable me to call my 
observation scientific, provided I had observed carefully 
and critically under favorable circumstances. But just 
there is the rub. It is extremely difficult, as a rule, to 
happen upon favorable circumstances for the observation of 
a particular phenomenon in nature. The person who is 
truly and liberally scientific in spirit would inevitably 
attempt to observe the behavior of the raccoon under ex- 
perimental conditions, not only for the sake of verifying 
the observation under definitely describable conditions, but 
also in order to repeat the observation almost at will. This 
in fact is the great merit of experimentation, it enables 
the observer to repeat his examination of the object until 



EXPERIMENTATION 47 

he is certain of his facts, and it also enables him to describe 
exactly the conditions of observation. By capturing a num- 
ber of raccoons and confining them in a restricted but rea- 
sonably normal habitat so that the conditions of observation 
were under satisfactory experimental control, I might learn 
more in a single day of careful observation than I could 
by roaming the woods for weeks. For however reluctantly 
we may admit it, objects do not bend all their energies 
toward aiding us in our studies of them. And of all objects, 
wild animals w T ould seem to aid us least. It is far from 
true, however, that the naturalistic method is useless. It 
should always be used to supplement or complement ex- 
perimentation. 

The experimental method in psychology. — Observation 
under experimental conditions in psychology has been prac- 
ticed commonly for about fifty years. It simply means that 
the experimenter chooses or controls the circumstances in 
which he studies consciousness so that he can describe them 
accurately and reestablish them subsequently in case he 
wishes to repeat the observations. Suppose a psychologist 
wishes to observe a sensation of cold. He may set about 
it by concentrating his attention introspectively upon the 
experience which comes to him whenever a cold object 
happens to come in contact with the skin of his body. This 
would be naturalistic observation because no attempt had 
been made to observe the sensation under controlled condi- 
tions. Or the observer might so arrange conditions that 
a particular point on the surface of the body could be 
touched in exactly the same way time after time by an 
object of a certain constant known temperature. This too 
would enable the individual to introspect the cold sensa- 
tion repeatedly. But unlike the former method, it would 
enable him so to describe his work that any other experi- 
menter could readily repeat it and thus verify or correct 
the first observer's results. An ideal experiment in any 



48 THE METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

science is one which can be repeated with extreme pre- 
cision of measurement in both conditions and results. 

Many persons have the impression that experimentation 
necessarily involves observation under uncomfortable or 
highly unnatural conditions. This is not necessarily the 
case. An experiment may be performed anywhere and at 
any time provided the observer has arranged describable 
and controllable conditions. The skill of a psychologist is to 
be measured by his success in avoiding unnatural and un- 
comfortable conditions, as well as by the degree of accuracy 
of his descriptions. Progress in psychology undoubtedly 
depends in large measure upon the development of precise 
methods of experimentation. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of some skin sensations. Ma- 
terials : paper and a nicely sharpened pencil whose point is not 
too fine. 

Allow the pencil to rest with its full weight upon the skin 
of the back of the hand. Carefully observe the sensation. Raise 
the pencil carefully and allow it to touch in succession several 
points on the hand. Are the sensations alike? In what re- 
spects do they differ? Now, draw the pencil slowly across the 
back of the hand, observing the changes in sensation, if any 
occur. How many kinds of skin sensation has this simple ex- 
periment revealed? Write a full account of your introspection. 

The instructor may profitably perform this experiment with 
the class and thus, by acting as a model experimenter, enable 
students to avoid mistakes in method. The written reports may 
be delivered to a member of the class as the basis, in connection 
with special reading, for a general report on cutaneous sensations. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B.: Text-book of psychology, §6. 
Titchener, E. B. : Outline of psychology, §§ 9 and 10. 
Wundt, Wm.: Outlines of psychology, §3. 
Myers, C. S. : Experimental psychology, pp. 1-10. 



CHAPTER V 

THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

" The importance of submitting our faculties to measurement lies 
in the curious unconsciousness in which we are apt to live of our per- 
sonal peculiarities, and which our intimate friends often fail to 
remark. I have spoken of the ignorance of elderly persons of their 
deafness to high notes, but even the existence of such a peculiarity 
as color blindness was not suspected until the memoir of Dalton in 
1794. That one person out of twenty-nine or thereabouts should be 
unable to distinguish a red from a green, without knowing that he 
had any deficiency in color sense, and without betraying his de- 
ficiency to his friends, seems perfectly incredible to the other twenty- 
eight; yet as a matter of fact he rarely does either the one or the 
other." — Galton, Francis : Inquiries into human faculty. Every- 
man's Library Edition, p. 31. 

Why does science exist? — There are at least two fairly 
obvious reasons for the systematic study of things which 
is called science. The one is man's desire for information, 
knowledge, understanding, or learning, and the other is his 
intense interest in the application of information to the 
problems of life. According as the one or the other of these 
interests or desires predominates in our study of things, we 
are said to work in pure science or in applied science. A 
few scientific investigators are devoted solely and with 
rare disinterestedness to the increase of human knowledge. 
They consistently assure those who upbraid them for wast- 
ing their time in a profitless quest of learning that they 
love truth for its own sake and not because of any com- 
mercial value which it may possess. On the other hand 
there are a few investigators whose interest centers about 
the practical applications of scientifically established facts. 
For them knowledge means increased possibility of progress 

49 



50 THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

in industry and art. Fortunately, however, not all sci- 
entists belong to these two groups. There are investigators 
— and to them civilization owes its heaviest debt— who are 
neither pure nor applied scientists because they combine 
the interests of both. 

Science as the hoarding of information. — He who 
questions nature and masters the knowledge of the ages 
with no other aim or desire than the satisfaction of his 
own curiosity and longing is little better than the miserly 
hoarder of money or of other forms of wealth. But to 
just this type of scientist we owe a striking emphasis of the 
fact that pure science justifies its existence in the measure 
in which it contributes to the welfare of mankind. Those 
disinterested investigators who pay no heed to the practical 
uses of the facts which they discover are worthy repre- 
sentatives of science only if they realize that theirs is the 
most serviceable attitude. For the truth is that should 
they limit their quest to those facts which are demanded 
by some particular need in art or in industry the develop- 
ment of knowledge would be delayed and most seriously 
distorted. Should they stop to ask at every turn of the 
way, "What value can this investigation have for society? 
they would defeat their own ends. The genuinely disin- 
terested and wise student of science has a large faith in the 
value of knowledge, and he realizes that it is only by slowly 
and laboriously gathering fragments of information that 
he can do his share toward preparing for great practical 
discoveries. Repeatedly during the development of modern 
science, it has been shown that what to-day seems utterly 
unimportant, even to the scientist who is keen for practical 
applications, may to-morrow loom up as a necessary step 
toward the greatest discovery of the age. This clearly 
points the moral that as scientists we should be neither 
miserly hoarders of information nor selfish seekers of ma- 
terial wealth. 



SCIENCE AND UTILITY 51 

Science as the search for useful knowledge. — There 
are those who believe that science exists because of its im- 
mediate value for man. This seems like a grossly utilitarian 
view, but it doubtless contains important truth. Man has 
not been slow to recognize that the sort of knowledge for 
which science strives enables him to predict and prepare for 
events. Yet even now less credit is given to science by 
most of us than is deserved. Look where we will, we dis- 
cover that systematic investigation has taught us what to 
expect of our environment and has helped us to adapt our- 
selves to the conditions of life. When we consider the 
recent discoveries of the sciences of bacteriology and pa- 
thology, we are forced to admit that the information which 
they have given concerning the relations of bacteria to man, 
the conditions of health, and the use of natural agencies 
for the control of disease daily brings us nearer to that 
perfect control of the conditions of life which is essential 
to our welfare. The brutes live comfortably or miserably 
according to the accidents of their immediate surroundings ; 
they are helpless in the face of unfavorable conditions. 
But man has taken into his own hands the control of many 
of the conditions of his life, and these he attempts to 
manipulate to his satisfaction. 

Innumerable examples of circumstances whose significance 
it is important for us to foresee might be given, but a few 
will suffice. "What does it mean to us to foresee that a 
certain untoward event is likely to result in hydrophobia, 
and at the same time to predict the prevention of this 
dread development by a certain course of treatment ? What 
does it mean to us to foresee, to prepare for or to prevent, 
the occurrence of accidents, diseases, destruction of prop- 
erty? To predict the appearance of earthquakes, cyclones, 
tidal waves, explosions, harmful or prized substances is 
eminently worth while, but as yet science has not accumu- 
lated enough knowledge of the conditions of these events 



52 THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

to make this possible. This proves simply that we are at 
the beginning of our study of nature. With that adequate 
knowledge of animate and inanimate things which is the 
goal of science in our possession we shall no longer stumble 
along half blindly in the world, but instead we shall wisely 
adjust environment to ourselves and ourselves to environ- 
ment. 

Has psychology the same values as science in general? 
— Yes. The knowledge of psychical events which it offers 
us is valuable both from the point of view of the scholar 
and from that of the applied scientist. As physical sci- 
ence teaches us how to predict and prepare for or control 
events in the objective world, so psychology teaches us how 
to foresee and modify events in consciousness. Are there 
baneful psychological phenomena whose occurrence we 
should be able to anticipate and prevent, then we must 
look to psychology for the needed information. Psychiatry 
as a special branch of psychology is, indeed, concerned 
exclusively with the study of aspects of our mental life 
which demand control. Education is to a very large extent 
the conscious or unconscious application of psychological 
facts and laws. If the study of mind from the scientific 
point of view and by exact methods had accomplished 
nothing for the human race except to bring about rational 
medical and educational treatment of mental diseases and 
defects it would have doubly justified its existence. But 
the fact is that psychology is meeting varied demands for 
accurate, exhaustive, and useful knowledge of mental proc- 
esses and of their conditions or causes. Apparently there 
is no sufficient reason for distinguishing the physical sci- 
ences from the psychical on the ground of values. Each 
group of sciences aims to satisfy our longing for knowledge 
and our need for the control of life. Both should increase 
human comfort and happiness. Both should tend to im- 
prove the race. 



KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF 53 

Psychology alone can give us self-knowledge. — We 
laugh sadly when any one is foolhardy or stupid enough 
to attempt to use electricity in utter ignorance of its prop- 
erties, but even greater are the reasons for concern and 
pity when a human being is seen struggling through life 
ignorant of his psychological characteristics and possibili- 
ties. We have been taught by the hard lessons of physics 
that one should not attempt to deal with a locomotive or 
an aeroplane until he thoroughly understands its mechan- 
ism and capacities. Yet, all the experience of the ages has 
not sufficed to teach us the folly of using our minds in 
ignorance of their constitution, peculiarities, character- 
istics, and capacities. In spite of the fact that I am not a 
visualizer, I try to carry on work which demands this 
psychological characteristic. Ignorant or oblivious of the 
fact that I am defective in ability to distinguish colors, 
I undertake responsibilities which I can not properly fulfill. 
Careless of the inevitable results, if not wholly ignorant 
thereof, I persist in a harmful habit of thought or action 
until my mental development has been seriously distorted 
or dwarfed. In what department or phase of life are we 
so careless of facts and principles as in our mental life? 
Admitting that intimate and exact knowledge of the psy- 
chological make-up of the self is of inestimable value for 
success and happiness, we go forward blindly. Self- 
analysis, self-observation, introspection should teach us self- 
control. They should enable us to understand our likes and 
dislikes, our prejudices and prides, our peculiar strengths 
and weaknesses, our associations and memories, and in the 
light of this understanding we should rationalize our living, 
and especially our social relations, as would otherwise be 
impossible. 

Psychology should help us also to understand other 
selves. — If knowledge of the self deserves to rank first in im- 
portance for the realization of the possibilities of the indi- 



54 THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

vidual life, knowledge of other selves deserves to rank 
next. Indeed, self-knowledge is the essential condition of 
the understanding and appreciation of other beings. At 
every turn in life's pathway we are forced to adjust our- 
selves to the thoughts, feelings, purposes of other persons. 
How can this be done intelligently if we are ignorant of 
our own mental peculiarities? How can we sympathize 
with the joy or sorrow of another when we have known 
neither of these experiences? As well might we insist that 
it is possible to act intelligently with respect to strychnine 
in ignorance of its properties, as to maintain that we can 
treat our own or another's mind properly in ignorance of 
what the science of psychology should teach. 

Systematic self-observation leads to intimately valuable 
knowledge of one 's self, and this self-understanding enables 
one to understand other persons. Finally the rational com- 
prehension of the constitution of other minds serves as a 
condition for sympathy. We must be able to imagine our- 
selves in the midst of this or that desirable or undesirable 
event — storm, explosion, celebration, victory, fall — in order 
to adjust our behavior to the situation ; and in precisely 
the same sense we mast be able to imagine the experiences 
of our friend in order to act appropriately or sympa- 
thetically. Few of us, however, are sufficiently close and 
keen observers of our own or of others' minds to be able 
to understand them perfectly. Psychology, like the other 
sciences, is far from complete. It fails to do all that we 
expect of it simply because of the multitudinous unsolved 
problems which confront it. But this should serve as 
a stimulus to redoubled effort in research rather than as 
a cause of discouragement. Believing, as we do, in the 
importance of scientific knowledge of consciousness, of its 
facts, its principles, and its causal relations, for the under- 
standing and appreciation of the self and of other persons 
and for the control of psychological events, the least we 



VALUE OF GENETIC DESCRIPTION 55 

can do is to insist upon the importance of more and better 
observation and experimentation. 

Psychology has special value as genetic description. — 
This is an era in which the evolutionary account of things 
is in favor. Since the days of Darwin science has sought 
persistently to obtain the history of organisms. This it 
has done by careful comparison and the discovery of rela- 
tions. The development of one thing from another has 
held attention, and from this study of genetic relations has 
arisen that history of living things which is now known 
as organic evolution. The solar system has evolved; the 
earth has evolved ; man has evolved. The natural history 
of even the least important thing is found to be complex 
and full of startling events. Of most things we have only 
a partial history. There are many large gaps in the account 
of the evolution of man, and the same is true of almost all 
animate and inanimate objects. Nevertheless, we are no 
more in doubt concerning the existence of an evolutionary 
process than we are of the existence of the self. 

Genetic or developmental description is in favor in 
physics, in biology, and in psychology. The physicist offers 
us an account of the evolutionary stages through which 
certain objects have passed in their progress toward their 
present condition. The biologist similarly offers us a de- 
scription of the development of the human being from 
germinal cell to adult state. The psychologist in the same 
spirit formulates the developmental history of conscious- 
ness in the individual from birth to maturity, and in the 
race from its simplest beginnings in primitive organisms 
to its complex condition in the grown man. It is precisely 
this kind of description of physical, physiological, and psy- 
chological objects that is called genetic or evolutionary 
description. It might with appropriateness be called 
history, for in reality it offers a natural history of 
things. 



56 THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Individual development. — Genetic description in psy- 
chology aims first to give the history of the mind of each 
of us from its just observable beginnings in infancy, 
through babyhood, childhood, youth and adolescence, ma- 
turity and senility, until finally, with the disintegration 
of the body, it passes beyond our powers of direct observa- 
tion. It is this story of the mental life of the individual 
which fascinates students of psychology. 

Racial development. — But there is another and no less 
important kind of genetic description. It differs from the 
description of the life of the individual between birth and 
death in that it traces the history of the individual into 
the remote past of the existence of its ancestors. This is 
known as phylogenetic or racial history in contrast with 
ontogenetic or individual history. Biologists have suc- 
ceeded in proving experimentally that one kind of animal 
or plant may develop from a more or less markedly differ- 
ing kind, and it is now commonly believed that more or less 
obvious changes from generation to generation, through 
thousands of years, account for the existence of a great 
variety of objects. The difference between a squirrel and 
a man seems very great, but if all the intermediate types 
of being which have intervened, and of which the majority 
have disappeared from the earth, were before us the evo- 
lutionary process doubtless would seem fairly simple. In 
order to give a complete history of the evolution of a given 
type of organism we should, of course, have to describe 
all of the stages or steps between its simplest animate 
ancestor and its present state. This is impossible. Con- 
sequently, most of the genetic descriptions which biology of- 
fers us are incomplete. Precisely the same holds true of psy- 
chology, for it is utterly impossible to trace the stages in the 
development of mind from its present condition in man back 
to its appearance among the ancestors of human beings. The 
best we can do is to follow the general trend of development. 



A DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 57 

Value of the history of mind. — In spite of its imperfec- 
tions, genetic description in psychology serves the purpose 
of bringing into relation a lot of bits of information which 
otherwise would remain isolated. It makes these fragments 
of knowledge intelligible by enabling us to picture to our- 
selves a series of objects with definite relations. By the 
study of the minds of different organisms we discover re- 
semblances which lead us to arrange the organisms in a 
certain order with respect to the psychological character- 
istics. Each individual or type represents a stage in the 
development of mind. Evidently such a description of 
mental life as genetic psychology offers is of value only 
as it enables us the better to understand mind as it now 
exists. This it does because it presents facts which are 
necessary for explanatory purposes. An important result 
of the search for the history of mind is the development of 
those special branches of the science which now go under 
the names plant and animal psychology, infant and child 
psychology, adult and senile psychology. 

A provisional definition of psychology. — We have now 
reached the point at which we must formulate a provisional 
definition of our science in terms of the characteristics of 
its subject-matter, its aims or tasks, its methods, and its 
values. We may briefly sum up the essential points of the 
foregoing discussion in the following formula. Psychology 
is the systematic study of phenomena of consciousness for 
the purpose of describing them in terms of their constituent 
elements and of giving their history, of discovering the 
principles and laws of their appearance, of explaining them 
by stating their causes or conditions, of correlating them 
with processes in the brain and in other parts of the body, 
and of thus providing us with that knowledge of mental 
life which should enable us to predict psychological events 
and to control them. 

This definition is not to be accepted uncritically. The 



58 THE VALUES AND IDEALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

reader has enough preliminary information about the sci- 
ence of psychology, as a result of the foregoing chapters, to 
be able to formulate a definition for himself. He must not 
permit the dogmatic tone of the book to discourage him in 
this attempt, for the fact is that this tone is due not to the 
choice of the writer, but to the need for brief and definite 
statements. Disagreements with any views expressed in 
the text-book or by the teacher should bear fruit in the 
modification of the statements offered and in the wording 
of other definitions. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of " my psychological traits." 
Materials : paper and pen or pencil. 

Let each student, either in the class-room or outside, describe 
one or more mental traits which he believes to be peculiar to 
himself. 

The reading of Sir Francis Galton's descriptions of " mental 
imagery, number-forms, color associations, and visionaries " in 
his " Inquiries into Human Faculty " will aid greatly in the 
performance of this task of self-observation. 

If the time of the class permits, this exercise may profitably 
be extended into a study of " my mental characteristics," which 
shall be continued throughout the course and completed with a 
sketch of one's psychological self. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Galton, Francis : Inquiries into human faculty. Everyman's Library 
Edition ( 35c. ) . This book should be owned by every student of 
psychology, and thoughtfully read. It is sure to arouse one's 
interest in mental traits, or, as the author calls them, " human 
faculties." 

Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapter 15, "The applications of psy- 
chology." 

Munsterbekg, Hugo : On the witness stand. " Introduction," " Illu- 
sions," " The memory of the witness." 



PART TWO 

PSYCHOLOGY AS DESCRIPTION OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 

CHAPTER VI 

CONCRETE EXPERIENCES, OR VARIETIES OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 

"My mind, then, is of the imaginal sort, — I wish that we had a 
better adjective! — and my ideational type is of the sort described in 
the psychologies as mixed. I have always had, and I have always 
used, a wide range and a great variety of imagery; and my furniture 
of images is, perhaps, in better than average condition, because — 
fearing that, as one gets older, one tends also to become more and 
more verbal in type — I have made a point of renewing it by prac- 
tice. I am able now, for instance, as I was able when I entered the 
class-room nearly twenty years ago, to lecture from any one of the 
three main cues. I can read off what I have to say from a memory 
manuscript; or I can follow the lead of my voice; or I can trust to 
the guidance of kina?sthesis, the anticipatory feel of the movements 
of articulation. I use these three methods under different circum- 
stances. When it is a matter of preparing a lecture on a definite 
plan, of dividing and subdividing under various headings, I draw up 
in the mind's eye a table of contents, written or printed, and refer 
to it as the hour proceeds. When there is any difficulty in exposition, 
a point to be argued pro and con or a conclusion to be brought out 
from the convergence of several lines of proof, I hear my own voice 
speaking just ahead of me: an experience which, in the description, 
sounds as if it should be confusing, but which in reality is precisely 
the reverse. When, again, I come to a piece of straightforward narra- 
tive, I let my throat take care of itself; so that I am able to give full 
attention to blackboard drawing or to the manipulation of instru- 
ments on the table. As a rule, I look to all three kinds of prompt- 
ing in the course of a single hour." — Titchener, E. B. : Lectures on 
the experimental psychology of the thought processes, pp. 7-9. 

The discovery of consciousness. — Each one of us has 
to discover consciousness for himself. This may seem 
strange. But is it really more surprising that we should 

59 



60 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

have to learn how to observe consciousness than that we 
should similarly have to learn to see things in the world 
about us? During infancy we are first conscious and then 
we become self-conscious. This process of becoming con- 
scious of the self continues for years. In some of us it 
finally culminates in the ability to introspect or to observe 
consciousness with pleasure and profit. In others it leads 
only to a morbid self-interest or curiosity. Those persons 
who never discover themselves psychologically are to those 
who know themselves as thinking and feeling beings as 
the blind man is to the normally equipped and trained 
observer of nature. Clearly the first step toward an ap- 
preciation of psychology or toward making a psychologist 
of one's self is the discovery of consciousness. 

Students of psychology belong to one of three classes : 
— (1) Those who of their own initiative discover themselves 
psychologically and are led by a glimpse of the wonders 
of consciousness to the study of the science of mind; (2) 
Those who are helped to discover themselves by a course in 
psychology, and who, with practice in introspection, learn 
to take keen satisfaction in the observation of psychological 
phenomena ; and ( 3 ) Those who neither of their own ini- 
tiative nor with the assistance of the trained psychologist 
are able to discover consciousness. At the beginning and 
again at the end of our course in psychology we should 
ask the question, To which of these classes do I belong? 
And we should answer the question honestly. "Whatever 
the answer, we should not permit ourselves to be unduly 
discouraged, but instead we should will, with all our 
strength, to take the psychological attitude ; to discover 
consciousness; to learn not merely how to introspect but 
how to do it well and with keen satisfaction ; and, above all, 
we should not rest content until we see our thoughts, emo- 
tions, and sentiments as clearly with our mind's eye as we 
see the landscape with our bodily organ of sight. 



POPULAR AND SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 61 

The popular and the scientific knowledge of conscious- 
ness. — If a child should study the physical world by observ- 
ing the simple parts into which scientists analyze things, 
instead of the things themselves, he never would know the 
world in which you and I live. Our everyday, common- 
sense, popular knowledge differs from that of the technical 
scientist precisely in that it has to do with complex objects 
and events as contrasted with simple elements and rela- 
tions. Popular knowledge is concrete; scientific knowl- 
edge is abstract. The former seems natural, the latter arti- 
ficial. Unless we happen to be chemists, mineralogists, or 
geologists, we are interested in mountains and valleys as 
features of the landscape or as sources of wealth and not 
as complex aggregates of chemical elements. The scientist 
speaks a language which only the initiated understand. 
He is occupied with the consideration of the nature and 
relations of atoms, molecules, cells, or whatever happen to 
be the products of analysis in his science. 

This contrast between the popular and the scientific point 
of view and knowledge of things is just as sharp in psy- 
chology as in the physical sciences. The psychologist, start- 
ing with the concrete experiences which make up our con- 
scious life, analyzes them into their constituent parts and 
thenceforth describes them in terms of these parts. Is it 
strange that we should not understand him? Is it strange 
that we do not realize he is talking about something with 
which we are perfectly familiar and in which we are in- 
tensely interested? 

In taking up the study of psychology it is of first impor- 
tance that we observe concrete experiences, the familiar 
furnishings of our minds, and from that task make the easy 
transition to the study of consciousness as it appears to 
the scientist. We must start with matters of common 
knowledge and by careful observation thereof learn to 
appreciate what is intelligible only after one has substi- 



62 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

tilted the scientific for the popular point of view. It is 
futile to attempt to present the subject by discussing the 
results of psychological analysis without first making it 
perfectly clear that familiar, commonplace, concrete ex- 
periences are the things which are analyzed. 

There are several varieties of consciousness. — For the 
concrete experiences with which we all are familiar we have 
many popular names. Certain of these names are also 
technical terms of the science of psychology. Such, for 
example, are sensation, emotion, and thought. But whereas 
popularly these terms are used very loosely and with wide 
variations in meaning, they are used scientifically with 
a much higher degree of precision. With the experiences 
of seeing, feeling, remembering, and imagining we are 
familiar, but of the exact nature and relations of these 
processes as phenomena of consciousness most of us know 
next to nothing. 

For a long time it has been customary to classify the 
common experiences of life in three groups. The groups 
are knowing, feeling, and willing. This classification has 
proved useful in the past and it is still used to serve the 
purposes of introductory courses in psychology. But from 
the first, we should realize that it is a popular rather than 
a strictly scientific grouping of the facts of consciousness. 
In fact, it belongs on the same level as the classification 
of the objects of nature in the three categories of the vege- 
table, the animal, and the mineral kingdoms. Fortunately 
the old game of " Twenty questions " has demonstrated to 
us that it is impracticable to attempt to force all objects 
of the world into one or another of these kingdoms. Many 
concrete things belong as much in one as in another of 
the classes, and similarly many concrete experiences belong 
as much in feeling as in knowing or in willing. There is 
no sharp line of division between consciousness of the 
knowing sort, and that of the feeling, or willing, sort. 



CONSCIOUSNESS AS KNOWING 63 

Usually we know, feel, and will all at once, or at least 
we do all of these things in connection with a single con- 
crete experience. As I glance up from the page which I 
am writing, I catch the reflected sunlight from the snow- 
clad hillside beyond the Charles and my concrete con- 
sciousness for the moment includes knowledge of the view, 
feeling of discomfort because of the blinding light, and the 
volitional act of deciding to draw the shade. I did not 
know, feel, and will instantaneously, but it is quite impos- 
sible for me to separate my real consciousness of the 
moment into three independent parts. 

Even from the moment of our discovery of conscious- 
ness we must seek to observe the various kinds of con- 
sciousness in their relations. We must study intellect, 
feeling, and will as aspects of consciousness and not 
as kinds or parts of experience. Nevertheless, it will be 
profitable for us at this point to note examples of know- 
ing, feeling, and willing, with certain of their prominent 
characteristics. 

Consciousness as knowing. — Knowledge constitutes a 
large part of consciousness. As a rule we couple the 
word with things or events and speak of knowledge of this 
or that object or occurrence in or about us. When we 
reply to the statement ' ' This is a text-book of psychology ' ' 
by saying " I know it," we assert that our consciousness 
includes awareness of a particular object. This aware- 
ness or knowledge may vary. It may be limited to con- 
sciousness of the words ' ' this is a text-book of psychology. ' ' 
It may include also consciousness of the appearance of 
the object as it is seen in daylight ; of its weight, its texture, 
and even the odor of its binding. To say that we know 
the book means that we are aware of a few or of many 
of the features or characteristics of the object. Knowing 
always involves sensations or sense images. We may know 
the book as an object here now, or as an object which we 



64 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

saw and handled and read yesterday, or as an object de- 
scribed to us by another person. 

It is in terms of knowledge that we describe the world 
in which we live, and ourselves as physical bodies. When 
we perceive, remember, imagine, and think, we are having 
conscious processes which must be classed with knowledge 
rather than with feeling or will. Perhaps the simplest sort 
of knowledge is awareness of a sensation. As the dentist 
with a quick steady pull withdraws the slender twisted wire 
from my tooth I experience a sudden, momentary, intense 
sensation of pain. For an instant my awareness is limited 
to this bit of consciousness. The pain is knowledge with in- 
ward reference. It is a part of my consciousness of self, and 
in this it differs strikingly from my knowledge of the book, 
for that I refer to something not myself. 

When we know objects or events in the physical world 
through the medium of our senses of sight, hearing, touch, 
taste, temperature, and the other modes of awareness, we 
speak of perceiving them. We may perceive a simple sensa- 
tion, as in the case of the intense pain on the injury of 
a nerve, or we may perceive a group of sensations as in the 
case of our consciousness of the book and, indeed, of most 
objects and occurrences. In any event to perceive always 
means to know more or less completely. 

Knowing as remembering. — A second form of knowl- 
edge is called memory experience. To-morrow I may re- 
member or re-live the pain of having a tooth extracted; 
I may be conscious of the book although it is not before 
me. To remember is to know something as a previous 
experience. It is one of the most important of the human 
types of knowledge. Lacking memory our conscious lives 
would be like a perpetually moving and endless series of 
kinematographic pictures. We should live in the experi- 
ence of the moment; there would be no past, and no 
future. 



VARIETIES OF COGNITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 65 

Knowing as imagining. — There is a third form of knowl- 
edge, closely related both to the perceptual and to the 
memory experiences. It is imagination. The newly dis- 
covered African animal, which I have never seen with my 
own eyes and which I am therefore incapable of knowing 
either in perception or in memory, I can represent to myself 
in imagination. As I write this paragraph I imagine ex- 
periences which will serve as illustrations for the text ; I 
imagine combinations of words which are new; I imagine 
the appearance of the printed page upon which this dis- 
cussion of knowledge will in due time appear if I remain 
faithful to my task and the printers and publishers lend me 
their aid. 

Knowing as thought. — Finally, as a fourth kind of 
knowledge, we have thinking. It is a vastly more complex 
kind of consciousness than awareness of sensation, perceiv- 
ing, or even than remembering and imagining, for as a 
rule it makes use of two or more of these kinds of knowl- 
edge. The simple thought " this is a text-book " is an 
experience which involves first, knowledge of " this," a 
particular object; second, knowledge of " text-book," a par- 
ticular sort of ' ' this ' ' ; and finally, knowledge of the like- 
ness between " this " and " text-book." When we judge, 
when we reason, we are thinking. This is a kind of knowl- 
edge which seems to be characteristic of human beings as 
contrasted with other animals. The cat and the canary 
sense, perceive, remember, and possibly imagine, but we 
have meager grounds for assuming that they think. 

Consciousness without knowing. — Man is an intellect- 
ual being a large portion of whose time is given over to 
those experiences which we choose to speak of as knowl- 
edge. Imagine, if you can, your consciousness minus all 
the types of experience described in this section. What 
would it be like? There would be no sensations, no aware- 
ness of objects or events, indeed, there could be no external 



66 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

world and no physical self. Consciousness would consist 
solely of feelings and volitional experiences. And what 
would these be like? To answer this question we must 
turn to the description of the concrete experiences of feel- 
ing and will. 

Consciousness as feeling. — Feeling is inextricably inter- 
woven with knowing and willing. Yet, it is possible, by the 
highly artificial process of limiting one's view to a par- 
ticular aspect of consciousness, to regard it introspectively 
as a special kind of experience which sometimes stands out 
prominently. In the category of feeling belong our con- 
sciousness of liking and disliking, of agreeableness and dis- 
agreeableness, and our emotions. 

Our consciousness of a particular person may be purely 
intellectual or it may include a feeling for the person. 
We may have an all-pervading feeling of agreeableness, or 
even an emotion of joy, whenever we see or think of the 
individual, and this may be quite as important a part of 
our awareness of the person as is our perceptual knowl- 
edge. It is difficult to imagine a rich life of feelings and 
emotions without knowledge, for the simple reason that 
we usually refer our emotions and feelings to objects of 
knowledge. But this clearly is not a sufficient reason for 
saying that we must know before we can feel. It is con- 
ceivable that infants and lower animals have conscious- 
ness of the agreeableness disagreeableness variety long be- 
fore, or even in the permanent absence of, any form of 
knowledge. They merely feel comfortable or uncomfortable, 
satisfied or dissatisfied, quiescent or restless. 

It is well worth while to try to think of a conscious life 
which consists only of feelings and emotions. Try to intro- 
spect the experience which pervades consciousness on the 
successful completion of a difficult and fatiguing task. 
There is satisfaction, relaxation, rest. One feels comforta- 
ble. A general agreeableness seems to monopolize con-' 



FEELING AND KNOWING 67 

sciousness. It is the prominent thing about our awareness 
that it may thus be dominated by a particular kind of ex- 
perience. Or, as an even more striking 'example, take the 
consciousness of having a tooth pulled. The intellectual 
feature of the experience is the sensation of pain, but as 
a matter of fact this is usually the least prominent of the 
aspects of our consciousness at the moment. We feel in- 
tensely uncomfortable, and we will to stand or to avoid 
the discomfort. It is feeling instead of knowledge which 
holds the center of consciousness at such moments, whereas 
at other times the reverse is true. The sensation of pain, 
apart from the intensely disagreeable consciousness which 
accompanies it in the dentist's chair or upon the operating 
table, is introspectively interesting. It pays to try to attend 
to it, for the concentration of attention upon the intellectual 
instead of the affective or feeling content of consciousness 
tends to diminish the disagreeableness of the experience. 
At times one may thus wholly neglect and almost wholly 
avoid the discomfort. But no one should be asked to accept 
such a statement on faith ! Every one should try it. 

The confusing of feeling with knowing. — It is easy to 
confuse feeling with knowledge for they regularly occur 
together. Indeed, not a few psychologists have agreed to 
regard feeling as an attribute of certain intellectual experi- 
ences instead of as a distinct kind or variety of conscious- 
ness. This is not the most profitable assumption for us to 
adopt at the beginning of our introspection, for it is ex- 
cellent training to try persistently to discover whether 
feelings are distinguishable from sensations and other forms 
of knowledge. The student who is able to observe both 
the peculiar character of the sensation of pain and the 
nature of the feeling of discomfort which happens to ac- 
company it, deserves credit for his observation even though 
authorities disagree. For myself, I find them distinguish- 
able. The peculiar pain quality which I experience every 



68 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

time a nerve is pressed or stimulated electrically is as dif- 
ferent from the so-called feeling of pain, or as I prefer to 
call it, the feeling of discomfort, as light is from darkness 
or hunger from thirst. I dislike the pain quality because it 
is associated with a disagreeable feeling, and in the same 
fashion, although to a less extent, I dislike the purple 
quality of visual sensation because it is associated with 
a disagreeable feeling. It is easier to distinguish the two 
aspects of consciousness in the latter case than in the 
former because as a rule neither is so extremely vivid or 
intense. 

Feeling as emotion. — Our emotions are complex experi- 
ences made up of cognitive (i.e., " knowing ") processes, 
of feelings, and of volitions. They are classed with feelings 
simply because in them feelings usually are predominantly 
important. 

At the sight of a long-lost friend we are swept from the 
straightforward course of our intellectual life by a surging 
emotion of joy. There are elements of knowledge in the 
experience, for we recognize the friend and remember a 
multitude of facts concerning the personality, and there 
are also elements of will, for do we not suggest a lot of 
unformulated queries by the form of welcome which we 
give and the immediate turn of conversation? Yet above 
these elements, and incalculably more important, is the 
satisfaction, the agreeableness, of the experience. It is that 
which dominates consciousness. But we remain thoroughly 
joyous only so long as the cognitive and volitional aspects 
of consciousness are kept in the background. 

A startling accident fills us with horror. Our cognitive 
and volitional experiences at such times are so far sub- 
ordinated that we stand aghast, incapable of action. Feel- 
ing is in the forefront of consciousness and we are mo- 
mentarily in the grip of a powerful emotion. To dissect 
the emotional consciousness and reveal the relations of the 



CONSCIOUSNESS AS WILLING 69 

many and complex processes which go to make it up is the 
task of the skilled psychologist. At present we need go 
no further than to note that feelings, whether of the emo- 
tional or of another type, are readily distinguishable from 
forms of knowing. 

Consciousness as willing. — The volitional experience has 
been referred to several times in the above accounts of 
knowing and feeling. It constantly appears in connection 
with them. Merely to know and to feel would be to remain 
passive. It is the volitional consciousness which prepares 
us for action and impels us thereto. But we must know 
and feel before we can desire or choose — before we can 
will. As it is possible to imagine ourselves mere creatures 
of intellect or of feeling, so we may imagine ourselves mere 
creatures of will. But how pitiable would be our plight 
were we merely intellectual, emotional, or volitional. The 
consciousness of impulse and of decision, which are pre- 
eminently important features of will, would be blind. In- 
deed we should be like the brutes who are impelled to action 
by their instinctive impulses. It is not easy for most of 
us clearly to distinguish willing from knowing in intro- 
spection, but difficulties need not and should not dis- 
courage us. 

Let us select some perplexing situation and observe 
critically and repeatedly the characteristics of our con- 
sciousness as we attempt to decide whether to do the task 
set us or to enjoy an hour at tennis, whether to obey the 
rule or to break it. Almost any moment of our waking life 
furnishes us with opportunities for introspection concern- 
ing knowledge, feeling, and will. Just now, as I conclude 
this paragraph, I am conscious of several things I should 
do before luncheon as well as of the desire to continue 
writing. The introspection proves interesting and I stop 
a moment to examine its products. Immediately I arise 
and go to the telephone. The volitional process gained 



70 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

predominance just as soon as my cognitive consciousness 
waned. 

Professor Thorndike's way of classifying experiences. 
— To distinguish the knowing, feeling, and willing kinds 
of experience is only one of several profitable ways of ar- 
ranging the first products of self-observation. Professor 
Thorndike, in his ' ' Elements of Psychology, ' ' offers a some- 
what different method of classifying. He distinguishes 
five kinds of experiences, to all of which he applies the 
word feeling. They are (1) Feelings of things and quali- 
ties as present (sensations and percepts) ; (2) Feelings of 
things as absent (images and memories) ; (3) Feelings of 
facts (relationships, meanings, judgments) ; (4) Feelings 
of personal condition (emotions) ; and (5) Feelings of 
willing. 

In general it may be said that the first three of Pro- 
fessor Thorndike's classes of feelings are subdivisions of 
what we have considered above as " knowing "; that the 
fourth class is co-extensive with " feeling "; and that the 
fifth class includes " willing." It is useful to subdivide 
our " knowing " (intellectual, or cognitive) experiences 
thus, for it aids us in discovering the several varieties of 
knowledge. Even the novice in psychology should soon 
discover that his consciousness of things as present is quite 
different from his consciousness of the same things as absent. 
And similarly, he should distinguish his consciousness of 
things and events from his consciousness of facts. It is 
excellent practice to attempt to classify one's experiences 
either as " knowing," " feeling," and " willing," or ac- 
cording to Professor Thorndike's method. 

Experiences may be classified according to degree of 
complexity. — There is one serious objection to the ways of 
grouping experiences which we have been examining. They 
are likely to make us think of consciousness now as purely 
intellectual, now as purely affective (the feeling sort), and 



COMPLEXITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 71 

again as purely volitional. This is not the case, for we 
know and feel and will in the same moment of conscious- 
ness, and our ability to describe a given experience as cog- 
nitive, affective, or volitional is due merely to the fact 
that some one of these three aspects of consciousness is 
more prominent than the others. We would do better to 
call them aspects than kinds of consciousness. 

Now, there is a method of viewing experiences which 
avoids this objection. It is classification according to the 
complexity of the experience. Professor Wundt has em- 
ployed this method in his " Outlines of Psychology." He 
distinguishes (1) Psychical elements; (2) Psychical com- 
pounds; and (3) Interconnected psychical compounds. A 
sensation is a psychical element, a percept, idea, or emo- 
tion is a psychical compound, and a judgment, thought, 
or train of associations is an interconnected group of 
psychical compounds. 

This way of arranging experiences is especially useful 
because it forces us to note the constitution of the things 
we are trying to classify. At the same time, it is highly 
desirable that we examine consciousness as concrete experi- 
ence until we can readily distinguish its knowing, feeling, 
and willing aspects, as well as its elements, its compounds, 
and its interconnected compounds. To begin the scientific 
study of consciousness without a general preparatory fa- 
miliarity with these several aspects of our experiences is 
much like undertaking to study the structure of an animal 's 
retina before making a general examination of the eye. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspective analysis of the (cognitive) 
consciousness of a pencil. Materials: paper and pencil. 

The members of the class should attempt to discover the psy- 
chological elements which enter into the consciousness of the 
pencil. What is the pencil, psychologically, apart from, or in 



72 CONCRETE EXPERIENCES 

addition to, these bits of consciousness — sensations of color, 
smoothness, etc.? Write as complete and accurate a description 
of the pencil as a physical object as you can, and then compare 
with it your similarly detailed description of it as an object of 
your consciousness. Wherein do the two differ? Supposing the 
two descriptions to be accurately written by all the members of 
the class, what are likely to prove to be the essential differences 
between the physical and the psychological pencils'? Does this 
study of the pencil from the points of view of physics and of 
psychology justify the assumption of physics that the object is 
independent of me as an observer? Does it justify the assump- 
tion of psychology that it is dependent upon me as an observer? 
If time permits, other objects may similarly be analyzed and 
the results of introspection presented for class-discussion and 
criticism. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Thorndike, E. L. : Elements of psychology, chapters 2-7. 
Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, chapter 12. 
Roffding, H. : Outlines of psychology, chapter 4. 
James, Wm.: Principles of psychology, vol. 1, chapter 9. 



CHAPTEE VII 

ANALYSIS AND THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ELEMENTS 

" Smelling furnishes me with odors ; the palate with tastes ; and 
hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and 
composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each 
other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as 
one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure, and 
consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one 
distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas 
constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things." — 
Berkeley, G: The principles of human knowledge, Fraser, vol. 1, p. 
257. 

Analysis as a scientific procedure. — It is our habit to 
accept the objects in our world, our own bodies, and every- 
thing which happens about and within us as simple facts. 
We are interested in them, and we may even describe them 
at length by comparing and contrasting them with one 
another. But we do not ordinarily tear them apart for 
the sake of discovering their constitution. It is precisely in 
this respect that the scientific procedure or attitude toward 
things differs from the common-sense or non-scientific 
attitude. Instead of simply accepting things as what they 
appear to be, the scientist sets about discovering whether 
what seems to be simple really consists of parts. Having 
succeeded in breaking up or analyzing the object with 
which he started, he next studies the relations of the parts, 
the way they act independently, and the various ways in 
which they may be put together. In a word, he seeks inti- 
mate and detailed knowledge of the composition and con- 
stitution of his object. The result is that the scientist usu- 

73 



74 THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

ally knows vastly more about things than does the ordinary 
observer. 

The process of analysis in chemistry. — The common 
sense and the scientific attitudes are readily brought into 
contrast. We have but to inquire, What is a pinch of table 
salt from the one point of view and from the other? For 
you and me, it is a simple whitish, soft, moist substance 
with a characteristic taste. For the chemist it is this and 
more. He really begins his description where we leave off. 
Instead of accepting the salt as what it seems to be, he 
analyzes it into its constituent parts, sodium and chlorine. 
Each of these products of analysis he is able to describe 
by enumerating its characteristic properties. But this does 
not complete the scientific account of a crystal of salt. For 
the chemist has discovered that each of the chemical ele- 
ments which go to make up a molecule of sodium chloride 
is composed of particles called atoms, and we may not say 
that the atom is the ultimate product of chemical analysis. 
At any time it may be shown to consist of yet simpler par- 
ticles of matter. 

It is important to note that whereas the so-called ' ' chem- 
ical elements " are evident to our senses, the atom has only 
recently and indirectly been detected. Sodium and chlorine, 
like lead or copper, can be seen and touched, but the atoms 
which constitute them ordinarily are beyond our powers of 
observation. 

Long before their presence could be demonstrated to the 
senses of man, the existence of atoms was postulated by the 
chemist for the purposes of description and explanation, 
and even then he believed in them as firmly as in the things 
which are seen. 

The process of analysis in biology. — The beautifully 
colored sea-anemone is an object of interest to the non- 
scientific observer as well as to the biologist. Yet, how 
true is the statement that it really is not the same object 



PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 75 

for both. You and I describe the animal by calling atten- 
tion to its coloration, its general form, and its activities. 
The skilled biologist begins where we leave off. To the 
casual observer he reveals the fact that the anemone is 
composed of certain parts or organs, and that each of these 
organs is composed of minute active living parts which he 
calls cells. He even describes the relations of these minute 
cells to one another, the ways in which they work together 
for the welfare of the animal, and the special work or 
function of each cell or cell-group. How different one's 
knowledge of an anemone when it includes all of these 
facts, and many more like them, in addition to the 
readily obtainable information with which scientific study 
begins. 

Psychological analysis. — The idea of snow and the emo- 
tion of fear, are psychological objects. To the casual or 
the untrained observer they seem simple, just as does the 
crystal of salt or the sea-anemone. Indeed, it requires long 
and patient observation to discover that the idea and the 
emotion are composed of certain simpler psychological 
processes. 

In the foregoing chapter we have summarily considered 
concrete experiences and certain ways in which they may 
be 'classified. It is just these concrete experiences which 
interest the unpsychological observer and gradually draw 
him into the study of the science of psychology. As the 
biologist starts with the apparently simple anemone and 
by thorough and long-continued observation reveals its vast 
and fascinating complexity of structure, so the psychologist 
starts with concrete experiences, with ideas, thoughts, feel- 
ings, emotions, and ultimately discovers their complex con- 
stitution. 

So long as we are not psychologists, an emotion, or any 
other concrete experience, is merely something to live 
through, something which we like or dislike, seek or shrink 



76 THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

from, vividly recall or attempt to banish from conscious- 
ness. But as soon as we become psychologists the same 
emotion becomes, also, a complex of psychological elements 
whose number, characteristics, and relations we are eager 
to discover. 

Truly analysis is the first strictly scientific task of the 
psychologist. For he must discover the simple processes 
which go to make up mental life; and learn what he can 
about their nature and relations. In psychology, not less 
than in the other sciences, the process of analysis is highly 
artificial and unnatural, and tends to suppress interest in 
the living of experiences in favor of an interest in under- 
standing them. 

The analysis of my consciousness of the typewriter before 
me is like the biologist's analysis of the sea-anemone. Both 
are matters of simple and persistent observation, aided to a 
certain extent by experimentation. In studying the type- 
writer, as a physical object, I may find it necessary to take 
it apart in order to discover the number, nature, and rela- 
tions of the several parts. Similarly, in studying my 
consciousness of the machine, it is necessary for me to 
resolve the total consciousness into simpler parts in order to 
understand, describe, and explain the experience. I remove 
the keyboard of the machine and thus discover certain 
facts of construction. I remove my sensations of sight from 
my present consciousness of the object and discover that 
they are important parts of the experience. 

As students of the sciences we can not too early or too 
well learn that scientific discovery depends upon ingenuity 
and patience. The more ways in which I can think of 
examining and testing my consciousness of the typewriter, 
the more I shall succeed in discovering concerning that 
consciousness. If the biologist confined himself to an exam- 
ination of the external surface of the anemone instead of 
dissecting it, if he used his unaided eye instead of the 



PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 77 

microscope, the description which he would give would be 
very different from that suggested above. Analysis uses 
many and various aids, but it is always a matter of observa- 
tion. 

A simple example of psychological analysis. — It is 
natural and inevitable that most of us should have diffi- 
culties at first in imagining psychological analysis. Things 
experienced seem so entirely whole and unitary that it 
is impossible to think of them as made up of parts. We 
have to get into the way of taking the scientific attitude. 
The consciousness of a sound which is produced by sharply 
striking a tuning fork is a simple experience for the ordi- 
nary observer. It seems to be just a sound: one can not 
think of other sounds which if added together would pro- 
duce the same consciousness. Yet, how different the state- 
ment of the psychologist. After careful and persistent 
study, he asserts that this auditory experience in reality 
consists of the experience of the noise due to the blow of 
one object against another, of a tone which is due to the 
primary vibrations of the fork, and of certain over-tones 
which accompany the fundamental tone. The more expert 
the observer the more over-tones are detected. Thus it 
appears that the seemingly simple sound is surprisingly 
complex. Psychological analysis in this instance proves 
that it is impossible to describe the experience accurately 
without taking into account its constituent parts. Indeed, 
knowledge of the constitution of our various experiences 
is just as necessary for accurate and valuable descriptions 
of mental life as knowledge of the materials which have 
been used in its construction is for the description of a 
building. 

The products of psychological analysis. — The chemists 
have discovered between eighty and ninety elements as con- 
stituents of the world. Psychology has many more elements, 
but they fall into a few classes. At the most there are only 



78 THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

four classes which are widely recognized. They are termed 
sensations, images, affections, and conations. 

A word in description of each of these varieties of pro- 
ducts of psychological analysis will render them intelligible 
to every one, and help to make them distinguishable in 
introspection. 

Sensations are those experiences, such as colors, tones, 
tastes, odors, pains which we uniformly refer to a definite 
bodily organ of sense. 

Images are faint copies of sensations which arise in . the 
absence of the stimulation of an organ of sense. 

Affections are those feelings of agreeableness and dis- 
agreeableness, present in almost every state of mind, which 
we can not definitely refer to any particular portion of 
the body, but which seem rather to be all pervasive. It 
should be noted that the word affection is here used as a 
technical psychological term and not in its common mean- 
ing. For psychology it refers to feeling, whereas in ordi- 
nary speech it refers to a particular emotional attitude 
toward some object. 

Conations are the experiences of effort which appear usu- 
ally in connection with willing. It is much more difficult 
for the beginner to discover conative processes of con- 
sciousness than sensations or affections. Perhaps the best 
opportunity for observing them is offered in the experience 
of trying to remember. At any rate, it is worth while for 
each of us to notice whether in the experience of trying 
to recall a name, there is something which is not sensation, 
image, nor affection. 

Relation of sensation, image, affection, and conation to 
knowing, feeling, and willing. — The thoughtful student 
will have correlated these statements concerning psychical 
elements with the first classification of concrete experiences 
given in the previous chapter. Sensation and image as 
elements seem to belong primarily to ' ' knowing ' ' ; aff ec- 



NUMBER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 79 

tion seems to belong to ' ' feeling ' ' ; and conation to ' ' will- 
ing. " It may even have occurred to some one that the 
discovery of three chief elements in consciousness — sensa- 
tion, affection, conation— may be due in no small measure 
to the fact that concrete experiences are conventionally 
placed in three classes. Possibly this tripartite division of 
experience has misled psychologists. Possibly they have 
allowed it to prejudice them in favor of three and only 
three kinds of psychical elements. At any rate, we may 
fairly ask whether this analysis of consciousness is accepta- 
ble to the majority of psychologists and whether it finds 
support from our introspection. 

How many kinds of elements of consciousness are 
there? — Psychologists disagree as to the number of psy- 
chological elements. There are those who maintain that 
sensation is the sole element. There are those who insist 
that sensation and affection are the only kinds of elements. 
And, finally, there are those who believe in the existence 
of three (sensations, affections, and conations) or more 
classes of elements. 

A question of fact. — Does analysis reveal only sensations 
and are the so-called feelings of agreeableness and disagree- 
ableness, of effort and strain, merely aspects or complexes 
of sensations as certain observers maintain, or does self- 
observation indicate the existence of images, affections, and 
conations, along with sensations, as distinct kinds of psychic 
elements ? 

At the beginning of one's introspection it is difficult to 
believe that all concrete experiences are complexes of sensa- 
tions. Rather we tend to believe that our feelings or affec- 
tions are quite different in character from our sensations. 
This tendency is well expressed by Professor Calkins in 
her discussion of attributive elements of consciousness. 
" It needs no text-book in psychology to convince us that 
our analysis of consciousness is incomplete when we have 



80 THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

merely enumerated the sense-elements. For, quite as prom- 
inent as the sights and sounds and fragrances and all the 
other sensational parts of our experiences are the pleasant- 
nesses and the unpleasantnesses. Now these are clearly 
elemental feelings. One can no more tell what one 
means by agreeableness or by disagreeableness, than one 
can tell what redness and warmth and acidity are : in 
other words, these are irreducible experiences, and they 
are perfectly distinct from each other as well as from 
the sensational elements.'' (Introduction to Psychology, 
p. 113.) 

On the other hand, those psychologists who discover in 
consciousness only sensation-elements maintain that intro- 
spection reveals sensations to have a certain attribute or 
property which they call their feeling-tone. It is this 
attribute of sensations which renders them agreeable 
or disagreeable. Furthermore, they hold that combina- 
tions of sensations with very marked feeling-tones con- 
stitute our feelings and emotions. From this point of 
view, feeling is a part of sensation, not a separate 
psychic element. 

It is only fair to psychology to state that this view is 
not generally accepted, but rather is in disfavor. Psy- 
chological as well as popular opinion tends strongly 
to the acceptance of the view stated by Professor 
Calkins. 

There are extremes in the matter of psychological ele- 
ments. — The belief in a single kind of element marks one 
extreme. The belief in an indefinitely large number of 
elements marks the other extreme. But much more widely 
and safely held than either of these extreme positions is 
the view that there are at least two classes of elements, 
sensations and affections, and that there may possibly 
be certain relational elements which belong in neither 
class. 



SENSIBLE AND HYPOTHETICAL ELEMENTS 81 

Although there are only a few kinds of elements, each 
class has many examples. — Of sensation-elements there 
are thousands of instances. The class contains, according 
to the results of introspection, at least fifty thousand ele- 
ments. These are known as sensation qualities. We dis- 
tinguish a sensation of redness from one of blueness, but 
further than this, we also distinguish a particular sensation 
of redness from many other sensations of redness. A loud 
tone is readily distinguishable from a low one, but of loud 
tones there are many different kinds which we do not 
confuse and for some of which we have special names. So 
it is with all our special senses; each includes a large 
number of qualities of experience to which we apply the 
term psychic elements. 

The same statements hold true of affections. The class 
of elements to which we are applying the term is readily 
divisible into agreeable and disagreeable affections, and in 
these subclasses we recognize varieties of agreeableness and 
disagreeableness. We must not therefore allow ourselves 
to think of psychological elements as few; it is only the 
large classes of elements that are few. 

Physical science makes use of two kinds of elements. — 
The products of scientific analysis may be classified as 
sensible and hypothetical. The chemical elements — copper, 
iron, sodium, potasium, iodine — may be seen, but chemistry 
makes use also of a product of analysis called the atom 
which has never been seen but whose presence has recently 
been demonstrated visually. Similarly the biologist, to 
whom the cell, as the structural unit or element of the 
organism, is revealed by the microscope, assumes that each 
cell is composed of unseen molecules and these in turn of 
atoms. For the purposes of description and explanation 
these invisible hypothetical elements are quite as important 
as those constituent parts of objects which may be seen and 
touched. Moreover, the scientist believes as firmly in the 



82 THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS 

existence of the one as in the other product of analysis, 
and realizes that at any moment the insensible may be 
rendered sensible. 

Psychology also may deal with elements which may be 
directly observed and with those whose existence is as- 
sumed. — Our sensations, affections, and conations corre- 
spond to the sensible products of physical analysis, to the 
chemical elements and the elements of biology. But each 
of these varieties of psychological elements may consist of 
yet simpler bits of consciousness which might be called 
psychic atoms. 

This subject has been interestingly discussed by Pro- 
fessor Miinsterberg. Starting with the assumption that all 
experiences may be analyzed into sensations, he writes: 
" Are these sensations the ultimate elements of the con- 
tents of our consciousness, or is that which we call a blue 
or hot sensation, a sweet taste, a tone C, a muscle sensation, 
or a pain sensation itself a complex affair which consists 
of more elementary parts: in short, have we in the mind 
ultimate elements which are simpler than the sensations? 
... It seems at first surprising that psychology in its 
modern form has hardly ever seriously raised this ques- 
tion, and has always stopped in its analysis as soon as the 
distinguishable sensations have been reached. Physics did 
quite otherwise: it never stopped at the point where the 
observation of the biologist or physicist or chemist found 
the last mechanically separable parts. Theoretical physics 
went far beyond that point, and saw its goal in a description 
of the physical universe according to which those cells and 
molecules and chemical substances are combinations of atoms 
which are unperceivable ; and the atomistic theory of the 
universe which necessarily transcends empirical observa- 
tion is to-day the basis of all natural science. Why has 
psychology never felt this demand which seems to physics 
so profound and so natural? " (Miinsterberg, Hugo: 



STUDY OF PERCEIVABLE ELEMENTS 83 

Psychological Atomism. Psychological Review, vol. 7, 
pp. 4-5. 1900.) 

As students we must seek first familiarity with per- 
ceivable elements of consciousness.— Theoretical psy- 
chology has its place, but it would be a great mistake for 
one to enter upon the study of consciousness by building 
atomic hypotheses. The first products of psychological 
analysis — sensations, images, affections, and whatever 
other processes introspection may reveal — are our sole con- 
cern in this book. If we succeed in learning how to observe 
them easily and accurately, we shall have taken an important 
step toward making psychologists of ourselves, and we shall 
have abundant reason to be satisfied with our progress. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Continuation of the introspection of the 
consciousness of pencil. The memory consciousness may, at the 
beginning of the exercise, be observed in contrast with the orig- 
inal perceptual consciousness. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchenek, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, § 9. 
Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapter 4. 
Wundt, Wm. : Outlines of psychology, § 6. 

Munsterberg, Hugo : Psychological atomism. Psychological Review, 
vol. 7, pp. 1-17. 1900. 



CHAPTER VIII 

SYNTHESIS: THE BUILDING OF COMPLEX 
EXPERIENCES 

" If an analytic result shows the true elemental constituents, it 
should be possible, at least in a good many cases, by adding the ele- 
ments one by one, to rebuild the original experience. Surely no better 
test of the accuracy of an analysis is possible than the reinstatement 
of the whole through synthesis of the products of dissection. . . . 
If we take advantage of special and constant conditions for the dis- 
section of mind, why may we not as well make use of these conditions 
in building up mind again? To make the matter concrete: why 
should we not, if we find that liquidity is a perception made up of a 
number of known elements, bring these elements together artificially 
and produce the perception in question? . . . Pressure and tem- 
perature are evidently the two important factors in liquidity. . . 
At first the subjects declared that the wetness was something added 
to the pressure and temperature: it was, for them, unique." — 
Bentley, Madison: The synthetic experiment. American Journal of 
Psychology, vol. 11, pp. 405, 416. 1900. 

Synthesis as a scientific procedure. — Synthesis is said to 
be the opposite of analysis. When we analyze a physical 
object, or an experience, we resolve it into its constituent 
parts or elements: when we synthesize the same object or 
experience we put the parts together again in their former 
relations so that the original object reappears. In every 
science the process of analysis must precede attempts at 
synthesis, for parts must be isolated before they can be 
reunited. Synthesis is of special importance and interest 
in science because it is our chief way of creating things. 
Whether we attempt to build a house or to manufacture a 
useful dyestuff, we employ a synthetic procedure. 

A part of the wealth of information which is necessary 

84 



SYNTHESIS 85 

for successful synthesis is revealed by the process of anal- 
ysis, but the greater part of it is obtained by other and 
various methods. Before the chemist can artificially create 
a substance he must know not only the elements which 
should be used, but also the properties and the exact rela- 
tions of these elements. Certain of these facts are re- 
vealed to him by analysis and others he obtains by special 
study of the products of analysis. Indeed, it may be said 
that the analytic procedure of the scientist is only the be- 
ginning of a long and varied series of processes, the crown- 
ing success and climax of which is perfect synthesis. For 
when we know so much about the constitution of a physical 
object or a psychological object that we can at will cause 
it to appear from the midst of its constituent elements we 
have achieved the goal of science. 

Chemical synthesis. — There is no science in which the 
importance of the synthetic procedure is clearer than it is 
in chemistry. During the present generation the increase 
in our knowledge of the structure or constitution of inor- 
ganic and organic substances has revolutionized many in- 
dustries. Certain dyestuffs which formerly were obtained 
from plants are now manufactured in great commercial 
laboratories, with the saving of untold millions of dollars. 
The chemist has learned that knowledge of the composition 
of things is only the first step toward ability to create 
them. He knows that synthesis can be accomplished only 
in the light of knowledge of the relations and properties 
of the elements of which the substance is made up. In 
other words, the constitution as well as the composition of 
a chemical object must be known before it can be made 
synthetically. The same elements differently arranged 
yield substances of unlike properties. Ethyl alcohol and 
dimethyl ether are composed of the same chemical elements, 
carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, but the atoms of these sub- 
stances are differently arranged in the alcohol and the 



86 THE BUILDING OF COMPLEX EXPERIENCES 

ether. This difference the chemist represents pictorially by 
the following formulae: 



STRUCTURAL FORMULA FOR STRUCTURAL FORMULA FOR 

ETHYL ALCOHOL DIMETHYL ETHER 

H H H H 

II II 

H— C— C— O— H H— C— O— C— H 

II II 

H H H H 



The psychologist has excellent reason for believing that 
isomerism, as this phenomenon of like chemical composition 
and different properties is called, exists in the realm of con- 
sciousness, and he does well to use the analytic procedure 
as an approach to that knowledge of the constitution of 
experiences which will enable him to represent the psychic 
elements in their relations. It would not be rash to predict 
that the study of psychological isomerism by methods as 
ingenious as those which have established the science of 
synthetic chemistry will yield us startling and invaluable 
knowledge of mental life, as well as power over it. 

It is easy to analyze; it is difficult to synthesize. — 
All that has thus far been said about the analytic and the 
synthetic procedures in science indicates that the ignorant 
may analyze, while only the wise can synthesize. Who of 
us has not met with the trying experience of unintentionally 
disarranging the parts of a complex object which we were 
incapable of rebuilding. It is easy for the novice in anat- 
omy to analyze an animal's skull into its constituent bones, 
but it requires considerable knowledge to synthesize the 
object from its constituent parts. To disarrange, break up, 
or dissect a jigsaw puzzle into its few score of parts takes 
but a moment of time and little thought, yet, how laborious 
the process by which these parts must be fitted together 
if the picture is to be reformed. And how different the 



NATURAL SYNTHESES 87 

knowledge of the object which one derives from breaking 
up (analyzing) and from putting together (synthesizing) 
the puzzle. Doubtless our experiences with such objects as 
carefully prepared skulls and picture puzzles make analysis 
appear easier than it really is in science, but they certainly 
do not over-emphasize the difficultness of synthesis. The fact 
is that in analyzing anything physically or psychologically 
.we learn a great deal about it. That is just the reason for 
analysis. And it is also a fact whose scientific importance 
should not escape us, that in attempting to synthesize what 
we have successfully analyzed we learn vastly more about it. 

All of our concrete experiences are products of natural 
syntheses. — Professor Wundt emphasizes the fact that 
" pure sensations " and " simple feelings " are not to be 
found in consciousness as concrete experiences. They exist 
only in more or less complicated relations to one another 
as groups of psychological elements. Like the atoms of 
chemistry, they are abstractions which are useful in the 
description of objects. All of the real experiences which 
we are interested in as men and as psychologists are com- 
plexes of sensations, images, and affections. Professor 
Wundt very profitably and logically discusses these prod- 
ucts of natural synthesis as " psychical compounds " and 
" interconnections of psychical compounds." And in so 
doing he makes it clear that in analyzing our experiences 
we really reverse the synthetic process and attempt to 
resolve these complexes into their parts, whereas in syn- 
thesis of the same complexes, we attempt to bring the parts 
together again in their proper relations. 

An excellent example of the process of synthesis which 
continually goes on in our minds is furnished by the fol- 
lowing experience which I take immediately from my intro- 
spection. I am aware of an object before me which I call 
an ink-bottle. As I review the past few moments I note 
that my consciousness of the particular object grew by the 



88 THE BUILDING OF COMPLEX EXPERIENCES 

combining of certain sensations and feelings. First of all 
there were the sensations of light and color — black, white, 
red, yellow — of label and fluid and the variations thereof 
which came to me as I looked at the bottle from different 
points of view. Then there were the sensations of cool- 
ness, of smoothness, of stickiness (where the ink had spilled 
over the bottle), of contact and pressure, and of weight as 
I lifted the object from the desk. Finally, I experienced 
yet other sensations as I removed the cork from the bottle 
and smelled the ink. Accompanying the sensations, I noted 
certain agreeable and disagreeable feelings. The coolness 
of the bottle was agreeable ; the stickiness and the odor 
were disagreeable. This natural process of the growth or 
upbuilding of my consciousness of the object is typical of 
what is constantly going on in our minds. 

It is fascinatingly interesting to observe the growth of 
conscious complexes, and it is equally interesting to reverse 
the process and by an analytic procedure break them up 
into their simpler parts or elements. Self-observation may 
be used with profit both in the study of the natural syn- 
thesis of conscious elements and in the study of the constitu- 
tion of complexes whose growth has not been observed. 

Simple examples of synthesis in psychology. — Just as 
it is difficult for the beginner to think of an experience as 
anything but what it is, a whole or unity, so it is difficult 
for him to conceive of a complex experience being built up 
by the welding together of simpler bits of consciousness. 
Examples of the results of synthesis will lessen this diffi- 
culty. 

We all know what harmony and discord mean in sound 
experiences, and we know too from the previous chapter 
that certain apparently simple experiences of sound are 
analyzable into simpler parts or psychological elements. 
Given the fact that certain combinations of these elements 
of sound experiences are harmonious and others discordant 



PSYCHOLOGICAL SYNTHESES 89 

or inharmonious, the problem of synthesis is to discover how 
to create either kind of experience at will. Often a musician 
can answer the question, What elements of consciousness 
must be combined, and in what relations, if discord is to 
result? This may lead to the suspicion that the knowledge 
is not psychological. But the truth is that the skilled 
musician has a practical knowledge of the psychology of 
auditory experience which far surpasses in extent and 
thoroughness that of most professional students of con- 
sciousness. He may not recognize his knowledge of the 
elements of auditory experience, and of their relations, as 
psychological, but it is not the less so for that reason. Ask 
any musician how to produce an harmonious or an inhar- 
monious sound by combining tones and he will immediately 
tell you of several ways. 

Similarly the skilled and successful artist has a practical 
knowledge of the elements and relations of color experi- 
ences. Certain color sensations tend to fight with one 
another, we are told; others agree or harmonize. This 
knowledge is invaluable if one wishes to obtain a certain 
artistic or economic effect. Again, color combinations have 
a marked effect upon the apparent warmth of a scene. It 
is not a foolish question to ask how a room may be fur- 
nished to make it seem warm, or small, or low, or cozy. 
The arrangement of those psychological elements which to- 
gether make up the experience of the room determines these 
matters. It is the psychologist's business to know pre- 
cisely what elements and in what relations will yield a 
given experience. 

To take another practical example, there are daily being 
created in the bakery and in the kitchen combinations of 
substances, each sapid and more or less likely to arouse 
our satisfaction, which " taste good." Into the ordinary 
culinary product go half a dozen or even a score of sub- 
stances which have specific tastes and odors. How is the 



90 THE BUILDING OF COMPLEX EXPERIENCES 

cook able to predict the gustatory experience which will 
result from these combinations of substances? Unfor- 
tunately she does not with certainty. Frequently she de- 
pends upon trial and error! But nevertheless, it is possi- 
ble, by a careful study of the elementary sensations of taste 
and smell and of their relations, to discover which are 
harmonious and which are inharmonious; which tend to 
destroy one another and which tend mutually to strengthen 
one another; which combine in such a way as to produce a 
new taste or odor entirely different from any of the ele- 
ments, and which refuse to combine. Each of us can from 
introspection produce examples of these sorts of experience. 
Now it is the duty, as well as the business, of the psy- 
chologist to furnish the information which will enable the 
cook, no less than the musician, the painter, or the house 
furnisher, to create objects, satisfactory according to their 
kind, not by a hit or miss method, but with the certainty 
and economic skill and saving which come from definite 
knowledge and foresight. This indeed is the psychologist's 
duty and privilege just as it is the chemist's to provide 
that knowledge which is to-day transforming our chemical 
industries. "Whether we are building a ship, manufactur- 
ing a dyestuff, painting a picture, or writing a book, we 
should be guided by definite knowledge of the elemental 
things with which we have to deal and of the ways in which 
they should be combined. 

Synthesis and practical interests. — The examples which 
have been chosen to illustrate psychological synthesis may 
seem trivial. They are not, for no point in which man 
gains control over himself or over his environment is trivial. 
However slight the importance of a certain bit of physical 
or psychological information may appear to-day it may 
prove of inestimable worth to-morrow. 

After all, it is by a process of synthesis that we aid in 
developing the mind of the child. Is this being done with 



VALUES OF SYNTHESIS 91 

consummate skill and insight to-day ? Do we know as much 
as is necessary about the nature of mind, its composition, 
its constitution, and the relations of its elements and com- 
plexes? Are we seeking certain ends with that definite 
scientific knowledge of means which alone can enable us to 
achieve them without waste and without failure? Are 
we working, as conscious beings, wisely or blindly? There 
is no doubt about the answer to the questions. We have to 
dodge the facts in order to say yes. 

Why do we study the processes of synthesis which are 
occurring within and about us. — All the while in our en- 
vironment and in our bodies objects are being broken into 
simpler parts and others are being built up from these 
parts. The plants and animals, for example, which to- 
morrow will serve as our food, are to-day growing by means 
of complex processes of chemical synthesis. All the while 
our concrete experiences are being created by the com- 
bining of more or less simple elements of consciousness. 
Why are we so keenly interested in observing these proc- 
esses? The question is answered by the single word " con- 
trol." We seek to understand the ways in which things 
grow — the objects of nature not less than our own minds — 
in order that we may direct the growth process to our satis- 
faction. Wherever we look we see examples of the practical 
application of such knowledge as has already been acquired. 
Races of plants and animals are improved by human skill. 
Our enjoyment of life is increased by the control of the 
conditions of gesthetic experience. Indeed, it is only as we 
become the masters of the synthetic process in the physical 
or in the psychological sciences that we are able to direct 
the course of events for our convenience and welfare. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The analytic and synthetic study of the 
consciousness of (a) lemonade, (b) ginger-ale, (e) horse-radish. 



92 THE BUILDING OF COMPLEX EXPERIENCES 

Materials : paper, pen or pencil, and some one or all of the 
substances mentioned. This exercise should be performed out 
of class and the written reports should be brought to the class- 
room as bases for the discussion of the task. 

First, analyze carefully and deliberately the perceptual con- 
sciousness of lemonade (either of the other substances will serve 
equally well). After as many as are discoverable of the con- 
stituent elements of the consciousness have been noted, the at- 
tempt to isolate one or another of the factors from the others 
may be made. Thus, lemon juice without sugar will furnish an 
experience lacking the element of sweetness. It may prove pos- 
sible also to isolate the sensation of warmth or of coolness. 

This exercise is likely to prove especially interesting and valu- 
able in connection with the reading of Professor Bentley's dis- 
cussion of " The Synthetic Experiment." 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Bentley, Madison: The synthetic experiment. American Journal of 
Psychology, vol. 11, pp. 405-425. 1900. 

Judd, C. H.: Genetic psychology, chapter 2. 

Galton, Francis : Inquiries into human faculty, " Composite por- 
traiture." 

Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, chapter 13. 

Titchenee, E. B.: Text-book of psychology, §§87, 99-101. 



CHAPTER IX 

SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

" I was once without the sense of smell and taste for several days. 
It seemed incredible, this utter detachment from odors, to breathe 
the air in and observe never a single scent. The feeling was probably 
similar, though less in degree, to that of one who first loses sight and 
can not but expect to see the light again any day, any minute. I knew 
I should smell again some time. Still, after the wonder had passed 
off, a loneliness crept over me as vast as the air whose myriad odors 
I missed. The multitudinous subtle delights that smell makes mine 
became for a time wistful memories. When I recovered the lost 
sense, my heart bounded with gladness." 

" I am sure that if a fairy bade me choose between the sense of 
sight and that of touch, I would not part with the warm, endearing 
contact of human hands or the wealth of form, the mobility and 
fullness that press into my palms." — These are the words of an ob- 
server who lacks sight and hearing. — Keller, Helen: The world I 
live in, pp. 78, 83. 

Simple psychological phenomena. — According to the 
opinions of a number of competent psychologists there are 
two, and only two, great classes of simple or elementary 
psychical phenomena. They are sensations and affections. 
For the present we may accept this opinion as ours and 
give our attention to the study of these varieties of con- 
sciousness. In so doing we must ever be mindful that both 
simple sensations and affections are products of analysis, 
not concrete experiences. 

A sensation is a simple fact of consciousness which is 
referred to some definite bodily organ — its sense organ. An 
affection, on the contrary, is a simple fact of consciousness 
which is not referred to a particular organ, but, instead, 
is pervasive of the whole body. 

Rules for the observation of sensations. — Not all 
sensations can with profit be observed in a given way, but, 

93 



94 SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

all things considered, the following set of rules for their 
introspection, formulated by Professor Titchener in his 
" Outline of Psychology," constitutes an admirable guide 
for the beginner. 

Rule 1. "When we introspect, we must be absolutely im- 
partial and unprejudiced. We must not let ourselves be 
biased by any preconceived idea. We are likely to think 
that, in all probability, a certain thing will happen, or we 
may actually want to obtain a given result, to confirm some 
view which we have already formed. In either case, we 
are in danger of mistaken observation. We ought to be 
ready to take the facts precisely as they are. 

Rule 2. When we introspect, we must have our atten- 
tion under control. The attention must not be permitted 
either to flag or to wander. 

Rule 3. When we introspect, body and mind must be 
fresh. 

Rule 4. When we introspect, our general disposition, 
physical and mental, should be favorable. We must feel 
well, feel comfortable, feel good-tempered, and feel inter- 
ested in the subject. 

These rules are obviously of fundamental importance for 
all introspection, and not alone for the introspection of 
sensation. 

The five special senses. — Popular opinion has it that 
there are just five kinds or classes of sensation. These 
groups are called the special senses of sight, hearing, touch, 
taste, and smell. They obviously correspond to, and are 
commonly referred to, the five portions of the body which 
are popularly recognized as sense organs — the eye, the ear, 
the skin, the tongue, and the nose. Indeed, it is just be- 
cause the average person is familiar with only five kinds 
of receptive organ that he divides sensations into five 
classes. There are, as a matter of fact, many more than 
these kinds of sensation. Precisely how many it is impossi- 



CLASSIFICATION OF SENSATIONS 95 

ble to state, for we can not be sure that our list is com- 
plete. In a classification of the sensations which will prove 
useful to us, Professor Titchener names eight classes in 
addition to the five " special senses." These additional 
classes he groups under the heading " organic sensations," 
as contrasted with ' ' sensations of the special senses. ' ' 

CLASSIFICATION OF SENSATIONS 

I. Sensations of the Special Senses (external stimulus). 

1. Visual sensations. 

a. Sensations of light (stimulus: mixed light). 

b. Sensations of color (stimulus: homogeneous or 

pure light). 

2. Auditory sensations. 

a. Sensations of noise (stimulus: sound concussion 

or shock). 

b. Sensations of tone (stimulus: sound-wave). 

3. Olfactory sensations (stimulus: odorous particles car- 

ried by a draught of air). 

4. Gustatory sensations (stimulus: the chemical constitu- 

tion of certain substances, which enables them to 
excite the organs of taste). 

5. Cutaneous sensations. 

a. Sensations of pressure and pain (stimulus: me- 

chanical affection of cutis and epidermis). 

b. Sensations of temperature (stimulus: thermal 

affection of the skin). 
II. Organic Sensations (internal stimulus). 

6. Muscular sensations (stimulus: contraction of muscles). 

7. Tendinous sensations (stimulus: pull or strain upon 

tendon). 

8. Articular sensations (stimulus: rubbing or jamming to- 

gether of surfaces of joints). 

9. Sensations from the alimentary canal. 

a. From the pharynx (stimulus: dryness of mucous 

membrane). 

b. From the oesophagus (stimulus: antiperistaltic 

reflex). 
e. From the stomach (stimulus: dryness of gastric 
mucous membrane). 



03 SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

10. Circulatory sensations (stimulus: change in circula- 

tion ) . 

11. Respiratory sensations (stimulus: change in breathing). 

12. Sexual sensations (stimulus: change in blood-supply, 

or in "secretory activity, of the sex organs). 

13. Sensations of the "static sense" (stimulus: change in 

the distribution of pressure from the fluid of the 
semicircular canals of the internal ear). 

A " sense " often includes distinct systems of sensation. 

— As this classification indicates, the word " sense " does 
not necessarily designate a homogeneous group of sensa- 
tions. Sight includes two distinct systems, the colorless 
light sensations, and the color sensations. Hearing, sim- 
ilarly, includes tone sensations and noise sensations; and 
what is popularly known as touch, really consists of at 
least four systems of sensation : pressure, pain, warmth, and 
cold. It will be convenient for us, therefore, to have a 
name for a group of sensations whose homogeneity separates 
it from other sensation systems of the same sense. For 
this purpose the word " mode " seems suitable. We there- 
fore shall speak of a mode of sensation, meaning thereby 
a group of sensations which differs from other groups psy- 
chologically but not necessarily with respect to the organ 
of sense to which it is referred. Tone sensations, or, better, 
the mode of tone sensation, are referred to the ear, as are 
also noise sensations, yet they belong to different systems. 
To indicate this fact we may speak of two modes of auditory 
sensations : The tone mode and the noise mode. 

A list of the modes of sensation with which psychologists 
are now familiar would have to include the following groups 
and systems of sensations : 

Achromatic (brightness) sen- Noise sensations 

sations Dizziness sensations? 

Chromatic (color) sensations Equilibrational (static sense) 

Tone sensations sensations 



SENSATION, SENSE ORGAN, AND STIMULUS 97 

Pressure sensations Muscle sensations 

Tickle sensations Joint sensations 

Sex sensations Tendon sensations 

Warmth sensations Organic sensations (probably 
Cold sensations many modes) 

Pain sensations (perhaps sev- Taste sensations 

eral modes) Smell sensations 

It seems quite improbable that this list is complete. Like 
the list of the chemical elements, it has been growing for 
years, and we have no reason to suppose that we have ex- 
hausted the possibilities of discovery. At any rate, it will 
serve to indicate that the five special senses include only 
a feiv of our important modes of sense. 

Sensation, sense organ, and stimulus. — Sensations are 
always referred to particular organs which are brought into 
action by disturbances without or within the organism. 
These disturbances are called stimuli, and the sense organs, 
because of their capacity to receive stimuli and to respond 
by certain activities, are called receptors. The physiologist, 
in order to avoid the implication of consciousness, speaks 
of photo-receptors, instead of eyes; of chemo-receptors, in- 
stead of noses or tongues. With the stimuli which operate 
upon sense organs, physics is concerned, for they are modes 
of energy and must be studied as such. With the sense 
organs to which sensations are referred, anatomy and physi- 
ology are concerned, for they are bodily structures whose 
form and function demand investigation. With sensations, 
psychology is concerned, for they are elements of con- 
sciousness. 

Ways of classifying sensations. — There are three im- 
portant ways of arranging or classifying sensations. They 
are (1) according to their degree of psychological likeness, 
(2) according to the bodily organs (sense organs) to which 
they are referred, and (3) according to the kind of stimulus 
which gives rise to them. 



98 SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

Of these three commonly used methods of grouping sensa- 
tions, the first is by all means the most valuable for strictly 
psychological purposes since it takes account of psycho- 
logical peculiarities of the things which are to be classified. 
It leads us to place color sensations together and to sep- 
arate them from all other sensations. It leads us also to 
place touch sensations in a different group from that in 
which we place tickle sensations. 

The second method is, however, more widely used aside 
from psychological studies. It is the basis of the groups 
which are known as the " special senses." There are in 
fact just five kinds of sense organs which force themselves 
upon the attention of the ordinary observer. These are 
the eyes, the ears, the touch organs (fingers, lips, etc.), the 
nose, and the tongue. Unfortunately for the value of this 
method, there are a great many kinds of organs which can 
not readily be seen. It is the overlooking of these organs 
which is responsible for the erroneous belief that we have 
only five senses. 

Classification according to the kind of stimulus which 
arouses sensations is valuable psychologically, for it brings 
into clear light the fact that each kind of sense organ is 
adapted especially well for the reception of a certain kind of 
stimulus. The eye, for example, responds most normally 
to light; the ear to air vibrations; the nose to chemical 
action on its membranes; the pressure organs to mechan- 
ical disturbances about them; and the temperature organs 
to changes in the temperature of their surroundings. 

There are only a few large classes of sensations, but 
there are many distinguishable sensation-elements in 
consciousness. — It is estimated that the normal human 
being experiences at least fifty thousand different sensa- 
tions. Of visual sensations alone there are almost forty 
thousand, and of auditory sensations there are more than 
ten thousand. For this reason it is quite impossible for 



LIST OF SENSE MODES 



99 



us to attach a name to each particular kind of sensation. 
Instead, we arrange them after the manner described above 
and content ourselves with names for the groups of ele- 
ments. Doubtless as the science of psychology progresses 
these groups will be broken up more and more because of 
the discovery of peculiarities which were at first overlooked. 

A list of human sense organs, with their corresponding stimuli, their 
sense modes, and the number of qualities of sensation in each 



SENSE ORGAN 



Eye (Retina) 



Ear (Cochlea) 

Ear (Cristse of 
canals) 

Ear (Maculae of 
sacs) 

Nose (Olfactory 
cells) 

Tongue ( Gusta- 
tory cells) 

Skin (Hair bulbs 
and corpuscles of 
Meissner ) 

Skin (Corpuscles 
of Ruffini) 



Skin (Bulbs 
Krause ) 



of 



Skin (Free nerve 
endings) 

Skin and muscle 
(?) 



Light : mixed 
wave-lengths in 
ether 

Light : homogen- 
eous waves in 
ether 

Air vibrations 
Air concussions 

Movements of 
fluid in canals 



Movements 
fluid in sacs 



of 



Chemical action 



Chemical action 

Mechanical dis- 
turbances ( Touch, 
pressure, etc.) 

High tempera- 
tures 

Low temperatures 

Mechanical, ther- 
m a 1 , electrical, 
chemical 

Mechanical dis- 
turbances 
(slight) 



MODES OF 
SENSATION 



Acromatic o r 
white light mode 

Chromatic or 

color light mode 

Tone mode 
Noise mode 

Dizziness mode ? 
Vestibular mode ? 

Smell mode 

Taste mode 

Pressure mode 

Warmth mode 
Cold mode 

Pain mode 
Tickle mode 



NUMBER OP 
QUALITIES 



600—700 



32,000—36,000 

11,000—12,000 
500—600 

1— ? 

1— ? 

9 classes, each of 
which contains 
hundreds of qual- 
ities 



1— ? 

1— ? 
1— ? 

1— ? 
1— ? 



100 SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 



SENSE ORGAN 


STIMULUS 


MODES OP 
SENSATION 


NUMBER OP 
QUALITIES 


Muscles ( Fascial 
corpuscles and 
muscle spindles) 


Mechanical 
chemical 


and 


Muscular mode 


2—1 


Tendons ( Spin- 
dles of Golgi) 


Mechanical 
chemical 


and 


Tendinous mode 


1— ? 


Joints ( Sensory 
corpuscles) 


Mechanical 




Articular mode 


1— ? 


Internal organs 










Digestive system 


Mechanical 




Probably no new 
mode 


3—? 


Circulatory sys- 
tem 


Mechanical 
chemical 


and 


Probably no new 
mode 


1— ? 


Respiratory sys- 
tem 


Mechanical 
chemical 


and 


Probably no new 
mode 


1— ? 


Urino-genital 

system 


Mechanical 
chemical 


and 


Probably no new 
mode 


1— ? 


Subcutaneous tis- 










sues ( Pacinian 
corpuscles ) 


Mechanical 




Pressure mode 


1 — ? 



Animals differ in respect to their senses. — Some kinds 
of animals have few senses, some have many. Some are 
strikingly like man in sensibility, others are as strikingly 
different. The dog, like the human being, has a sense of 
smell, but it is extremely different from the human sense 
in degree of development. Indeed, so acute is olfactory 
sensibility in this animal that psychologists have thus far 
found no way to study it. The dog's sense of sight also 
is markedly different from man's, for it apparently does 
not include color vision. Certain animals, like the lobster 
and the crab, lack hearing. They are sensitive to slight 
jars and vibrations in the surface upon which they rest, 
but they utterly lack what we understand by sensations of" 
sound. On the other hand, there is excellent reason to 
believe that there are animals in which senses exist of 
which we have no knowledge. How else are we to explain 
to ourselves the remarkable ability of certain beings to find 



INDIVIDUAL SENSE DIFFERENCES 101 

their way home or to make long migratory journeys? We 
must not permit ourselves the thought that all animals 
experience the same sensations, or even that they possess 
the same modes of sense. 

Even human beings differ importantly with regard 
to the number and characteristics of their sensations. — 
The color-blind individual is not a rarity, and partial or 
total deafness occurs frequently. Those exceptional indi- 
viduals who wholly lack such senses as sight, hearing, taste, 
smell, or the several modes of sense of the skin, necessarily 
live in a world of their own. They learn to recognize things 
in ways which are strange to us. They become proficient in 
the use of the receptive organs which they happen to have 
at command. To an almost incredible extent the organs 
of touch and smell may be made to do the duty of sight. 
This the statements of Miss Helen Keller prove. But hear- 
ing too may bear its share of the burden and its great 
acuteness often goes far toward compensating for total 
blindness. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The upper limit of hearing. Materials : 
Galton whistle (either the ordinary type or the Edleniann modi- 
fication), paper, and pen or pencil. 

In preparation for this exercise, each student should write in 
the left margin of a sheet of paper the numbers in order from 
1 to 20. With the whistle, the instructor — who will act as ex- 
perimenter for the class — produces in succession tones differing 
in pitch. He may either follow the plan here suggested, or 
better, he may arrange a series of stimuli to suit the circumstances 
of the exercise. 

SUGGESTED PLAN 
Number of test Result : heard or not heard Vibration rate or pitch of tone 

1 Yes =; heard 10,000 complete vibrations 

2 " 14,000 

3 " 16,000 

4 " 18,000 

5 " 20,000 

6 " 21,000 
and so on, by steps of 1,000 vibrations to 30,000. 



102 SENSATIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

Each time, immediately after the sounding of the whistle, the 
student should record on his record sheet whether or not he 
heard the tone. It is important that he early learn to distin- 
guish between the hiss of the air escaping from the whistle and 
the tone, and it is also important that he attempt to describe the 
various tones in terms of their peculiarities. 

If time permits, the order of the tests may be reversed and, 
beginning with a tone whose pitch is too high to be heard, the 
experimenter may produce with the whistle lower and lower tones, 
until finally a point is reached at which all members of the group 
clearly recognize the tone. 

At the conclusion of the exercise, the results may be handed 
to some member of the class for special study and report. Such 
a general report should embody the results of reading on the 
special topic of the upper limit of hearing as well as a statement 
of the general results of the class experiment. 

As references for further information may be mentioned 
Myers, C. S., " Text-book of Experimental Psychology," p. 36 
Galton, Francis, " Inquiries into Human Faculty," pp. 26, 252 
Titchener, E. B., " Experimental Psychology," vol. 2, part 2, 
p. 41 ff . 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Wundt, Wm. : Outlines of psychology, § 6. 
Thokndike, E. L. : Elements of psychology, chapter 2. 
Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§10-13. 



CHAPTER X 

THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

" We call the reverberations of a thunderstorm more voluminous 
than the squeaking of a slate-pencil; the entrance into a warm bath 
gives our skin a more massive feeling than the prick of a pin; a 
little neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face seems less exten- 
sive than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discomfort of a 
colic or a lumbago; and a solitary star looks smaller than the 
noonday sky. . . . 

" In the sensations of smell and taste this element [property] of 
varying vastness seems less prominent but not altogether absent. 
Some tastes and smells appear less extensive than complex flavors, 
like that of roast meat or plum pudding, on the one hand, or heavy 
odors like musk or tuberose, on the other. The epithet sharp given 
to the acid class would seem to show that to the popular mind there 
is something narrow and, as it were, streaky, in the impression they 
make, other flavors and odors being bigger and rounder." — James, 
Wm. : Principles of psychology, vol. 2, pp. 134, 135. 

The properties, characteristics, or attributes of things. 
— All objects, whether they be physical or psychical, possess 
properties, or, rather, are constituted by a certain group 
of properties. A property may, for our purposes, be defined 
as a way in which an object behaves. We call an object 
red if it behaves in a certain way with respect to light. 
We call it hard if it behaves in a certain way when touched. 
We call it brittle, explosive, inflammable, according to 
its behavior. Molecules, crystals, flowers, birds, and also 
psychic objects such as sensations and affections are dis- 
tinguished from one another by their different properties. 
It shall be our task in this chapter to examine into the 
number and nature of the properties of sensations. 

There are two classes of properties belonging to sensa- 
tions: the common and the particular. — Certain proper- 
ties are possessed by all sensations. These we call common 

103 



104 



THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 



or essential properties. Others, which we may call par- 
ticular or accidental, belong to only a few or to a single 
sensation. Misunderstandings have arisen because many 
text-books of psychology present lists of the common prop- 
erties of sensations without emphasizing the fact that every 
sensation possesses a great many other properties which are 
not common to all sensations. 

Common properties of sensations enumerated by dif- 
ferent psychologists. — 



WUNDT 


MUNSTERBERG 


TITCHENER 


ANGELL 


BALDWIN 


Quality 
Intensity 


Quality 
Intensity 
Vividness 
Value 


Quality 

Intensity 

Clearness 


Quality 
Intensity 


Quality 
Quantity 






Tone 




Duration 


Duration 
Estensity 



















Comparison of these several lists yields a total of six 
different properties. They are quality, intensity (or quan- 
tity), clearness (or vividness), duration, extensity, and 
value (or tone). The use of different terms to designate 
the same psychological facts is an annoying practice in 
psychology and one which should as rapidly as possible 
be corrected by the adoption of a certain system of 
terms. 

From the above lists, which are fairly representative of 
psychological opinion, we discover that quality is a. char- 
acteristic of sensation generally accepted and by right of 
importance placed at the head of the list. Intensity also 
is universally accepted and ranked next in importance to 
quality. The other characteristics are of less importance 



QUALITY OF SENSATIONS 105 

and their number varies according to the theoretical views 
of the individual psychologist as well as with his intro- 
spective ability and experience. 

Certain sensations have clearness, duration, extensity 
(called voluminousness by Professor James), and value. 
The pertinent question is, do these properties belong in the 
same class with quality and intensity by virtue of the fact 
that they are common to all sensations? At this point it 
should be noted that Professor Miinsterberg and Professor 
Baldwin include in their lists an attribute (value or feeling- 
tone) which is missing from all the other lists. This means 
that they believe that each sensation has a certain feeling- 
tone or value, and is, necessarily, more or less agreeable 
or disagreeable. Other psychologists, and they appear now 
to be in the majority, believe, on the contrary, that feeling- 
tone is really an element of consciousness instead of an 
attribute of sensations. 

Quality is the property by means of which we recognize 
and name sensations. — Quality is to sensation what ex- 
pression is to the human face. But for it and its variety 
our sense experience would be monotonous. We experience 
thousands of qualitatively different sensations daily. A 
sensation of color differs from a sensation of taste first of 
all in quality. A sensation of red differs from a sensation 
of green primarily in quality. One sensation of red may 
differ from another sensation of red merely in quality, yet 
psychologically they may be as different as night is from 
day. All other characteristics remaining the same, we 
readily distinguish sensations of diverse quality. No won- 
der then that introspection forces us to place quality at 
the head of the list of the attributes of sensation. 

It is quality which gives its name to a sensation. Red, 
as a name for a sense-element, designates not a single quality 
but a group of qualities, for there are many qualitatively 
different sensations of redness. Pain, likewise, designates 



106 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

not a single sensation, but a class of pain qualities. And 
so it is throughout our list of words for sensations. We 
have names not for particular qualities but for classes of 
qualities. These classes we have above proposed to call 
sense modes. A single " mode of sense " may include a 
dozen, a hundred, or thousands of qualities, and a " sense " 
always includes a large number of different qualities. The 
sense of sight, for instance, includes hundreds of qualities 
of light sensations and thousands of color sensations, so 
that together there are several thousands of visual sensa- 
tions. 

Quality is the most interesting characteristic of sensa- 
tions, yet it alone does not enable us to describe a sensation- 
element satisfactorily. As well might the chemist claim to 
have completed his account of a chemical element after 
stating its atomic weight as might the psychologist con- 
sider his task finished after the quality of a sensation has 
been named. 

We describe things by pointing out as many of their char- 
acteristics as we can discover. The newly discovered metal 
has a score of attributes which are of value. So has the 
newly discovered sensation. In emphasizing the importance 
of quality we must not lose sight of the value of the other 
characteristics of sensations. 

Every sensation has intensity. — Intensity is but another 
name for the quantity of sensation per unit of time. It 
has nothing to do directly with duration or quality. A 
sour taste may be weak or strong; of slight or of great 
intensity. Indeed, we are able to measure the intensity 
of sensations by taking account of the number of steps by 
which one differs from another. Two sensations of the 
same quality may yet be readily distinguishable by reason 
of difference in intensity. A sensation of tone may be 
varied in intensity from its faintest perceivable condition 
to a loudness which can not be exceeded. Between these 



CLEARNESS OF SENSATIONS 107 

two points there are hundreds of intensities which can be 
distinguished. It requires some introspective care to avoid 
confusing qualitative with intensive differences, for when 
there are great differences in the intensity of two colors, 
or lights, or sounds, or tastes it may at first seem as though 
the two differed in quality. 

Every sensation has clearness. — Each of us has experi- 
enced pains which were surprisingly mild and unobtrusive. 
A cut, or burn, or bruise has caused us almost no annoy- 
ance because we were occupied fully with some task and 
we had no time to attend to it. A sound from the street 
has come to us faintly not because it was faint but because 
we were occupied. Evidently clearness is not the same as 
intensity either psychologically or physiologically. Two 
sensations of precisely the same quality and intensity may 
yet seem quite different, and they may not be recognized 
as identical in these characteristics, because of difference in 
clearness. 

Concerning this property of sensation Professor Munster- 
berg writes, ' ' Vividness is not identical with intensity ; the 
vivid impression of a weak sound and the faint impression 
of a strong sound are in no way interchangeable. If the 
ticking of a clock in my room becomes less and less vivid 
for me the more I become absorbed in my work, till it 
finally disappears, it can not be compared with the experi- 
ence which results when the clock to which I give my full 
attention is carried farther and farther away. The white 
impression, when it loses vividness, does not become gray 
and finally black, nor the large size small, nor the hot luke- 
warm." (Munsterberg, Hugo : Psychology and Life, p. 86.) 

Every sensation has duration. — A sensation which does 
not last for at least an instant is inconceivable. With re- 
spect to the length of time which they remain with us sensa- 
tions differ rather markedly. Among the pain sensations 
some are momentary thrills or throbs, others are persistent 



108 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

dull aches. Some flash through consciousness, and others 
enter and leave it slowly. Here, then, we seem to have an 
additional characteristic by which it should be possible to 
distinguish sensations or, at least, to perfect our descrip- 
tion. We should measure with all attainable accuracy the 
duration of each mode of sensation, and of such qualities 
within a mode as vary in this respect, and we should then 
use the available facts for descriptive purposes. Such 
rough statements as those we are accustomed to hear and 
to make with reference to the length of life of a sensation 
are far from satisfying to the scientific mind. We must 
know accurately the duration of each kind of sensation. 
It is not sufficient that we know pressure sensation to be 
of greater duration, as a rule, than color sensation. Our 
knowledge must be rendered precise, if the characteristics 
of sensations are to be made valuable in description. 

Many, if not all sensations, possess a certain extensity 
or voluminousness. — Professor James has thus stated the 
facts of introspection : "In the sensations of hearing, 
touch, sight, and pain we are accustomed to distinguish 
from among the other elements (or characteristics) the 
element of voluminousness. ' ' The sound of a croaking frog 
is vastly more voluminous than that of a shrill whistle. 
In fact, low tones or deep noises are as a rule more ex- 
tensive than high tones or piercing noises. Languages indi- 
cate this fact by characterizing sensations as dull, deep, 
piercing, penetrating, flat, sharp, cutting. The difference 
between the lowest audible tone of a tuning fork and the 
highest audible tone is not merely one of quality or even 
one of intensity, of clearness, or of duration, for there is 
a voluminousness about the low tone which is in marked 
contrast with the small extent of the high tone. The 
former seems to be massive and spread out ; the latter 
seems sharp and it has an effect which is best described as 
cutting. 



VALUE OF SENSATIONS 109. 

Again, two pain sensations are often readily distin- 
guishable by their extensity : the one is all pervasive, the 
other narrowly limited. And this has reference not to the 
amount of the body stimulated, but instead to our con- 
sciousness of the size of the sensation itself. Professor 
James has picked out those senses in which voluminousness 
is most striking. Surely we have in extensity still another 
characteristic of sensations which is worthy of careful in- 
vestigation and accurate measurement. 

The value or feeling-tone of sensations. — Many sensa- 
tions are accompanied by a feeling- or affective-tone which 
seems to be a characteristic of the sensation itself. Evi- 
dently there are two possibilities: either this feeling may 
be an element of consciousness which accompanies certain 
sensations, or it may be an aspect or property of the sensa- 
tion itself. At present the facts of introspection do not 
enable us to decide with certainty which is the case. It 
may prove to be true that there are independent " sense- 
feelings, ' ' as Professor Wundt calls them, which sometimes 
accompany sensations, and also that there is an affective- 
tone which is a characteristic or property of the sensations. 
The best we can do is to note that some sensations feel 
agreeable, some disagreeable, and others indifferent. It is 
the business of the psychologist to study this aspect of 
sensation with such care as to discover definitely whether 
or not sensations possess the attribute of feeling-tone. 

Are there other characteristics of sensation? — Yes, the 
particular. In the opinion of the writer, it is just as mis- 
leading to state that there are two, three, or four properties 
of sensation as it is to contend that there are but five 
special senses. As a fact there is an indefinite number of 
properties, attributes, or characteristics, only a few of which 
are common to all sensations. 

Of the many particular or accidental properties of sensa- 
tions, only a few are mentioned in psychological text-books. 



.110 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

Many of them, in fact, are not sufficiently well known in 
introspection to justify attempts at description. But far 
more unfortunate than this gap in our knowledge of the 
particular characteristics of sensations is the fact that many 
psychologies lead their readers to infer that quality and 
intensity together with two or three other attributes are 
the sole properties of sensations. It is manifestly unwise 
for a psychologist to set a limit to the number of character- 
istics which a sensation, or any other consciousness, may 
possess. As well might the physicist attempt to set a limit 
to the number of possible characteristics, attributes, or 
properties of a flying-machine, or the biologist maintain 
that protoplasm has four and only four properties 

We should study the particular as well as the common 
properties of sensations. — Instead of limiting ourselves to 
a study of the common properties of sensations, we should 
strive to discover as much as possible about their nature and 
relations. As the astronomer studies the heavenly bodies 
in order to learn all that he can about their behavior, so the 
psychologist should study sensations in order to learn as 
completely as he can what may be expected of them. There 
are innumerable conditions or respects in which a sensation 
may be tested, and each exhibits a new property of • the 
phenomenon. Who shall say how many important par- 
ticular properties we may discover if we persistently ex- 
amine our sensations? 

A partial list of the facts about sensations which are 
observable. — It is to be remembered that this list is 
avowedly incomplete, and that it should be the task of 
every reader to add to it. 

We may study any simple sensation in order to get in- 
formation concerning: 

(1) The threshold. — There is a minimal sensation for 
every " mode " and " quality " of sense. Is this least of 
sensations of the same size for all the modes and qualities? 



PARTICULAR PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 111 

Does it bear the same relation to the physical stimulus and 
to the activity of the sense organ in each case? Is the 
amount of energy expended by the nervous system (sense 
organ) in connection with a minimal or threshold sensation 
alwaj^s the same ? These are psycho-physical problems, but 
they throw an important light upon one characteristic of 
a sensation. The threshold is really the minimal intensity 
of a sensation, but we can not on that account say that it 
is not a characteristic, for it may turn out that there are 
characteristic differences in the thresholds of different 
modes and qualities of sensation. Here research is im- 
perative. 

(2) The maximum. — There is also a maximal sensation 
for each quality. It is at the opposite extreme from the 
threshold. The minimal and the maximal sensations repre- 
sent the intensity limits of a given quality. Suppos- 
ing that here again the maximum is characteristic of 
the quality under consideration, it is evident that it 
should be considered a particular characteristic of the 
sensation. 

(3) The threshold of difference for a sensation. — It is 
legitimate to ask by how much a given sensation must be 
increased or decreased in intensity or changed in quality 
in order that it shall be perceived as different. Provided 
this amount proves to be characteristic of the mode or 
quality, it may properly be spoken of as a characteristic 
of the sensation. 

(4) The position of a sensation in the intensity series. — 
"Whether a given sensation lies near the minimal or near the 
maximal sensations of its series may seem unimportant, but 
for certain purposes this information is invaluable. And 
it has a right to the title of characteristic, for it aids us 
in so describing a sensation that it may be identified with 
certainty. Although this simple fact of position or relation 
to other members of the intensity series evidently has refer- 



112 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

ence to the attribute of intensity, it is different from the 
property of intensity. 

(5) Time of development. — Some sensations gradually 
and slowly push their way into consciousness; others shoot 
in. There is a period of increase, a period of maximal pres- 
ence, and a period of waning. The length or duration of 
each of these periods may be characteristic of a given sense 
mode or quality. If we were seeking merely to string out 
the characteristics of sensations to their greatest length, we 
should speak of these as three separate characteristics. For 
as a fact we have to determine separately (a) the length 
of time during which the sensation waxes in prominence, 
(b) the length of time during which it is at its maximum, 
and (c) the length of time during which it passes from 
the maximum to the vanishing point. How important these 
three facts concerning sensations may prove to be, later in 
the development of our science, no one can safely predict. 
Our clear duty is to collect the facts in order to use them 
as may prove needful later. 

(6) Facts about clearness. — The property of clearness, 
as contrasted with intensity, is dependent upon the relation 
of the simple sensation to other contents of consciousness. 
An intense sensation may be unclear; and a weak sensa- 
tion may be clear. But aside from this fact, it may be 
that certain sensations are prepotent over others, because 
of natural clearness. If we think of each quality of sensa- 
tion as having a number of distinguishable grades of clear- 
ness, then some qualities may have fewer of these grades 
than others, some may go further than others in the direc- 
tion of diminishing clearness, and others may go furthest 
in the direction of increasing clearness. The property of 
clearness in the case of a given sensation might profitably 
be studied (a) with respect to the minimal clearness dis- 
coverable, (b) with respect to the maximal clearness, (c) 
with respect to the number of distinguishable grades of 



INTROSPECTION OF SOUNDS 113 

clearness between the extremes, and (d) with respect to 
the relation of the several facts of clearness to intensity. 

(7) Relations to other sensations. — Every sensation has 
a multitude of properties of relation to other elements of 
consciousness. Gold differs from platinum in its capacity 
to combine with chlorine. A sensation of color differs from 
a sensation of taste in its capacity to combine with a sensa- 
tion of light. Yet each of these characteristic capacities 
or properties is truly an attribute of the objects, and valua- 
ble to him who wishes to describe them. 

In studying a sensation we seek to learn all we can 
about it. — Although our first task in studying the psy- 
chology of sensation is to observe the characteristics of the 
several sense modes and the existence of qualities, it should 
be our aim to learn all that we can about the sensation as 
a psychological object rather than merely to note the ex- 
istence of certain characteristics. No preconceived ideas 
should hamper our observation and no limitations should 
be set to the number of facts which may be discovered. 

Introspective accounts of high and low tones of dif- 
ferent timbre. — From student's reports the following de- 
scriptions of relatively simple auditory experiences are 
quoted to illustrate methods of describing introspections 
and individual differences in consciousness. 

The tones referred to are a Stern variator tone of 300 
complete vibrations per second (low tone) and a Galton 
whistle tone of 12,000 complete vibrations per second (high 
tone) ; and the tones of two Koenig tuning forks, the one 
of 870 complete vibrations per second (low tone), and the 
other of 2,560 complete vibrations per second (high tone). 

First observer. — " The variator tone seems cool, deep, 
wide. I do not know whether it is correct to use these ad- 
jectives of a sound, but they are precisely the ones the tone 
suggests. It is also distant, as though coming from outside 
the room, and rather pleasant. The whistle tone gives me 



114 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

a prickling sensation. Every time it is repeated a needle 
point seems to touch my ear drum. The sound seems to 
be inside the head; certainly not from the desk. 

" The tone from the 870 vibration Koenig fork is to me 
soft, pleasant. The tone from the 2,560 vibration fork 
suggests a yellowish flash, and it is at the same time so 
sweet that it almost brings a perfume. I wish I could ex- 
plain this. I have two distinct impressions as the tone 
reaches me. I can recall each of these tones as distinctly 
afterward as when they are sounded. After ten minutes 
I still can hear them without making an effort to do so. 
They are in my ears." 

Second observer. — ' ' The sound of the variator is pleasing 
and soothing. It is like passing the hand over satin ; or 
looking out on a starlight night. It seems, too, far away, 
as though a memory of something heard years before. If 
a sound has size or shape, this must be broad and convex, 
with no corners. 

" The tone of the whistle seems not so much a sound; it 
is more like a hat-pin thrust into me full length. I shrink 
from it as though the contact were really tactual. It is 
like a bright electric light suddenly flashed into the 
eyes. 

' ' The fork of higher pitch produces 'a more immediate 
effect and it seems nearer than the lower tone. But its 
effect is not so lasting. It does not call up so many associa- 
tions as the lower tone. The higher tone seems to occupy 
less space. It is something like a narrow band; while the 
lower tone is an expanse without boundaries." 

Third observer. — " The sound made by the Galton whistle 
is high and sharp. It is of shorter duration than the tone 
of the variator, and it ends slowly with a lowering of pitch. 
The variator 's tone is, however, more agreeable than the 
sound of the whistle. The whistle tone is like the cry of a 
mouse ; that of the variator is like a locomotive at night 



INTROSPECTION OF SOUNDS 115 

two miles down the track. The sound of the whistle seems 
pink, that of the variator seems blue-black. 

' ' The tone of the 870 vibration tuning fork is gray-blue ; 
that of the 2,560 vibration fork is yellow. The higher of 
the tones also seems to have a metallic quality which is 
entirely lacking in the lower. 

" I could reproduce the sound of the Galton whistle and 
the low tone of the variator by recalling the squeak of a 
mouse and the shriek of a locomotive whistle." 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The properties of sensations of sound. 
Materials : paper and pen or pencil, Galton whistle, tuning forks, 
steel rods, or any instrument or instruments by means of which 
tones differing markedly in pitch, in quality, and in both re- 
spects simultaneously, may be produced. For this exercise spe- 
cial experimental apparatus is not more valuable than musical 
instruments. Every instructor will find it easy to provide suitable 
materials. 

The class may be asked to observe and carefully describe sound 
experiences with respect to the following characteristics: (1) 
Quality. A low and a high tone are sounded in quick succession. 
How do they differ psychologically? (2) Intensity. A faint 
and a loud sound are produced in succession. Describe the 
differences in their effects upon you? Can you readily distin- 
guish differences in pitch from differences in intensity? In 
pitch sounds are high or low; in intensity they are loud or faint. 
(3) Clearness. Let the same sound be heard once without ac- 
companying distracting visual stimuli (such, for example, as the 
writing of the name of the instrument and the pitch of the tone 
on the blackboard while the sound is being produced) and again 
with this visual distraction. Compare the two experiences of 
60und. Are they equally clear or vivid? This experiment may 
have to be repeated several times with slight variations before 
all members of the class are enabled to note degrees of clearness 
in their sensations. (4) Duration. With the Galton whistle two 
tones, the one relatively low and the other high, are produced. 
Do the sensations last equally long? Is duration dependent 
upon the quality or the intensity of a tone? (5) Affective-tone. 



116 THE PROPERTIES OF SENSATIONS 

Are the different tones which you have heard equally agreeable? 
Compare tones differing in pitch, those differing in loudness, 
and finally those produced by various instruments. 

Which of the attributes of auditory sensations observed are 
essential or common, and which are accidental or particular? 
Make a list of the properties of sensations of sound observed by 
you. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titcheneb, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 10-13. 
Munsterberg, Hugo : Psychology and life, chapter on " Psychology 

and physiology." 
Angell, J. R. : Psychology, pp. 145-148. 



CHAPTER XI 
THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

" If it is vacation time and I am digging in my garden and a 
neighbor leans over the fence and says, ' What do you think of 
James ? ' I shall probably think, ' What James ? ' If I were in a 
class-room in the university and a student asked the same question, 
I should think of the gifts and work of the eminent psychologist. 

" The same thought may arouse different associates according to 
whether it is felt in one's work system or play system; one's week- 
day or Sunday system; at home or at school; by one's self or among 
others; in one's scientific or one's sentimental system; in the mood 
of elation or of depression. . . . Notice how every new thought in 
the following reverie is due, not to the previous thought alone, but 
also to the general system of ' African war affairs ' : 

" Sensations of getting warm under sun while walking fast. Sol- 
diers in Africa compared with me. My bag not like soldier's gun but 
officer's sword. Officers do not wear swords, but I saw a picture of 
one with a scabbard recently. British have learned a lot in this 
war. Boers taught officers to quit wearing swords by shooting at 
officers. Old chivalric notions dying out of warfare; thought of 
Fontenoy and the silly exchange of courtesies. Newspaper tale that 
Roberts has society men on his staff as well as real men. Does he 
have to? That's why he keeps ahead of Kitchener, by not appearing 
harsh. What's Kitchener doing as chief of staff? Roberts sending 
him to relieve Rushenburg, something like sending him to the Vic- 
toria West District. I guess they work separately better than to- 
gether. I would better think of something useful. I'll work up this 
train of thought." — Thoendike, E. L.: Elements of psychology, pp. 
248, 249. 

The psychology, as contrasted with the physics and 
physiology, of the senses. — In the few brief chapters which 
can be devoted in this book to sensation, attention is directed 
solely to the psychological properties and peculiarities of 
sense qualities. Departing from the custom in connection 
with outlines of psychology, I have chosen to use all of 
the available space for this strictly psychological task, in- 
stead of giving a portion of it to a consideration of the 
physical characteristics of the stimulus, and to the nature 

117 



118 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

of the physiological processes which occur in the body in 
connection with sensations. This has been done not because 
the facts of physics and physiology are lacking in impor- 
tance, or even because they are less important than the 
matters which are discussed, but simply because this is 
a text-book of psychology, ivhose 'primary purpose is to 
teach self -observation through the study of the problems, 
methods, facts, and principles of the science of mental life. 

Certainly every one should know much about the physical 
conditions of life and about the vital processes themselves, 
but surely this information should not be imparted in a 
course in psychology at the expense of the study of con- 
sciousness. It is as unfair to teach physics and anatomy 
and physiology under the guise and in the name of psy- 
chology as it is to teach psychology under the guise of any 
of the physical sciences, for in any case the student gains 
an incorrect conception of the nature of the science which 
he supposes he is studying. 

Sensations form systems or series. — The sensations of 
some of the modes of sense which were mentioned in Chap- 
ter IX may be arranged in continuous series. This is obvi- 
ously true of achromatic or white light sensations, for we 
can pass by steps from white, through light and dark gray, 
to black. This system of visual sensations is sometimes 
called the brightness series, but because of the need of the 
term brightness for other purposes, it seems more desirable 
to call it the achromatic series. Similarly our tone sensa- 
tions form a continuous series, from low to high. On the 
other hand, our smell sensations have thus far remained 
unclassified. If there are natural series within this mode 
of sense — and it certainly seems as if there were several — 
they are strangely difficult to discover. 

Again, there are two sorts of series of sensations which 
are readily observable: the qualitative and the intensive. 
Our color sensations from red to purple, and thence to red, 



VISUAL SENSATIONS 119 

constitute a qualitative series. And the various intensities 
of red, ranging from the threshold sensation of this quality 
to the maximum sensation, constitute an intensive series. 
That there are also possible series for other common prop- 
erties, as well as for certain of the particular properties of 
sensations, seems highly probable. It would seem, for in- 
stance, that there must be a clearness series and a duration 
series for every quality of sensation. In view of such a 
possibility the number of series or systems of sensations 
seems almost hopelessly large, but only a few are well 
enough known at present to justify description. 

The psychology of sensation is a large subject. — In 
no direction has the science progressed so far or so satis- 
factorily as in the study of sensation. The text-book writer 
is therefore forced to choose between devoting a large 
amount of space to the subject or treating it inadequately 
in order to have space for other aspects of the science. 
We shall choose the latter alternative, and by sketching 
the chief characteristics of this field, we shall attempt to 
give the beginner a clear knowledge of what sensation is 
and what the psychologist is trying to do with it. A multi- 
tude of facts — important and interesting as they are — we 
shall pass unmentioned. 

VISUAL SENSATIONS 

Achromatic, or white light, sensations. — There are two 
chief systems of visual sensations : the achromatic or white 
light, and the chromatic, or color, sensations. Whites, 
grays, and blacks belong to the former ; reds, blues, greens, 
etc., to the latter. We shall now examine the peculiarities 
of the achromatic sensations. 

Between the whitest white and the blackest black of 
human experience there are from six to seven hundred dif- 
ferent sensations. These sensations constitute the white 
light series. As there are degrees of sweetness, sourness, 



120 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEAKING 

or pain, so there are degrees of whiteness and blackness 
and grayness. An extremely black sensation may be ob- 
tained by looking into a perfectly light-tight box through 
a small hole, and similarly a white sensation which makes 
that obtained from white paper seem gray in comparison 
may be obtained by looking at a good reflecting surface — 
a bit of silvered glass or a highly polished piece of metal — 
upon which direct sunlight is falling. 

Thus far, the achromatic sensation series appears to be 
one dimensional, and it may be graphically represented by a 
straight line, upon which dots stand for the several qualities 
of black, gray, or white. Now, it is important that we should 
know not only how many distinguishable sensations of white 
light there are, but also how this fact may be determined. 

Methods of discovering how many sensations of color- 
less light one experiences. — One of the simplest ways of 
discovering how many sensations of this sort a particular 
person can experience is the following: Take two discs of 
cardboard, the one very white and the other dull black, 
make a small hole in the center of each and then slit each 
along a radius from edge to center. Divide the circumfer- 
ence of the discs into degrees and mark them plainly on 
the back. The two discs may now be interlocked, and the 
amount of white or black surface which is visible may be 
varied at the will of the experimenter. By referring to 
the scale of degrees on the back of the discs it is easy to 
read off the proportion of each which is exposed to the 
view of the observer as he stands in front of the discs. 
A second pair of discs should now be made. Next, the 
pairs may be placed on a double color wheel and rotated 
rapidly. If the black disc is covered by a considerable 
width of the white disc, the rapidly moving surface will 
appear gray instead of either white or black. The question 
to be answered by the observer is by how much must the 
one black disc be lightened by the addition of white in 



ACHROMATIC SENSATIONS 121 

order that it shall seem just perceivably different from the 
other black disc. -This may be determined by rotating the 
pure black side by side with a black to which a small amount 
of white has been added. The observer determines just 
how much white is necessary to render the new sensation 
distinguishable from the original black. This gives the 
first step toward white. Then to the pure black disc white is 
added until it, in turn, seems just noticeably lighter than the 
gray of the other disc. Thus the second step toward white is 
taken. With patience the whole distance between dead black 
and intense white may thus be traversed and the exact num- 
ber of sensation qualities in the achromatic series determined. 

Another method of solving the problem is to arrange 
two small openings or windows beside one another in a 
perfectly dark room, each covered with opal flashed glass 
which can be illuminated from the side opposite the ob- 
server. The observer sits in the dark room looking at the 
two windows while an experimenter gradually increases 
the amount of light coming through one of the windows 
until it is just perceptible. The observer then stops him 
by stating that one window looks lighter than the other. 
Next the experimenter illuminates the other window until 
it is just appreciably lighter than the first. And so on, 
step by step, advance is made from utter blackness to the 
extreme of whiteness. During this process the experimenter 
carefully measures the intensity of the light each time a 
change is made and keeps a record of the number of dis- 
tinguishable sensations. 

Do achromatic sensations differ only in intensity or 
also in quality? — This question is difficult, and introspec- 
tion has led skilled observers to widely differing answers. 
Professor Wundt states that the series is intensive merely. 
In his opinion white differs from black, or light gray from 
dark gray, only in that the one sensation is more intense 
than the other. Professor Titchener, on the contrary, be- 



122 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 



lieves that the series is both qualitative and intensive. One 
sensation of gray may differ from another sensation of gray 
in two preeminently important characteristics: it may be 
lighter (or darker), and it may at the same time be 
brighter (or duller). This leads Professor Titchener to 
describe the achromatic series of sensations as varying in 
two dimensions, instead of in one as Professor Wundt main- 
tains. These two dimensions are named the lighter-darker 
and the brighter-duller. The facts may readily be repre- 
sented diagramatically as follows: Professor Wundt 's con- 
ception of the relations of the sensations obviously demands 
only a straight line as a means of representation, while 
Professor Titchener 's would seem to demand a two dimen- 
sional figure (plane). 

Brightest Dulles* 

i . Wf , , i 



Wiite 



Light - - Gray- 
Gray - " 
Dark --Gray 

Black 



I 1 I I \\ 



BrijSht-D, 






i i I I 



SI 



M-S 



1 I 1 l i i l 



ill Dimension, 

l » i 1 l > 



Mi l l 



Black 



4— h-i 



Fig. 1. The system of light Fig. 2. The two dimensions of light 
sensations. sensations: the brighter-duller and 

the lighter-darker. 



TASKS FOR INTROSPECTION 123 

As a matter of fact, Professor Titchener insists that every 
considerable change in the brightness of a sensation in- 
volves also a change in lightness. Consequently the two 
dimensions tend to merge into one. The writer, entirely on 
his own responsibility, presents Fig. 2 as a diagrammatic 
representation of the system of achromatic sensations. 
There can be no doubt that any considerable change in 
brightness is impossible without a change in lightness, but 
there nevertheless appear to be a number of distinguishable 
brightnesses for each particular quality of lightness. 

Tasks for introspection in connection with achromatic 
sensations. — In view of the above facts, it is clear that our 
first task is to determine by self-observation whether our 
colorless light sensations differ from one another in the 
two distinguishable properties or attributes to which the 
names lightness and brightness have been given. It is easy 
enough to note that the white of this paper is lighter than 
that of another. Is it, at the same time, brighter? With- 
out accepting as final the statements of either of the au- 
thorities cited, we should put this matter to the test of 
introspection. 

Our second task, as observers of the nature of sensations 
of colorless light, is to determine the number of brighter- 
duller sensations which exist for a given quality of light- 
ness. To be sure, the possibility of doing this depends upon 
the nature of our solution of the first problem, for unless 
sensations are brighter-duller, as well as lighter-darker, 
it would have no meaning to ask how many degrees of 
brightness exist for the observer. Supposing, however, that 
the writer's introspective results be verified, then, it is clear 
that the exact shape of the plane which should represent 
our system of achromatic sensations must be determined 
by careful observation. The procedure would have to be 
somewhat as follows, we may imagine. 

Starting with the experimentally determined fact that 



124 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

for a given observer six hundred and fifty-four distin- 
guishable qualities of sensation exist between the extremes 
of white and black, we should erect a vertical line upon 
which dots should represent each of the six hundred fifty- 
four light-dark sensations. We should then have to deter- 
mine by experiments similar to those just described, how 
many distinguishable degrees of brightness or dullness exist 
for each of the more than six hundred qualities of lightness. 
Let us suppose that there proved to be only a few distin- 
guishable degrees of brightness for white and black sensa- 
tions, and an increasing number for each successive gray as 
we approach " middle gray." Then it is evident that the 
plane which would roughly represent these facts is diamond 
shaped, like that of Fig. 2. 

To determine experimentally the number of brightnesses 
existing in the case of each of six hundred and fifty-four 
qualities of light sensation would be a tremendous task, but 
it is precisely such tasks that the real experimental psy- 
chologist is eager to undertake. 

An estimate of the number of distinguishable achro- 
matic sensations, supposing that lightness and bright- 
ness are distinguishable properties of each sensation. — 
It is fair to ask whether lightness is not a quality of sensa- 
tion, and brightness an intensive attribute. This would 
appear to be Professor Titchener's opinion, but he espe- 
cially emphasizes the fact that the qualitative and intensive 
attributes of visual sensations are most complexly related. 
Doubtless it will be easier for us to remember the points 
which have thus far been made with respect to light sensa- 
tions, if we think of each of the six hundred and more 
whites, grays, and blacks as presenting themselves to us in 
a number of intensities. At any rate, we shall make our 
imaginary estimate of the total number of distinguishable 
colorless light sensations on the basis of this assumption. 

Let us suppose that ten intensities of the uppermost 



CHROMATIC SENSATIONS 125 

quality of white exist between the least (threshold) and 
the greatest (maximum) degree of brightness. Let us 
assume also that the corresponding number for the lower- 
most quality of black is five, while that for the middle 
gray is fifty. And let us further assume that the average 
number for all the qualities of light is thirty-two, then the 
total number of distinguishable sensations represented by 
the plane (Fig. 2) would be, for the particular observer 
whose number of qualities is known to be six hundred 
fifty-four, 32 x 654 or 20,928. 

Here is one of many fields of psychological research which 
is worthy of the most patient and industrious of ob- 
servers. 

Chromatic sensations. — The series of color sensations is 
closely related to that of colorless light, for every color is 
more or less light. By means of a prism pure white sun- 
light may be resolved into the spectrum. This consists of 
the colors red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet. To 
this list a color must be added which forms the connecting 
link between red and violet, but which does not exist in 
the spectrum ; it is purple. Our color sensations differ from 
our achromatic sensations in that they form a closed series, 
for starting with red, we may return to red through purple. 
It is not possible to do this in the case of the light sensa- 
tions, for there is no link connecting black and white. ' ' Let 
us take, as the arrangement of colors with which we are 
most familiar, a chart or a projection of the solar spectrum, 
and let us work through it, from the left or long-wave to 
the right or short-wave end. On the extreme left we have 
the quality of red. As we travel to the right, the red takes 
on more and more of a yellowish tinge, until it passes 
through orange to a pure yellow. Here, then, we have a 
linear series of qualities, precisely similar to the series 
of light sensations. Now, at yellow, we change our direc- 
tion. The yellow gradually becomes tinged with a new 



126 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

quality, that of green; it passes through yellow-green to 
a pure green. Here is a second line of qualities. Again 
we change our direction ; the green becomes more and more 
bluish, until it passes through blue-green to a pure blue. 
Here is a third line of qualities. Once more we change our 
direction. This time, however, the tinge that our initial 
quality takes on is not new; the blue becomes increasingly 
reddish, as we travel to the right-hand end of the spectrum. 
Here is a fourth line of qualities, but a line which in the 
spectral series is left incomplete, at violet. If we continue 
it by adding the purples and carmines, we are finally 
brought back to our starting-point, — the red of the extreme 
left." (Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of Psychology, pp. 
60-61.) 

The number of " colors " popularly so-called and our 
names for them. — Our color sensations are called hues, 
colors, or color tones. They number about one hundred 
and sixty. This fact may be determined most readily by 
projecting two spectra, the one beside the other, upon the 
white wall of an otherwise dark room; covering each, with 
the exception of a narrow line, and then varying the region 
covered in the case of the one until the line is just notice- 
ably different in color from that of the other. By thus 
working slowly, and with many repetitions of the observa- 
tions, throughout the length of the spectrum, it is possible 
to determine just how many hues or colors — aside from 
those of purple— are experienced by a given observer. 

We are able to distinguish fewer qualities of color than 
we do qualities of colorless light, and yet we have many 
more color terms than names for colorless sensations. For 
the former we have red, orange, pink, scarlet, vermillion, 
crimson, etc. throughout the series, whereas for the latter 
we have only black, gray, and white, with variations indi- 
cated by light, dark, etc. It would seem, therefore, that 
our color sensations are either more important or, for some 



CHROMATIC SENSATIONS 127 

reason, more interesting to us than our colorless experi- 
ences. 

Chromatic sensations may differ from one another 
qualitatively in several respects. — The attribute of qual- 
ity in the case of achromatic or colorless light sensations 
appears to be simple, but in the case of chromatic sensa- 
tions it is complex. The results of psychological analysis 
at present go to show that every sensation of color possesses 
at least three qualitative attributes. There is first of all, 
and most important, the quality of color or color-tone, com- 
monly so-named, or hue, as we shall designate it in this 
book. Thus, blue, green, violet are hues. Secondly, every 
hue — and as has already been stated, there are some one 
hundred and sixty of them experienced by the normal 
adult — possesses the quality of depth or degree of color. 
This is often spoken of as the saturation of the color. We 
shall call it the chroma. Red, for example, is experienced 
by us in many different chromas (pink, crimson, etc.). 
Finally, a color sensation possesses the quality of degree 
of lightness. It is either lighter or darker than another 
sensation of the same hue and chroma. For this quality, 
following Professor Titchener's usage, we shall use the 
term tint, in spite of the fact that it has not commonly 
been used in this sense. Thus in the terminology used for 
the Milton Bradley colored papers, we note that tints are 
the qualities of a color which lie nearer to white and shades 
those which lie nearer to black. 

From the point of view here adopted, no description of 
a chromatic sensation is qualitatively complete unless it 
indicates the hue, the chroma, and the tint of the experi- 
ence. 

Intensive, as contrasted with qualitative, differences in 
sensations of color. — Two sensations of like hue, chroma, 
and tint (that is, qualitatively identical) yet may differ 
with respect to their degree of brightness. The one may 



128 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

be brighter than the other. This attribute, just as in the 
case of achromatic sensations, we may term the brighter- 
duller, as distinguished from the lighter-darker, character. 
The qualitative attribute of degree of lightness (tint of a 
color) is frequently confused both in observation and in 
description with the intensive attribute of brightness. As 
a given sensation of white may be lighter than another qual- 
ity of white and at the same time duller, so a given sensa- 
tion of color may be lighter (of higher tint) than another 
and at the same time duller (less bright). 

How may our system, or systems, of color sensations 
be represented graphically?- — Evidently this system is too 
complex to be represented by a straight line, or by a plane 
figure, as is the achromatic series. 

It has been discovered that a double pyramid, like that 
of Fig. 3, serves to represent all of the qualities of our 
color sensations, and those of our colorless light sensations 
as well. The manner of this representation is admirably 
described by Professor Titchener: " At the two poles 
[white and black of the figure] stand the extremes of white 
and black; upon the vertical axis, between the poles, are 
arranged the remaining sensations of light. Round the 
base of the figure lie all hues of a middle tint and of max- 
imal chroma. Between base and poles lie the same hues 
in all their further variety of tint ; all are still of maximal 
chroma, though the chromatic maximum decreases steadily, 
above and below. If we cut into the pyramid, from any 
point on the outside to a corresponding point upon the 
axis, we lay bare a series of sensations of the same hue and 
tint, but of varying chroma. 

" The double pyramid, then [as shown in Fig. 3], embod- 
ies the two systems of visual sensations, sensations of light 
and sensations of color, and shows these systems both in 
their mutual independence and in their mutual relations. 
There are at least a hundred and fifty distinguishable hues 



AUDITORY SENSATIONS 



129 



round the base. In counting up the whole number of 
visual sensations we must, however, take account also of 
differences in tint and in chroma. These are ultimate dif- 
ferences: a pink is no more analyzable by introspection 
into a red and a white than an orange-red is analyzable 

White 




Black 

Fig. 3. The system of color sensations: color pyramid. 
Titchener.) 



(After 



into a red and an orange. All in all, the full tale of visual 
elements can not fall far short of thirty-five thousand." 
(Text-book of Psychology, pp. 63, 64.) 



AUDITORY SENSATIONS 



There are two systems of auditory sensations. — Like 
our sensations of sight, our sensations of sound fall into 



130 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

two classes: tones and noises. Of tones the normal adult 
person experiences between 10,000 and 12,000; of simple 
noises, at least several hundred. Every auditory sensation 
possesses qualitative and intensive attributes. Especially 
noteworthy among the latter is the property of extensity 
or voluminousness. The low tone is large, the high tone 
small whether they be weak or loud. Thus the croak of 
a bull-frog seems to us voluminous and that of a tree-frog 
piercing, shrill, and less extensive than the former. It is 
quite possible for us to experience tones apart from noises, 
but it is doubtful whether a noise ever lacks a tonal ac- 
companiment. Pew indeed of what we are in the way of 
designating as sounds are either simple and unanalyzable 
tones or noises. Almost all of them are complexes of these 
elemental experiences. 

Sensations of tone. — The lowest audible tone is produced 
by a vibration rate of the air varying from 12 to 30 com- 
plete vibrations per second: the highest audible tone is 
produced by a rate of from 25,000 to 40,000 complete vibra- 
tions per second. Between these two extremes — the lower 
and the upper limits of hearing — we experience a number 
of sensations whose most conspicuous difference is in pitch. 
Beginning with the lowect audible tone, it is possible to 
progress by steps of just perceivable difference to the high- 
est audible tone. The number of sensations (distinguish- 
able pitches) in this series differs for individuals and for 
the same person at different times. One's age and condi- 
tion of health are important in this connection. In general 
the range of hearing, and therefore the number of tones 
which one experiences, tends to diminish rapidly with in- 
crease in age, and with failing health. 

Like our achromatic sensations, our tonal sensations may 
be graphically represented by a plane. Upon a straight 
line all the pitches between the lowest and the highest may 
be indicated by dots, and upon lines at right angles to 



NOISES 131 

this pitch axis may be shown the number of degrees of 
loudness or intensity in which each tone is heard. That 
this representation of our tonal system is not complete be- 
comes obvious when we stop to consider that each tone and 
loudness may appear in two or more degrees of clearness, in 
a number of durations, and possibly also in a variety of 
extensities. This should remind us of the fact that no one 
aspect or property of a sensation may be studied profitably 
without consideration of the properties which are inti- 
mately associated with it, since as one property varies the 
others are quite likely to vary also within certain limits. 

In affective value auditory sensations differ markedly. 
— Many low tones are decidedly unpleasant because of their 
great extensity or volume, and many high tones are sim- 
ilarly unpleasant because of their slight extensity and the 
consequent cutting, penetrating, piercing effect. All in all, 
sensations midway between the extremes of the tonal series 
appear to be the most pleasant. 

Sensations of noise. — Noises have many points of re- 
semblance to colors, as tones have to achromatic sensations. 
In the first place, they can not be arranged, in the light 
of our present knowledge, in a continuous series. As each 
principal color seems to constitute in its various hues a 
separate mode or system of sensations, so every noise seems 
to present itself in a variety of forms, which together con- 
stitute a mode or system of auditory sensations. Snaps, 
pops, hisses, thuds, booms, roars, clicks, cracks, scrapes are 
names for noises. It is difficult to classify them by resem- 
blance, yet doubtless we should agree that a snap is more 
like a crack than it is like a hiss, or that a boom is more 
like a roar than it is like a pop. It has been said that there 
are two classes of noises : sudden or explosive, and pro- 
longed or continuative. This would appear to be verified by 
introspection, but there is no sharp line of demarcation, for 
the sudden noises, such as snaps, pops, cracks, gradually 



132 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

give place to noises of longer and longer duration as we 
examine our experiences of noise. This classification rests 
upon the attribute of duration, and since sensations vary 
with respect to this property from the brevity of the flash- 
like toothache to the duration of the persistent pain, they 
can not be profitably separated into groups whose only dif- 
ference is in duration. 

Noises are peculiar in their affective values. — Some 
are extremely unpleasant ; others are slightly pleasant ; but 
few indeed are, for most individuals, very pleasant. We, 
of course, like certain noises and dislike others because of 
associations. It is necessary therefore, in observing the af- 
fective tone of a sensation of noise, to distinguish it clearly 
from acquired feelings for the noise. Certain noises, as 
for instance scraping, squeaking, grating sounds, are pecul- 
iarly and almost uncannily unpleasant. There seems to be 
something about them which irritates us, and we react to 
them somewhat as we do to spiders, snakes, and mice, with 
unthinking repugnance. 

It is an interesting task to attempt to make out a list 
of names for noises, to arrange the several sensations in 
order of resemblance, and then to try to discover their 
relative pleasantness or unpleasantness. It is quite possible 
that persistent attention to these interesting auditory ex- 
periences may eventually enable us to classify them as sat- 
isfactorily as we now can arrange our visual sensations. 

A program for the introspecting of auditory sensa- 
tions. — We make surprisingly little progress in the study 
of any sort of consciousness if we work without a plan. 
We must have questions in mind, points of interest, more 
or less definite goals. It is for this reason that the following 
suggestions toward the observation of tones and noises are 
given. 

First of all we should note the properties of tones and 
noises and learn to distinguish them readily. To make a 



INTROSPECTION OF SOUNDS 133 

list of the psychological characteristics of each kind of 
auditory sensation will help greatly in this task. Next, 
tones should be compared carefully with respect to their 
qualitative aspects or attributes. It is fair to ask whether 
there are other qualities than pitch. Possibly we may dis- 
cover that, like colors, tones or noises, or both, possess 
several qualities. The same question may be asked con- 
cerning intensive attributes. The intensity of a sensation 
is no more strictly a quantitative attribute than is its ex- 
tensity or volume, supposing that it possesses that attribute, 
and there may be still other intensive properties which the 
patient and persistent observer can discover. 

Noises should be observed with respect to their relations 
to tones. If, as some observers suspect, every noise, com- 
monly so-called, consists of a tone and a simple noise, just 
as every color sensation really consists of a light and simple 
chromatic quality, we should not think of our ordinary 
experiences of noise as simple elements of consciousness. 

Finally, there are endless possibilities of observation in 
connection with the affective tone of auditory sensations. 
The question of whether every auditory sensation is in- 
trinsically pleasant or unpleasant each observer among us 
must answer for himself. 

One need not listen to an orchestra in order to obtain 
opportunities for the introspecting of sounds. Indeed, it 
is as a rule far better to choose simple instead of complex 
experiences. A human voice offers us abundant materials 
for observation and our experience of its psychological pe- 
culiarities, as we listen to it, is well worth careful study. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. The introspection of achromatic visual after- 
images. Materials : sheet of white cardboard 22 s 28 inches, 
or thereabouts; sheet of black cardboard of same size; squares 
2x2 mches of white and of black paper. 



134 THE SENSATIONS OF SIGHT AND HEARING 

The white square should be fastened to the black cardboard 
about six inches from one of the 22-inch edges. The black square 
should similarly be fastened to the white cardboard. About six 
inches from the opposite edge of each cardboard a pin-hole should 
be made. 

Having instructed the class (1) to look steadily and directly 
at the square of paper, (2) likewise to look steadily and with- 
out movements of the eyes at the pin-hole in the lower half of 
the cardboard when directed to do so, and (3) to close the eyes 
between experiments in order to rest them, the instructor should 
furnish opportunity for the observation of after-images of 
light. 

With the class attending, note-books ready for records, the 
instructor holds up the black cardboard and the members of 
the class look fixedly for fifteen seconds at the white square. 
The instructor then says, " Look at the pin-hole," and each in- 
dividual immediately fixes the gaze upon that point on the card- 
board and carefully observes the visual after-sensation. 

This should be repeated at intervals of two to five minutes, 
during which the student writes an accurate account of his in- 
trospection, with fixation intervals of 5, 10, 15, and 20 seconds, 
and each individual should note the interval which gives the 
clearest, most persistent, and frequently returning after-image. 

Next, the same experiments should be performed with the 
white cardboard and the black square. And, if time permits, like 
observations may be made with a gray square on the white and 
the black cardboards. 

Of primary importance in this exercise is the description of 
introspections. Of secondary importance is the identification of 
" positive " and " negative " after-images and the noting of the 
characteristics of each. Such questions as the following may 
suggest points for discussion after the exercise. How long does 
the after-image last? Does it appear and disappear repeatedly? 
If so, how often and how rapidly? What fixation-time is most 
favorable ? 

The results may be carefully studied and a general report 
made by one member of the class. The following refer- 
ences should be used in connection with the preparation of a 
report : 

Seashobe, C. E. : Elementary experiments in psychology, chapter 1, 
" Visual after-images." 



SUPPLEMENTARY READING 135 

Myers, C. S. : Text-book of experimental psychology, pp. 89-91. 
Titchener, E. B. : Experimental psychology, volume 1, part 2, pp. 
37-50. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§14-28. 
Calkins, M. W. : A first book in psychology, chapter 3. 
Ku'lpe, 0.: Outlines of psychology, §§ 14-21. 



CHAPTER XII 

PECULIARITIES OP OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

" For the comparison of different kinds of pain — itch, smart, burn, 
ache, etc. — the application of a mustard plaster to a small area on 
the arm, a sharp rap on the palm of the hand with a ruler, and heat 
and cold stimulation were employed. Typical introspections for the 
first refer to itching as made up of intermittent pain sensations, 
fusing now into a sharp sting referred to a single point on the 
skin, now spreading and irregular as if hundreds of little bubbles 
were breaking through to the surface; followed by a suffused warmth 
coming in waves along with pain of increasing intensity until a 
fairly unanalyzable mass of heat and pain results. For the second: 
' smart made up of prickly points ; gets more steady, a general ache 
or throb; ache is below surface, large, of one piece, rounder edges 
than smart.' Similar observations on heat and cold pain, and the 
use of ginger, pepper, vinegar, lemon, etc., on the tongue, bring out 
the fact that the observers feel no need of different qualitative terms 
in distinguishing any of these sensation experiences, even when 
for the sake of more exact comparison they followed closely in 
succession." — Murray, Elsie: Organic sensations. American Journal 
of Psychology, vol. 20, pp. 440, 441. 1909. 

Certain modes of sensation consist of discrete sense 
qualities. — We have noted that the visual and the auditory 
sense modes consist of sensations which are related to one 
another in such wise that they may be arranged in a con- 
tinuous series. There are the achromatic series or system 
of sense qualities, the chromatic series, the tonal series. 
In each of these systems of qualities, a given sensation 
may be defined, in fact must be defined, with reference to 
its relations to other members of the series. This method 
of ordering sense qualities possesses many advantages for 
the scientist, and he has therefore searched diligently for 
like relations among the sense qualities of other modes, but 
thus far the search has yielded little. 

136 



THE SENSE OF TASTE 137 

The modes of sense to be considered in this chapter are 
not systems. — In the cases of taste, smell, pressure, warmth, 
cold, pain, movement, and organic sensations the various 
qualities are discrete. That is, they possess no definite 
relations to one another which would justify the observer 
in arranging them serially. Each particular quality is a 
unique experience and apparently unlike all the others. 
Particularly in the mode of smell it would seem that a 
system should be discoverable. There are hundreds of 
distinct qualities, yet the psychologist has failed to discover 
a satisfactory basis of classification. 

Psychological peculiarities of gustatory sensations. — 
The sense of taste is peculiar in that we confuse its special 
qualities to a surprising extent with oral sensations of touch 
and temperature, as well as with smell sensations. To any 
one who has not tried the experiment, tasting a variety 
of foods with the nose held tightly closed so that none of 
the substance can pass into the region of the sense organs 
of olfaction, is an illuminating experiment. It serves to 
convince one that a great many sensations which are ordi- 
narily thought of as tastes belong instead to the modes of 
smell, touch, or temperature. So striking, indeed, is this 
experiment, that we are led to doubt our ability to distin- 
guish by taste a number of things which we ordinarily 
consider markedly different in this respect. This is a 
commonplace example of the kind of information self- 
observation provides. After all it would seem decidedly 
worth while to know whether one is tasting or smelling 
a substance ! 

There are only four classes of tastes. — During the last 
twenty years a considerable amount of excellent work has 
been done on the sense of taste. Of prime interest has 
been the question, How many distinguishable qualities of 
sensation are there in this mode of sense? Early in the 
scientific history of the subject, there were thought to be 



138 OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

many, later several, finally six, and at present the majority 
of observers agree in distinguishing only four. Whether 
these are strictly qualities — as are a quality of green, of 
black, of tone, or of noise — or, instead, classes of qualities 
as are the blacks, whites, grays, reds, blues, noises, etc., 
is a question which the writer would answer by stating 
that they are classes. The four fundamental varieties of 
gustatory sensation are sweet, sour, bitter, and salt. And 
although we certainly do distinguish many sweet sensa- 
tions, and many sensations in each of the other classes, it is 
still uncertain whether these differences are due to the qual- 
ity of the sensations rather than to accompanying sensa- 
tions of touch and temperature, and to affections. Certainly 
there are many widely differing chemical substances which 
can not be told apart by the quality of the taste which they 
evoke. "Witness the sweet taste of cane sugar and of lead 
acetate. It would seem then that we are certain of the 
existence of only four taste qualities. This small number 
is in striking contrast with the large number of qualities of 
visual and auditory sensations. 

Olfactory sensations. — Like taste, smell is one of the 
chemical senses, but in its case we are even less able to 
bring the various qualities into a series than in the case 
of taste. We can not even classify odors satisfactorily, for 
the reason that no principle of arrangement has been dis- 
covered. What we know from casual observation, not less 
than from careful introspection, is that we experience a 
great and interesting variety of olfactory qualities. How 
many hundreds or thousands of distinguishable sensations 
exist in this mode no psychologist is able to say. For in 
spite of persistent and intensive research we are still dis- 
covering new qualities, as we come to test new substances. 
In fact, it would seem probable that the creation of new 
odorous substances might indefinitely continue to add to 
our list of odors. 



CLASSES OF ODORS 139 

On the basis of qualitative resemblance, Professor 
Titchener, in his " Text-book of Psychology," gives the 
following classes of smells. This grouping follows mainly 
the naturalist Linnasus : 

1. Ethereal or Fruit Odors. — All fruit and wine odors; the scents 

of the various ethers; the smell of beeswax. 

2. Aromatic or Spice Odors. — All spicy smells: camphor, tur- 

pentine, cloves, ginger, pepper, bay leaves, cinnamon, cara- 
way, anise, peppermint, lavender, bitter almonds, rose- 
mary, sassafras; thyme, geraniums, bergamot; rosewood, 
cedarwood, etc. 

3. Fragrant or Flower Odors. — All flower scents; vanilla, tonka 

bean, tea, hay; gum benzoin, etc. 

4. Ambrosaic or Musky Odors. — Musk, ambergris, sandalwood, 

patebouli. 

5. Alliaceous or Leek Odors. — Onion, garlic, asafcetida; india- 

rubber, dried fish, chlorine, iodine. 

6. Empyreumatic or Burned Odors. — Roasted coffee, toast, to- 

bacco smoke, tar, burned horn, carbolic acid, naphthalene, 
benzin, creosote. 

7. Hircine or Rank Odors. — Stale cheese, sweat, valerian, root 

and stem of barberry and black currant, lactic acid, 
caproic acid. 

8. Virulent and Foul Odors. — Opium, laudanum, French mari- 

gold, fresh coriander seeds, bed bugs, squash bugs. 

9. Nauseous Odors. — Carrion flowers, stinkhorns, water from 

wilted flower stems, decaying animal matter, fasces. 

Sensory adaptation. — An important fact of sense psy- 
chology, not peculiar to the psychology of smell, but espe- 
cially well exhibited therein, is adaptation. Translated into 
non-technical language, this means that we can not for any 
considerable period of time continue to experience a given 
sensation quality in its original intensity, even if at all. 
A color sensation may enter and remain as a portion of 
consciousness for seconds or even for minutes, with fluctu- 
ations in clearness due to changes in the content of con- 
sciousness, but it does not necessarily undergo any radical 



140 OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

alteration in quality or intensity. It neither disappears 
nor changes into a new quality. This is not true of smell. 
At this instant I experience vividly an agreeably pene- 
trating odor coming from the photometer room in which 
an amyl-acetate lamp is burning. I note the quality and 
intensity introspectively and set my mind to discover how 
long I can remain conscious of the impression as essentially 
the same. In a few seconds I know that the sensation is 
becoming weaker, and after a longer interval, I note also 
that the quality is difficult to distinguish from other odors. 
As the physiologist puts it, I have become adapted to the 
odor and no longer experience it as I did at first. 

Precisely the same is true of temperature sensations. 
Whereas when one first enters a hot room, the temperature 
sensations are intense and vivid, one soon becomes adapted, 
or, as we say, accustomed to the heat and no longer experi- 
ences the sensations. Or, if the two hands be held for a 
few minutes, the one in cold water and the other in warm 
water, and they then be plunged into water of an inter- 
mediate temperature, it will not seem the same for both 
hands. 

The importance of escaping sensations. — That it is well 
for us to be able to get rid of sense qualities is obvious. 
If we had to continue to smell a disagreeable odor which 
upon our entrance to a room was intense, we should have 
much greater cause to be dissatisfied with our sense of smell 
than we now have. Adaptation protects us from this dis- 
agreeable fate. It is a provision against too much sensation 
of a given variety ! 

A peculiarity of sense terminologies. — It is significant 
that for the sense qualities of some modes we have special 
names, while for those of others we wholly lack such terms. 
For vision we have the names red, orange, crimson, green, 
blue, purple, violet, pink, brown, yellow, ochre, etc., each 
designating a particular group of color qualities, or in some 



SENSE TERMINOLOGIES 141 

cases a particular quality. The case of sound is utterly dif- 
ferent, for it is only by reference to some system of musical 
notation or to a physical method of describing the stimulus 
that we can name the particular tonal quality which is 
being experienced. We have no particular names for audi- 
tory experiences of the tonal series apart from our musical 
notations, although we have a variety of names applying 
directly to noises and complexes of noises, or combinations 
of tones and noises — crack, boom, roar, thud, creak, crash, 
snap, scrape. For taste qualities we have a few particular 
names, few indeed in comparison with the number of visual 
words, but each of them definitely applies to a distinct 
quality, and it is even possible that for every one of the 
fundamental gustatory qualities we have a term : salt, sweet, 
bitter, sour indicate elemental qualities ; alkaline, metallic, 
astringent instead refer to experiences which most ob- 
servers consider combinations of sensations, the chief factor 
in which is one of the four gustatory qualities. The 
alkaline taste, for example, is analyzable into salt (or sour) 
plus certain temperature and touch sensations. Our taste 
terminology is scanty, yet apparently it is sufficient for all 
ordinary needs. 

Unlike taste words, the words for smell sensations refer 
to the source of the sensation. In almost every instance 
we designate the quality by naming the sensation after the 
object. It is an odor of roses, of tar, of ether. Only the 
psychologist or the physiologist is likely to use such terms 
as are used in the classification of odors given above, and 
even in that it is apparent that there is a double system of 
terms — the first naming the odor itself, the second desig- 
nating the source of the same. Doubtless the psychological 
significance of the way in which language develops 1 is of 
great importance. 

*See Ebbinghaus, H. : Psychology, § 16, for good brief discussion of 
this topic. 



142 OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

The cutaneous or skin sensations. — From the skin we 
obtain, or rather to it we refer, several important modes of 
sensation. Chief among them are pressure, pain, warmth, 
and cold. ,Each term designates a particular quality of 
sensation. There are many decidedly different experiences 
of touch, contact, pressure, tickle, and tingle in which the 
fundamental quality of sensation is pressure, but with this 
are associated other sense qualities so that the complex 
has a character of its own. 

The skin gives us many modes of sensation but few 
qualities. — Whereas the eye gives us thousands of different 
qualities of sensation and only a few modes, the skin gives 
us several modes and few qualities. Some observers think 
they experience different qualities of contact, pressure, or 
touch, but it is extremely difficult to be certain that these 
are not intensity differences in the one quality of pressure 
sensation. To the beginner it inevitably seems that each 
mechanical stimulation of the skin yields a new quality of 
sensation, and this may be the case. At any rate, the sensa- 
tions of light touch are quite different from those of strong 
pressure, and both are different from tickle. Only the 
experienced introspector is able to discover the common 
quality of these experiences. 

The temperature sensations are peculiar in that they 
range from zero to an extreme in two directions. — One 
of these extremes is known as cold ; the other, as hot. From 
the zero point of temperature sensation to the maximal 
sensation of heat is an intensity distance, and the same 
holds of the range from zero to the maximal cold sensation. 
Wherever the temperature sensation appears it has one of 
two qualities : either warmth or cold. Unlike the light 
sensation series, the temperature series is an intensive 
series, for each sensation differs from its neighbor only 
with respect to intensity. This fact is relatively easy 
to verify in introspection. The extremes of heat and 



PAIN SENSATIONS 143 

cold are much alike in quality and may readily be con- 
fused. 

Tickle, tingle, pins and needles, and similar sensations. 
— Although these several sense qualities, or complexes 
thereof, seem very different at first, they turn out upon 
closer study to consist of pressure qualities plus certain 
other sensations. Tickle is weak pressure ; pins and needles 
sudden strong pressure often repeated; the tingle which 
comes from a sharp blow seems to be pressure quality 
mixed with other modes of sensation. All of these experi- 
ences are likely to be mixed. They must be examined care- 
fully if the fundamental quality is to be discovered. 

Pain sensations. — The quality of pain is similar and sin- 
gle, wherever it occurs. We distinguish many kinds of pain 
according to the intensity, duration, extent, and other prop- 
erties of the sensation, but of quality there appears to be 
only one. This is sometimes referred to the skin, some- 
times to deeper portions of the body, as, for example, when 
the lungs, stomach, heart, or any other internal organ is 
the center of disturbances. It is clear that the pain quality 
is something very different from most other sensations. 
It has the property of commanding attention and in its 
higher intensities it crowds everything else out of con- 
sciousness. 

Because pain uniformly accompanies maximal sensa- 
tions of many modes it has been supposed by many ob- 
servers to be a property of the sensations rather than a 
separate quality. The fact seems to be that a maximal 
stimulus of almost any sort sets the pain organs into activity 
as well as the special organs for the reception of that par- 
ticular mode of stimulus. Thus it comes about that pain 
and other sense qualities may appear in consciousness almost 
simultaneously and are difficult to distinguish. Many of the 
sensations which we habitually call pain sensations are in 
reality mere disagreeable intensities of other qualities of 



144 OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

sensation. It requires some introspective experience to dis- 
tinguish the pain quality so that it shall not be mistaken for 
other qualities. Even an intense light is said to become 
painful. "What does this mean? Merely that the observer 
is experiencing both light sensation and pain sensation. 
The latter because the strong photic stimulus has set up 
bodily changes which bring the sense organs of pain into 
operation. 

Sensations of movement. — All of our sensations from 
muscles, joints, tendons, and the motor mechanism gen- 
erally may be grouped as movement sensations. That there 
are several qualities of movement sensation can readily be 
determined if attention be paid to the sensations connected 
with an arm bent at the elbow strongly and slowly. The 
muscle sense quality is likely to be confused with joint 
and tendon sensations unless special precautions be taken 
to simplify the experience. The joint sensations may be 
observed to advantage when an arm is moved passively. 

For further facts concerning sensations of movement, 
as well as of the other modes, the reader is referred to the 
admirable presentation of this general subject in Professor 
Titchener's " Text-book of Psychology." 

After-sensations or after-images. — After-images corre- 
sponding to several of the modes of sense may be observed. 
Most obvious are those of sight, hearing, touch, temperature, 
and pain. But of all of these varieties of after-images the 
visual are the most interesting and the most readily studied. 
We may therefore advantageously use them to illustrate 
the points to be made in a general description of the phe- 
nomenon of after-sensations. 

" The positive [visual] after-image has the same rela- 
tions of brightness as the stimulus, as in a photographic 
positive. The negative after-image has the relations of 
light and shade reversed, as in the photographic negative. 
The after-image may be of the same color as the stimulus, 



AFTER-IMAGES 145 

or it may be other-colored. There are positive same-colored 
and positive other-colored, negative same-colored and nega- 
tive other-colored after-images. Generally, however, posi- 
tive after-images are same-colored and negative other-col- 
ored are complementary. 

" The positive after-image appears first and is usually 
very short in duration and difficult to detect. To make it 
conspicuous, one must employ a strong stimulus. . . . 
After some training one may see the positive after-image 
before the negative in the exposure of ordinary objects 
of moderate intensity." (Seashore, C. E.: Elementary Ex- 
periments in Psychology, p. 7.) 

The after-images of the different modes of sense differ 
greatly in speed of development, in duration, and in clear- 
ness. All varieties of the phenomena possess quality, in- 
tensity, duration, clearness, and, possibly, extensity. Some 
are fairly easy to observe — pressure, pain, temperature, 
visual, auditory — others are difficult to note and more so 
to study introspectively. 



CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspection of the after-images of 
color sensations. Materials: Sheets of white and of black card- 
board as in previous experiment ; pieces, lxl inch, of red, yel- 
low, green, and blue papers. (The Milton Bradley colored pa- 
pers will serve.) 

The procedure in this exercise should be determined by the 
results of the method employed in the previous observations of 
after-images. The instructor will almost certainly be able to 
improve upon the plan. 

Questions : What relation does the color of the after-sensation 
bear to the primary sensation? Does it fluctuate, now appear- 
ing, now disappearing? Does it undergo changes in clearness? 
Does it change in color? Does it move with the eye? 

After the exercise, the reports of introspection may be de- 
livered to some member of the class for thorough study, in the 



146 OTHER MODES OF SENSATION 

light of the literature on after-images mentioned at the close of 
the preceding exercise, and for report to the class. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 29-59. 
Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapter 5. 
Angell, J. R. : Psychology, chapter 5. 

Schafer, E. A. : Text-book of physiology, " Cutaneous sensations," 
" The muscular sense." 



CHAPTER XIII 

AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

" The feeling-tone with sensations from sandpaper is grating, irri- 
tating, stirring, stimulating. The feeling is one of contraction, of 
withdrawal, of uneasiness. One is full of 'collapsing chills,' of 
minute little pains, and there is a decided call for an opposite kind 
of behavior. The sense of weakness, of waste of power and energy, 
of being penetrated, of strained expectation, of unwelcome tension, 
and of slight ' wasteful excitement ' results. To some subjects . . . 
at times the whole feeling of stimulation as such predominated, and 
the total effect produced was agreeable, as it ' satisfied a felt need of 
waking up.'" — Johnston, C. H. : The combination of feelings. 
Harvard Psychological Studies, vol. 2, p. 169. 1906. 

A definition of affection. — We sense and we feel. The 
former variety of experience yields us our thousands of 
qualities of sensation, and the latter yields us a multitude 
of simple facts which the psychologist calls affections. One 
of the most prominent differences between sensations and 
affections is the reference of the former to particular bodily 
organs — the sense organs — and of the latter to the body as 
a whole. A sensation has as one of its characteristics a 
sort of local mark; an affection lacks this property. A 
pain, a touch, a taste exists in consciousness as awareness 
of the condition of a certain part of the body, whereas a 
feeling of relaxation, of agreeableness, or of restlessness 
exists as awareness of the condition of the whole body. An 
additional difference which helps us to identify the two 
types of conscious elements is that of clearness. Sensations 
vary in degree of clearness according to their position in 
the stream of consciousness, or, as is often said, according 
to the amount of attention they receive. The more we 
attend to them the clearer they become. Just the opposite 

147 



148 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

is true of affections, for the instant we try to introspect them 
they tend to become unclear and even to disappear from con- 
sciousness. This renders the study of affections very difficult. 

As our working definition of affection we use this formula. 
An affection is a simple or elementary fact of consciousness 
which is not referred to any particular bodily organ (as 
are sensations) and which tends to diminish in clearness as 
it is examined (instead of to increase, as do sensations). 
This definition has the merit of enabling us to hold in mind 
two of the cardinal differences between the two great classes 
of psychical elements. 

What would life be like if we sensed without feeling? — 
It is quite conceivable that a living being might either 
sense without feeling or feel without sensing. If the former 
were the case the mental life of the creature would consist 
of awareness of things and events both within and without 
the body, of ideas, of thoughts, and of all the other simple 
and complex experiences which are called cognitive. The 
awareness would be purely and coldly intellectual. It 
would lack feeling. And, on the other hand, if there were 
feeling without sending, the stream of consciousness would 
be made up wholly of feelings of pleasantness and un- 
pleasantness, of excitements and depressions, of tensions 
and relaxations, of emotions, and of sentiments ; in a word, 
of all of the simple and complex experiences which are 
popularly grouped under the word feeling. How different 
these two imaginary types of mind! Imaginary we call 
them, but is this really the case? Are we not each of us 
acquainted with persons who are so predominantly intel- 
lectual or cognitive in their mental make-up that they seem 
to lack the ability to feel; and with other individuals 
whose ability to feel so overshadows their life of thought 
that they seem unintellectual. 

Ways of classifying the affections. — We have already 
seen that sensations may be classified in any one of at least 



PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF AFFECTIONS 149 

three ways. Namely, according to their psychological prop- 
erties, according to the sense organs to which they are re- 
ferred, or according to the stimuli which set these sense 
organs into action. Is it possible also to classify affections 
in one or all of these ways? Let us, in turn, consider the 
three possibilities. 

The stimuli or physical conditions of affections, as a 
basis of classification. — The definite conditions of sensa- 
tions are physical stimuli, and adequate knowledge thereof 
should provide a useful basis for the arrangement of sensa- 
tions, and more especially of sensory-reactions, but unfor- 
tunately our knowledge is not adequate and consequently 
at present sensations are not satisfactorily classified accord- 
ing to their appropriate stimuli. Of affections it may be 
said that their physical conditions are even less adequately 
understood. About all that we really know is that pre- 
dominantly destructive, or as the physiologists name them 
katabolic, changes in the body are accompanied by feelings 
which we group as unpleasant, depressing, and wearing, 
whereas those changes which are predominantly con- 
structive, or anabolic, are accompanied by feelings of pleas- 
antness, elation, and vigor. This roughly divides our af- 
fections into two large groups (1) those which accompany 
the building-up processes in our bodies, and (2) those which 
accompany the breaking-down processes. A like division of 
our sensations may be made on the basis of changes which 
occur on the surface of the body and give rise to sensations 
of the special senses, and those which occur within the body 
and are accompanied by organic sensations. We know well 
that this grouping does not constitute a very useful classi- 
fication and we may be equally certain that our affections 
should be classified otherwise than by being grouped with 
reference to the katabolic and the anabolic bodily changes. 
Doubtless there are many kinds of destructive changes 
within us, each with its appropriate class of affections, and 



150 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

similarly many kinds of constructive changes to each of 
which a class of affections corresponds. 

When we are in good health and full of energy our feel- 
ings are predominantly agreeable. "When we are diseased, 
fatigued, feeble, they are predominantly disagreeable. It 
is this simple observation which gives the starting point 
of our classification of affections according to their "stim- 
uli ' ' or physical conditions. It certainly seems worth while 
to attempt, by more thorough study of the nature of the 
physiological changes in the organism, to obtain a basis 
for the subdivision of the " katabolic " affections and the 
" anabolic " affections. 

Affective organs, as a basis of classification. — Appar- 
ently there are no bodily organs whose sole concern is with 
affections. For the reception of many of the modes of 
energy in the world of physics we have special organs, the 
sense organs, but to these there is nothing which corre- 
sponds on the side of affective experience. To any portion 
of the body, or to the whole body, a given feeling may be 
referred at different times. There is, it would seem, no 
basis whatever for a grouping of the affective elements 
of consciousness in this direction. Affections appear to 
have reference rather to a particular state or condition 
of the organism than to a particular organ or part of 
the body. Hence it is that we look more hopefully to 
" stimuli," as a basis of classification, than to 
" organs." 

Psychological properties, as a basis of classification. — 
As in the case of sensation, the only truly psychological 
way of arranging affections is with respect to their prop- 
erties — their psychical resemblances and differences. It is 
upon this basis that the groups commonly recognized are • 
formed. We all distinguish certain feelings as agreeable 
and certain others as disagreeable. And we may also dis- 
tinguish from these large groups feelings of restlessness and 



QUALITIES OF AFFECTION 



151 



quiescence. There appear, then, to be modes of feeling just 
as there are modes of sensation, but as to the number and 
relations of these modes there is much uncertainty. This 
is in part due to the difficulty in introspecting affection 
and in part to the recency of intensive study of the sub- 
ject. On the whole it looks as though our list of modes 
of affection were much further from completeness than that 
of the sense modes. We suspect that there are many classes 
of feelings, but when we seek to verify our suspicion by 
introspection we discover only a few. Yet here again there 
is as one might expect wide difference in opinion. The 
majority of psychologists maintain that there are only two 
modes of affection, feelings of pleasantness and feelings of 
unpleasantness. Others hold that four classes or modes may 
be distinguished, feelings of restlessness and feelings of 
quiescence in addition to the two which are universally 
accepted. And still others, few in number, claim that they 
can distinguish yet another pair of modes, feelings of ex- 
citement, and feelings of depression. 

Lists of feelings given by different psychologists. — 



WUNDT 


ROYCE 


TITCHENEK 


Agreeableness 


Pleasantness 


Pleasantness 


Disagreeableness 


Unpleasantness 


Unpleasantness 


Excitement 


Restlessness 




Quiescence 


Quiescence 




Tension 






Relaxation 







Are there four distinct modes of affection? — In the list 
of modes of affection offered by Professor Royce, there are 
four classes of feelings. They are pleasantness and un- 
pleasantness, restlessness and quiescence. Because of their 



152 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

obvious opposition they are grouped in pairs. It is quite 
impossible to have pleasant and unpleasant feelings at the 
same time, and it is just as impossible to have feelings of 
restlessness with feelings of quiescence. But it is possible 
to experience pleasantness with either restlessness or quies- 
cence, and so also of unpleasantness. 

Pleasant and unpleasant feelings are receptive affec- 
tions. — All sensations are likely to be accompanied by feel- 
ings. These are called sense-feelings. They are predom- 
inantly agreeable or disagreeable according as the sensation 
increases or diminishes the vital processes. This pair of 
affective modes is characteristic of the passive as contrasted 
with the active organism. If we were incapable of move- 
ment of any sort, if we could not react to stimuli within 
or without our bodies, we probably should experience feel- 
ings of pleasantness and of unpleasantness because of the 
ways in which the body would be influenced by sense- 
stimuli, but we probably should not experience feelings of 
restlessness and of quiescence. 

Restless and quiescent feelings are reactive affections. 
— This pair of affecti/e modes is intimately related to the 
attitude which the organism takes toward things. It is con- 
nected with what the animal does rather than with what it 
receives in the shape of sensations. When one or another 
condition impels us to action we feel restless in some one 
of many different ways. When the condition does not de- 
mand movement, we feel quiescent. 

Are there many qualities for every mode of affection? 
— Whereas there are not more than a score of modes of 
sensation known at present, there are many thousands of 
distinguishable qualities of sensation and there are still more 
sensation-elements of consciousness, since each quality may 
appear in a greater or less variety of intensities, clearnesses, 
durations, extensities, and relations to other elements of 
consciousness. Precisely the same may prove to be true of 



PROPERTIES OF AFFECTIONS 153 

affections. Although the modes which are generally recog- 
nized are few — at most not more than six — the number of 
distinguishable qualities may be great, and that of affective- 
elements far greater. 

The properties of affections. — Throughout the forego- 
ing discussion we have assumed that affections possess 
quality. That this assumption is correct it requires only 
brief self-observation to convince us. Each feeling differs 
from another in kind or quality. The unpleasant affection 
accompanying a headache is not to be confounded with the 
pleasantness connected with a rich warm color experience, 
or even with the unpleasantness of a bruised finger, for the 
three differ in that fundamental property we call quality. 
In fact, it is this difference which furnishes the basis for 
the classifications which have been described. Psycholo- 
gists generally recognize that every affection, as well as 
every sensation, possesses quality, but they are not agreed 
as to the number of varieties of quality which deserve to 
be ranked as modes of affection. 

Affections possess the property of intensity, as well as 
quality. — The affection accompanying headache, toothache, 
color, burn, taste may range in strength or intensity from 
weak to strong. Affections have a threshold, just as do 
sensations, and there is an upper limit beyond which they 
may not transcend. This seems to be true for every one 
of the qualities of affection which are included in our sev- 
eral modes. The disagreeableness of a headache may be 
mild and unobtrusive, just a vague discomfort in the back- 
ground of consciousness, or it may be strong and intrusive, 
an unwelcome visitor in the forefront of the stream of con- 
sciousness. And between the extremes— the minimal and 
the maximal intensities — an affection may occur in any 
one of a multitude of degrees of strength. Experimental 
psychology has not with precision determined the number 
of distinguishable intensities of our affective qualities. The 



154 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

task is a difficult one, but by no means impossible of per- 
formance, and it is to be hoped that we shall sometime 
know how many affective elements really appear in con- 
sciousness. 

Affection possesses also the property of duration. — 
No element of consciousness can be thought of as lacking 
duration. In general, it is true that feelings last much 
longer than sensations. They fluctuate in intensity from 
moment to moment, but they often remain in consciousness 
for minutes. There are few affective experiences which 
flash through consciousness with anything approaching the 
rapidity of the sensation of an electric shock. They last 
for a measurable length of time. This facilitates the study 
of them, and were it not that they tend to disappear as 
soon as one begins to introspect, they would be easier to 
observe than are sensations. 

Is clearness a property of affections? — In the case of 
sensations we have distinguished clearness from intensity 
because a weak, a medium, and a strong sensation may be 
equally clear or unclear. In other words, because the 
definiteness with which a sense element stands out in intro- 
spection seems to be fairly independent of its intensity. Is 
this true of the affections ? 

Just a momeDt ago, I experienced a feeling of depres- 
sion because of the large number of kinds of sense impres- 
sions which interfered with my attempt to introspect a 
feeling of agreeableness. The feeling had a life span which 
could be observed and definitely described. Like a sensa- 
tion it slowly came into being, lasted a moment at its max- 
imum clearness, and waned. It acted, so far as I could 
observe, something as does a sensation. The only difference 
was that attempts at introspection caused the affection to 
diminish in clearness instead of to increase. It would seem, 
then, that a feeling has clearness as well as quality, in- 
tensity, and duration, and that the duration and clearness 



CLEARNESS OF AFFECTIONS 155 

are markedly influenced by introspection. But here we 
evidently have a problem for careful consideration, for Pro- 
fessor Titchener comes to the conclusion that affections lack 
clearness. The first difference between sensation and affec- 
tion, he says, is this: " that affection lacks the attribute 
of clearness. Pleasantness and unpleasantness may be in- 
tensive and lasting, but they are never clear. This means 
if we put it in the language of popular psycholgy, that it 
is impossible to attend to an affection. The more closely 
we attend to a sensation, the clearer does it become, and 
the longer and more accurately do we remember it. But we 
can not attend to an affection at all; if we attempt to do 
so, the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us 
and disappears, and we find ourselves contemplating some 
obtrusive sensation or image which we had no desire to 
observe." (Text-book of Psychology, p. 231.) 

Is this really the case? Have affections clearness or 
have they merely the common properties of quality, in- 
tensity, and duration? To the writer it seems as certain 
that they possess clearness as that sensations possess this 
same property. Either an intense sensation or an intense 
affection may be clear or unclear. The affection, however, 
is never as clear as the sensation at its best, and it certainly 
tends to become unclear as it is observed. 

In addition to the common properties of quality, in- 
tensity, clearness, and duration, affections have certain 
particular characteristics. — A feeling can not be ade- 
quately described with reference alone to its quality, in- 
tensity, clearness, and duration. Its individual properties 
must also be taken into account. The sense-feeling which 
is almost inextricably associated with the taste of bitter 
aloes differs in a number of respects from the feeling of 
depression which follows stage fright. To name a few 
of these special or particular properties as examples will 
render clearer the meaning of this statement. The sense- 



156 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 

feeling in question is more definitely limited in its bodily 
reference ; it interferes more acutely with attention to other 
features of consciousness; it tends to stir one up instead 
of to depress; it possesses, usually, a high degree of clear- 
ness ; it has its own particular affinities with other elements 
of consciousness. In all of these respects the two feelings 
are markedly different. 

This suffices to show that our business as psychologists 
is not merely to discover whether a given feeling possesses 
any two, three, or four common properties of affection, but 
instead to learn all we possibly can about both its essential 
and its accidental properties. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspection of the affective values 
of colors. Materials : squares, 6x6 inches, of Milton Bradley 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet papers (the number 
of hues may profitably be increased to ten if the time available 
for the exercise permits the use of so many) ; a piece of gray 
cardboard about 24 x 24 inches with two windows near its center, 
each 4x4 inches and with a space of 2 inches between them. 
It is convenient to have the gray cardboard mounted on wooden 
blocks so that it will stand upright. Around the lower and 
vertical edges of the windows in this cardboard a pasteboard 
molding should be fixed, as a means of holding the squares of 
colored papers. 

With the gray screen set up before the class, the instructor 
directs that each student compare, as they are shown, each pair 
of colors with respect to their agreeableness. It facilitates the 
recording of judgments and avoids errors if the instructor says 
each time, "Is the red (e.g.) moi*e or less agreeable than the 
blue (e.g.) ?" The symbol + may be used to indicate the judg- 
ment more agreeable; that of — to indicate less agreeable. Each 
color is shown in company with each of the others: for example, 
red with orange, red with yellow, etc., with the red always ap- 
pearing in the window on the right of the observer. Later the 
same series of comparisons should be made, with the red appear- 
ing always in the window on the left. 



THE AFFECTIVE VALUE OF COLORS 



157 



The time of exposure of the colors should be kept fairly con- 
stant at 5 or 10 seconds. 

Each student should prepare in a note-book two or more blank 
tables, like the accompanying form, in which to record judg- 
ments. In this blank the result of comparing red with orange, 
with red on the right, would be recorded in the upper line, first 
blank space at the left. If the judgment were red more agreeable 
than orange, a plus (+) would be written in the blank; if less 
agreeable, a minus ( — ). 

When comparison has been made of each color in the right 
window with each other color in the left window, the table con- 
tains thirty records, five for each of the six colors. As it is de- 
sirable, if possible, to obtain ten, fifteen, or twenty judgments 
for each color, the series of comparisons should be repeated two, 
three, or four times, as time permits. 

The following typical tables of results will render these di- 
rections clearer. In these sample tables the results given by one 
individual are recorded. The plus ( + ) signs indicate that the 
standard color, which for a given horizontal line in the table is 
always printed at the left, was judged to be more agreeable 
than the color with which it was compared. Thus, hi Series 1, 
orange, yellow, green, and violet were each judged as less agree- 
able than red, whereas blue, as is indicated by the minus ( — ) 
sign, was judged to be more agreeable. 



Series 1. Standard color on left 
Red Orange Yellow Green Blue Violet Totals 



Eed 




+ 


+ 


+ 


— 


+ 


4 


Orange 


— 




— 


— 


— 


— 





Yellow 


— 


— 




— 


— 


+ 


1 


Green 


— 


+ 


+ 




— 


+ 


3 


Blue 


+ 


4- 


+ 


+ 




+ 


5 


Yiolet 


— 


+ 


+ 


— 


— 




2 


Totals 


4 


i 


i 


3 


5 


1 


30 



158 AFFECTIONS AS ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Series 2. Standard color on right 
Red Orange Yellow Green Blue Violet Totals 



Bed 




H- 


+ 


4- 


— 


+ 


4 


Orange 


— 




— 


— 


— 


— 





Yellow 


— 


+ 




— 


— 


4- 


2 


Green 


— 


+ 


+ 




— 


+ 


3 


Blue 


+ 


+ 


+ 


4- 




+ 


5 


Violet 


— 


+ 


— 


— 


— 




1 


Totals 


4 





2 


3 


5 


i 


30 



In the right margin of the table for each series is given the 
number of judgments in favor of each color. This number is 
obtained by adding the plus signs. In the last horizontal line 
of each table the number of judgments in favor of a given color 
is obtained by adding the minus signs. For Series 1 red, when 
used as the standard color, was judged more agreeable than the 
compared color four times; when used as the compared color it 
was judged more agreeable four times. The sum of these two 
results, eight judgments, indicates that red was preferred to the 
other colors by this particular individual eight times in ten. 

Following this method of obtaining the number of judgments in 
favor of a given color, we obtain by adding the results of the two 
series the following figures : 



Color 


Red 


Orange Yellow 


Green 


Blue 


Violet 


Judgments in favor of 


16 


1 6 


12 


20 


5 



This yields as the order of preference for the six colors — blue, 
red, green, yellow, violet, orange. 

After the experiment has been completed, the tables of judg- 
ments should be worked over by some one member of the class 
for report. The following questions may suggest ways of deal- 
ing with the results : 

Are individuals consistent in their judgments? This can be 



COLOR PREFERENCE 159 

answered only if the comparisons have been made more than 
once. 

What is the order of preference for the several colors'? 

Is it the same for both sexes? Can you offer any reasons for 
the preferences which your own judgments indicate? 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 68-74. 

Royce, Josiah : Outlines of psychology, chapter 7, " The feelings." 

Wundt, Wm. : Outlines of psychology, § 7. 

Seashore, C. E. : Elementary experiments in psychology, chapter 15. 



CHAPTER XIV 

PSYCHIC COMPLEXES: PERCEPTION 

" To a child the taste of lemonade comes at first as a simple quality. 
He later learns both that many stimuli and many nerves are in- 
volved in the exhibition of this taste to his mind, and he also learns 
to perceive separately the sourness, the coolness, the sweet, the 
lemon aroma, etc., and the several degrees of strength of each and 
all of these things, — the experience falling into a large number of 
aspects, each of which is abstracted, classed, named, etc., and all 
of which appear to be the elementary sensations into which the 
original ' lemonade flavor ' is decomposed." — James, Wm. : Prin- 
ciples of psychology, vol. 2, p. 2, footnote. 

The elements of consciousness exist only in psychic 
complexes. — Elementary sensations and affections exist in 
isolation only during the early stages of mental life. Long 
before one reaches the period of self-consciousness and in- 
trospective ability they have disappeared, lost in a maze of 
complex relations and overshadowed by important concrete 
experiences. It is, then, only by the analysis of these ex- 
periences of later life that we approach a knowledge of the 
constituent elements of consciousness. Having in the previ- 
ous chapters of this introduction examined the varieties 
and properties of the elementary mental phenomena, sensa- 
tions, and affections, we are now prepared to study psychic 
complexes. Emerging from the sea of artificial products 
of analysis with which psychologists surround themselves, 
we shall plunge into the familiar and vitally interesting 
world of concrete experiences. 

The kinds of psychic complexes. — It is convenient to 
separate our experiences into two classes: (1) Those which 
consist wholly or chiefly of sensations or images, and (2) 

160 



SENSATIONS, PERCEPTIONS, IDEAS 161 

those which, instead, are composed principally of affective- 
elements. The first we shall call sense-complexes (percep- 
tions, ideas), and the second, affective-complexes (feelings, 
emotions). In the present chapter we shall limit our at- 
tention to the sense-complexes. 

Sensations, perceptions, and ideas. — For psychology a 
sensation is a particular kind of psychic element: for com- 
mon-sense it is, more frequently, an experience which is 
made up of a number of such elements. Popularly we talk 
of sensations of sight, of sound, or of touch, or of taste 
when we really mean what the psychologist designates as 
perceptions. For a visual experience which consists of a 
group of sense-elements is really a visual perception, not 
a sensation; the sound which is made up of noises, over- 
tones, and a fundamental tone is an auditory perception ; 
the taste, as of lemonade, which consists of a number of 
gustatory qualities, certain olfactory and other qualities, 
confused almost beyond recognition, is a gustatory per- 
ception. From these examples of the technical applica- 
tion of the term perception, it is clear that the word is 
used to designate psychic complexes which are made up 
chiefly of sense-elements. 

Psychology makes another distinction which is important 
in this connection. It contrasts experiences which come to 
us directly and immediately through the senses as percep- 
tions and those which are remembered as ideas. I have a 
perception of the taste of banana when I have the substance 
in my mouth and experience sensations, but I have, instead, 
an idea of it when I experience images. 

An idea differs from a perception in that it consists chiefly 
of images, whereas the perception consists chiefly of sensa- 
tions. ' ' Look across the room and you perceive the table ; 
shut your eyes and you ideate the table." This distinction 
is important for we shall later have to consider the re- 
spects in which immediately perceived psychic complexes 



162 PERCEPTION 

(perceptions) differ from the same complexes when they 
are remembered (ideas). 

Varieties of perception. — As is hinted in the foregoing 
paragraph, it is quite possible to classify our perceptions 
according to the mode of sensation which is prominent or 
predominant. We speak of visual, of auditory, of tactual, 
and of other kinds of perceptions, meaning thereby to indi- 
cate the fact that in these psychic complexes some particular 
mode of sensation is preeminently important. It is this prin- 
ciple of classification which has given origin to the notion of 
perceptual and ideational types. Persons whose percep- 
tions or ideas are characterized chiefly by visual sensations 
or sense-images are said to belong to the visual type: they 
are visualizers. Those whose perceptions and ideas are 
made up chiefly of sensations or images of sound are said 
to belong to the auditory type. Still others, because of the 
predominance of tactual and organic sensations, are char- 
acterized as tactual-motor in type. But perhaps the most 
frequented of all the perceptual and ideational groups is 
that which is known as the mixed, for it includes all those 
persons whose experiences are not predominated by any 
one kind of sensations or images. 

Sir Francis Galton's study of mental imagery, as re- 
ported in his " Inquiries into human faculty," should be 
read by every student of psychology, for it constitutes one 
of the most interesting, as well as illuminating, of the con- 
tributions to psychology. Few persons know enough about 
their perceptions and ideas to say with certainty whether 
they belong to the visual, the auditory, the tactual-motor, 
or the mixed, type. This is something to be ashamed of, 
as one should be ashamed of ignorance of his age, date 
of birth, or nationality. If psychology does no more for 
each of us than stir us to an introspective study of our 
perceptions and ideas so that definite information about 
them shall be obtained, it will have benefited us greatly. 



CLASSIFICATION OF PERCEPTIONS 163 

The relation of perceptions to the properties of sensa- 
tions. — Another basis for the classification of our percep- 
tions is the importance of the several common properties 
of sensation in the complex. From this point of view we 
may distinguish qualitative perceptions, extensive percep- 
tions, and intensive perceptions. Professor Wundt distin- 
guishes just three classes: (1) the intensive, (2) the spatial, 
(3) the temporal. Professor Titchener enumerates the 
extensive, the temporal, and the qualitative. In their 
definitions of the temporal and the spatial they agree, but 
whereas Professor Titchener states that " intensive ideas " 
are non-existent, because of the fact that intensity is always 
bound up with quality, Professor Wundt uses the term 
intensive to designate what Professor Titchener calls the 
" qualitative idea." 

The two methods of classification do not conflict. — 
The perceptions of any particular mode of sense, as for 
instance the tactual, may belong to any one of the types 
mentioned above. They may be qualitative, extensive 
(spatial), durational (temporal), or, provided we succeed 
in distinguishing this variety from the others, intensive. 
Each of the classes which we obtain on the basis of the 
predominance of sense-elements may, therefore, be split up 
into three or four parts. Thus we come to distinguish a 
dozen or more varieties of perceptions and ideas. Of these 
the qualitative are by far the most interesting to the be- 
ginner in introspection. 

Examples of tactual perceptions. — Through the senses 
of the skin — roughly grouped as tactual — we obtain sense 
impressions which combine into perceptions of several sorts. 
There are qualitative perceptions, for we are conscious of 
the nature of an object: it is hard, rough, sticky. There 
are extensive perceptions, for we are also conscious of the 
object as of a certain size, form, and position. There are 
durational perceptions, for we are aware of the sequence 



164 PERCEPTION 

of impressions as the finger or hand is moved over irregu- 
larities in the object. And it is possible that from these 
we may at times distinguish an intensive perception, as 
we become aware of the vividness, distinctness, or clear- 
ness of the complex of sense-elements without attend- 
ing to the quality, extent, or duration. Sometimes I 
seem to discover this aspect of perception, but for 
the most part it is obscured by the other properties of 
sensations. 

Examples of visual perceptions. — Visual perceptions are 
so prevalent in our mental life that it seems almost needless 
to cite examples. Glancing up from my typewriter my eye 
falls upon a row of books in a case. The experience which 
I observe is predominantly visual. First, I note the quali- 
tative aspect of the perception. I am aware of the visual 
qualities of red, pink, brown, green, blue, black, and gold. 
These are the prominent features of my consciousness as 
I glance at the shelf. Then there is the experience of size, 
form, distance, position, for my eyes sweep along the line 
of books. The perception has changed from a purely quali- 
tative complex of sensations to one in which extent is 
prominent : it has become spatial. Almost at the same time, 
I notice the serial arrangement of the books : the experience 
of rhythm breaks in upon my consciousness. This is en- 
hanced by the fact that at one end of the shelf there are 
several volumes of about the same size, while in the middle 
there are a few large volumes which disturb the regularity 
of my eye movements. Thus the temporal aspect of my 
perception appears. At this moment I am not aware of 
anything identifiable as an intensive aspect of the experi- 
ence, but I have previously observed that the light re- 
flected from the glass door in front of the books gives me 
an experience which is best described as intensive. At such 
times I am conscious not of the characteristics of the books, 
of the size, or form, or position, or regular arrangement 



EXAMPLES OF PERCEPTIONS 165 

of the objects, but merely of the intensive character of my 
visual complex. The consciousness is one not merely of 
light too bright for comfort, but it vaguely includes the 
books. In other words, it is for the time an intensive per- 
ception. 

Examples of taste perceptions. — In many respects our 
so-called perceptions and ideas of the tastes of edible sub- 
stances are interesting. They are not at all what we think 
them, for ordinarily we confuse olfactory with gustatory 
sensations, and sometimes we even fail to distinguish tactual 
and temperature sensations from those of taste and smell. 
A grape fruit, or a luciously ripe peach, yields us an experi- 
ence which is surprisingly complex. For it consists of 
sensations belonging to several modes. Tastes, odors, 
touches, temperatures are interwoven in the psychic com- 
plex. Place a bit of the substance in the mouth, with the 
nose held firmly between the fingers so that no odor sensa- 
tions can be received, and you may be startled to discover 
that what had previously seemed to be a taste has disap- 
peared and in place of it there stand out the sensations of 
texture and temperature. Apple and potato are much 
alike, except for differences in texture, when the nose is 
held and olfactory sensations are thus excluded. 

Foremost among the aspects of perceptions of taste is the 
qualitative. The qualities of sapid substances especially 
interest us. The ripe peach exists in consciousness pri- 
marily as the perception or idea of sweet juiciness. Sec- 
ondarily we may become aware that the object is small or 
that it will not last much longer. Thus the extensive 
(spatial) and durational (temporal) ideas supplant the 
purely qualitative. At times, when we are comparing 
the experiences yielded by two sapid substances of like 
quality, a purely intensive perceptual consciousness of 
taste may appear, but as a rule the intensity or clearness is 
subordinate to the quality, extent, and duration. 



166 PERCEPTION 

The pleasantness or unpleasantness of tastes, or 
sounds, or sights. — Few indeed are the perceptions and 
ideas which lack affective accompaniments. Pleasantness is 
even more prominent in my consciousness of " ripe peach " 
than is sweetness or mild acidity or velvety softness. It 
seems to be an essential part or property of the sensations 
which go to make up my awareness of peach. It is impor- 
tant indeed that we should note that few perceptions and 
ideas lack value or affective accompaniments. 

Perceptions of things or objects. — The consciousness of 
a particular object usually includes a variety of elements. 
Now the visual is the more important, now the auditory, 
or the tactual. At one instant the experience is qualitative, 
and at the next it is spatial, temporal, or intensive. My 
consciousness of a picture in my office contains a very large 
number of sense- and affective-elements which are so related 
or interconnected that I feel the unity of the experience. 
I readily convince myself that the picture consists solely 
of qualities of sensation and that my experience adds to 
these certain affective elements. But the many simple psy- 
chological phenomena so combine that I am aware of the 
object as having certain properties, a certain size, form, 
position, value for me. Ordinarily, then, what is called 
consciousness of an object is composed of a number of 
groups of conscious elements closely related and together 
giving a feeling of oneness to the experience. For this 
reason, among others, it is misleading to classify percep- 
tions as perceptions of things, of space, and of time. The 
first really includes all of the others. 

The furnishings of our minds are mostly perceptual 
or ideational experiences of objects or events. — Really 
our consciousness of things, or of essential features thereof, 
makes up the greater part of our experience. Our waking 
moments are filled with a succession of perceptions and 
ideas. Sometimes the train moves rapidly and is most 



CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBJECTS 167 

intricately interwoven by associative processes ; sometimes 
it lags and we are bored by onr lack of ideas or of power 
to relate them. By the number and complexity of relation 
of his ideas we measure the intellectual strength of a per- 
son. Each idea represents an item of information. The 
variety of these items, with respect to a given object, is 
very great, and most observers are able to continue to add 
to their store of information about a thing throughout their 
natural lives. Let us ask, What are some of the aspects 
of objects or happenings which are important to us? 

Elements which combine in our experiences of objects 
or things. — It would be a long list that would include all 
of the elements in one's perception of an object. Those 
which are mentioned below are merely examples of the 
items of information which we seek. 

Almost every question that we ask about an object or 
happening demands as its answer a sense experience, a per- 
ception, or an idea. Of the skates which are before me 
I ask : Are they sharp ? Are they large enough ? Will 
they fit my shoes? Are they properly curved? Is the 
steel sufficiently hard? When, where, and how shall I use 
them? Once I had completed the list of questions which 
I should naturally ask about a pair of skates before buying 
them, I should, if the appropriate answers were forthcom- 
ing, be provided with the information that would enable me 
to give a good description of the objects. I should know 
a large number of their chief properties. Each of our 
ideas about a thing really stands for a property or group 
of properties of the thing, just as each of our sense-elements 
constitutes a portion of a simple aspect of perception. But 
whereas the properties of the elements of consciousness are 
simple and neither describable nor analyzable, the proper- 
ties or attributes of things are frequently complex and 
analyzable into sense-elements. The property of color in 
the book before me as it appears in my consciousness is 



168 PERCEPTION 

analyzable into chromatic and achromatic qualities of 
sensation. "What I call the size of the book consists of 
related sensations of vision, of touch, or of both. The 
same holds for the other properties which enter into the 
experience of the object. For my consciousness the book 
is the sum of these bits of information, each of which 
stands for a property of the object itself. 

Sensations, or images, of many modes may unite in 
a perception, or idea. — Although, as has been said, there 
are perceptions in which sensations of only one mode are 
present, as a rule a considerable variety of sense modes and 
qualities are represented. When we characterize an experi- 
ence as visual, we mean either that it is exclusively made 
up of visual sensations or that it includes no other elements 
of importance. Most frequently the latter meaning is in- 
tended. There are few perceptions of things which are 
built up from a single mode of sense. Our qualitative per- 
ceptions of sights, pressures, tastes, sounds usually include 
sensations of other modes. Our extensive or spatial per- 
ceptions, as a rule, contain sensations from two, three, or 
four modes: the visual, the tactual, and the kimesthetic. 

Ideas tend to run together, or fuse. — Just as sensa- 
tions and affections tend to unite in psychic complexes, so 
perceptions and ideas, in turn, tend to become grouped. 
My consciousness of the typewritten page is a group of 
perceptions and ideas, plus rather interesting affective ele- 
ments. This fact is commonly expressed by the statement 
that perceptions and ideas become associated. Most books 
on psychology devote much attention to the varieties and 
characteristics of the association process. The word fire 
brings to consciousness an idea of noise ; that, in turn, 
drags in the idea of men; men leads to the idea of run- 
ning ; running of engine ; engine of water ; water of cold ; 
cold of frozen hydrant ; and so on throughout a long series 
of ideas which I experienced recently in connection with 



IMPRESSION AND IMAGE 169 

a fire near my office. Each of the ideas in the series is 
described as associated with the others. 

Both perception and association involve the intercon- 
nection of psychic complexes. — Evidently we have trans- 
gressed the limitations set by the heading of this chapter, 
for instead of discussing psychic compounds we are now 
dealing with the relations of these compounds. Even the 
consciousness of an object is a complex of complexes, for 
it includes a number of associated perceptions or ideas. 
The fusion of sensations into groups, the fusion of these 
groups into a compound perception, the fusion of percep- 
tions into a thought, are all of them associative processes. 
When the welding together, or fusing, of the parts occurs 
almost instantaneously it is called simultaneous associa- 
tion. "When it occurs more slowly, it is called successive 
association. 

Impression and image. — Our discussion of perception 
has neglected an important aspect of the subject. We 
have considered only the immediately experienced facts of 
consciousness, the sensations which come to us from mo- 
ment to moment, utterly neglecting the images which enter 
into the composition of very nearly all of our perceptions. 
It is now impossible for me to perceive Professor Ebbing- 
haus' " Grundziige der Psychologie " without having old 
sensations (sense images), familiar affections, and old ideas 
appear as parts of the experience. To my present impres- 
sion of the book there is added these memory contributions 
and my perceptual consciousness of the object is a com- 
plex of these two sorts of psychic material. The consid- 
eration of the re-presentational (remembered) materials 
of consciousness as contrasted with the presentational has 
been omitted wholly in this chapter in order that it may 
be given fuller attention in chapter XVI. 

False or misleading perceptions. — There are two well 
known types of misleading perceptions: illusions and hal- 



170 PERCEPTION 

lucinations. If two lines are perceived as of equal length 
when they really are different or if what is perceived as 
a rectangle is in reality a square, the perceptions are il- 
lusory. There are a great many optical illusions. An 
hallucination is experienced when the perceptual conscious- 
ness of an object appears although the object is not present. 
The person who sees a ghost in a black void is experiencing 
a false perception of the hallucinatory type. 

In almost any text-book of psychology may be found 
descriptions of a number of illusory perceptions and of 
typical hallucinations. 



CLASS EXERCISE 

Psychological facts and laws as exhibited by advertisements. 
This exercise should be done out of class. Materials: Ten full- 
page advertisements selected from some magazine. The in- 
structor should choose advertisements which in his opinion range 
from excellent to very poor. He should then provide himself 
with enough sets of these advertisements to supply each student 
with a set. Each advertisement should be plainly numbered at 
the top of the page. The writer uses a set of ten advertisements 
which he selected from a number of the Century Magazine. He 
obtained fifty copies of the magazine at a reasonable rate, tore 
them up, trimmed the pages which were to be used, and arranged 
them in sets. The cost of the sets was approximately twelve 
cents each. By using a cheaper magazine the sets might be 
obtained for a smaller expenditure. 

A set of advertisements should be handed to each student 
with the direction to arrange the ten in order of excellence, from 
best to worst, after a general examination of the set. It should 
be emphasized that the arrangement is to be made rather on the 
basis of first impression than after detailed examination and 
careful study of each advertisement. After an order has been 
decided upon, the student should make a record thereof by using 
the numbers of the advertisements as, for example, thus: 

Place : First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, etc. 

Adv. No. 4 6 2 9 1 etc. 



PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE OF ADVERTISEMENTS 171 

Next, the chief reasons for choosing the order should be stated. 
This should be done in the light of introspection of the ways 
in which the several advertisements appeared in consciousness. 

The results should be handed in, and then submitted to a mem- 
ber of the class for special study. The instructor should give 
suggestions as to methods of dealing with the materials 
statistically. 

Possible methods of treatment and interesting values which may 
be determined: 

(1) The distribution of judgments may be ascertained and 
indicated in tabular form. 

Table of distribution of judgments for a class of twenty 
Place 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 



Adv. No. 


1 








1 


3 


2 


2 


6 


3 


2 


1 


" " 


2 


5 


6 


2 





3 


3 


1 





1 





" " 


3 


1 


2 


1 


2 





5 


4 


2 


2 


1 


a a 


4 


1 


1 


4 


2 


8 


1 


1 








2 


" " 


5 





3 


3 


3 





5 





4 


1 


1 


" " 


6 


2 





1 





5 





1 


4 


5 


2 


a it 


7 


1 


4 


1 


4 


1 


3 


1 


1 


2 


2 


(i it 


8 


1 


1 


1 


2 





1 


1 


1 


2 


10 


tt (i 


9 


9 


2 


4 


3 


1 








1 








" " 


10 





1 


2 


1 





1 


5 


4 


5 


1 



This table indicates, for example, that adv. no. 1 was given 
first place by no one, that it was given fourth place by three 
individuals, seventh place by six, etc. 

(2) From such a table of the distribution of judgments, the 
average order of merit of the advertisements may be determined. 
One way of doing this is to credit an advertisement with ten 
points every time it appears in the first place, with nine points 
every time it appears in the second place, with eight points every 
time it appears in the third place, and so on. Since, in the 
results from which the above table was constructed, an advertise- 
ment had twenty chances to appear in the first place, the maxi- 
mum number of points which it could have to its credit was 
20 X 10 = 200. As a matter of fact, no one of the advertise- 
ments reached this maximum. The actual results, or as they may 
appropriately be termed values, for the ten advertisements as 
determined by the method just described are as follows: 

No. of Adv. 12345 6789 10 

Value 89 154 102 124 112 86 116 67 170 80 

Order of merit Nos. 9, 2, 4, 7, 5, 3, 1, 6, 10, 8. 



172 PERCEPTION 

(3) The closeness of the arrangement made by any individual 
to that made by the class as a group may be ascertained. A 
simple method of doing this is to credit the individual with one 
mistake for each place by which his ranking of an advertisement 
differs from the average. Taking the average or group order as 
9, 2, 4, 7, 5, etc., the individual who placed adv. no. 9 in the 
third, instead of the first, place would be said to have made two 
mistakes — because he missed the average position by 3 — 1 = 2 
places. If he placed adv. no. 10 in the second place instead of 
in the ninth, his mistakes would amount to 9 — 2 = 7. 

For the twenty students whose judgments have been classified 
in our table the average number of mistakes was 18.7. The 
maximum number was 38, and the minimum, 8. 

(4) The results for the sexes may be tabulated separately and 
the above values determined for each group, for the sake of 
comparison. 

(5) Comparison of introspective data may be made in a class 
discussion of the exercise. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§85-104. 

Witmer, L. : Analytic psychology, chapters 3 and 4. 

Myers, C. S. : Text-book of experimental psychology, chapter 22. 

Angell, J. R. : Psychology, chapters 6 and 7. 

Calkins, M. W. : A first book in psychology, chapters 2 and 4. 

Munsterberg, H: Pseudoptics (The Milton Bradley Company). 



CHAPTER XV 

PSYCHIC COMPLEXES: FEELINGS 

" Every one of the bodily changes occurring in connection with an 
emotion, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment 
it occurs. If the reader has never paid attention to this matter, he 
will be both interested and astonished to learn how many different 
local bodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his 
various emotional moods. It would be perhaps too much to expect 
him to arrest the tide of any strong gust of passion for the sake 
of any such curious analysis as this; but he can observe more 
tranquil states, and that may be assumed here to be true of the 
greater which is shown to be true of the less. Our whole cubic 
capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its 
pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to 
that sense of personality that every one of us unfailingly carries 
with him. It is surprising what little items give accent to these 
complexes of sensibility. When worried by any slight trouble, one 
may find that the focus of one's bodily consciousness is the con- 
traction, often quite inconsiderable, of the eyes and brows. When 
momentarily embarrassed, it is something in the pharynx that com- 
pels either a swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a slight cough ; and 
so on for as many more instances as might be named." — James, Wm. : 
Principles of psychology, vol. 2, p. 451. 

Affections and feelings. — Perceptions are complexes of 
sensations, and feelings are complexes of affections. In the 
preceding chapter we grouped all psychic complexes whose 
chief constituents are sensations, and in the present chapter 
we shall consider, in like manner, all experiences in which 
affection is predominant. Again we must remind our- 
selves that few experiences are exclusively composed either 
of sensations or of affections : our classification rests wholly 
upon the relative importance of these elements of conscious- 
ness. As the word perception may be used to denote the 
general class of sense-complexes, so we may use the term 
feeling to denote affective complexes. 

173 



174 FEELINGS 

The popular usage of the word feeling. — It is our wont 
to describe conditions within and without our bodies in 
terms of feeling. We " feel cold, weary, hungry, stiff, 
uncomfortable, calm, restless, annoyed, impatient." Such 
expressions obviously refer to conditions of our bodies, 
whereas we describe conditions outside us by saying that 
something " feels hard, heavy, rough, brittle, steady, safe." 
This usage is quite in accord with that intended in the 
title of this chapter. But whereas popularly we may desig- 
nate all varieties of the affective complexes by the single 
term feeling, it is not convenient to do so in psychology. 
We may therefore proceed to distinguish the important 
kinds of feelings. 

The chief varieties of feelings.— There are four classes 
of affective complexes which should be included in the 
generic term feeling. They are (1) sense-feelings, (2) 
emotions, (3) sentiments, and (4) volitions. Sense-feel- 
ings are sufficiently characterized by the fact that they 
are accompaniments of sensations or complexes of sensa- 
tions, constituting the tone or value thereof. Emotions are 
complexes of strong sense-feelings which accompany percep- 
tions or ideas. Sentiments are emotions which have ac- 
quired a connection with a particular object. Volitions are 
feelings which regularly culminate in a feeling of decision 
and are rather abruptly terminated with the expression 
of the decision. Each of these classes of affective experi- 
ences may now be examined more fully. 

Sense-feelings and their properties. — For a sensation, 
a perception, or a memory to lack an accompanying feeling 
is the exception. Indeed so uniform is the association of 
affective elements with sensations and their complexes that 
the ordinary observer is likely to describe the sensation as 
a feeling. When we say that sandpaper " feels rough " 
we indicate that the affective elements of our experience 
influence us more strongly than do the sensation-elements. 



SENSE-FEELINGS 175 

Yet, analysis reveals the fact that the tactual sensations 
obtained when the finger is brought into contact with sand- 
paper are the chiefly significant parts of the experience so 
far as the psychologist is concerned. The popular phrase 
should, however, impress upon us the fact that con- 
sciousness of sandpaper consists of sensations plus 
important sense-feelings or affective elements. It may 
be said that we sense the sandpaper, and have a feel- 
ing for it. The former aspect of our consciousness 
is purely intellectual or cognitive, the latter is purely 
affective. 

The more complex the group of sensations the more 
complex the affections. — An idea of pain may be accom- 
panied by a vivid and insistent disagreeableness, but this 
sense-feeling is relatively simple in comparison with the 
affective elements which accompany the perception of an 
appetizing meal when one is ravenously hungry. The pain 
consciousness contains only a few elements of either the 
sense or the affective sort : the consciousness of the food is 
extremely complex in the number and relations of the sensa- 
tions which enter into it and also in its affective constitu- 
ents. Or, again, the perception of a color apart from an 
object is likely to be accompanied by a definite sense-feeling, 
but that feeling is almost elementary, in many instances, 
whereas the perception of a highly and complexly colored 
object is likely to be enveloped in a group of affective ele- 
ments. It seems to be the case that the majority of sensa- 
tions and common groups of sensations possess their char- 
acteristic feelings, and that the greater the number of these 
sensations or groups that are welded together in a given 
psychic complex the greater the number of affective ele- 
ments in the experience. 

Are there more than two kinds of sense-feelings? — 
It is readily discovered that there are at least two kinds 
of feelings connected with our sensations, perceptions, and 



176 FEELINGS 

ideas. We call them feelings of pleasantness and unpleas- 
antness when we think especially of our own bodily condi- 
tion and feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness 
when instead we think of the relation of something else to 
our bodies. This, however, is not an important distinction 
and it need not concern us further than to bring to our 
attention the fact that we sometimes refer feeling to our- 
selves, sometimes to other objects. Now, introspection indi- 
cates that sensations are separable into three classes with 
respect to their affective escorts. There are, first, those 
which are unmistakably pleasant, or agreeable ; second, 
those which are as unmistakably unpleasant or disagree- 
able ; and, third, those which have so little of feeling accom- 
paniment that they must be described as indifferent. The 
sensations of certain modes are frequently characterized by 
being placed in one of these classes. The elements of the 
pain mode are usually unpleasant ; those of the visual mode 
are usually pleasant. Of most varieties of sensation it is 
true, however, that the three relations to affection are repre- 
sented. Some pain qualities are distinctly unpleasant, 
others are indifferent, and still others are slightly pleasant. 
To the popular ear it seems like a contradiction to say 
that a pain sensation may be pleasant, but introspection has 
convinced not a few observers that this really is the ease. 
In the case of most experiences which involve pain qualities, 
what we notice is not the quality of the pain sensation or 
sensations, but, instead, the feeling which accompanies 
them. We thus come to confuse the pain itself with the 
sense-feeling which accompanies it under certain conditions. 
There is no mode of sensation in which the real psychic 
characteristics of the sense qualities are so obscured by 
their sense-feelings, so difficult to observe, and so frequently 
misunderstood as that of pain. The reader will do well to 
observe introspectively several color experiences, noting 
the sense-feeling which accompanies each, with a view to 



SENSE-FEELINGS 177 

finding out whether some colors are pleasant, some unpleas- 
ant, and still others indifferent. 

Feelings of restlessness and quiescence. — As I hold my 
fingers above the keyboard of my typewriter, waiting for 
the proper word to come to the focus of consciousness, I 
experience a feeling which seems neither pleasant nor un- 
pleasant. It is a consciousness of tension and restless ex- 
pectancy. There is at times unpleasantness, but more fre- 
quently it seems unfair to characterize the sense-feeling 
by that term: it is more truly a feeling of restlessness. I 
seem to get this feeling mostly when after a decision, or 
after stimulation, something temporarily inhibits reaction. 
The feeling is distinctly one of strain and unrest. Perhaps 
it would be fair to say that this is the particular quality 
of unpleasantness which usually accompanies sensations of 
strain or the inhibition of movement. Almost the opposite 
of this restless feeling is that luxurious experience of calm 
relief which comes over one after a difficult act has been 
performed. Quite aside from the pleasantness of free and 
unobstructed activity I seem to discover in myself a sense- 
feeling of quiescence. Sometimes it follows activity; again 
it possesses me when there is no call for action. I have 
experienced it most vividly when after a satisfying dinner 
I settled into an easy chair for a half hour of relaxation 
before beginning work. I attribute the feeling to the gen- 
eral condition of the organism. Possibly, like the restless 
feeling, it too is merely one variety of pleasantness 
or unpleasantness. Only introspection can definitely 
settle this question and the more efforts at accurate ob- 
servation are made in this connection the better for psy- 
chology and for our understanding of our psychological 
selves. 

Emotions. — There is no variety of experience which is 
of such intense popular interest, so prominent in the con- 
stitution of mental life, and at the same time so important 



178 FEELINGS 

and so interesting scientifically as those affective complexes 
which are known as emotions. In comparison with an emo- 
tion, a sense-feeling seems simple and readily understood. 
Yet there really is not as great a difference in complexity 
of structure as is often supposed; rather the difference 
consists in the vividness of the affective elements. We call 
an experience a perception, an idea, or a memory when 
the intellectual or cognitive aspect is predominant, and the 
same general experience we call a feeling or an emotion 
when the affective aspect is predominant. The first time 
you examined this book you experienced a perceptual com- 
plex, while as you examine the object now you have an 
emotional experience and that simply because the feelings 
of your consciousness are more prominent and stronger 
than the perceptions and ideas. As I looked up from 
this page I saw a leather-bound volume ; I certainly per- 
ceived the book, but what I was intensely conscious of was 
an emotion of resentment, for the author of that book has 
written so carelessly that it is almost impossible to dis- 
cover what he meant to say. I feel, each time I take 
up the volume, that I am being insulted, for the style 
indicates that the writer did not consider it worth 
while to take sufficient pains with his work to do it 
well. 

Emotions are directed toward something. — It is char- 
acteristic of emotions that they are associated with percep- 
tions or memory experiences. My resentment is directed 
toward a particular object. I am angry with a certain per- 
son. I am amused by a joke and laugh at it. I am sorry 
for my friend in misfortune. Every emotion is a more 
or less strong feeling for or against something. It may 
be my psychological or my physical self to which the emo- 
tion is referred, it may be some other self or some inanimate 
object or happening, but the reference is always there. 
Some psychologists content themselves by saying that an 



EMOTIONS 179 

emotion is a strong feeling and that certainly is true, but 
it seems to be more than that. The feeling is associated 
with a simpler intellectual content as a rule than is the 
emotion. I may feel the disagreeableness of a sudden fall 
in temperature or of having my face washed with snow, 
but I have no emotions attaching to the objects which are 
involved. If the fall in temperature, as I become conscious 
of it, is accompanied by an emotion it is likely to take the 
form of dissatisfaction with the person who had the care 
of my furnace or the engineer of the building, or of anger 
with that person because he has disobeyed or neglected 
his duty. 

On the rise of emotions. — ' ' The conditions under which 
an emotion arises will, then, be somewhat as follows. We 
set out with a consciousness, composed of a number of ideas, 
more or less distinct, and more or less pleasant or unpleas- 
ant. This consciousness is suddenly interrupted by an 
idea to which the attention is forcibly attracted (passive 
attention). The idea is immediately supplemented by other 
ideas, and a simultaneous association is formed, reflecting 
a scene or situation in the physical world. The situation 
is of such a kind that the organism, in obedience to bio- 
logical law, must feel it to be pleasant or unpleasant. At 
this stage we have, therefore, a complicated feeling set in 
the midst of the original consciousness. The feeling is so 
powerful, however, that the original processes are now 
upon the verge of disappearance. 

" An organism which is called upon to face a particular 
situation must do so by a particular bodily adjustment, a 
special bodily attitude or set of bodily movements. This 
adjustment is taking place at the same time that the com- 
plicated feeling, just described, is ousting the processes of 
which the original consciousness was composed. As it takes 
place, various organic sensations are set up, — the direct 
results of the changes in the position, tension, etc., of the 



ISO FEELINGS 

various bodily organs involved. These organic sensations 
associate to the mass of ideas contained in the feeling, and 
together with that feeling constitute the emotion. 

" It is essential, then, for the formation of an emotion: 
(1) that a train of ideas shall be interrupted by a vivid 
feeling; (2) that this feeling shall mirror a situation or 
incident in the outside world; and (3) that the feeling shall 
be enriched by organic sensations, .set up in the course of 
bodily adjustment to the incident. The emotion itself, as 
experienced, consists of a strong affection, and a simultane- 
ous association of ideas, some of the part-processes in which 
are always organic sensations." (Titchener, E. B. : Out- 
line of Psychology, pp. 229-231.) 

The three phases of the formation of an emotion. — 
These phases are clearly exhibited in the following case. 
As I am lying on the beach enjoying the relaxation and 
exhilaration which follow an ocean bath and thinking of 
nothing in particular, a cry for help suddenly and unex- 
pectedly breaks in upon my consciousness. In the quality 
of the voice itself there is something which prepares me for 
the scene which meei;s my eyes when I turn them toward 
the sea. A weak swimmer has been carried beyond his 
depth by the outgoing tide and is crying in terror for aid. 
My consciousness is instantaneously transformed from a 
purely and evenly associational affair to an emotional one, 
for a feeling of unpleasantness extremely vivid and in- 
sistent has broken in upon it. The feeling is one which 
has come to be associated with danger and death. My whole 
body responds to the situation instantly. My heart fairly 
jumps into my throat and beats with a speed which is 
double its usual ; the perspiration comes out in beads almost 
before my muscles have brought me to the edge of the 
water. I am in a state of extreme muscular tension. Thus 
from these unusual bodily conditions, I receive sensations 
which are as unusual as is the feeling which called them 



EMOTIONS 181 

forth. They fuse in the total consciousness, which I describe 
as an emotion of horror. But this experience lasts only 
a moment, for the instant I have made up my mind what 
to do I am lost in the consciousness — purely intellectual 
— of effort to get to the drowning person. As I swim as rap- 
idly and as steadily as I can in the proper direction, I am 
aware of many things, but predominant is the conscious- 
ness that I must keep calm and work steadily and hard 
if I am to be of any service. I know that the return of 
the emotion into which the cry of terror threw me would 
prove fatal to my aim. 

Emotions interfere with action, when they are strong. 
— When in fear we act rashly or blindly. When in anger 
we act foolishly. When in extreme joy we act extrava- 
gantly. An emotion spurs us to action, but it must pass 
before we can act to best advantage. 

Emotion and perception. — As Professor Thorndike very 
well says, " The emotions form in a sense a radically dif- 
ferent group of mental facts [from the sensations, percepts, 
images, and other features of our life of thought]. Love, 
hate, fear, jealousy, anger, joy, sorrow, and the like, are 
feelings, not of or about things or bodily conditions recog- 
nized as such, but of one's own conditions, unref erred to 
bodily facts. They have, that is, a subjective or personal 
as opposed to an objective, reference. The emotional state 
of mind, in which one's own mental condition is para- 
mount, is opposed to the intellectual state of mind, in 
which some object of thought is paramount. Besides pos- 
sessing this subjective quality, the emotions are less subject 
to elaboration and manipulation than are sensations, per- 
cepts, and images. They do not connect with one another 
so as to form any system or order as do the feelings of 
things, meanings, and relationships. They are essentially 
isolated and incoherent. In the third place, we do not 
master them and use them at will for intellectual and prac- 



182 



FEELINGS 



tical ends as we do our ideas and judgments; rather they 
master us. For the time being one is the emotion." 
(Elements of Psychology, p. 74.) 

Grades of emotions. — A persistent feeling, although not 
unduly strong, may yet be properly characterized as an 
emotion if the course of development outlined by Pro- 
fessor Titchener appears. In this case we experience a 
mood. It is a continued feeling of pleasantness or unpleas- 
antness, or restlessness or quiescence. It colors the whole 
of our consciousness, cognitive as well as affective, for a 
period of time. We have times of depression when no good 
fortune counts for much and when any bad luck casts us 
into the depths of despondency. And again we have 
periods of cheerfulness when even a serious misfortune 
seems trivial. These moods are characteristic of what is 
called the temperament. We shall consider them in the 
following paragraph. There are three readily distinguisha- 
ble grades of intensity in emotion : moods, ordinary emo- 
tions, and passions. A passion is the opposite of a mood. 
Unlike the latter it is extremely intense and also short 
lived. Because of its great intensity it can not last long. 
Indicative of the four grades of emotion which we habit- 
ually distinguish in speech are the following affective terms : 



MOOD 


WEAK EMOTION 


STRONG EMOTION 


PASSION 


Wonder 
Irritation 
Kindliness 
Chagrin 


Surprise 
Aversion 
Friendliness 
Mortification 


Astonishment 
Anger 
Liking 
Resentment 


Amazement 
Rage 
Love 
Exasperation 



In general it may be said that the stronger or more 
intense the feeling which breaks in upon the unemotional 
consciousness the more numerous, vivid, and intense the 



TEMPERAMENTS 183 

bodily sensations which it arouses and the stronger the emo- 
tion which is experienced. The receipt of an interesting 
and friendly letter from an old acquaintance may give 
rise to an emotion of cheerfulness, which may persist as 
a mood or develop into an experience of delight. Its dura- 
tion is almost certain to depend upon its strength. Those 
persons who are prone to violent emotions pass into them 
quickly and as quickly emerge from them. They lose their 
tempers almost instantly upon provocation, fly into a rage 
for a moment or so, and emerge from it almost before the 
person who has been the cause of the emotion has got well 
started toward an emotion of resentment. Passionate indi- 
viduals are wont to be surprised because after they have 
recovered from their anger toward a person that person is 
likely to be at the height of his emotional experience and 
can not be placated. This is an important individual dif- 
ference. 

Psychological temperaments. — As there are eye-minded, 
ear-minded, and touch-minded individuals among us, so 
also are there moody, even-tempered, and passionate per- 
sons. As a rule, however, we distinguish only two types 
of individual by strength of emotion and two by quickness 
of emotional response. These familiar classes of tempera- 
ments are: 

The choleric — characterized by strong feeling and quick 
thinking and acting. 

The sanguine — characterized by weak feeling and quick 
thinking and acting. 

The melancholic — characterized by strong feeling and 
slow thinking and acting. 

The phlegmatic — characterized by weak feeling and slow 
thinking and acting. 

It is an interesting and not altogether profitless exercise 
to attempt to arrange one's friends and acquaintances in 
these temperamental groups! 



184 FEELINGS 

The bodily accompaniments or expressions of the emo- 
tions. — At one time a considerable stir was caused among 
psychologists by the assertion that bodily conditions are the 
causes of emotions. Professors Lange and James expressed 
this idea in somewhat different ways. What they both 
emphasized was the fact that apart from the bodily condi- 
tions which regularly attend an emotional experience the 
experience itself is negligible. They reversed the usual 
order of facts and stated that we are angry because we 
clench our fists, look unfeeling, have rapid heartbeat, are 
warm, etc. That we feel sad because we express sorrow 
instead of the reverse. This way of putting an important 
fact of observation misled many persons into thinking that 
our emotions are nothing except the sensations of bodily 
conditions which accompany the responses to certain sit- 
uations. This is not the whole truth. The response which 
we make to a given situation has a great deal to do with 
the nature and duration of the emotion which we experi- 
ence but it does not wholly determine it. For in the first 
place, the feeling which primarily interrupted the train 
of thought is not a product of bodily sensations. It ap- 
pears, is responded to, and immediately is supplemented 
by the sensations arising from our bodily condition. There 
is, however, a great deal of truth in the statement that we 
do not experience anger to any considerable extent when 
we suppress the so-called bodily expressions of the emotion. 
As a matter of fact it is utterly impossible wholly to sup- 
press the bodily conditions and visible expressions of a 
given emotion. Could we do so, we doubtless should not 
experience the emotion. What we can do to a limited extent 
is to control these expressions. We find that when we do 
so the emotion is lessened in strength and is of diminished 
duration. Indeed, if, in the face of a situation which is 
wholly calculated to call forth anger, I merely laugh and 
make light of the circumstances I do not experience anger 



SENTIMENTS 185 

to any marked extent : I may even experience another kind 
of emotion. Thus it happens that persons experience very 
different emotions or the same emotion in different ways 
and in varying degrees under the same circumstances. The 
fact is that the bodily sensations accompanying what we 
do in the face of any situation which tends to call forth 
an emotional response are essential parts of the emotional 
experience. 

Sentiments are emotions which, like moods, tend to 
last. — A sentiment has been defined as an emotion which 
attaches itself to a particular object. For the home of my 
childhood I have a sentiment: I can not return to the 
place even in memory without experiencing an emotion of 
mixed nature, the prominent characteristic of which is its 
duration, and its permanency of reference. It is the feel- 
ing which I have for that particular place. Similarly, the 
emotion which I experience on seeing a very dear friend 
is a sentiment for it belongs to my consciousness of that 
individual. It seems then, that a sentiment is an emotion 
which has come to be definitely attached to a particular 
thing and seems to belong to it. It differs in no other 
essential respect from other emotions, except that it usually 
involves a judgment or complex intellectual act. 

Pour classes of sentiments have been distinguished: the 
intellectual, the ethical, the religious, and the aesthetic. 
These sentiments arise respectively in connection with sit- 
uations which demand judgments concerning what is true 
(logic), good (ethics), beautiful (aesthetics), or right in 
the divine plan (religion). 

Volitions. — The last of the four types of affective com- 
plexes mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is voli- 
tion. " Every emotion," says Professor Wundt, " made 
up, as it is, of a unified series of interrelated affective proc- 
esses, may terminate in one of two ways. It may give place 
to the ordinary, variable, and relatively unemotional course 



186 FEELINGS 

of feelings. Such affective processes which fade out without 
any special result, constitute the emotions in the strict 
sense. ... In a second class of cases, the emotional process 
may pass into a sudden change in ideational and affective 
content, which brings the emotion to an instantaneous 
close ; such changes in the sensation and affective state which 
are prepared for by an emotion and bring about its sudden 
end, are called volitional acts. The emotion together with 
its result is a volitional process." (Outlines of Psychol- 
ogy, p. 203.) This will serve us as a definition of voli- 
tion, as far as the feeling involved is in question. But the 
affective portion of the volitional process is only one part 
of a very elaborate psychic complex. We must not fall into 
the error of supposing that the whole of will may be de- 
scribed under this head. There is a definite kind of feel- 
ing accompanying every will act, and it is appropriate to 
mention it as a type of affective experience, since it is 
markedly different from sense-feelings, moods, emotions, 
and sentiments. The feeling of hesitancy is as unlike what 
we have been examining in the previous paragraphs as is 
the feeling of decision. It is the latter which abruptly 
terminates so many of our emotional experiences and sets 
us forth upon a new course. Indeed, the chief characteristic 
of a volition would seem to be precisely what Professor 
Wundt has pointed out as its tendence to pass suddenly 
into something else. I feel determination and forthwith 
the nature of my train of thought and my feelings changes. 
Every judgment really involves a volition. — No judg- 
ment is utterly intellectual for there is always present at 
some stage of the process a volition. There must be a feel- 
ing of certainty or of uncertainty, or of partial certainty. 
A feeling of satisfaction accompanies the formation of the 
judgment, but this is not to be confused with the feeling 
for the judgment which is really a part of the intellectual 
process. 



AFFECTIVE VALUES OF ADVERTISEMENTS 187 
CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The affective values of a set of advertise- 
ments. Materials: the same set of ten advertisements used in 
the exercise described at the end of chapter XIV. 

This exercise may be conducted either with the class as a group 
or by the individuals out of class. The former method is 
recommended. 

The instructor should arrange a screen, similar to that used 
in connection with the experiment on the affective values of 
colors, in which two windows permit the exposure to view of 
two full-page advertisements. This screen should be so placed 
that each member of the class can see the two advertisements 
clearly. 

A number of blank tables like the one used in the color exer- 
cise (page 157) should be prepared in advance either by the 
instructor or by the students. In these tables the results of the 
experiment may be rapidly recorded. 

The instructor, having made clear the purpose and method of 
the exercise, begins by exposing to view for five or ten seconds 
adv. no. 1 with adv. no. 2, at the same time asking, " Is no. 1 
more or less agreeable than no. 2 ? " " If the former, record the 
judgment by placing a plus in the upper space of the vertical 
column which is headed by 2 in the blank form; if the latter, 
enter instead a minus." Next, no. 1 is shown with no. 3, then 
with no. 4, and so on. In this case, as in the exercise with col- 
ors, the advertisement which is being compared with the re- 
mainder of the set should always be exposed in the same win- 
dow — say, the one on the right of the observer. 

As soon as each advertisement has been compared thus with 
every other, and the table of judgments completed, the instructor 
should repeat the series under slightly different conditions, by 
placing the advertisement to be compared with the others in the 
window on the left of the observer. Thus two series of judg- 
ments may be obtained. 

At the conclusion of the exercise the results should be delivered 
to a student for special examination and report. 

Points to be brought out in this report are (1) the order of 
preference — from most to least agreeable — for each individual, 
as determined by adding the judgments of the two series; (2) 
the average order as obtained by considering together the results 
for all the members of the class; (3) the departure of each 



188 FEELINGS 

individual from this average order; (4) the reliability of the 
results; (5) a comparison of the ranking of the advertisements 
according to affective value with the previous ranking according 
to first impression of excellence. 

Immediately after this exercise, each student should write a 
full introspective report of the work, attempting to describe 
the characteristics of the affective consciousness. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

James, Wm. : Principles of psychology, vol. 2, chapter 25. 
Titchener, E. B.: Text-book of psychology, §§128-137. 
McDougall, Wm. : Social psychology, chapter 3. 
Thoendike, E. L. : Elements of psychology, chapters 5 and 6. 



CHAPTER XVI 

PSYCHIC COMPLEXES: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

The following introspective account of a chess game was 
written by Professor E. E. Southard. Some twenty min- 
utes after the completion of the game in question Professor 
Southard replayed it as a blindfold game, and he there- 
upon wrote down the introspections which are here quoted. 

A RECORD OF INTROSPECTION FOR CHESS IMAGERY 

I. THE GAME 



F. J. M., WHITE - 


- E. E. 


S., BLACK 


1. P-K4 






P-K4 


2. P-Q4 






P x P 


3. K Kt-B3 






K Kt-B3 


4. P-K5 






Kt-K5 


5. Q x P 






Kt-B4 


6. KB-B4 






Kt-B8 


7. Q-KB4 






Kt-K3 


8. B x Kt 






QP x B 


9. Q-Kt3 






Kt-K2 


10. Castles 






Q-Q4 


11. Kt-B3 






Q-B5 


12. [B-Kt5] 


Kt- 


Q2 


[Kt-B4] l Q-B3 


13. [Q-R3] ' 


Kt-Kt3 


Kt-B4 


14. Q-R3 






P-QKt3 


15. B-KKt5 






P-KR3 


16. QR-Q 






B-Kt2 


17. P-KB3 






P x B 


18. Q x R 






[Q-B4] x Kt-K6 


19. Kt-Q4 






Q-B[4]'-5 


20. Kt (Q4)- 


Kt5 




Kt x KR 


1 Errors in transci 


•iption shortly afterward rectified. 






189 





190 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

21. R-Q4 Q-B4 

22. K x Kt B-R3 

23. R-Q3 B x Kt 

24. Kt x B Q x Kt 

25. Resigns 

II. REPRODUCTION OF GAME 

" Move 1. Auditory with repetition of image, twice. 

" Move 2. Now what op. . .ing? Visual image: vague 

sense of position vis d vis in atmosphere somewhat darker than it 
actually was. White? Black? (rising inflection) very faint yes. 
Center G. . .bit. 

" Visual image of M.'s pawn at King's Fifth ( as per fourth move, 
but seen at some time in the game subsequent to Black's eighth move, 
as there was a dim image of White's King's pawn confronted by 
Black's pawn at King's Third) and also of some pawn at White's right 
side, possibly King's Rook's pawn ( which in point of fact remained un- 
moved up to White's resignation), with vaguest possible image of 
some pawn of Black's on his Queen's wing. The blackness and white- 
ness are imaged as of the bullet-like tops of the pawns. Sense of a 
visual something else besides the pawns seen. Squares of board not 
seen, yet the pawns are distinctly enough oriented in space as in front 
of an extremely vague propria persona (itself in this case not analyz- 
able). Then the move 2. P-Q4 is set down forthwith without 
analyzable image. P x P is accompanied by vague auditory repetition 
( ecks P, ecks P ) . This last is an habitual thing with me when the 
sign x (i.e., "takes") is clearly seen, based on a former whimsical 
wonder why the sign x was adopted. Parenthetically, I may say that, 
whenever I am rather lazily reading and let my mind wander from the 
subject matter, fantastic ideas, compounded of visual and auditory, 
are apt to center upon the printed letters (inadequate efforts after 
some kind of symbolism). 

" Move 3. KKt-B3 is set down after an auditory image, attended 
by a fleeting visual image of the Kt posted diagonally back of the 
pawn at King's Fifth, both seen quite out of relation to any board or 
anything else save something vaguely massed behind to the left and 
before somewhat farther away. 

" Black's reply was for the moment in doubt. ' Doubt ' equals a 
slight feeling of tension with possibly the vaguest schematic visual 
image of two dog's ears pricked up (my habitual doubt symbol). A 
sudden sharp visual image like that above (Knight in relation to 
pawn) shot in. Perhaps a kaleidoscopically sudden fresh image of the 
Black's King's Knight attacked by White's King's pawn, as under 
move 4, entered. At all events the reply to KKt-B3 followed at once 
without remembered image. Overlapping those images ( I do not make 
out whether originating before or after the doubt just mentioned) an- 
other contest set in in my mind, namely, whether I should write KKt- 
B3 or Kt-KB3. This alternative presented itself as a visual image 



INTROSPECTION OF CHESS IMAGERY 191 

in which the initial K of the phrase KKt-B3 and the second K of 
the phrase Kt-KB3 were the best lighted parts. The auditory image 
'German notation,' 'Why not,' 'Why,' entered (I have never settled 
whether I preferred to use the German or the English notation in 
transcribing games). This question was shortly dismissed by a 
process of unremembered character in which possibly an auditory 
image ' sil ' (presumably of the word "silly") appeared. Many of 
my mental meanderings I am inclined to terminate in this way. 
Thereafter the question of notation failed to appear throughout the 
transcription. 

" Move 4 was mechanically set down with a brief visual image of 
the Knight hovering over King's Fifth before being set down. Here 
is the first possibility of a kinaesthetic image. I am not sure whether 
there was or was not a kinaesthetic element here. As I try to repro- 
duce the image, I seem both to feel something, curiously enough, in 
right upper arm muscles (a feeling most nearly resembling a pres- 
sure skin sensation plus something else ) combined with a visual image 
of a moved dark long object, on arm presumably, running from right 
to left toward the Knight in question. All such movements are repro- 
duced in memory as of the right arm, though in actual play the left 
may be used for pieces and pawns nearer the left hand. As a matter 
of fact by repeating the moves, I can remember that the piece was 
actually moved by the left hand: in so reproducing the fact, I get a 
distinct kinaesthetic image referred to the left upper arm, below and 
externally, apparently rather superficially in the arm. 

" Move 5 was set down mechanically, except that the Knight at 
QB4 and a vague tall something (the Q at Q4) were held in mind 
for some little interval and a sense of recognition appeared. There 
was apparently a brief auditory image ' oth ' .... of the term ' other,' 
possibly referring to another period. This ' oth . . . ' was attended by 
the distinct auditory image ' Barry,' being the name of a player with 
whom I had formerly had ( several years before) a similar confronting 
of pieces. No further use was made of this memory. 

" Moves 6, 7, 8, were transcribed rapidly with brief but continuous 
visual imagery in which the pieces were not seen as such or at all 
outlined, but seemed to go too swiftly to be seen, although adequately 
recognized. 

" Move 9 found me wavering between Q at KKt3 and Q at KR3 
(the latter an illegal move). I saw somewhat clearly this corner 
of the board as it appeared in actual play at move 14. Then the 
actual move Q-Kt3 was set down without further ado, without, 
apparently, any form of imagery. 

" Delay ensued over 9 Kt-K2, and a quick succession of brief 

visual images of later positions (only two or three pieces seen) was 
succeeded by an emphatic writing down of the move. 

"At this point I made an error in the transcription, setting down 
12. B-Kt5, Kt-B4, 13. Q-R3 instead of the actual continuation 12. 
Kt-Q2, etc. And in rectifying my error I wrote 12. Kt-2T2 instead of 
the correct Kt-Q2, in my haste to get the right move noted. This K 
apparently came in a brief auditory way from the fact that it was 
the King's Knight that was moved instead of the Queen's. 



192 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

" The following moves were reproduced very rapidly by the visual 
route, accompanied by a faint euphoric or exultant feeling, which 
seems to be with me a slight sense of motion, or warmth ( ? ) , in my 
cheeks, as if from a beginning smile. If reproduced at all steadily, 
I get a feeling referred to the skin of the lower eyelids, apparently 
gotten by opening the eyes wide. There was a sense of lack of resist- 
ance and an easy flow — combined visual imagery and equilibrated 

feeling as of one in a boat moving from right to left. 16 B-Kt2 

was reproduced visually but with an attendant kinesthetic image of 
something going on in the under surface of the right forearm or in 
the hypothenar eminence of the right hand — and something going on 
rapidly. 

" Following moves mechanically and swiftly reproduced until 19, 
when doubt set in, this time without sensations like those ' doubt ' 
sensations set down under move three. Instead there was a curious 
combined visual and kinesthetic image as of some object of a snout- 
like character moving about in the region of the chessboard in ques- 
tion (possibly survival of images got from a picture of Bcecklin's). 

"19 Q-B5 was transcribed erroneously at first as Q-B4 and in 

move 20 I wrote down Kt(Q4)-Kt5 instead of the more strictly best 
notational form ( KKt-Kt5 ) , as I did not for the moment remem- 
ber whether the Kt in question was the King's Knight or the Queen's. 
I got a faint kinesthetic image of a shake of the head referred, on no 
proper mechanical principles, to the two temples ' seen ' or felt from 
behind and above. Parenthetically I may say that my kinesthetic 
imagery seems to have little relation to the anatomical situation of 
the proper muscles, but is rather referred by preference to some ex- 
ternal surface. It is also frequently accompanied by visual imagery. 
The localization, as such, seems to be largely a visual affair. 

" The remaining moves were recorded instanter without visual ac- 
companiments. 

" The time taken for writing down the moves as above was eleven 
minutes. The time for writing these remarks, one hour, forty minutes. 
(Manuscript.) 

New and old experiences. — The first time an elemen- 
tary mental process or a psychic complex enters conscious- 
ness it is new to that consciousness ; the next time it enters 
it is old. Practically we distinguish the new from the 
old by saying that certain experiences are novel and unfa- 
miliar to us while others are mere repetitions of what is 
familiar. These two varieties of experience : what we are 
aware of for the first time and what we recognize as having 
previously formed a part of our mental life, are often called 
the presentative and the representative aspects of conscious- 
ness. Evidently the mere fact of repetition or reappearance 



MEMORY 193 

in consciousness does not constitute an experience a remem- 
bered experience. It must be recognized as old, it must 
be accompanied by a feeling of familiarity. 

Elements as well as psychic complexes may seem either 
new or old to us. — After a particular quality of sensation 
or of affection has been experienced once, it may upon recur- 
rence be recognized as identical with or similar to the 
previous consciousness. In that event, it is no longer a 
simple psychic process, for the feeling of familiarity is an 
essential part of the experience. For this reason no memory 
experience, no represented consciousness, is simple and ele- 
mentary ; it may be analyzed into that which is remembered 
or recognized and the recognition consciousness. Never- 
theless, it is convenient and desirable to distinguish new 
mental elements from old, and new mental complexes 
from old. 

Sensations and affections are of two kinds. — A sensation 
which appears in connection with the stimulation of a 
bodily sense organ is known as an impression. When it 
appears apart from any disturbance of the sense organ it 
is known as an image. We may experience sensations of 
red, of sweet, of warmth, in a situation which enables us 
to attribute the sensations to disturbances about us, or in 
circumstances which enable us to say only that we are 
conscious of the sensations. These facts we express by 
saying that we see red, we have an image of red, or we 
remember red. Similarly we may re-experience any sense 
or feeling quality which we have previously experienced. 
An image of a sensation or affection is quite impossible 
unless the sensation or affection has been previously experi- 
enced. A person blind from birth is incapable of experi- 
encing visual images : incapable indeed of having visual 
ideas. Sensations are present in consciousness in two 
forms: (1) as presentative experiences (impressions), and 
(2) as representative experiences (images). It is not as 



194 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

certain that affections are ever re-lived as images, but the 
writer suspects that they are sometimes. 

Not every represented experience is remembered. — 
"Whether it be a simple or a complex experience which is 
repeated in consciousness, it may possess or it may lack 
the characteristic mark of memory. Nothing is remem- 
bered unless it is recognized. This means that it must 
be accompanied by a feeling of familiarity. It matters 
not how many times I see an interesting face in the car 
as I ride to and from town, I may not say that I am remem- 
bering a previous experience of the face unless I definitely 
recognize it, refer it to a more or less definite place in 
my past mental life, and feel familiar with the present 
experience. There are mistakes of both sorts in this con- 
nection. Sometimes we fail to recognize an old and often 
repeated experience, and at other times we recognize, with 
a strong feeling of familiarity and certainty, an experience 
which later turns out to be new to us. The one of these 
errors is about as disturbing and humiliating as the other. 

Cases of erroneous recognition. — The other day I was 
stopped on the street by a stranger, addressed most fa- 
miliarly, and asked whether I did not remember Mr. D. 
I did not, nor could I, and when I explained my identity, 
the gentleman was as much surprised as he appeared to 
be annoyed. To him had come an experience which bore 
all the ear-marks of memory, yet it really had no claim 
to those marks, for he convinced himself that he had not 
seen me before. The explanation for this variety of error 
is simple. We mistake a person who is strikingly like 
another for the latter because of points of resemblance. 
We are misled, and at times it is almost impossible to con- 
vince ourselves that we have not previously seen or met 
the individual. The same explanation applies to all sorts 
of experiences in which the new seems to be old. The truth 
is we come to recognize a situation by some one or a few 



MEMORY IMAGES 195 

of its important features and when they happen to reap- 
pear in some other connection we are likely to confuse the 
one experience with the other. 

Failures to recognize. — All of us are familiar with fail- 
ures to recognize when we might reasonably be expected 
to do so. There are individuals who may gaze intently 
upon your face time and time again, and talk with you, 
and yet fail to recognize you a few days later. To such 
individuals it would seem that the human race must prove 
infinitely varied ! Likewise some of us may read a passage, 
a poem, or even a book twice at considerable intervals with- 
out becoming aware of our previous experience. The ex- 
tremes in this direction are rare, but the more common- 
place instances of failure to recognize are myriad. 

Memory images. — The truth is that almost none of our 
concrete experiences are either wholly new or old. Instead 
they consist of a complex of presentative (impressions) and 
representative (images) bits of consciousness. The total 
effect may seem either new or old according to the nature 
of the preponderating elements. A perception contains 
as a rule fragments of consciousness which are recognized 
as old, or would be so recognized if they should be exam- 
ined introspectively. But that is the point. When we 
remember we are aware of the feeling of familiarity in the 
experience, whereas when we perceive we are more likely 
to be occupied with the immediately given sensations and 
affections of the experience. Yet even these may seem 
familiar to us. The rows of books before me I have per- 
ceived day after day for months and years as I have sat 
at my desk writing, but to-day, as the first time I looked 
upon them, they are borne in upon me with a certain fresh- 
ness and novelty which is characteristic of experiences 
which are made up largely of impressions. The impres- 
sional sort of experience is likely to be clearer, more vivid, 
than the imaginal experience. When I turn my eyes 



196 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

from the bookcase and remember the appearance of the 
objects I have an idea of them, but the experience is in 
a variety of respects different from the perception which 
I experienced a moment ago. Both hold the ear-marks of 
recognition, for long dwelling on the sight of the case has 
made it a part of my life, but the perception seems more 
impelling, intense, clear, than does the idea. 

Each perception in reality consists of impressions and of 
images, for in looking at an object with which we are 
familiar we seldom see or otherwise directly receive all of 
the sensations and affections which enter into our experi- 
ence. Some of them are supplied from previous experi- 
ences. Thus, as I look at the sheet of paper before me my 
consciousness of it includes certain sensations of touch 
and temperature, if not also certain affective elements, 
which introspection tells me are brought from my previous 
experience of the paper. I am not touching it now so I 
have no impression of touch, yet I am aware of that prop- 
erty of the object, for I have a touch image. The part 
played by past experiences in the constitution of a per- 
ceptual experience varies greatly with individuals and with 
circumstances. Some persons are conscious almost solely 
of what is at the moment received in the shape of sense- 
impressions, others are conscious to a great extent of im- 
ages from previous experiences of the same object or of 
like objects. 

Images in dreams. — Images of both the sense and the 
affective type appear in dreams. Often they are very vivid 
and can be introspected readily on waking. Not a few 
individuals who are unable to discover certain kinds of 
images in their ordinary memory consciousness note them 
in dreams. The writer, for example, although ordinarily 
unconscious of auditory images in his experiences, has ob- 
served remarkably vivid ones in his dreams. 

The introspection of one 's dreams thus provides a method 



IDEATIONAL TYPES 197 

of gaining much valuable information concerning images. 
Professor Calkins l has complied the following table of the 
frequency of occurrence of various types of sense images 
in dreams : 



Number 

Observer f d ream8 Visual Auditory Dermal Gustatory Olfactory 

S 133 85.0$ 57.1$ 5.3$ 0.0$ 1.5$ 

C 165 77.0 49.1 8.5 0.0 ' 1.2 

W 141 100.0 90.0 13.5 12.0 15.0 

B 150 72.7 54.6 6.0 2.7 2.7 



Total 589 Average 83.2$ 62.1$ 8.3$ 3.6$ 4.9$ 

This table indicates the percentage of dreams, in the cases 
of four observers, in which visual, auditory, dermal, gusta- 
tory, and olfactory images appeared. 

Ideational types and types of memory-images. — The 
expression ideational type may be used to refer to the 
variety of sense or affective experience which preponderates 
in the individual. It may not refer specifically to either the 
presentative or the representative experiences of the indi- 
vidual. For if the visual elements of experience are of 
paramount importance to us, they are likely to appear both 
in our perceptions and our memories. We might, to be 
perfectly definite in our statements, speak of perceptive, 
ideational, and memory types. For thus we could refer 
to the particular variety of experience in question. 

Suddenly some one shouts the word ' ' telephone. ' ' What 
happens in your consciousness 1 ? If you are a visualizer 
you will probably see more or less clearly the telephone 
you are accustomed to use, or the one nearest at hand, or 
the one to which you happen to know reference is in- 
tended. The details of your visual images of the telephone- 

1 Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, p. 400 ; American 
Journal of Psychology, vol. 5, pp. 311-343; also Weed, S. C. and Hal- 
lam, F. M. : American Journal of Psychology, vol. 7, pp. 405-411. 



198 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

situation may include yourself at the telephone and the 
surroundings, yet it may not go beyond what you could 
see if you were in the presence of the object. Your con- 
sciousness is predominantly visual and your imagery is 
therefore called visual. 

If, instead, you are of the auditory type you will doubt- 
less become conscious of the sound of a conversation over 
the telephone. Perhaps of the last you had. Auditory 
images will stand forth in clearness, whereas all other 
images will form merely the background of your experience. 

If you are a tactual-motor individual, you will feel the 
articulatory movements necessary for the pronunciation of 
the word telephone, the feelings which you get in holding 
the receiver and in so moving your lips, tongue, larynx 
as to express certain words. In a word, your imagery will 
be chiefly tactual and motor for you will feel bodily changes 
instead of seeing or hearing the situation. 

If you belong to the mixed type, you are likely to have 
all kinds of sense (and affective?) elements present in the 
imagery. No one kind of element will be predominant. 
Certain features of the situation will appear visually, per- 
haps indistinctly and scarcely recognizably, others will ap- 
pear auditorily, still others factually or in terms of move- 
ments, there may even be traces of taste or smell images. 
As a rule individuals belonging to the mixed type possess 
nothing so clearly defined that it is easily recognized as a 
sense or affective image. 

Galton's investigation of imagery. — Many years ago the 
attention of a wideawake, keen observer of living things 
and of the conditions of life, who, although not a profes- 
sional psychologist, has done more to advance our knowl- 
edge of human characteristics than most psychologists, was 
drawn to the matter of differences in remembering. This 
gentleman, Sir Francis Galton, was struck by the fact 
that whereas his scientific acquaintances almost to a man 



CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMORY 199 

emphatically denied clear visual imagery, ordinary folk 
much more frequently admitted that kind of experience 
and took satisfaction in describing it for him. This observa- 
tion led Galton to an extended inquiry into the subject, 
an interesting account of which is to be found in his " In- 
quiries Into Human Faculty ' ' under the heading ' ' Mental 
Imagery." • 

By questioning hundreds of persons of different ages, 
sex, and occupation, Mr. Galton discovered that a large 
number of persons have extremely clear and varied mental 
pictures of things. It was his method to ask a person to 
remember the breakfast table and to describe his conscious- 
ness. Some individuals see the object with the mental eye, 
others do not see it. at all. Inability to see things mentally 
is especially prevalent among men of science and those 
who deal with abstractions — philosophers. Of them Mr. 
Galton writes ' ' To my astonishment, I found that the great 
majority of men of science to whom I first applied pro- 
tested that mental imagery was unknown to them, and 
they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in supposing 
that the words ' mental imagery ' really expressed what 
I believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had 
no more notion of its true nature than a color-blind man, 
who has not discerned his defect, has of the nature of 
color. They had a mental deficiency of which they were 
unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those who 
affirmed they possessed it were romancing." 

Our individual characteristics of memory. — The atti- 
tude of these scientists concerning mental imagery is not 
unlike that of most of us when we are presented with a keen 
and penetrating example of introspection. We are sur- 
prised, dubious, even incredulous of the results of a per- 
son's introspection because we find nothing to correspond 
in our own experiences. 

The study of the science of psychology should teach us 



200 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

to judge carefully and with full recognition of the follow- 
ing important facts : ( 1 ) that not all persons have the same 
experiences, and (2) that individuals differ as greatly in 
introspective ability and skill as in their experiences. 
There was a time when clear visual imagery seemed to me 
fictitious : I did not experience anything of the sort myself 
and I doubted whether any one else did. My attitude has 
changed completely for I now recognize that my way of 
remembering things is as markedly different from that of 
the majority of persons as is that mind which lacks visual 
imagery from that one which has it vividly and in abun- 
ance. If we would be successful psychologists we must 
be open-minded and charitable, we must accept observa- 
tions, upon sufficient evidence of care and competency, 
even though we can not verify them in our own experience. 

Number-forms and similar groups of visual images, — 
It was Francis Galton who first brought into clear light 
the important fact that some persons have peculiar and 
individual ways of representing certain matters to them- 
selves. While the majority of us, members of the common 
herd as we are, have no especially interesting experiences 
when we think of the numerals, the days of the week, the 
names of the months, or of the seasons, there are individuals 
who regularly experience these facts visually and in odd 
ways. 

Two of the number forms described in Mr. Galton 's 
book are reproduced in Fig. 4. But since these drawings 
give a very inadequate knowledge of the nature of such 
types of imagery a case may be more fully described. 

Imagery of the months. — Mrs. Yerkes has written the 
following description of her manner of picturing the 
months and seasons. 

; ' The form which my mental image of the months of the 
year takes may be described roughly as a letter U. The 
left arm of the letter is continued, however, in a curve to 



IMAGERY 



201 



the right and then downward until it ends abruptly about 
two-thirds of the way to the bottom. It is, moreover, not 
all in the same plane, for the arms slant backward as well 
as upward, as if resting on a hillside, while the horizontal 
portion lies flat on the ground at the bottom. 

" My own view of this figure is always obtained from 
that position on the figure which the present moment occu- 



200 




100 
Fig. 4. Examples of visual number forms. (After Galton. ) 



pies. Suppose, for example, that this is a day near the end 
of January. My own position is therefore around the turn 
at the top and part way down the middle line of the figure. 
In looking forward to the year, I look forward and down- 
ward to the end of March where an abrupt break occurs; 
the first of April I see over on the hill-top at a point slightly 
higher than that where I now stand, and at the beginning, 
as it were, of another road running parallel to this, down- 
ward, but some distance away. July and August I see 
curving around below me on the level ground, connecting 
the downhill road of spring and the uphill one of autumn. 
One further point may be mentioned here : this road on 
the plain is always flooded with sunshine which pales on 



202 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

the hill roads till the winter months are somber, though, 
oddly enough, March seems the dullest of all. 

" This effect of sunshine is apart from the color of the 
month and both are distinct from the color of the names 
of the months themselves. The two former points are con- 
nected rather with their relation to the year as a whole. 
The month July, for example, is bathed in sunshine ; the 
name July, on the other hand, calls up hues of blue verg- 
ing on violet; April is pale yellowish-green in color (asso- 
ciated with daffodils), May is a deeper green but with flecks 
of pink (apple-blossoms) and June is a cool deep green. 
The name April, however, is chiefly white owing to the 
dominance of the long sound of ' a ' which always has 
that association for me ; the name May is pink. The name 
June agrees with the color of the month, possibly because 
the letter ' n ' is also green. I might add here that in 
their relation to the year as a whole the rest of the months 
are less definite in color. Four of them are seen in varying 
shades of gray; of these December is the lightest, then 
September, November, and March. February, August, and 
October are shades of tan ranging from light to dark in 
the order named. 

" I have spoken of the course of the months as a road; 
it is so only in that it leads me somewhere. It has none 
of the other attributes of roads, such as earth, grass, trees, 
or buildings, though my image of the month is often accom- 
panied by a swift glimpse of some appropriate scene, either 
imaginary, composite, or plainly remembered. The days of 
the month are rather like a succession of numbers; usually 
when I think of a single date in the month all of the days 
are in a continuous procession. The weeks then are dis- 
tinguished from one another though I can not tell exactly 
how; the vagueness is doubtless due to the variation in 
the day of the week with which the month begins. When, 
on the other hand, I think of the month as a whole, some- 



IMAGERY 203 

times the days are grouped in weeks which occur in hori- 
zontal parallel rows as in the average calendar. 

" Along this winding road the important anniversaries 
of the year stand out like milestones. Not that there are 
any marks by which to distinguish them in my mental 
picture; the numbers are no larger or blacker but they 
stand out more clearly. The most prominent ones are 
those associated with my early childhood — Christmas and 
New Years days, the Fourth of July, and my own birthday. 

" As the year progresses I advance with it till at the 
first of August I stand at what is to me the middle of 
the year, for in the figure July and August occupy sym- 
metrical positions, June and September, May and October, 
April and November. With December begins the unsym- 
metrical extension ; the greater part of the turn is occupied 
by that month and it is completed by the first few days 
of January. It is one of the oddities of the figure that 
I never have any difficulty in bridging the gap between the 
thirty-first of March and the first day of April. It is 
jumped automatically in the night." (Manuscript.) 

Importance of knowledge of this imagery. — The 
variety of such particular and highly individual imagery 
is great and its value can not be fairly judged. Most 
persons who have such experiences either do not know 
that they are exceptional or are troubled by the notion that 
they are abnormal. Witness the following quotation from 
one of Galton's correspondents. " I had no idea for many 
years that every one did not imagine numbers in the same 
positions as those in which they appear to me. One unfor- 
tunate day I spoke of it, and was sharply rebuked for my 
absurdity. Being a very sensitive child I felt this acutely, 
but nothing ever shook my belief that, absurd or not, I 
always saw numbers in this particular way. I began to 
be ashamed of what I considered a peculiarity, and to im- 
agine myself, from this and various other mental beliefs and 



204 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

states, as somewhat isolated and peculiar. At your lecture 
the other night, though I am now over twenty-nine, the 
memory of my childish misery at the dread of being pe- 
culiar came over me so strongly that I felt I must thank 
you for proving that, in this particular at any rate, my 
case is most common." (Inquiries Into Human Faculty, 
p. 113.) 

Herein we have another proof of need of openmindedness 
and willingness to give serious attention to experiences 
which are foreign to our mental life. 

The use of imagery in exceptional cases. — Prodigies of 
various sorts are known to depend, in many instances, upon 
a remarkable power of visualization. This is true of a 
number of mathematical prodigies who are able to do men- 
tally mathematical feats which are difficult and time-con- 
suming for the ordinary person. To be able to see clearly 
before one the numerals 187,293,047,890 and 328,790,- 
283,289 and the several lines of digits which would result 
in the case of long-process multiplication, and to read with 
the mind's eye the product is indeed a remarkable feat 
from the point of view of most of us. It is, however, possi- 
ble to those individuals whose visual images are exception- 
ally clear and persistent. 

The imagery of the blind, and of the blind and deaf. — 
Those unfortunate individuals who from birth lack the 
senses of sight and hearing often possess mental imagery 
which is extremely interesting. Miss Helen Keller, who al- 
though deprived of sight, hearing, and the power of articu- 
late speech, is highly educated and closely in touch with the 
world of human events, writes most illuminatingly of her 
imagery and of her sense experiences. "It is not for me 
to say whether we see best with the hand or the eye. I only 
know that the world I see with my fingers is alive, ruddy, 
satisfying. Touch brings the blind many sweet certainties 
which our more fortunate fellows miss, because their sense 



IMAGERY 205 

of touch is uncultivated. When they look at things they put 
their hands in their pockets. No doubt that is one reason 
why their knowledge is often so vague, inaccurate, and 
useless." ..." I know by smell the kind of house we 
enter. I have recognized an old-fashioned country house 
because it has several layers of odors, left by a succession 
of families, of plants, perfumes, and draperies." . . . 
" From exhalations I learn much about people. I often 
know the work they are engaged in. The odors of wood, 
iron, paint, and drugs cling to the garments of those who 
work with them. Thus I can distinguish the carpenter 
from the iron-worker, the artist from the mason or the 
chemist. "When a person passes quickly from one place to 
another I get a scent impression of where he has been — 
the kitchen, the garden, or the sick-room. I gain pleas- 
urable ideas of freshness and good taste from the odors 
of soap, toilet waters, clean garments, woolen and silk 
stuffs, and gloves." (Keller, Helen: Sense and Sensibility, 
The Century Magazine, vol. 75, pp. 566-577.) 

Touch, smell, taste, and the sensations of movement and 
of bodily condition count for everything in the perceptions 
and ideas of such individuals. What we see actually, or 
in our mind's eye, they perceive or image in terms of the 
other senses. Miss Keller's imagery is chiefly tactual-motor 
and olfactory, but it is almost impossible for us to imagine 
what it is like, so different is it from our own. 

Imagining. — We are said to imagine not when we merely 
have images, but when our imagery is of such a nature that 
our experiences seem to us new and original. Imagery 
which is repetitional of previous experiences and which 
has the feel of familiarity we class with memory experi- 
ences; that which shares in an experience which seems 
unfamiliar, new, is classed with imagination. 

Because of this important difference memory and im- 
aginative experiences have been grouped together under the 



206 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

general term imagination and two varieties of imaginative 
experiences have been described. The first is reproductive, 
the second is creative. Reproductive imagination is mem- 
ory. Creative imagination is what is usually spoken of as 
imagination. Thus far in our discussion we have consid- 
ered memory. We must now examine the properties of 
experiences of creative imagination. 

What are the materials imaginings are made of? — In 
memory experiences we recognize the same varieties of con- 
scious elements which we have found in presentative psychic 
complexes: sensations and affections, but they are in the 
form of images instead of impressions. The same is true 
of our ideas. Now, in imaginings there exist the same 
materials, with the exception of the recognition conscious- 
ness and its feeling of familiarity. An imaginative experi- 
ence may involve a complex of visual, auditory, and taste 
images, together with affective elements and feelings, emo- 
tions, or sentiments, many of which have been experienced 
vividly and often in other relations, but the total experi- 
ence in this case has a novel feel. I imagine a Gump. It 
is nothing I have ever seen or heard of, and for some 
strange reason the utterly commonplace group of elements 
of experience which are at this moment combined into my 
idea of the object seem to me to yield a highly original 
result. I do not have any memory of the object. Instead 
I insist that I am imagining, meaning thereby that I am 
creating mentally an object which has never before existed 
in my consciousness and to which I attribute no existence 
beyond my present consciousness. 

The characteristics of imagination. — There is one pe- 
culiar fact about imagination. Whereas things feel to us 
new, they are really made up of elements of experience 
which are old to us. We do not imagine new sensations 
or affections, however often we may imagine new objects 
or events. What we really do is to experience our stock 



IMAGINATION 207 

sensations, affections, perceptions, images, ideas, in new 
and novel relations. The Gump, after all, possesses only 
the attributes of objects which I have been familiar with 
for years, but it possesses these old attributes in new rela- 
tions. It has the body of a monkey, the horns of a deer, 
the neck of a giraffe. Truly the experience is new for I 
never have seen such a creature save with my mind's eye. 

Imaginings, as a rule, are novel in the sense that they 
represent old bits of experience in a new guise and are 
accompanied by a feeling of newness or originality. Until 
one learns to take account of the distinguishing marks of 
memory and imagination, it is impossible to distinguish 
the old in experience from the new. It is for this reason, 
and not because of desire to deceive, that the young child 
falsifies situations. It states as memory facts mere imag- 
inings. It is incapable of telling what it gets by a process 
of reproductive imagination from what comes as a result 
of the activity of creative imagination. We are prone to 
make grave mistakes and to do serious injustice by judging 
guilty of falsehood those who have neither the intention to 
deceive nor knowledge of deception. 

The importance of memory and imagination. — It 
would be vain to try to decide which of these varieties of 
experience or aspects of mental life is the more important. 
We should be utterly different kinds of beings if we lacked 
either. 

Memory experiences are the keys to many of the secrets 
of human progress. If we could not relive our mental life 
we should be unable to profit by experience as we do. 
Instead of possessing rationality, insight, foresight we 
should be creatures of the moment, whose consciousness 
consisted solely of a passing show of elements and com- 
plexes of consciousness. This kaleidoscopic series of 
changes in experience would be varied, ever progressive, 
never returning upon itself. We should have neither past 



208 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

nor future, for it is only in memory that we obtain those 
materials by means of which we are enabled to picture to 
ourselves a future. It is our supposition that many of the 
lower animals lack memory wholly, or in large measure, 
and that their experiences are made up almost if not ex- 
clusively of new elements. At the first thought it may 
seem a desirable condition, that of never having to re- 
experience anything, but when one comes to the point of 
thinking out clearly what it would mean he inevitably 
shrinks from it. To live in the moment alone would be to 
lack most of our satisfactions, as well as most of our 
sources of dissatisfaction. It would be to live a non-rational 
life. 

Of unimaginative persons we have plenty about us. In 
fact it may be said that the majority of us are so. For 
we are so feeble in creative imagination that we seem rather 
creatures of memory than of imagination. The contrast 
between imaginative and unimaginative individuals is some- 
times sharp, and although there are persons who doubt the 
value of imagination, the great majority feel that it is 
something much to be desired. The unimaginative person 
is matter-of-fact, commonplace, uninteresting. He lacks 
originality. He does not progress beyond the beaten track. 
He is conventional, conservative, dependable. The imag- 
inative person is progressive, unpredictable, interesting. 
The progress of the world would appear to depend chiefly 
upon those individuals who are imaginative, whereas the 
conservation of advances in civilization seemingly depends 
upon the unimaginative members of the race. 



MEMORY OF ADVERTISEMENTS 209 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspection of imaginative (repro- 
ductive and creative) consciousnesses. Materials : Sets of adver- 
tisements used in previous exercises; note-books. 

From memory describe as accurately as you can each of the 
ten advertisements. Selecting the one which you most distinctly 
recall, tell as directly and simply as you can how you remember 
its various features. After completing your detailed memory 
descriptions compare what you have written with the actual 
advertisements (your perceptions), in order to discover how much 
you have reproduced from previous experience and how much 
you have created in the descriptions. 

Did you really remember most accurately the advertisement 
with which you felt most familiar? 

Attempt to imagine an advertisement. Describe your conscious- 
ness. How does it differ from your perceptual consciousness of 
an advertisement? From your memory consciousness? 

If time permits, the memory — from the previous exercise — for 
the ten advertisements may be measured in order that they may 
be ranked as to memory value. This may crudely be done by 
having each student write under the number of each advertise- 
ment: (1) the exact name of the article advertised; (2) the 
exact name and address of the manufacturer, or manner of ob- 
taining article; (3) the chief points in the illustration; (4) the 
chief points in the text of the advertisement. 

The values of these results may be estimated by the instructor 
or by some member of the class, and the set of advertisements 
arranged in order of accuracy of memory for each individual 
and for the class as a group. Thus will be obtained values 
which may be compared with the impression value and the 
affective value as previously obtained. 

A careful comparison of the consciousness of the perceived, 
the remembered, and the imagined advertisement will prove in- 
teresting and profitable in connection with this class exercise. 



210 MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

SUPPLEMENTARY B.EADING 

Titchener, E. B.: Text-book of psychology, §§ 112-120. 
Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, chapters 15 and 16. 
Thorndike, E. L. : Elements of psychology, chapter 3. 
James, Wm.: Principles of psychology, vol. 1, chapter 16; vol. 2, 
chapter 18. 



PART THREE 

PSYCHOLOGY AS THE HISTORY OF CON- 
SCIOUSNESS: GENETIC DESCRIPTION 

CHAPTER XVII 

THE HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE INDI- 
VIDUAL: ONTOGENESIS 

" She was, of course, sometimes quaintly misled in an inference by 
lack of knowledge. In the last week of the month I shut my eyes 
and asked her, ' Where are aunty's eyes ? ' The baby tried in vain 
to find them behind the lids, and then leaned over from my lap and 
looked carefully for the lost eyes on the floor! 

" I hardly think that memory is much developed at this age 
[twelve months] ; the probability is that even the two-year-old remem- 
bers things only in glimpses — one here and one there — but nothing con- 
tinuous: this is one of the great differences between his mind and 
ours. But our little girl plainly remembered some things for days. 
In the second week of the month her uncle showed her how he lifted 
the window sash, and four days after, catching sight of the finger 
handle, she tugged at it with impatient cries, trying to make the 
sash go up. A few days later, having a flower in her hand, when 
her feet were bare, she began, with a sudden memory, to beg to have 
something done to her toes with it, and it proved that two or three 
weeks before her mother had stuck a flower between the fat toes. 

" All this month, even more than in the eleventh, she was in- 
cessantly busy in exploring and learning. She opened boxes, took 
things out, and put them back; worked with infinite diligence and 
seriousness at such matters as getting a rubber ring off a note- 
book I had stretched it round; investigated crannies, spaces under 
grates, doors ajar, with an undying curiosity. 

"She began to imitate our actions more and more: she tried to 
comb her hair, to put flowers into a vase, to mark on a paper with a 
pencil; she pulled at her toes and muttered as if she were saying the 
piggy rhyme." — Shinn, M. W. : The biography of a baby, pp. 243- 
245. 

The history of mind is called psychogenesis. — The 

sum of events in consciousness between the birth and the 

211 



212 ONTOGENESIS 

death of the individual constitutes the history of the mental 
life of the individual. It is called ontogenesis. Psycho- 
genesis, however, includes the history of mind in the race, 
as well as in the individual. This is called phylogenesis. 
Just as it is possible to describe, in the science of embry- 
ology, the series of changes which constitutes the history 
of the development of the body from birth to maturity, 
so it is possible to describe the development of mind. And 
just as it is possible to describe, in the science of organic 
evolution, the development of one type of organism from 
another, so also it is possible to describe the development 
of one type of mind from another. As step by step we 
trace the onward progress of the natural process of evolu- 
tion from one variety of animal to another, so we are able 
to trace the progress of mind from one stage to another. 
Ontogenesis therefore has to do with progressive changes 
which occur in the mind of some individual. Phylogenesis, 
instead, has to do with the stages or steps in the evolution 
of mind which are represented by the various types of living 
beings. 

Nature of the task cf ontogenesis. — It is much easier 
to discover the history of the mind of the individual than 
that of the race. This is true, first of all because the indi- 
vidual may be observed continuously, if we choose, through- 
out life, whereas many of the stages through which mind 
has passed in the evolution of animals are unobservable 
because they no longer exist upon the earth. Yet, even the 
accurate and complete history of mind in the individual is 
difficult to obtain. As a matter of fact no human individual 
is ever observed continuously. Our genetic description of 
a person's mental life is always a more or less incomplete 
patchwork of observations. Nevertheless, we know fairly 
well the chief characteristics of the mental life of human 
beings at different stages of their existence and with the 
facts every student of psychology should be familiar. Psy- 



THE LIMITS OF MENTAL LIFE 213 

chologically a baby differs as widely from a man or woman 
as a dog differs from a man. 

When does the mental life of the human individual 
begin? — Waiving the problem of the existence of conscious- 
ness before birth — and there are excellent reasons for sup- 
posing that it does exist — it may fairly be maintained that 
for the science of psychology the mental life of each of us 
begins at birth, for then only do we come within the range 
of observation. From that moment on, through all the 
vicissitudes of existence, we continue to furnish material 
for the student of ontogenesis. It has not as yet been possi- 
ble for science to determine either the source or the moment 
of appearance of consciousness in the individual. Fortu- 
nately for psychology, this is not an essential matter. 

When does the mental life end? — This too is an un^ 
solved problem. All that we can say with certainty is that 
as psychologists we do not observe consciousness after the 
death of the individual. We need not insist, need not 
believe even, that death ends the conscious existence of 
the person, for it is quite conceivable that consciousness 
should continue to exist after the body has returned to 
the dust. Freely the psychologist sets as his limits for the 
description of the mental life of the individual on the one 
hand birth and on the other death. Between these great 
events he attempts to sketch, or to draw in detail, a picture 
of the stream of consciousness. 

Changes in consciousness between birth and death. — 
Life means constant change. Our bodies are used up in 
the form of energy and the waste is constantly repaired 
by nutriment. Every few months the entire body is re- 
newed. Likewise, from the dawn of consciousness there is 
an ever moving train of mental processes. These it is 
which make up the flood of the stream of consciousness. 
To enumerate all of the changes which occur during the 
mental life of any one of us, or even the chief among them, 



214 ONTOGENESIS 

would be a herculean task. Instead of attempting it, we 
may in this chapter merely mention certain of the prom- 
inent stages in the mental development of a human being. 
Partly on physical and partly on psychological grounds, 
the life of man is commonly divided into a number 
of periods, each of which is characterized by certain 
bodily traits and conditions and also by certain mental 
traits. 

The divisions of mental life. — For the purpose of 
sketching the history of mind in the human individual we 
may divide life into five periods. They are infancy, child- 
hood, youth, maturity, and age. These, of course, are 
entirely artificial divisions, for between no two of the 
periods is there a sharp line. Each gradually passes into 
the next. As there would undoubtedly be wide difference 
in opinion as to the years of life included in each of these 
five periods, it may be well to state precisely their limits 
as the terms are used in this book. Infancy or babyhood 
includes the first two years of life ; childhood, from the 
second to the twelfth years ; youth, from the twelfth to 
the twentieth ; maturity, from the twentieth to the fiftieth ; 
and age from the fiftieth to death. 

The artificiality of this method of splitting up the life of 
a being is too obvious to need emphasis, but it should be 
borne in mind that the rate of development mentally and 
physically varies widely in different individuals. Some 
of us are as old at five as others are at eight, and even 
more strikingly obvious is the fact that certain persons 
are aged long before their time. This indicates that each 
individual should be studied separately, if we are to dis- 
cover the facts of his existence or offer a genetic descrip- 
tion of his consciousness. 

The psychology of infancy or babyhood. — The most 
important single point in which the consciousness of the 
infant differs from that of the adult is self-consciousness, 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INFANCY 215 

for whereas we adults are keenly conscious of ourselves 
and constantly distinguishing the self from other selves 
and from other objects generally, the infant is not conscious 
of itself. Instead, it is merely aware of happenings. It 
lives, for the first few months of life, as Professor James 
has said, in a buzzing, blooming confusion of sensations 
and feelings. All the while impressions are pouring into 
the stream of consciousness. The baby at first does not 
remember for it has nothing to re-live in consciousness, 
unless, indeed, it be its prenatal existence. It neither 
thinks nor experiences emotions. The elements of con- 
sciousness are at first unrelated fragments : it is only during 
the early years of childhood that they become knit together 
in the psychic complexes with which we grown-ups are 
so familiar. 

The infant eagerly seeks new sensations: it tries to 
touch, handle, taste, smell, and in all other ways of which it 
is capable, test the qualities of the objects which fall within 
reach. Once a sensation or a feeling has been experienced, 
it is possible for it to recur with the marks of memory upon 
it. Hence, it is quite likely that the baby soon begins to 
have memories. Then too, its experiences with the world 
in which it lives soon furnish it the material out of which 
emotions are formed and it begins to exhibit the signs of 
anger, resentment, fear, and delight. 

Another striking characteristic of infancy is the rapidity 
with which consciousness changes. The stream of con- 
sciousness flows very rapidly at this time of life and it 
swells apace, for into it are pouring a vast variety of new 
experiences. Nothing long remains in consciousness. The 
baby turns rapidly from object to object, attending for 
only a few seconds to each. Again and again it returns 
to the same object. Restlessness, impatience, efforts to 
repeat experiences constantly appear. Attention is readily 
obtained, but with difficulty held. 



216 ONTOGENESIS 

Like the animal, the infant lacks systematic means of 
expressing itself. It has gestures and bodily expressions, 
similar to those which later come to indicate to us feelings 
or emotions, hut it is incapable of speech. True, during the 
latter part of the second year of life it may acquire a 
number of sounds which it uses to indicate ©bjects of 
peculiar significance to it, as, for example, its mother or 
nurse, its bottle or toys. For precisely this reason the 
study of the psychology of the infant is similar in method 
to animal psychology. In both instances it is necessary 
to depend upon direct observation of what the individual 
does and thus to read the mental life of the being instead 
of making use of introspection. Indeed, the human being 
is several years old before introspective ability has devel- 
oped to a useful degree. 

The consciousness of the baby during the first few months 
is made up of sensations and feelings. These come to it 
not all at once but in a certain order. At birth the infant 
is sensitive to light. It clearly experiences sensations of 
the achromatic series, but in all probability not so many 
qualities as do we. During the first year or more of life 
it does not experience color sensations. It lives, therefore, 
in a world of lights and shadows and movements. It is not 
until sometime in the second year that color qualities 
begin to be experienced. They come gradually, it would 
seem, and it is years before this series is present in its 
completeness. In other words, it takes a long time to 
acquire the full quota of visual sensations. 

Most infants appear to be deaf at birth, and it is often 
a day, or even two or three, before tone or noise sensations 
are experienced. We have no very satisfactory knowledge 
of the nature and variety of the early auditory sensations, 
but there are reasons for suspecting that the infant only 
very slowly comes into the experience of the series of tone 
sensations with which psychologists are familiar. At first 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD 217 

doubtless all sounds seem much alike, just as to the adult 
all the new faces of a foreign race look alike. 

Taste and smell sensations are received soon after birth, 
but there are no indications of a variety of qualities and 
we must suppose that the consciousness of the baby only 
gradually comes to include a considerable number of these 
elements. 

Touch sensation seems to be present from the first. 

To sum up the discussion of sensation — the infant rapidly 
grows into its life of sensation. Before the end of the 
second year of life there is reason to believe that it is 
familiar with a large number of the fifty or more thousand 
of sense qualities which the psychologist describes. But 
at the same time it lacks introspective ability. " And 
even when an ordinary excitation does penetrate to the 
slumberous little consciousness, the utmost response which 
it awakes (to quote Professor James) is best ' expressed 
by the bare interjection " lo " ! ' — except, indeed, in the 
case of pains or sharp discomforts which doubtless make 
a more intense and voluminous, though probably no more 
distinct, impression. The story is told of a young mother 
who brought in her bachelor brother to see the new baby 
asleep in its cradle. Among the other things she asked 
if he didn't think the baby was very intelligent. He said 
he didn't feel himself altogether a competent judge and 
asked what the baby did that was so intelligent. The 
mother exclaimed, ' Why, you great stupid, don't you see 
how intelligently he breathes ! ' The mother didn 't miss 
by far the baby's highest pitch of intelligence." (Sanford, 
E. C. : Mental Growth and Decay, Amer. Jour, of Psy., 
vol. 13, p. 429). 

The psychology of childhood. — Between the second year 
and the twelfth the process of mental development pro- 
ceeds with astonishing rapidity. The child learns to dis- 
tinguish itself from other objects. It learns to talk, and 



218 ONTOGENESIS 

its language provides us with ample proof of its ability 
to think. To the multitudes of sense qualities, feelings, 
memory images, and simple ideas which were present at 
the close of infancy are now added with increasing speed 
ideas and associations. It is a memorable day in the life 
of the parent when the first baby puts two ideas together 
so that they represent a thought. And from that point to 
the formulating of thoughts in sentences is not far. 

The child, unlike the infant, is more or less fully con- 
scious of itself and tends rapidly to become increasingly 
so. It not only feels, its knows that it feels. That is, it is 
capable of self-observation. It not only has sensations of 
color: it knows that it does and is able to express the fact 
verbally. Language comes as the result of the presence 
of ideas, but at the same time it offers a great incentive 
to thought, for the child is constantly seeking for some- 
thing to express. 

Clear evidences of reasoning sometimes appear toward the 
close of infancy, but it is during the psychological changes 
of childhood that the human being so rapidly and far out- 
strips the animal. The child of two years exhibits an 
emotional life which is highly complex and its intellectual 
life is evidently incomparably more complex than that of 
the infant. It acquires associations, learns new things about 
its environment and itself day by day, and long before 
the twelfth year has been passed it is living a mental life 
which is in its chief essentials like that of the adult. 

Childhood can be studied psychologically a little more 
satisfactorily than infancy because the child has greater 
powers of movement and a considerable command of lan- 
guage, as well as some ability in self-observation. Indeed, 
after the fifth year, it is possible to get the child so to 
describe its experiences that the psychologist may directly 
enter into the fruits of its labors. 

The greatest difference between child and adult men- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD 219 

tally lies in the store of experience. Whereas the child 
has few and not highly varied experiences, the adult has 
lived through a far greater variety. The same holds of 
emotional and other affective experiences as of intellectual 
experiences, for the longer one has lived the larger the 
stock is likely to be. 

There is a novelty and freshness about experience for 
the child which the adult lacks. There are new experiences, 
and many of them, for the infant; fewer, but still a great 
variety, for the child ; but for the adult most experiences 
are old. They can be re-lived, but they lack the novelty 
and vividness which give its chief characteristic to the 
consciousness of the child. 

Childhood is a period of immense intellectual vigor. The 
process of learning or of acquiring experiences and fitting 
them together progresses with tremendous rapidity. 
Therefore it is that this is the time for educational 
training. 

One of the important differences between the child's 
mind and the adult's is in the manner of perceiving things. 
We not only learn to distinguish sensations: we also learn 
to see things. The child does not perceive the world as 
does the adult and therefore arise many misunderstand- 
ings for which parents and teachers are responsible. A 
touching illustration of failure to bridge this gap is offered 
by Professor Judd. 

" I remember when I was a little boy riding across a 
high railroad bridge with my father. Down on the flat 
land at the river level were some laborers. I was much 
interested in them, they were such little men. I could 
have held one of them in my hand. I decided to share my 
delight with my father, and induced him to look out and 
see my pygmies. Like all children, I believed, of course, 
in the infallibility of my father and of my own eyes. My 
beliefs received something of a shock that day when he 



220 ONTOGENESIS 

told me that my pygmies were just ordinary men, and 
turned back to his reading. I dare say I charitably at- 
tributed his remark to the rather superficial glance he had 
given the men ; at any rate, I remember believing in the 
testimony of my eyes in that case, and silently protesting 
against what was, from my point of view, a most unac- 
countable lack of interest in a curious race of men. Need 
I add the explanation of this experience? A little greater 
elevation, a little less experience in the interpretation of 
visual sizes, and man and boy might have had experiences 
more alike. As it was, those men were inside the range 
of my father's interpretation of perspective, while they 
were outside of mine. 

" Years after I was a party to a similar comparison of 
adult and child experience ; this time, however, I was the 
adult. We were riding along together, and looking out 
over the broad pasture land, a little girl of six and I, when 
we saw some horses grazing quietly a quarter of a mile 
or so away. There was no difficulty in recognizing the 
horses as animals of full, ordinary size. And I was sur- 
prised into looking a second and even a third time by 
the little girl's cries of joy at seeing " those colts," as she 
insisted on calling them. Finally, I realized that the horses 
were to her untrained eyes colts. I even induced her to 
discuss the matter with me until I told her that they were 
really horses, and then the look of incredulous pity for 
my grown-up ignorance gave me one of the best insights 
I have ever had into the truth of the principle that children 
and adults live in different worlds. I also had a clearer 
understanding of the child's mind at that moment from 
my understanding of the fact that if the quarter of a mile 
had grown into two miles, I, too, might have been in doubt 
as to whether the horses were horses or colts." (Judd, 
C. H. : Genetic Psychology, pp. 9-10.) 

The child is highly imaginative instead of matter of 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF YOUTH 221 

fact. Experience does not enable it to distinguish with 
certainty between the products of reproductive imagination 
(memory) and creative imagination (imagination). Be- 
cause of this confusion it can not tell the truth as do adults. 
The child lives often in a purely imaginary world : playing 
with imaginary toys or companions, eating purely imag- 
inary food, and drinking imaginary tea or coffee. Indeed, 
of childhood nothing is so sharply and distinctively char- 
acteristic, no one feature of mental life serves as well to 
distinguish it from adulthood, as imaginativeness. The 
child lives happily in a world of its own creation : the adult 
lives in a world of brutal facts. The contrast is one which 
we would not destroy. Rather in aiding the individual to 
pass from the childish stage of mental development to the 
adult stage, we should seek to retain imaginativeness while 
rationalizing it through contact with the matter-of-fact 
world. 

The memory of the child, as a rule, is admirable. Rec- 
ognition, at first doubtful in the infant, is clearly exhibited 
and the part which memory experiences play in the mental 
life is obvious. 

Adults too frequently make the mistake of underesti- 
mating the intelligence and insight of the child. The infant 
seems to us more intelligent than it really is, just as do 
many animals (because they act reasonably), but the child 
often seems less intelligent than it is and we are led into 
grave mistakes of treatment. 

The psychology of youth. — Peculiarly distinctive of this 
period of mental development is the sudden transition from 
childish interests to the interests and ideals of the grown-up. 
Between the ages of twelve and twenty, we rapidly pass 
from imaginativeness to practicality. Our sensations and 
feelings are well developed; we distinguish sense qualities 
as well as ever; we note contrasts of feelings. Our emo- 
tional life is in the ascendant, for there rush into conscious- 



222 ONTOGENESIS 

ness a multitude of new relations and interests which 
mark the transition from childhood to manhood or woman- 
hood. These tend to interfere somewhat with the steady 
progress of mental development. The purely intellectual 
life is, for a time, subordinated to the affective life. The 
youth is a creature of sentiments, emotions, feelings, ideals, 
dreams, as contrasted, on the one hand, with the imaginative 
child and, on the other, with the prosaic man. 

In fact, it would seem that such mental progress as occurs 
during youth is largely brought about by the influence of 
the emotions and sentiments. Affective, as contrasted with 
logical, judgments predominate and determine the nature 
of the rational life. The youth is rash as compared with 
the child or the adult ; he is a creature of strong and action- 
impelling desires and emotions. He knows the world in 
much the way, although less well, that the adult does, but 
for him it has a much stronger feeling value. This it is 
which the practical experiences of contact with the world 
in later life tone down. 

" It is a time of hero-worship also — sometimes real peo- 
ple, sometimes imaginary ones. It is the time for day 
dreaming, for air castles, for romance, for ideal literature 
in poetry and prose. The day dreams and ideals are some- 
times impossible ; they are often crude ; they are always 
inexperienced; but they are not therefore fair targets for 
ridicule. The boy of sixteen may be doing a deal more 
of serious thinking than he gets credit for. He realizes 
his inexperience and the crudity of his thought, and he is 
eager enough for something better, but he hates to have 
what he has taken pleasure in laughed at (or even smiled 
over), and so does not talk of it. As he advances in age 
his ideals become more definite and tangible; he gets down 
toward reality, and in the end experience furnishes all the 
correction necessary. Perhaps too much ! At this early age 
he is ready to put his ideals into practice ; he may not be 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MATURITY 223 

later. It is the youth, who, when duty whispers low, 
' Thou must,' replies, ' I can.' " (Sanford, E. C. : Amer- 
ican Journal of Psychology, vol. 13, p. 442.) 

If infancy is the most appealing period of mental and 
physical development because of the individual's helpless- 
ness, and childhood the most fascinating because of its im- 
aginativeness, youth is the most engaging because of its 
enthusiasms, high hopes, sentiments, and ideals. 

The psychology of maturity. — Mental development, in 
the sense of increase in intellectual power, usually continues 
for a considerable period after the twentieth year. Some 
persons continue to increase in mental power throughout 
a long life. But the most noteworthy feature of the mature 
mind is, not its sense qualities and feelings, for the youth 
has these in like form, but its abundance of ideas and asso- 
ciations, its reasoning processes and its ability to initiate 
and sustain new lines of thought. 

The infant lives a life of sense impressions and simple 
feelings. 

The child lives a life of perceptions, ideas, memories, and 
associations. 

The youth lives a life of ideas and emotions. 

The adult lives a life of thought and feeling. Which 
predominates depends upon the constitution of the indi- 
vidual. 

Between the twentieth and the fiftieth years of life the 
power to see in the sense of perceiving reaches its maximum ; 
the power to acquire new facts, to form new associations, 
rapidly wanes. It is at its maximum during the early 
years of life. For this reason, memorizing is easier during 
childhood than later in life. 

The adult, in the full bloom of his intellectual and af- 
fective capacities, seeks new combinations of experiences, 
creates new objects, lives in a world of intellectual or emo- 
tional endeavor. 



224 ONTOGENESIS 

Because of the lack of novelty in experience, time seems 
to pass quickly. This is in marked contrast with the experi- 
ence of the child. Every adult thinks with puzzled curi- 
osity of the length of the years of childhood and the short- 
ness of the years of manhood. The older we become, the 
shorter seems the year or month or day. 

Maturity is a period of variable length between youth 
and age. The limit of twenty to fifty years is too short 
for some individuals, too long for others. But all those 
who live to die of old age or of the infirmities thereof, 
experience a marked change, or set of changes, in mental 
life. These changes are as interesting as are the changes 
of childhood, albeit not so cheering. 

The psychology of age or senility. — Life may be 
likened to a mountain with rapidly sloping sides. Infancy 
is the first stage of the upward slope on one side ; childhood 
carries us nearer to the summit; youth bears us almost 
to the crest ; maturity carries us to the crest, holds us there 
for a longer or shorter space of time, and then gradually 
allows us to descend the opposite side. With age, we reach 
the lower slopes, corresponding to those occupied by in- 
fancy and childhood. There is sad truth in the saying 
that in old age we tend to become childish. Some even 
become infantile. Sometimes at forty, sometimes not before 
sixty or even seventy, body and mind begin to fail in 
strength. Little by little the variety of sensations and 
feelings decreases ; sight, hearing, and the other special 
senses either become dull or are lost; the emotions and 
sentiments become less vivid than they were in maturity ; 
associations are more slowly acquired; memory weakens, 
especially for recent experiences; thought is slow and in- 
effective. Interest in life wanes and the individual sinks 
gradually into a psychological state which, although super- 
ficially resembling that of the child, as a matter of fact 
differs radically from it. The aged person is childish only 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENILITY 225 

in that the mental powers are on the level of the 
child 's. 

In the early years of life the memory for recent events 
is best; in senility the memory for remote (early) experi- 
ences is best. 

Mental growth and degeneration are exhibited in every 
individual who lives out his three score years and ten, and 
the complete history of the span from the dawn of con- 
sciousness to its disappearance from view is a long and 
fascinating story. In this chapter we have only sketched 
its chief changes. The whole story would fill a volume. 
Scientifically and practically the psychological character- 
istics of the various periods of life are of great importance 
and interest, for it is only in the light of thorough knowl- 
edge thereof that we can understand our fellow men. 



CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. The perception of time. Materials : stop 
watch; record blanks; note-books; a book of general interest 
from which the instructor may read. 

The instructor should choose three, or, if time permits, four 
different conditions for the estimation of intervals. In the illus- 
trative record-sheet appended four conditions, which are desig- 
nated as " idleness," " reading," " writing," and " estimating," 
were used. The class should be instructed that each of the sev- 
eral intervals — four may be used, varying in length from a quar- 
ter of a minute to a minute and a half or two minutes — is to be 
judged in seconds, and the result recorded in the record blank 
at the end of the interval. It should further be explained that 
the condition of " idleness " demands simple passivity, without 
special attention to the task of judging the length of the interval; 
that during " reading " attention is to be given undividedly to 
the passage read aloud by the instructor ; that during " writing " 
attention is similarly to be given to writing from the dictation of 
the instructor; that during "estimating" attention is to be con- 
centrated upon the task of judging the length of the interval. 
Each individual should choose the method of doing this — other 



226 ONTOGENESIS 

than counting heart-beats, clock-ticks, etc. — which promises to 
give him most accurate results. 

It is well to begin this exercise by giving a thirty-second in- 
terval as a standard. Members of the class should of course be 
ignorant of the actual lengths of the intervals used in the 
exercise. 

In the accompanying record-blank, the lengths of the intervals 
used in a number of experiments by the author are given. These 
are needlessly long. 

TIME ESTIMATION 

A RECORD-BLANK FOR JUDGMENTS OF THE LENGTH OF 
INTERVALS OF TIME 

Name Place 

Age Date 

Order of Tests Actual Length in Seconds 

1. Idleness 108 

2. Reading 3G 

3. Writing 72 

4. Estimating 18 

5. Reading 108 

6. Idleness 36 

7. Writing 18 

8. Estimating 108 

9. Reading 72 

10. Idleness 72 

11. Writing 36 

12. Estimating 72 

13. Reading 18 

14. Writing 108 

15. Estimating 36 

16. Idleness 18 

Questions concerning the perception of time and its changes 
during ontogenesis. Recall your last vacation. Does the inter- 
val seem, in memory, longer or shorter than a corresponding 
interval during the school year? Which seemed the longer in 
passing? Why? Do the days, months, or years seem as long 
now as formerly? If not, how do you account for the change? 

The record-blanks for the class, after they have been properly 
filled out by the members of the class, may be delivered to a 
student with instructions to make a thorough statistical study 
of the results and report to the class. In the preparation of this 



THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME 227 

report a paper on " Time estimation," by R. M. Yerkes and 
P. M. Urban in the Harvard Psychological Studies, vol. 2, 
pp. 405-430, and a briefer description of a similar exercise by 
R. MacDougall, which appeared in Science, N. S., vol. 19, pp. 
708-709, may prove of service. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Preyer, Wm. : Mental development in the child. 

Shinn, M. W. : The biography of a baby. 

Sanford, E. C. : Mental growth and decay. American Journal of 

Psychology, vol. 13, pp. 426-449. 
Calkins, M. W. : Introduction to psychology, chapter 26. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE RACE: 
PHYLOGENESIS 

" One of my chicks three or four days old snapped up a hive-bee 
and ran off with it. Then he dropped it, shook his head much and 
often, and wiped his bill repeatedly. I do not think he had been 
stung, probably he tasted the poison. In any case, in a few minutes 
he seemed quite happy and eager after new experiences. But though 
he came and looked at it once or twice, he made no further attempt 
to run off with the hive-bee. An association, based on a, single experi- 
ence, was at least temporarily established. Similar experiments with 
the unpleasant caterpillar of the cinnabar moth and with lady- 
birds showed that the association between a peculiar appearance and 
nasty taste was in all cases very rapidly established, and that the 
visual impression suggested the idea or re-presentation of unpleasant 
gustatory experience." — Morgan, C. Lloyd : Introduction to com- 
parative psychology, second edition, p. 86. 

The natural process of evolution. — Everything has a 
history. Sometimes this history is a record of changes in 
a definite direction, or, as we are in the habit of saying, 
toward a certain goal. Sometimes it is merely a record 
of slight and irregular variations in position, size, shape, 
energy, or relation to other things. Evolution is an orderly 
series of changes which may be described, as in the case 
of the formation of the earth, the development of plants 
and animals, or the growth of an object of human creation. 
A house evolves in the mind of the architect and under 
the hands of artisans; a painting evolves, under the intelli- 
gent and artistic touch of the painter, just as truly as any 
natural object evolves from one stage or condition of exist- 
ence to another. Worlds to-day are believed to be evolving 
by two series of changes: the one progressive, the other 
regressive. The story of the world in which we live, as 

228 



THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 229 

told in the history of the earth by geologists, is an account 
of the evolution of our home. It is similar in principle to 
the story of the development of one type of animal or of 
plant from another form. To-day this series of changes, 
leading from one variety or species of animal or plant to 
another more or less markedly different, may be observed 
as we observe the growth of the animal from infancy to 
age. There is nothing fanciful in the belief that man has 
evolved from animals. Accepting, as we do, the account 
of man 's body as offered in the general theory of evolution, 
we are forced to inquire what is the story or history of 
the human mind. 

There has been, and still continues, an evolution of 
mind. — In the human individual one may at any time 
observe the unfolding of mind, the development of mental 
life from its simple beginnings in the baby to its complex 
and manifold condition in the adult man. Similarly, al- 
though not so directly nor so easily, we may observe the 
evolution of mind in the race. Centuries ago there existed 
on the earth man-like animals whose consciousness was dif- 
ferent in important respects from ours. Their bodies, too, 
were unlike ours. By a series of changes both mind and 
body became what is now called human. This is a step 
in the evolution of mankind. The mind of man differs 
no more strikingly from that of the dog or the monkey 
than does his body. It is as easy to conceive of the proc- 
esses by which one became transformed into the other in the 
case of mind as in the case of body. We may not see the 
changes, but we must believe they occurred, if we are to 
hold to the evolution theory. From the mind of the simple- 
celled microscopic organism to that of the ant is a long 
stretch, but may it not have been bridged by innumerable 
slight changes? And so from the mind of the amoeba to 
that of man, it is conceivable that, could one see the changes 
as they really occurred, there should be nothing more 



230 PHYLOGENESIS 

startling in the sight than in the growth of a house from 
a pile of bricks and boards. 

Types of mind and the breaks in the process of evolu- 
tion. — At present it is quite impossible to trace the history 
of the body of man back through the animal races to its 
earliest ancestor, for many of the steps in the series of 
changes have utterly disappeared from the earth. For 
precisely the same reason, it is impossible to follow the his- 
tory of mind in the race back through the ages, and from 
one type of living thing to another. As we examine the 
varieties of mind which are now to be found on our earth, 
we note vast differences in character, and the relations of 
one variety to another are sometimes obscure. So numerous 
and so large are the gaps in the series of changes from the 
mind of the amoeba to that of man that no one can with 
certainty place all existing minds in the series. The proba- 
bility is that many of them do not belong there. 

The recapitulation theory. — From the observations of 
embryologists there arose the idea that the individual organ- 
ism more or less perfectly repeats the series of changes 
which has occurred in the race. Or, in other words, that 
in developing from simple cell to adult organism the human 
being passes successively through the various stages or 
conditions of the race which together constitute the evo- 
lutionary series. If one of the remote ancestors of man 
was a variety of fish, then at some time in development 
each one of us passes through a fish stage! Observation 
has fully proved that we do not pass through these stages 
in detail ; they seem to be greatly condensed and abbrevi- 
ated, so that a million years of racial, or as it is called, 
phylogenetie, evolution, may be passed through by the 
individual in a few hours. Incomplete and fleeting as it 
is, this tendency for the individual to repeat the history 
of the race has considerable value for the student of the 
history of the body and mind of man. For in studying 



THE MENTAL LIFE OF ANIMALS 231 

the consciousness of human beings we constantly observe 
phenomena which remind us of the minds of other animals. 
In man we see more or less clearly not only each human 
ancestor, but also, with rapidly diminishing clearness, his 
animal ancestors. But the recapitulation theory must not 
be overtaxed. It may be that our preconceived ideas of 
the stages through which the organism passed in pro- 
gressing from amoeba to man have led us to imagine that 
we see these stages mirrored in the developing individual. 

The mental life of animals. — The study of the minds of 
animals is much like that of the mind of the infant and 
the young child for they can not introspect for us expertly 
as can many adults. Nevertheless, animal psychology to- 
day is in excellent condition. Indeed, it is fair to contend 
that we know as much about the mental life of many types 
of animals as we do about the infant's consciousness. 

It is no more necessary to inquire whether a given 
animal has a mind than it is to ask the same question con- 
cerning the human infant. We have every reason to believe 
that many animals have minds and it would be as absurd to 
deny this statement as to contend that the human infant is 
not conscious because it can not introspect or is not self- 
conscious. Animals have minds and it is the business of 
the psychologist to study their characteristics to the best 
of his ability. Only thus can we hope to discover even a 
portion of the racial history of mind. 

There are many types of mind, just as there are many 
types of body. — Upon the earth at present there exist thou- 
sands of differing species of animals. Each of these species 
or types of living creature probably has a variety of mind 
which is characteristic of it. When one states that animals 
are conscious, he does not necessarily mean that they are 
conscious as is man./J^He may, instead, mean that they 
are conscious as is the infant, or even in a more simple and 
primitive manner. The task of studying the animal mind is 



232 PHYLOGENESIS 

therefore one of discovering the psychological character- 
istics of each type of organism. But it may not stop there, 
for just as in the case of human beings we discover that 
there are great and all-important individual differences 
which make it highly desirable to study individuals instead 
of the type, so in animals, the individual differences or 
peculiarities of mind are so marked that one may not 
describe the mind of a particular animal in any detail 
from knowledge of the characteristics of the mind of the 
species to which it belongs. Nevertheless, there is a type 
of mind characteristic of the cat — the acme of selfishness — 
of the dog, of the orang-outang, just as there is of man. 
It is these types which must be described and related to 
one another — as the steps in the development of the body 
from germ to adult must be related to one another — if the 
racial history of mind is ever to be completely written. 

Plants as well as animals may have minds. — There is 
no valid reason for denying the existence of mind in plants. 
On the contrary, there is abundant reason for the opposite 
opinion, for especially the sensitive plants, Mimosa, Dioncea 
(Venus' fly trap), Drosera, and Drosophyllum, in so many 
respects behave as do animals that one can but treat them 
as conscious. The writer is content, in his investigations of 
the consciousness of organisms, to grant that mind may be 
coextensive with life and to study every living thing from 
the point of view of psychology. 

The classification of animals. — Zoologists have classified 
animals according to their resemblances in bodily form. 
Psychologists have made no classification according to re- 
semblances in mental life. Yet, such a classification is 
both possible and desirable. For the purposes of this book 
it is not necessary that we attempt an elaborate psycho- 
logical classification, although it would be convenient for 
our use were one at hand. Instead, in the description of 
types of animal mind which is to constitute our sketch of 



ANIMALS CLASSIFIED PSYCHOLOGICALLY 233 

the history of the development of mind in the race, we 
shall use a crude combination of zoological and psycho- 
logical classifications. The animal kingdom will be divided 
into six groups as follows: 

Group I. Animals which lack a nervous system: the 
unicellular organisms. 
II. Multicellular organisms which, although pos- 
sessing a nervous system, are simple in 
structure and behavior as compared with 
all other animals except those of the first 
group. 

III. Insects: animals with complicated structure 

and behavior, but lacking a back-bone. 

IV. The lower vertebrate animals: fishes, am- 

phibians, reptiles, and birds. 
V. The higher vertebrates, including all of the 
mammalia, except the primates. 
VI. The primates: monkeys and apes, excepting 
man. 
In the remainder of this chapter an attempt will be made 
to sketch the psychological characteristics of these six large 
groups of animals. The descriptions must necessarily be 
incomplete and perhaps to a certain extent misleading, be- 
cause of lack of space for details. 

The psychology of simple one-celled organisms, Group 
I. — Familiar examples of this group are amoeba, Para- 
mecium, stentor, vorticella, and the bacteria. In form 
these creatures are distinguished from all other animals 
by single-celled bodies and the lack of brain, sense organs, 
and nerves. They are simply constructed and simple in 
their behavior. What of their mental life? 

The best authority on the mental life of an animal is 
not necessarily he who talks or speculates most about its 
possibility, probability, or nature, but instead he who is 
most intimately acquainted with the structure of the animal 



234 PHYLOGENESIS 

and with its activities. No one in America is more com- 
petent to express an opinion concerning the presence of 
mind in unicellular organisms than is Professor H. S. 
Jennings. His conclusion is expressed in the following 
words : 

" Is the behavior of lower organisms of the character 
which we should ' naturally ' expect and appreciate if 
they did have conscious states, of undifferentiated char- 
acter, and acted under similar conscious states in a parallel 
way to man? 

" If one thinks this question through for such an organ- 
ism as Paramecium, with all its limitations of sensitive- 
ness and movement, it appears to the writer that an af- 
firmative answer must be given. . . . Suppose that this 
animal were conscious to such an extent as its limitations 
seem to permit. Suppose that it could feel a certain degree 
of pain when injured ; that it received certain sensations 
from alkali, others from acids, others from solid bodies, 
etc., — would it not be natural for it to act as it does? 
That is, can we not, through our consciousness, appreciate 
its drawing away from things that hurt it, its trial of the 
environment when the conditions are bad, its attempting 
to move forward in various directions, till it finds one 
where the conditions are not bad, and the like? To the 
writer it seems that we can ; that Paramecium in this be- 
havior makes such an impression that one involuntarily 
recognizes it as a little subject acting in ways analogous 
to our own. Still stronger, perhaps, is this impression 
when observing an amoeba obtaining food. . . . The writer 
is thoroughly convinced, after long study of the behavior 
of this organism, that if amoeba were a large animal, so 
as to come within the everyday experience of human beings, 
its behavior would at once call forth the attribution to it of 
states of pleasure and pain, of hunger, desire, and the 
like, on precisely the same basis as one attributes these 



MIND IN SIMPLE ANIMALS 235 

things to the dog." (Jennings, H. S. : Behavior of the 
Lower Organisms, p. 336.) 

In the opinion of the authorities who have given this 
matter most careful consideration the mind of the one- 
celled animals consists of a certain limited number of sense 
qualities, together with feelings of agreeableness and dis- 
agreeableness. These sense qualities are not necessarily 
the same in all the animals of the group ; on the contrary, 
there probably are considerable variations. There is no 
sufficient reason for assuming that the animals experience 
ideas, memories, emotions, sentiments, thoughts, or any of 
the psychic complexes which have been observed in man. 
Their mental lives are extremely, delightfully, simple as 
compared with ours. Theirs must be lives of simple aware- 
ness of certain features of their surroundings, without 
even the consciousness of self as distinguished from en- 
vironment. There is absolutely no reason for supposing 
that they are self-conscious. In a word, the organisms of 
this, our first group, are psychologically below the level 
of the infant newly born. 

The psychology of simple multicellular animals of 
Group II. — In this group are found the sea-anemones, 
jelly-fishes, hydras, crabs, worms, etc. They are made up 
of many cells; they have more or less complicated nervous 
systems, and their behavior is, perhaps, more complex than 
that of the representatives of Group I. 

Here sensations exist in a much greater variety of 
mode and quality than is the case in the mind of the one- 
celled animals. Feelings exist too, and apparently in more 
complex forms than in simpler organisms. Certain evi- 
dences of images, lacking, perhaps, the element of recogni- 
tion or the feeling of familiarity, are discoverable, and we 
must conclude that the minds of these creatures resemble 
that of the infant at birth more closely than do those of 
simpler creatures. Many varieties of worms, crustaceans, 



236 PHYLOGENESIS 

and coelenterates are known to profit by experience in ways 
which strongly suggest consciousness of the re-presentative 
sort. But we must not be over-generous in our ascription 
of mental states to them. 

The psychology of the insects, Group III. — As a whole 
the insects appear to be more highly and more complexly 
conscious than the animals of Groups I and II. Their 
bodies are highly organized and, especially with respect 
to their nervous systems, they approach the degree of 
differentiation found in man. Undoubtedly, however, cer- 
tain insects are lower both physically and psychologically 
than are exceptional representatives of Group II. 

Sense modes appear to be more numerous in the insects 
than in unicellular animals or in the representatives of 
Group II. Ants, bees, wasps, and other social insects evi- 
dently experience a great variety of sense qualities. Their 
perceptions are far more complex than those met with in 
Groups I and II. There are evidences that their feelings 
also are vivid and varied. The affective side of their ex- 
perience consists predominantly of instinct consciousness. 
This fact, coupled with the observation that a large number 
of their environmental relations are definite and almost 
automatically met in action, has led to the impression that 
they lack complex experiences and are mere creatures of 
instinct. It is high time that biology and psychology took 
account of the fact that instinct as a form of action has 
as its accompaniment an important affective variety of 
consciousness. 

" It is evident that the best way to know what instincts 
are is to experience, that is, to live them. Such experience 
shows that they arise as primitive volitions or cravings, or 
what the Germans call " Triebe " — a word for which we 
have no exact equivalent in the English language — and 
that they are inseparable from certain pleasurable or 
painful emotions. The question then suggests itself as to 



INSTINCT AS CONSCIOUSNESS 237 

whether there is anything to indicate that ants experience 
similar internal states. We are, of course, working here 
merely with analogical inferences and probabilities, and 
may, therefore, incur the contempt of a whole school of 
German physiologists, but, as has been often stated by 
other authors, we must either proceed in this manner or 
abandon animal psychology altogether. I admit that it is 
very easy and very reprehensible to read one's own psy- 
chology into an animal, but after a patient, and, I believe, 
unprejudiced study of the ants, I have reached the same 
conclusions as Forel, Wasmann, and others, namely, that 
these insects show unequivocal signs of possessing both 
feelings and impulses. In my opinion they experience 
both anger and fear, both affection and aversion, elation 
and depression in a simple, " blind " form, that is, with- 
out anything like the complex psychical accompaniment 
which these emotions arouse in us. Whether a stinging 
ant or hornet merely exhibits a pure reflex or has a feeling 
of anger besides, is a nice problem. I have unintentionally 
sat on nests of Vespa germanica and Pogonomyrmex bar- 
batus, and while I have no doubt that I myself acted re- 
flexly under the circumstances, it will take quite an army 
of physiologists to convince me that these creatures were 
acting as nothing but reflex machines." (Wheeler, W. M. : 
Ants: Their Structure, Development, and Behavior, 
p. 529.) 

Viewed in the light of their highly organized social 
relations and adaptations many of the insects seem more 
intelligent, more nearly human in their rationality, per- 
haps, than are the majority of the vertebrates. It is only 
their small size and lack of close resemblance to ourselves 
that enables us to think of them as unconscious mechan- 
isms. Were ants large enough to be obtrusive, and were 
they also similar to us in general bodily form, we should 
undoubtedly consider their behavior indicative of an intel- 



238 PHYLOGENESIS 

ligence similar to our own. The chief difference would 
appear in the relative importance of instinct and reason. 

It is difficult to place the animals of this group in their 
relation to the history of consciousness in the race. They 
seem to lie off the direct line of progress and they may 
well be considered a divergent group. To compare them 
directly in their mental life with the human being is even 
more difficult, for in some respects they are more remarka- 
ble than the two-year-old child, while in others they are 
hopelessly inferior. With reason, one might claim that 
certain of the insects are psychologically superior to man 
and represent a stage in the evolution of mind which, al- 
though strikingly different, is more advanced than our 
own. And, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the 
direction in which our mental life has developed is not 
to be conceived of as a stage in the evolution of insect 
consciousness. Rather we may conclude that the social 
insects represent the highest development of mind in one 
direction; and man, the highest development, in another 
direction. It is not for us, with modesty, to insist that 
our psychic characteristics are best ! 

The psychology of the lower vertebrate animals, 
Group IV. — The fishes, frogs, salamanders, and toads are 
far less interesting psychologically than many of the in- 
sects. They possess many modes of sense and a fair degree 
of discriminative ability, but of complex relational experi- 
ences : emotions, sentiments, associations, memories, they ap- 
parently have few or none. If the mind of man is to be 
conceived of as having evolved from that of a frog or a 
fish, a vast gap must be bridged, for there is a world of 
difference in mental make up. 

The reptiles and birds have a wider range of experi- 
ences and, in some instances, they appear to live a life 
of emotions and memories. Many of them appear to be 
on the level of the higher insects, although markedly dif- 



MIND IN COMPLEX ANIMALS 239 

ferent from them in respect to complexity of instinctive 
behavior. Rationality of a sort may be attributed to some 
of them. It is different from ours, doubtless, in that there 
is less clear and inclusive awareness of the conditions and 
results of action. Between the most intelligent representa- 
tives of this large group of vertebrates and man there is 
a gap which ages of development might have bridged. 

The psychology of the higher vertebrates, Group V. — 
With this group we reach those animals to which we feel 
mentally most nearly akin. For in the horse, the dog, the 
raccoon, the squirrel, and other of the mammals we discover 
experiences like our own. This is not simply because many 
of these animals are our hearth-side companions and pa- 
tient servants. Even in the creatures of the wild we detect 
many similar mental traits. For all of the animals of 
this group, save those toward which we have some special 
cause for enmity, we have a degree of sympathy and in- 
terest which far surpasses that which we feel for the other 
animals about us. Therefore it is that we object to the 
abuse or mutilation of a dog, although we may quite calmly 
eat a live oyster or plunge a living lobster into hot water. 

There is no question, in the mind of the person who 
really knows animals, that the higher vertebrates possess 
a great variety of sense qualities and feelings. Doubtless 
these differ in many respects from ours, and even among 
one another, but on the whole they appear to be more 
nearly like ours than those in any other group of living 
things. Of emotions, sentiments, associations, memory im- 
ages, ideas, and even certain forms of judgment there are 
noteworthy evidences, and the more liberal among psy- 
chologists are at present inclined to believe that at least 
some animals, among them the dog and horse, the raccoon 
and cat, experience conscious complexes which are much 
like ours. It is upon this subject that the attention of 
animal psychologists, who are interested in what animals 



240 PHYLOGENESIS 

feel rather than merely in what they do, is now concen- 
trated. 

The dog and the cat may be compared in the character- 
istics of their mental life to the infant of from birth to 
a year of age. Perhaps at times they transcend this limit 
and enter into the range of experiences of the next three 
or four months of human life, but this would appear to be 
exceptional. Could the student of the animal mind for one 
brief hour introspect the consciousness of a dog there can 
be no doubt that the science of psychology would be revo- 
lutionized. 

The psychology of the primates, Group VI. — To be 
sure the primates are higher vertebrates and also mam- 
mals, but by their closer resemblance structurally to us, as 
well as by their mental traits, they are entitled to be placed 
in a separate class. It is not alone in bodily form that 
they are strikingly like us. They share a large portion of 
those psychological peculiarities which distinguish us from 
animals. The monkeys and the apes are man-like in their 
curiosity, their emotional life, their ideas, their memories. 

Between the other -vertebrates and the highest apes there 
is a great psychological gulf. It is almost as difficult for 
the imagination to bridge it as it is to imagine the transi- 
tion from the mental life of the fishes to that of the 
birds. 

If the consciousness of the dog may fairly be compared 
with that of the infant during the first year of life, that 
of the orang-outang and of the chimpanzee may be com- 
pared with that of the first three years of human life. The 
child, during the third year of life, exhibits practically 
all of the characteristic psychological traits of the human 
being, and in a similar way the ape exhibits these traits 
throughout its life. But the child . matures, enters into a 
wider and ever widening range of experiences, whereas 
the ape seems to stand still. What the child has in germ, 



THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 241 

and the man in fully developed form, the ape always pos- 
sesses in germ. 

For the intimate and thorough student of the animal 
mind it is by no means difficult to think of the mind of 
the monkey or the ape as a step in the evolution of the 
human mind. The difference in mental life is a matter of 
degree, not of kind. Few traits which man possesses seem 
wholly lacking in the other primates. 

The tree of mental evolution. — An effective way to rep- 
resent to one's self an outline of the history of animals is 
the racial tree. Thus we may, with the aid of the available 
facts of bodily structure and their relations, construct a tree 
of the evolution of one type of animal from another. It 
schematically represents the steps in evolution. In similar 
fashion we may picture to ourselves the course of mental 
evolution by means of a tree. 

At the base of the tree, as the starting point of mind, 
we have the animals of Group I. Theirs is the primitive 
kind of consciousness, a mere awareness of something. This 
point in the evolution of mind might appropriately be 
called the dawn of consciousness. Doubtless plants should 
not be excluded from this scheme, for their consciousness 
probably evolved simultaneously with that of animals. 
However, for them we should have to construct a different 
sort of tree whose only connection with that for animals 
would be at the base. 

Proceeding upward along the trunk of our tree, we might 
represent the condition of mental life found in Group II 
at a distance above the base. At this point mind has 
evolved into a vastly more complex and varied awareness, 
including several qualities of sensation and feeling, if not 
memories also. 

Here the tree forks and we are no longer able to follow 
a direct line from group to group. One main branch leads 
us finally, as its crowning glory, to the mind of the higher 



242 



PHYLOGENESIS 



G. IIIA Highly complex affective life, 
(Social insecfte instinct, memories, 

ants, bees, wa^ps) associations, etc. 



Man 

Reason 

G. VI. 

(Monkeys^ apes)/Memory, 

eas, dawn 
of reason. 




G. V. (Higher vertebrates, not including 
the primates— cats.Alogs, elephants.) 



(Simple multicellular G. II. 
organisms, with nervous systems) 



G.X 

(Unicellular organisms-amoeba) 



Complex sense patterns and feelings 
and possibly representational cons. 



Primitive awareness 

The dawn of consciousness. 



Fig. 5. The psycho-phylogenetic tree. G. I (Group I), unicellular 
organisms: primitive awareness; G. II, simple multicellular 
organisms: sense qualities and patterns, feelings, and, possibly, 
representational consciousness ; G. Ill, social insects : sense and 
affective patterns, associations and images; G. IV, lower ver- 
tebrates: sense patterns, associations and images — affective con- 
sciousness less developed than in social insects; G. V, higher 
vertebrates, exclusive of the primates: complex perceptual and 
emotional life, images; G. VI, monkeys and apes: memory and 
ideas, dawn of reason. 



MIND IN ANIMALS 243 

social insects, Group III. This product of the natural 
process of development is as far removed from the starting 
point in Group I as is the mind of man. The two most 
noteworthy achievements of mental evolution — the mind of 
man and of the social insects — are almost if not quite as 
distant from one another as is the mind of the ant from 
that of the worm. Between the mental life represented 
in Group II and that of Group III many important stages 
have intervened, and it is more than likely that certain of 
them are still existent. Only a thorough study of the mental 
life of animals now existent can enable us to decide this 
matter. 

Following another of the main branches of the tree we 
come next to the stage of Group IV, the lower vertebrates. 
Their type of mind represents a direction of mental evo- 
lution which is radically different from that of the insects 
and which is therefore indicated in our tree by placing 
the two on different branches. Further along on this branch 
we find Group V, Group VI, and finally the stage of human 
consciousness. 

Of the two remaining branches which emerge from the 
trunk of our tree at Group II nothing can certainly be 
said. We suppose that many directions of mental evolu- 
tion must have proved useless and disappeared from the 
earth, as have many tendencies in bodily evolution. The 
same is true of the subdivisions of the main branches. They 
are meant to indicate the fact that mental evolution has 
proceeded, and is proceeding, for all that we know to the 
contrary, in a great number of directions. 

Thus crudely we may present to ourselves a picture of 
the course of the evolution of mind from its earliest mani- 
festations to its condition in man. The particular tree 
which I have constructed in the light of my limited knowl- 
edge may prove to be incorrect, but however that may be, 
it will serve to make clear our chief lesson in the study 



244 PHYLOGENESIS 

of the history of mind in the race, namely, that mind has 
changed step by step, in one direction or another, until 
finally there has appeared upon the earth in connection 
with other and widely differing types of mental life the 
consciousness of man. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Observation of animal mind. The grading of animals in intel- 
ligence. Materials: a list of twenty animals with which all the 
members of the class are familiar; record sheet. 

Each member of the class should, after a brief discussion of 
the purpose and method of the exercise by the instructor, ar- 
range the names in the list in the order of diminishing intelli- 
gence : i.e., from the animal which, in the opinion of the student, 
furnishes most abundant and satisfactory evidences of complex 
mental life to that which furnishes least satisfactory evidences 
of intelligence. 

In connection with the task, it is likely to prove important 
to have each individual formulate a definition of " intelligence," 
and to state briefly but clearly the chief reasons for the particular 
ranking of the animals. 

A proposed list of animals. This will not prove equally satis- 
factory in different parts of the country. House-fly, mosquito, 
dog, rabbit, rat, toad, ant, honey-bee, cat, monkey, pigeon, squir- 
rel, canary, crow, sparrow, mouse, pike, tortoise, jelly-fish, horse. 

The record sheets may be taken for examination by some mem- 
ber of the class and the results tabulated and studied, as in the 
case of the results of the exercises with advertisements. The 
average order should be determined, and the departures of indi- 
viduals from this average. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Morgan, C. Lloyd : Introduction to comparative psychology. 
Washburn, M. F.: The animal mind, chapters 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12. 
Yerkes, R. M. : The dancing mouse, chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 
Kirkpatrick, E. A.: Genetic psychology, chapter 5. 
Thorndike, E. L. : Animal intelligence. 



PART FOUR 

PSYCHOLOGY AS GENERALIZATION 

CHAPTER XIX 

OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, LAWS, AND 
PRINCIPLES 

" The immediate contents of experience which constitute the subject- 
matter of psychology, are in all cases processes of a composite char- 
acter. Sense perceptions, memories of such sense perceptions, feelings, 
emotions, and volitional acts, are not only continually united in the 
most various ways, but each of these processes is itself a more or less 
composite whole. The idea of an external body, for example, is made 
up of partial ideas of its parts. A tone may be ever so simple, but 
we localize it in some direction, thus bringing it into connection 
with the idea of external space, which is highly composite. Every 
feeling is referred to some sensation that aroused the feeling, and 
every volition is referred to an object willed. In dealing with a 
complex fact of this kind, scientific investigation has three problems 
to be solved in succession. The first is the analysis of composite 
processes; the second is the demonstration of the combinations into 
which the elements discovered by analysis enter; the third is the 
investigation of the laws that are operative in the formation of such 
combinations." — Wundt, Wm. : Outlines of psychology, p. 28. 

Differences between observation and generalization. — 
We always observe a particular occurrence. It is the fact 
that a particular stone falls to the ground when I let go of 
it that I observe. When from repeated observation of this 
kind of behavior on the part of the stone, and of many 
other like objects, I reach the conclusion that all stones will 
fall to the ground if thrown into the air, I have formulated 
a scientific generalization, for it is something which I can 
never observe. No matter how many experiments I may 
try, there will always be other stones or other objects with 

245 



246 OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, ETC. 

which I have no direct contact and whose behavior I have 
not tested. We are able to see or otherwise directly take 
knowledge of the particular fact, but the generalization is 
a product of the scientific imagination. Those observers 
who lack this quality of mind can do nothing but observe 
particular facts and describe them, thus laying the founda- 
tion for the brilliant generalizations of observers who pos- 
sess imagination. 

In chemistry the qualities and even the atoms of gold 
are observed and described, but the generalization, from 
these particular facts, that all substances are composed of 
atoms is beyond observation. Likewise, in biology, the ob- 
servation that a certain cat has a tail and the verification 
of this observation on animal after animal, finally leads 
to the thought that a tail is the property of all cats. But 
further observation may reveal exceptions, as in the case 
of the Manx cat, to this generalization. 

Certain general statements are known as laws. — Any 
generalization which enables us to predict the properties of 
an object may be called a law. The laws of chemical com- 
bination are condensed statements of what may be expected 
wherever two substances enter into combination. The laws 
of gravitation likewise, in a few words, tell us what we 
may expect of objects under certain definite conditions. 
The laws of habit-formation, were they definitely known, 
would similarly enable us to predict the behavior of an 
animal under known conditions. It is to be noted that 
these so-called laws are merely the application of particular 
observations to a variety of situations like the one or ones 
in which the observation was made. Having noted with my 
own eyes the fact that two chemical substances always com- 
bine with one another in definite proportions, I venture 
upon the statement that this is a law of their combination. 
And having further observed the same fact in the case of 
other substances, I further conclude that the statement has 



DEFINITION OF LAW 247 

a still wider applicability, and forthwith I formulate the 
law of definite proportions. 

Chemistry has three laws which enable it to predict the 
behavior of substances with respect to one another. They 
are: 

Dalton's first law: The law of definite proportions. The 
relative weights of elementary substances in a compound 
are definite and invariable. 

Dalton's second law: The law of multiple proportions. 
When two elements unite with each other to form more than 
one compound, the resulting compounds contain simple 
multiple proportions of one element as compared with a 
constant quantity of the other. 

Wenzel, Richter, Dalton : The law of reciprocal propor- 
tions. The ponderable quantities in which substances 
unite with the same substances express the relation, or a 
simple multiple thereof, in which they unite with each 
other. 

Professor Pearson's definition of scientific law. — The 
English biologist, Professor Karl Pearson, has defined a 
law as " a formula which in a few words resumes a wide 
range of facts. The object served by the discovery of such 
laws is the economy of thought. 

" The law of gravitation is a brief description of how 
every particle of matter in the universe is altering its mo- 
tion with reference to every other particle. It does not 
tell us why particles thus move; it does not tell us 
why the earth describes a certain curve round the sun. 
It simply resumes, in a few brief words, the relation- 
ships observed between a vast range of phenomena. It 
economizes thought by stating in conceptual shorthand that 
routine of our perceptions which forms for us the universe 
of gravitating matter." (Pearson, K. : Grammar of Sci- 
ence, second edition, pp. 77, 78, 99.) 

The law of gravitation in its most general form is thus 



248 OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, ETC. 

formulated: " Every two bodies or portions of matter in 
the universe attract each other with a force proportional 
directly to the quantity of matter they contain, and in- 
versely proportional to the square of their distances." 

Laws differ with respect to the number of facts to 
which they apply. — Some laws enable us to predict the be- 
havior of a large number of objects — this is true of the three 
chemical laws just formulated — others apply only to a nar- 
rowly limited variety of object, as, for example, to the 
human being, the chair, or the stone. A law of habit- 
formation which has been demonstrated to hold for the 
frog is applicable perhaps to millions of objects, for there 
are many objects of this class in the world, but how much 
greater would be its range of application should it be 
demonstrated by observation to hold for all animals. Thus 
we see that the range or inclusiveness of these generaliza- 
tions to which the name law is applied varies greatly. 
I Another type of general statement is called a principle. 
— The scientific principle, apart from the usage of this term 
as synonymous with law, which is common, is a generaliza- 
tion which must prove true if our definition of our object 
is to remain correct. Every science has its fundamental 
and its subordinate principles the modification of which 
occurs only upon the discovery of some serious error of 
generalization. Whereas the law is something which ob- 
servation indicates to be true, and yet which may at any 
moment be proved to be narrowly limited in its application, 
the principle is a generalization which must be true under 
the conditions of observation. This is the usage of the 
word principle advocated by the eminent mathematical 
physicist, Professor Poincare. He writes, " When a law 
has received sufficient confirmation from experiment, we 
may adopt either of two attitudes : either we may leave 
this law in the fray ; it will then remain subjected to an 
incessant revision, which without any doubt will end by 



FACT, LAW, PRINCIPLE 249 

demonstrating that it is only approximative. Or else we 
may elevate it into a principle by adopting conventions such 
that the proposition may be certainly true." (Poincare, 
H.: The Value of Science, p. 124.) 

Definitions of fact, law, and principle. — A fact is a sim- 
ple product of observation. It is the raw material of sci- 
ence. A law is a generalization which is made possible by 
the accumulation and examination of facts in comparison 
with one another. A principle is a generalization which 
according to definition of the objects of observation must 
be true. It can not be overthrown by observation, whereas 
the law may be. Facts are the first fruits of scientific 
research; they are also the last, for this kind of material 
is inexhaustible. But the crowning glory of every science 
is its generalizations. 

Description and generalization naturally proceed side 
by side. — The separation of description and generalization 
in this book is highly artificial and unnatural. We observe 
the particular fact and immediately describe it. Again we 
observe the same kind of fact and describe it. This con- 
tinues without ceasing. But from time to time our par- 
ticular observations are grouped into smaller or larger 
collections for which a single description is formulated. 
Thus description becomes generalization. It might fairly 
be argued that generalization is merely one kind of de- 
scription. This indeed is the conception of the writer. 
Nevertheless, it has seemed best in this book to discuss gen- 
eralization separately even at the risk of giving the im- 
pression that scientific laws are radically different from 
other descriptions. 

The law, as truly as the particular statement of fact, is 
descriptive, for it tells us something about the things which 
we observe or may observe. The chief gain in separating 
description and generalization in psychology at this time 
is the emphasis of the importance of the latter form of 



250 OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, ETC. 

description. Psychology has its facts, it has also its gen- 
eral statements, its laws, and its principles. 

Generalization is common to sciences. — All sciences 
have their general statements, but some either because of 
greater abundance of facts or of highly imaginative investi- 
gators have many more than others. Generalization can 
not profitably outrun observation. We must have the par- 
ticular fact before we can formulate the law descriptive 
of it. 

Psychology and its facts. — To present adequately the 
facts of any highly developed science is a gigantic task. 
They are so numerous and so varied that they demand 
unnumbered words. Thus far this book has been devoted 
chiefly to a general account of the kinds of facts with 
which psychology deals. This account has been brief and 
necessarily incomplete. Now we shall turn to the laws of 
mental life to which the facts of observation have led 
investigators. 

It is rather because of the youth of the science as science 
than because of the character of its materials that psy- 
chology has not accumulated a larger body of generaliza- 
tions and that the text-books do not more frequently con- 
tain the word law. 

Examples of physical and psychological facts. — The 
distinction between facts and generalizations seems clear 
enough as one reads of it, but when one attempts, while 
reading a scientific book, to classify the statements as par- 
ticular facts, laws, and principles, difficulties are likely to 
arise. Perhaps we may avoid some of them by examining 
a few more instances of facts and generalizations in various 
fields of scientific observation. 

I toss a stone into the water and it sinks; I throw a bit 
of wood in and it does not sink. These are physical facts 
which I have observed. The greater part of the time of 
the infant is spent in accumulating just such bits of in- 



PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTS 251 

formation about objects. One never gets all the informa- 
tion that one might have. Some people retain throughout 
life the curiosity which impels them to constant search 
for new facts about things. They are information mad. 
Others, with the maturing of their mental powers and the 
blunting of their interest in the world of facts by the wear- 
ing off of novelty, become more interested in generalizations 
and laws than in particular facts. 

Or, I touch a sensitive plant, a bird, or a child with a 
hot object and each draws away; similarly I touch a 
bar of iron or a log and see no movement. These are 
physiological facts, a particular kind of physical fact 
perhaps. 

Again, I observe that each time I experience a particular 
sensation of sound certain peculiar sensations of shiver 
follow in its train; that whenever I become aware of a 
vivid color sensation there follows some other variety of 
sense quality. 

The stone is a physical object concerning which many 
brute facts are known. It has weight, hardness, friability, 
structure, temperature, and it enters into certain observa- 
ble relations with other objects of observation. 

The same is true of the sensitive plant, or the bird or 
child. Pages might be filled with the description of any 
one of the objects of these classes and these descriptions 
would consist of an enumeration of particular facts of 
observation. 

Precisely the same holds of the sensations of sound, of 
shiver, of color. For we know in the light of our study of 
descriptive psychology that the description of an object 
of consciousness involves the enumeration of all the facts 
which we have been able to discover concerning it. Thus 
the sound sensation is described by statements concerning 
its quality, intensity, duration, extension, clearness, affective 
accompaniments and other relations. 



252 OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, ETC. 

Examples of physical and psychological generaliza- 
tions. — Most of the statements which one reads in scientific 
books are general statements based upon the accumulated 
observations of the science. Were this not the case the 
beginning student would be insufferably bored by details. 
To be sure, it is quite possible to teach science through the 
presentation of particular facts, but it is not always prac- 
ticable. 

In a text-book of physics we read the following : " If you 
take a piece of sealing-wax or of resin, or a glass rod, and 
rub it upon a piece of flannel or silk, it will be found to 
have acquired a property which it did not previously pos- 
sess : namely, the power of attracting to itself such light 
bodies as chaff, or dust, or bits of paper." (Thompson, S. : 
Elementary Lessons in Electricity and Magnetism, p. 3.) 
This at first seems like a set of particular statements, 
but consideration of the meaning of the whole soon con- 
vinces the reader that a number of generalizations are 
implied. First, it would be quite hazardous for any writer 
to state that any one of the three kinds of objects would 
behave thus unless many observations had been made. 
Therefore there is implied the general statement that any 
bit of sealing-wax if rubbed with flannel will attract chaff. 
The same generalization holds of resin and of glass rods. 
Further, there are the generalizations that all pieces of 
flannel and of silk will produce the same effect on sealing- 
wax, resin, and glass rods. Thus the apparently simple 
physical statement turns out to rest upon a number of 
simple generalizations. 

In a psychological text (AngelPs " Psychology," p. 234) 
we read ' ' When memory begins to decay under the advance 
of age there is a remarkable uniformity in the order in 
which certain kinds of knowledge disappear, . . . Thus, 
the memory of proper names is among the earliest of the 
losses, and the more concrete are our ideas, the earlier do 



GENERALIZATIONS 253 

we lose the memory of the words for them." These are 
general statements, for they are based not on a particular 
observation but on a number of observations in which a 
certain uniformity has been noted. The particular form 
of the first statement would be that John Doe in his old 
age lost first his power to recall proper names, etc. It 
would be highly unscientific to state upon the basis of this 
single observation that the same holds true for all human 
beings whose memory disintegrates. 

Books are full of generalizations. — The really thorough- 
going scientist never loses his tendency to question a gen- 
eralization. Indeed, he may always feel certain that fur- 
ther study, as Poincare points out, will lead to some modi- 
fication of the generalization. We never know all of the facts 
and therefore our laws can not be complete or wholly true. 

There is nothing much more illuminating in this con- 
nection than to go over a few paragraphs of some scientific 
book carefully and critically in order to pick out the par- 
ticular statements and the general statements, the laws and 
the principles. If it be done with this book, it will doubt- 
less be found to consist chiefly of statements which must 
be classed as generalizations. The text-book writer, to save 
space and the time of his readers, must take grave responsi- 
bilities in formulating generalizations. Often he would 
greatly prefer to offer the particular facts. 

An imaginary psychological law. — Let us suppose that 
an observer notices the fact that as his finger touches a 
toothed wheel which is just beginning to revolve he experi- 
ences separate sensations of touch or pressure similar in 
quality and intensity and that he notes also an increase 
in the rate or frequency of these sensations as the speed 
of the wheel is increased. Thirdly, he observes that after 
a certain speed has been attained the sensations are no 
longer separate and distinguishable but instead run to- 
gether or fuse into a continuous contact sensation. It feels 



254 OBSERVATIONS, GENERALIZATIONS, ETC. 

as though the wheel were smooth instead of toothed. Let us 
suppose that this series of simple psychological observa- 
tions causes the observer to remember also that when flashes 
of light come very frequently they yield, instead of sep- 
arate sensations of light, a continuous sensation ; that when 
clicks or other noises follow one another with a frequency 
greater than twenty to thirty a second, they are heard as 
a continuous sound instead of as separate noises. And let 
us further suppose that these facts set him wondering as 
to what general description will so accurately describe these 
and similar facts of the fusion of sensations that, given the 
conditions of observation, one might predict when fusion 
will occur. 

Our scientist might first of all imagine that the follow- 
ing law would hold. When the stimuli are presented at 
a rate which is higher than that demanded for the covering 
of the life span of the sensation fusion occurs. Supposing 
that a certain quality and intensity of tactual sensation 
requires one-thousandth of a second to develop and wane, 
then the presentation of tactual stimuli more frequently 
than a thousand per stcond would result in the experience 
of a continuous pressure. And supposing that the total 
duration of a particular quality and intensity of auditory 
sensation is one twenty-fifth of a second, then the pre- 
sentation of clicks, for example, at this rate or higher 
would result in a continuous sound. The same would hold 
of all modes of sense. This, we say, is possibly a valid 
law. It would remain for the observer who in imagination 
had formulated such a law, to proceed to test it by the 
rigorous observation of facts. Finding that it did not at 
all fit the facts, he would of course have to turn to another 
formula. As a rule the result of such a procedure as we 
are imagining is that the formulation proves to be neither 
wholly right nor wrong, but instead needs to be corrected 
or modified in accordance with the facts. This the ob- 



FORMULATION OF LAWS 255 

server does and thereupon presents to science a more or less 
exact and reliable generalization. 

Laws may be formulated either prior to observation or 
cm the basis thereof. — All investigators of insight and 
energy are constantly formulating statements which they 
imagine to describe correctly a group of facts. They then, 
if they are honest workers, set about making the observa- 
tions which shall prove or disprove the validity of the 
formulae. This method is perfectly proper and very valua- 
ble in practice. There are many scientists, however, who 
never discover a law unless they have the observed facts 
before them as an aid to their imaginations. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. The facts of color mixture and generaliza- 
tions (laws) therefrom. Materials: a color mixer (simple 
electrical mixers may be obtained) ; discs of red, yellow, green, 
blue, black, and white papers cut to fit the mixer and slit along 
a radius. 

With the members of the class so placed that each can see 
clearly the colored disc, the instructor should make a series of 
experiments to demonstrate some of the laws of color mixture. 

1. Combine in equal proportions (a) red and white, (b) yel- 
low and white, (c) green and white, (d) blue and white. In 
each case the student should record his observation concerning 
the results of the mixture (introspective description). Sum- 
marize all of the particular observations in a general statement, 
generalization, or law of color mixture. 

2. Combine similarly in equal proportions each color, in turn, 
with black. Describe the results and formulate a generalization. 

3. Combine each color in equal proportions with each of the 
others: thus, red with yellow, with green, with blue; yellow with 
green, with blue; green with blue. Describe the results of the 
mixtures and formulate a general statement which shall present 
the essential characteristics in the several results. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Poincaee, H. : The value of science; also Science and hypothesis. 

Pearson, K. : Grammar of science, chapter 3. 

Baldwin, J. M. : Dictionary of philosophy and psychology, " Law." 



CHAPTER XX 

LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

" In our normal waking life every conscious process, of whatever 
grade, may be said to be supported by sensory stimuli; that is, our 
consciousness accompanies central nervous processes that depend upon 
the current stimulation of sense organs. . . . The most absorbed 
meditation is affected by the sensory stimuli that we are receiving. 
This is shown by our well-known preference for certain places, 
surroundings, or objects, as aids to our meditations. One carries on 
a meditation of a given type best in his study, or again best in 
church, or again by preference during a walk in the fields. At such 
times one may not be at all directly conscious of how one's inner 
process is related to the sensory stimuli. Thus, in the fields, one may 
suppose that one is entirely oblivious of the natural facts about one, 
just because one is absorbed in some train of thought that bears on 
a scientific topic, or on a personal and practical problem. But none 
the less, the external objects are all the time sending in their sen- 
sory disturbances. These maintain certain current conditions of the 
brain. Were these conditions to change, the train of thought would 
change. And even where the connection between surrounding objects 
and the train of thought pursued is by no means one of which we are 
definitely conscious, the just mentioned preference for one sort of 
surrounding as against another, as the place for a given kind of medi- 
tation, illustrates how important this relation may be." — Royce, 
Josiah: Outlines of psychology, pp. 123, 124. 

Typical laws of sensibility. — Since it is quite impossi- 
ble, within the compass of a brief text-book, to enumerate 
all of the generalizations of the science, only a few typical 
or representative laws will be presented. From these it is 
hoped the student may gain a clear notion of the meaning 
of generalization as well as of the character of the laws of 
mental life. The laws mentioned are not necessarily the 
most important, nor are they those which are best estab- 
lished by observation, for in some instances the writer has 
purposely chosen to cite generalizations which evidently 

256 



PSYCHO-PHYSICAL LAWS 257 

demand further verification before they may be safely ac- 
cepted. The reader will inevitably notice that the state- 
ments which in this portion of the book are set forth as 
generalizations or laws are in all respects like many of the 
statements of the earlier parts of the book, and in so doing 
he will have observed correctly, for it is true that this part 
of the book is intended simply as a special examination of 
the laws of psychology. 

The generalizations of psychology are not always 
strictly psychological. — There are many so-called psycho- 
logical generalizations which express certain observed uni- 
formities or correlations between physical and mental 
events. These should be called psycho-physical laws or 
generalizations. No attempt has been made in this book 
to exclude generalizations which are not strictly psycho- 
logical, but wherever such a statement is made attention 
has been called to its partial psychological nature. This 
will enable the student to avoid confusion of the two points 
of view and to learn how to distinguish the physical from 
the psychical. Doubtless the psycho-physical laws are 
quite as important as the psychological and as deserving 
of our attention. 

The laws of sensation may be arranged with respect 
to the properties of sensation. — As will become apparent 
in the course of this chapter, there are certain generaliza- 
tions which refer particularly to the quality of sensation, 
others to intensity, others to duration, others to extensity, 
and still others to clearness and to affective accompani- 
ments. Although the procedure is highly artificial and in 
some respects apt to prove misleading to the thoughtless 
or casual reader, it has seemed desirable to arrange the laws 
of this chapter under the general headings of the properties 
of sensation. We shall therefore consider in turn the laws, 
or rather some of the laws, of each of the common prop- 
erties of sensation. 



258 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE QUALITY OP SENSATIONS 

From the earlier chapters on sensation many general- 
izations may be selected which would seem worthy of 
the name laws. — It is, for example, a law that every sensa- 
tion possesses quality, intensity, etc. Additional laws con- 
cern the way in which the particular or individual prop- 
erties of a sensation vary with variation in the common 
properties. There is almost unlimited opportunity for 
research in this field and it would be idle to attempt to 
formulate the laws here. Oddly enough we know much 
more about the laws of the relations of sensations than 
about their peculiarities in isolation. This is due doubt- 
less to the fact that in experience they exist as a rule only 
in intimate relation to one another. 

Law of the qualitative relation of sensations. — When 
two sensations appear in consciousness at the same time 
or in quick succession they may enter into any one of 
several relations to one another. This is commonly ex- 
pressed by the statement that sensations combine in dif- 
ferent ways. There are four important varieties of com- 
bination : 

(1) Simple combination 

(2) Partial fusion 

(3) Complete fusion 

(4) Inhibition 

These four possibilities may be stated thus simply. The 
two sensations may exist side by side without modifying 
one another with respect to quality. They may partly fuse 
or run together, so that although neither is quite itself 
both can be identified by introspection as parts of the com- 
bination. They may fuse completely so that neither is 
identifiable, and this fusing may result in a sensation whose 
quality is entirely different from that of either of the 
original sensations. The one may destroy the other, or 



LAWS OF VISION 259 

they may mutually destroy one another so that nothing 
remains. 

In each of the modes of sense, and from mode to mode, 
we discover illustrations of these varieties of relation. We 
may examine a few of the special laws expressive thereof. 



Separate Partial Complete 

Sensations Fusion Fusion 

Fig. 6. Representing the isolation, partial, and complete fusion of 

sensations. 

Laws of the relations of visual sensations. — (1) Law 
of relation of color to light sensations. Every color sensa- 
tion is accompanied by a light sensation. Illustration: As 
the intensity of a green sensation is diminished, a point is 
finally reached at which the color experience disappears 
while the sensation of light continues to exist. 

(2) Law of complementary colors. For every color sen- 
sation there exists another which if combined with it in the 
proper proportions will result in a sensation of colorless 
light. Illustrations: Red and green, properly combined, 
yield the experience of gray. The same is true of yellow 
and blue. This evidently is a case of complete fusion. 

(3) Law of partial color fusion. When two colors which 
are not complementaries are combined a new color quality 
is experienced. This new quality stands between the orig- 
inal colors in the spectral series and its position with 
respect to them is determined by their relative intensities 
and degrees of saturation. Illustration: When a green 
sensation is combined with a blue the quality known as 



260 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

greenish-blue or blue-green may result. It is possible by 
combining two or more color qualities to match any color 
sensation which we experience. 

(4) Every visual sensation affects other simultaneously 
occurring visual sensations according to the laws of con- 
trast. Illustration : A black spot looks blacker because of 
the simultaneous appearance of a white spot. 

(5) The contrast effect produced by two visual sensations 
is always in the direction of greatest qualitative opposition. 
Illustration : White and black being extreme opposites, a 
white background always increases the apparent blackness 
of a dark object upon it. Red and green being opposites 
(antagonists or complementaries), a green background al- 
ways causes objects upon it to appear reddish, and a red 
background likewise causes objects to appear greenish. 

(6) The more saturated the inducing color (the back- 
ground or predominating color), the greater the contrast 
effect. Illustration: The more saturated the green back- 
ground the redder appears the object upon it. 

(7) The nearer together the contrasting surfaces, the 
greater the contrast effect. Illustration: When the black 
spot lies directly upon the white background it appears 
blacker than it does when it is raised above the white sur- 
face. 

(8) Color contrast is at its maximum when contrast 
of light is absent. Illustration : If upon a green background 
a patch of gray paper of the same lightness as the green 
be placed, the gray will appear more markedly reddish 
(the contrast color induced by green) than it would if the 
green and the gray differed in lightness. 

(9) Contrast effects are increased by the hiding of con- 
tours. Illustration: The more clearly defined the outlines 
of an object upon a background the less the color or light 
contrast effect. It is for this reason that in demonstrating 
contrast effects of color, a sheet of tissue paper is usually 



LAWS OF SMELL 261 

placed over the object and its background so that the out- 
lines are obscured. 

These are fair samples of the many laws of visual sensa- 
tion which might, if space permitted, be presented at this 
time. 

Laws of the relations of olfactory sensations. — The 
laws according to which odors combine with one another 
are very imperfectly known as compared with those of 
vision and they are mentioned merely in order to give 
the student a true estimate of the progress which psy- 
chology has made in the task of generalizing. If vision 
alone were mentioned his estimate would be exaggerated. 
If smell alone were mentioned, it would be too small. 

(1) Odors combine in each of the four ways mentioned 
at the beginning of this discussion : by simple combina- 
tion, by partial fusion, by complete fusion, and by in- 
hibition. 

(2) Law of partial fusion. For every odor sensation 
there are others which when combined with it in certain 
intensities give rise to a sensation in which both of the 
original components are distinguishable. Illustration: 
Iodine and camphor thus mix after the manner of partial 
fusion, and so do camphor and laudanum. 

(3) Law of complete fusion. For every odor sensation 
there appears to be another or others which when com- 
bined with it in the proper proportions gives rise to a new 
quality of sensation in which neither of the original odors 
is detectable. Such odors may appropriately be termed 
complementaries or antagonists, for like the complementary 
colors they destroy one another and give origin to a new 
quality of sensation. Illustration : The odors of cedarwood 
and India rubber, or of beeswax and India rubber, under 
certain conditions antagonize one another. 

(4) Law of olfactory contrast. When simultaneously 
or successively presented, an odor sensation modifies by con- 



262 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

trast the quality of certain other sensations. The laws of 
odor contrast effects are too imperfectly known to justify 
an attempt at formulation. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE INTENSITY OF SENSATIONS 

Law of the range of intensity. — Every quality ranges 
between two extremes. The minimal intensity is called 
the threshold sensation, and the maximal intensity is called 
the maximal sensation. Illustration : Beginning with a 
light sensation which is just perceivable, it is possible to 
pass by steps to an intensity of light which can not be 
exceeded. Likewise in the case of an odor or a sound, 
below a certain limit the stimulus has no corresponding 
sensation, and above a certain limit there is no observable 
increase in the intensity of the sensation. 

Law of the just perceivable difference in sensations. — 
For every sensation (except the threshold and the max- 
imal), of whatever mode, there is a sensation intensity 
which is just perceivably less and one which is just per- 
ceivably greater. Whether these two steps, the one down- 
ward in the scale of intensity and the other upward, are 
equal is an important problem for psychology to solve. 
If they can be proved to be so, a simple method of measur- 
ing the value of a sensation in terms of units of intensity 
will have been discovered. Illustration : Given a certain 
sensation of light which is midway between the threshold 
and the maximum, there is another intensity of the same 
quality which can be said to be just weaker than the first 
and another which can similarly be said to be just stronger. 

The Weber-Fechner law of the relation of stimulus to 
intensity of sensation. — In order that a stimulus shall be 
rendered just noticeably stronger it must be increased by 
a certain constant fraction of itself. For example, a weight 
of one ounce upon the hand feels lighter than one of one 



LAWS OF INTENSITY 263 

and a tenth ounces, whereas all the variations between an 
ounce and one and a tenth feel the same as one ounce. 
Similarly a weight of ten ounces feels just noticeably lighter 
than one weighing eleven ounces. The stimulus must, in 
the case of passive touch or pressure, be increased or dimin- 
ished by one-tenth of itself in order that it shall seem dif- 
ferent. 

This is obviously a psycho-physical law, for it expresses 
a uniformity of relation observed to exist between stimulus 
and sensation. 

Law of summation of sensations. — Under certain condi- 
tions two sensations of the same quality appearing in con- 
sciousness either together or successively sum up and yield 
an intensity which is greater than that of either alone. Il- 
lustration : With repetition a sensation of cold which is at 
first agreeable becomes painfully intense. Two touch sensa- 
tions from adjacent points on the skin may fuse into one 
which is more intense than either. 

Law of inhibition. — Again, under certain conditions, a 
sensation may either partially or completely destroy an- 
other's intensity without noticeably altering the quality or 
qualities. Illustration : A sensation of color may diminish 
the intensity of a simultaneously occurring sensation of 
cutaneous pain. 

Law of adaptation. — If a stimulus be long continued or 
often repeated in a brief interval, its accompanying sensa- 
tion tends to diminish in intensity and change in quality. 
Illustration : If the hand be plunged into a pitcher of water 
which is almost unbearably hot the sensation of temperature 
will be very intense. If thence it be transferred to a vessel 
of warm water, it may seem even cool. The skin rapidly 
becomes adapted, the psychologist tells us, to the condition 
of stimulation. Under a constant condition of stimulation, 
the intensity, clearness, and quality of a sensation is likely 
to change gradually or suddenly. It is adaptation which 



264 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

exhibits itself when in a room filled with a vile odor we 
rapidly become accustomed to it. The sensation loses in- 
tensity and becomes almost unrecognizable. As we become 
adapted to a colored light the intensity and quality of the 
sensation change. 

Adaptation appears in all of the senses. It is a pro- 
vision against the perseverance in consciousness of a given 
sensation. According to this law there may be rapid change 
even when conditions of stimulation are fairly constant. In 
smell and taste adaptation is quite as evident as in touch 
and temperature and vision. It is closely related to fatigue 
and exhaustion as is proved by the fact that we may become 
adapted, fatigued, or exhausted for one odor and still smell 
others strongly. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE DURATION OP SENSATIONS 

Law of latent period.— ^-For each mode of sensation there 
is a specific interval termed the latent period, during which 
the sensation matures or develops from its minimal to its 
greatest intensity. Illustration : Pain sensations are said 
to arise or develop mu-m less rapidly than do touch sensa- 
tions. This is readily observable in the case of the human 
skin. 

Law of the relation of latent period to strength of 
stimulus.— L It appears that the duration of the latent period 
is inversely proportional to the intensity of the stimulus. 
The stronger the stimulus, within limits, the sooner the 
sensation reaches its greatest intensity.* 

This generalization demands further verification. 

Law of after-images. — Under certain conditions, a sen- 
sation is uniformly followed by an after sensation which 
bears a definite qualitative and intensive relation to the 
original sensation. After-images occur strikingly in vision, 
hearing, touch, temperature, pain, and some other sense 
modes. There are two kinds of visual after-images: the 



LAWS OF DURATION 265 

positive and the negative. The positive after-image closely 
resembles the original sensation in quality and intensity; 
the negative presents the conditions of light reversed as 
in a photographic negative. Illustration : To observe a 
positive after-image look steadily at a gas flame for a few 
seconds, then turn it off quickly. The flame and burner 
may for an instant be seen as a positive after-image. To 
observe negative after-images gaze out of a bright window 
steadily for a few seconds and then suddenly turn the 
gaze upon a uniformly and not too brightly illuminated 
wall. The window will appear as an after-image with its 
light parts dark and its dark parts light. 

Professor Titchener thus formulates the laws of negative 
after-images : 

( 1 ) The color or brightness of the images is always antag- 
onistic to the color or brightness of the stimulus (original 
sensation). Illustration: A red spot is followed by an 
after-image of green. 

(2) A contrast color in the stimulus is effective in the 
after-image. Illustration : Suppose that a gray patch upon 
a red background has been viewed, then the negative after- 
image should show the spot as reddish instead of as 
greenish as it appeared in contrast and the background 
as green. 

(3) The interaction and reciprocal influence of differ- 
ently stimulated parts of the retina persist in the after- 
image. 

(4) The after-image is intermittent or periodic, not con- 
tinuous. 

(5) The intensity and duration of the after-image are 
a function of the intensity (relative and absolute) and 
duration of the stimulus, and of the intensity of the react- 
ing light. 

It would be easy to multiply generalizations regarding 
after-images in the various modes of sense. They are 



266 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

important features of the mental life of all of us and in 
some instances they become strikingly interesting on ac- 
count of their variety and frequency. 

The after-images of touch, pressure, and pain are fairly 
easy to observe. The distinct after-throbs of touch, cold, 
warmth, and pain should be observed by every one. The 
study of after-images constitutes an easy and interesting 
approach to psychology, and it furnishes splendid oppor- 
tunities for practice in self-observation. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE EXTENSITY OP SENSA- 
TIONS 

The law of extensity of tone. — It would appear that the 
extensity of a tone is inversely proportional co its pitch. 
Illustration : As we proceed from low tones to high tones, 
we note a diminution in the voluminousness of the sounds. 
This law demands further observation. 

Law of the localization of sensations. — Every sensation 
is referred more or less definitely to a particular portion 
of the body, or to an external object. Every cutaneous sen- 
sation, for example, has as one of its particular properties, 
a local sign by which it is distinguishable from other touch 
sensations. 

Law of accuracy of localization and fineness of dis- 
crimination. — The more frequently a given sensation has 
been experienced with its appropriate local sign the more 
accurately it can be located by the observer and the more 
definitely it can be distinguished from sensations arising 
from surrounding parts of the skin. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE CLEARNESS OP SENSA- 
TIONS 

Law of the relation of clearness to sensation. — Clear- 
ness is an essential attribute of sensation. It varies in 
degree, as does intensity, but it is never lacking. 



LAWS OF CLEARNESS 267 

Law of the relation of clearness to intensity. — Other 
conditions remaining constant, the more intense a sensation 
the clearer it is likely to be. Clearness, however, depends 
upon other factors than stimulus strength, which is the 
prime condition of intensity, and it is frequently noted that 
a weak sensation is clear, whereas a strong one is unclear. 

Law of the relation of clearness to introspection. — 
The harder one tries to observe a sensation the clearer it 
tends to become. 

Law of the relation of clearness to quality. — New, 
novel, or unusual qualities of sensation tend to be clearer 
than those with which we are perfectly familiar. 

Law of the relation of clearness to affective tone. — 
The stronger the affective accompaniment of a sensation 
the clearer it is likely to be. 

Law of the relation of clearness to attention. — That 
which is clear is attended. To attend to a sensation means 
simply to experience it clearly. Were we able to state 
accurately the several factors which determine the clear- 
ness of a sensation we should be able also to describe those 
conditions which favor attention. In other words, the 
laws of clearness are in part identical with the laws of 
attention. 

The importance of clearness. — The memory value of a 
sensation seems to depend largely, if not chiefly, upon its 
degree of clearness. That which we do not clearly experi- 
ence we do not readily or accurately recall for introspective 
examination. It would seem, therefore, that those condi- 
tions of consciousness which favor sensory clearness are 
favorable also to the subsequent recall of experiences. 

.GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING THE AFFECTIVE ACCOMPANI- 
MENTS OF SENSATIONS 

Law of the relation of affections to sensations. — Every 
sensation is accompanied by an affection (sense-feeling, 



268 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

as Professor Wunclt calls it). This statement is not gen- 
erally accepted by psychologists, and it should be carefully 
tested by observation. 

Law of relation of affection to intensity of sensation. — 
Change in the intensity of sensation from the threshold to 
the maximum is usually accompanied by a two-fold change 
in the sense-feelings : a change in intensity and a change 
in quality from agreeable to disagreeable. There are in- 
stances in which the change in quality does not occur, but 
it is the usual thing. 

As a sensation of sweet or of warmth is steadily in- 
creased from the threshold intensity, it " feels " first pleas- 
ant with gradually increasing intensity, but beyond a cer- 
tain point, without change in the quality of the sensation, 
the affection becomes unpleasant. 

Law of the relation of affective sense accompaniments 
to bodily condition. — Sensations which accompany bodily 
processes which are favorable to the life of the individual 
usually possess pleasant affections; those which accompany 
bodily processes which are unfavorable usually possess un- 
pleasant affections. 

A LIST OP THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF SENSIBILITY 

As a summary and review of the chapter there is offered 
below a list of the chief generalizations concerning sensory 
consciousness. 

1. Laiv of threshold. — For every quality of sensation 
there is a minimal or threshold intensity at which the 
quality is just recognizable. This is commonly called the 
threshold sensation. 

2. Laiv of maximal sensation. — -For every quality of sen- 
sation there is an intensity beyond which the quality of 
the sensation no longer remains constant, even if it con- 
tinues to exist. This is the maximal sensation. 



LAWS OF SENSIBILITY 269 

3. Law of just perceivable difference in sensations. — The 
sensations of a given quality may be arranged in series 
in such wise that each differs from the next by precisely 
that amount which is necessary in order that they be intro- 
spectively distinguishable. 

4. Law of adaptation. — Even with the stimulus for a 
sensation remaining constant, it tends upon repeated ap- 
pearance in consciousness to change in both quality and 
intensity. 

5. Law of exhaustion. — Under definitely describable con- 
ditions a sensation ceases to reappear in consciousness after 
a certain number of repetitions. 

6. Law of contrast. — When two sensations of different 
quality, or of different intensity, either simultaneously or 
successively appear in consciousness they tend mutually 
to modify one another according to certain laws, the most 
important of which is that each tends to render the other 
the opposite of itself. 

7. Law of mixture. — Under certain conditions, when 
two sensations appear in consciousness either together or 
successively they run together so that each loses its identity 
and a third sensation appears in which each of the originals 
is recognizable. 

8. Law of fusion. — Under certain conditions, two sen- 
sations completely fuse so that they are themselves lost 
and give rise to an entirely new sense quality. 

9. Law of inhibition. — Under certain conditions, when 
two sensations together compete for introspective presenta- 
tion, the one completely destroys the other, or each has 
an inhibitory effect upon the other. 

10. Law of latent period. — Every sensation during a cer- 
tain interval waxes in intensity. 

11. Laiv of life-span. — Every sensation has a definite 
period of life. It rises to its maximum intensity and 
then wanes. This period with its three parts — waxing, 



270 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

crest, and waning — may best be represented by a curve. 
(Fig. 6, p. 259.) 

12. Law of summation. — Under certain conditions, if a 
sensation be repeated frequently, the repetitions sum up so 
that a sensation of greater intensity results. 

13. Law of positive after-image. — A sensation may be 
followed in consciousness by a more or less dim repetition 
of itself, a sort of shadow sensation, which is known as its 
positive after-image. 

14. Law of negative after-image. — Under certain con- 
ditions, a sensation is uniformly followed by a sensation 
of the opposite quality, intensity, or both. 

15. Law of local sign. — Every sensation possesses definite 
relations to other sensations which are known as its local 
signature. 

Each of these classes of laws has many special formu- 
lations and for each sense mode there are special laws. 
Each law leads beyond itself by suggesting other general- 
izations which are demanded if the law is to be rendered 
of its highest service to man as a means of predicting 
events. 

PERCEPTION 

Sensations carry meaning. — As they exist in concrete 
experiences sensations are so related to one another, to af- 
fections, to images, and to ideas that they become the 
bearers of meaning. We speak, therefore, not of our sen- 
sations of space or of objects, but of our perceptions. The 
laws of perception might appropriately be considered under 
the general topic sensibility were it not for the fact that 
affections and images are as important constituents of many 
perceptions as are sensations. 



DOUBLE PERCEPTION 271 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING PERCEPTION 

Law of perception. — Simultaneously presented sensa- 
tions, affections, and images tend to become welded into 
an apparently single unitary consciousness. Illustration : 
I am experiencing the sensations of light, color, cold, pres- 
sure, odor, and taste from an apple, together with a certain 
agreeableness which accompanies the flavor, a certain dis- 




Fig. 7. Double perception. 

agreeableness which accompanies the coolness, and images 
of more or less similar sensations, and possibly also of 
feelings, which have previously been experienced. But all 
of these elements of my consciousness are so closely related 
that only persistent attempts at analysis enable me to tease 
them out of the perception. I simply am conscious of the 
apple. I do more than " sense it," more than " feel " thus 
and so toward it, more than imagine it, for my perception 
is made up of sensations, affections, and images. 

Law of least resistance. — We tend strongly to group 
mental elements and so to supplement them by images as 
to get perceptions which we have previously experienced. 
Less technically stated, we are likely to see things as ive 
have seen them. Illustration: Fig. 7 may be perceived 
in at least two ways, which one of the two objects one 
sees depends upon the point of fixation. If one at first 
perceives a duck's head the chances are that it will dom- 
inate. Every time the figure is presented the duck's head 



272 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 

consciousness will appear. If, on the other hand, it is first 
perceived as a rabbit's head, that particular way of seeing 
the figure will tend to persist. 

The drawing of Fig. 8 may be perceived in several 
ways. It is easy enough to discover that one continues to 
see it as a set of steps if one saw it thus at first. 




Fig. 8. Multiple perception. 



In this phenomenon of the recurrence of a perceptual 
experience, under conditions which give other persons 
strikingly different perceptions, we have a particular ex- 
pression of the general principle of habit. 

Law of perceptual supplementation. — Perceptions 
grow. With each repetition of a perceptual experience 
new elements are added. Illustration : Thus the protozoan 
which as I first viewed it with the aid of a microscope was 
perceived as a jelly-drop moving about and changing shape, 
acquires new features of structure each time I look at it. 
The longer, the oftener, the more carefully we examine an 
object the more complicated our perceptual consciousness 
of it becomes. 



LAWS OF PERCEPTION 



273 



This process of supplementation is due quite as much to 
the appearance of new feelings and images as it is to new 
sensations. 

To learn to observe means, first of all, to acquire the 
ability to observe and re-observe until finally one's per- 
ception is rich in detail, accurate, and clear. The sci- 
entifically trained person sees more in an object, sees it 
more accurately, and is capable of describing it from mem- 
ory more satisfactorily than the average observer because 
he has acquired the habit of persistent attention. He per- 
ceives and re-perceives, and with each detail added to the 
perception his chances of discovering something new are 
bettered, for the more one sees the more one is likely to 
see. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of the phenomena of visual 
contrast and the formulation of generalizations or laws. Mate- 
rials : Sheets 18 x 18 inches of white, gray, black, red, orange, 
yellow, green, blue, and violet papers ; strips 18 x Vz inches of 
white, gray, and black papers ; sheets 18 x IS inches of thin 
tissue paper. 

In turn, with intervals between for the writing of accurate 
accounts of the introspections, the instructor should exhibit to 
the class the following combinations of papers: 















First 


Second 














Without 


Covered with 


I. 


(a) 
(b) 
(c) 


White 

Gray 

Black 


strip 


on black 

tt a 
it tt 


>aper 

a 


tissue paper 

a 


tissue paper 
it 


II. 


(a) 


Black 


" 


" white 


a 


tt 


a 




(b) 

(c) 


Gray 
White 


« 


a a 


a 
a 


tt 
it 


tt 
it 


III. 


(a) 


Gray 


a 


" red 


a 


tt 


tt 




(b) 
(e) 
(d) 

(e) 


ti 


« 


" orange 
" yellow 
" green 
" blue 


ti 
tt 

a 


it 
it 
it 
tt 


tt 
tt 

tt 
it 




(f) 


" 


t( 


" violet 


it 


ti 


tt 



274 LAWS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION 



SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 10-59, 62-67. 
Titchener, E. B.; Experimental psychology, vol. 1, part 1. 
Stout, G. F. : Manual of psychology, chapter 2. 

Holt, E. B. and Yerkes, R. M. : An experimental study of sensation. 
(Harvard Cooperative Society, Cambridge.) 



CHAPTER XXI 

LAWS OF AFFECTION 

" An emotional mood, whatever may be its primary origin, tends 
to persist when once it is aroused, and to fasten upon any object 
which presents itself. Ill-temper or gloomy depression or hilarity 
may originate in the first instance in the use of drugs; but when 
these moods are once in existence they create objects for themselves. 
A man who gets up in the morning in a bad temper, due to want 
of sleep or similar causes, is apt to be irritated by almost everything 
that occurs; though in another mood the same incidents would be 
received with complacency. The cook angered by her mistress will 
box the ears of the scullion; a herd of cattle, enraged by the sight of 
a comrade in distress, will vent their fury on their unfortunate com- 
panion; the reason being simply that he is the only object on which 
their attention is fixed. Their excitement must find an outlet; and 
in the absence of any other definite channel for it, it discharges itself 
on the injured animal." — Stout, G. F.: Manual of psychology, p. 129. 

A few facts and generalizations concerning affection. — 

The psychology of the affective aspect of consciousness — 
of our feelings, emotions, and sentiments — is less advanced 
along strictly scientific lines than is that of sensation, per- 
ception, ideation, and the various aspects of cognitive con- 
sciousness. There is a dearth of well-observed facts and 
a like dearth of generalizations. 

The laws of affection are not less important than those 
of sensation. — It must not be supposed that scientists have 
consciously chosen to study sensation rather than affection 
because they considered it of greater practical or theoretical 
importance. This certainly is not the case, for there is no 
aspect of our mental lives which is more interesting or of 
more obvious importance scientifically than affection and 
its complexes. The truth is that choice of a field of re- 
search is influenced more largely by the ease and certainty 

275 



276 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

with which facts may be observed than by a consideration 
of relative values. Affection happens to be difficult to study 
with scientific accuracy. Nevertheless, during the past few 
years, master psychologists have begun to concentrate at- 
tention upon its problems and there is promise of a steady 
increase in our knowledge of the facts and laws in this 
field of research. 

Even the lack of words for affective experiences may 
not be accepted as evidence of their slight importance. For 
it is just because these experiences can not ordinarily be 
referred to the physical world that we do not name them. 
We describe objects in cognitive terms, not in affective 
terms: it is only the exceptional observer who feels the 
need of a richer language for the description of affective 
elements and complexes in consciousness. 

Varieties of affective experience. — Our affective experi- 
ences are of four types: (1) affective elements of conscious- 
ness, (2) feelings, (3) emotions, (4) sentiments. For each 
of these varieties of affection we shall seek generalizations, 
laws, principles. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING AFFECTIVE ELEMENTS OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 

Law of properties of affection. — There are four proper- 
ties common to all affective elements: quality, intensity, 
duration, and clearness. 

Law of the relation of affection to bodily organs. — 
Affections are not definitely referred to particular bodily 
organs as are sensations, but they are, instead, referred to 
the body as a whole. A corollary of this law is the gen- 
eralization that affections differ from sensations in that 
they lack " local sign." 

Law of relation of affection to bodily processes. — 
Pleasant feelings are accompaniments of normal healthy 



AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 277 

constructive physiological processes — the upbuilding of the 
body. 

Unpleasant feelings as a rule accompany katabolic or 
destructive physiological processes — the wasting of the 
body. 

Professor Titchener's law of the relation of affection to 
attention.—" Sensations become clearer as they are ob- 
served; affections become less clear. The more closely we 
attend to a sensation, the clearer does it become, and the 
longer and more accurately do we remember it. We can 
not attend to an affection at all. If we attempt to do so, 
the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us and 
disappears, and we find ourselves attending to some ob- 
structive sensation or idea which we had no desire to 
observe. If we wish to get pleasure from a picture, we 
must attend to the picture: if, with our eyes on it, we try 
to attend to our feelings, the pleasantness of the experi- 
ence is gone." (Outline of Psychology, p. 108.) 

This is an admirable generalization for examination in- 
trospect! vely. Every reader should attempt to test the 
validity of the law. Is it true that we can not attend to af- 
fections? Do they differ from sensations as the law claims 
that they do? Does the affective element prove more 
difficult of introspective examination than the sensation, 
and does it have to be observed differently? These ques- 
tions we may profitably put to the test of observation. 
The primary question is, What are the facts ? 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING PEELINGS 

Feelings, it is to be remembered, are complexes of af- 
fective elements, sensations, and images. 

Law of the relation of feeling quality to action. — 
Agreeable feelings are accompaniments of mutually 
harmonious and relatively unimpeded activities. Disagree- 



278 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

able feelings are accompaniments of mutually inharmoni- 
ous and impeded activities. The one accompanies harmony, 
the other conflict, in actions. This generalization is thus 
illustrated by Professor Judd: 

" Take the case of a person who is trying to read and 
hears continually sounding in his ears a noise calling him 
away from his book. The tendency to respond to the visual 
stimulations, as exhibited in the active fixing of the eyes 
on the printed page, is in conflict with the tendency to 
answer the noise, and the person is conscious of a conflict 
in his experience. The conflict may be analyzed and may 
be made the subject of knowledge and thought, but quite 
apart from this analysis and thought about the conflict of 
tendencies, there is in experience a disagreeable feeling 
which is the conscious result of the conflict. The feeling 
is not a content factor, as are the noise and the printed 
words ; it is rather the experience of restless wavering be- 
tween contents. It is the characteristic consciousness of 
inability to settle down to one kind of attention; it is an 
attitude of effort to secure an adjustment which seems to 
be just beyond reach. 

" Contrast with this feeling of conflict and unpleasant- 
ness, the attitude of another person with entirely different' 
active tendencies in the presence of the same noise. Let 
us suppose that this second person is actively engaged in 
making all the noise he can. He will welcome the support 
which comes to his plans and experience from the dis- 
turbance that was so unpleasant to the reader. The experi- 
ence of satisfaction in the second person can not be ex- 
plained, any more than could the experience of dissatis- 
faction in the first person, by the quality or intensity of 
the noise. In both cases, it is a matter of personal atti- 
tudes. The whole trend of activity in the noisy individual 
is congenial to the further reception of sound impressions. 
The more sounds there are the more easily the response 



LAWS OF FEELING 279 

which he is making can be continued and increased." 
( Judd, C. H. : Psychology, p. 197.) 

Law of the relation of intensity of feeling to activity. — 
The more intense a feeling, beyond a certain point, the less 
adaptive, serviceable, satisfactory are the reactions of the 
individual. We behave normally only under conditions 
of moderately vivid or intense feeling. Persons whose af- 
fective experiences are stronger than their sensory experi- 
ences are less able to adjust themselves to new situations 
than are those whose feelings are less influential. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCES 
FORMULATED BY PROFESSOR WUNDT 

The theory of feeling. — We can not to advantage sep- 
arate Professor Wundt's generalizations in order to present 
them in logical fashion under the appropriate headings of 
affective elements, feelings, emotions, and sentiments. In- 
stead we shall consider the various aspects of his view 
under the above supplementary heading. 

Professor Wundt's laws of affection. — (1) The quali- 
ties of affection fall into three groups. They are (a) the 
agreeable-disagreeable affections, (b) the exciting-depress- 
ing affections, (c) the tension-relaxation affections. 

(2) Each of these groups includes qualities which are 
psychologically opposites. Thus agreeableness is the oppo- 
site of disagreeableness ; excitement of depression ; and ten- 
sion of relaxation. 

(3) A given affection may possess any one of these three 
sorts of quality ; it may possess a combination of any two, 
or, finally, it may possess a combination of the three quali- 
tative dimensions. 

Professor Wundt thus states and illustrates his view. — 
"It is greatly to be regretted that the names of simple 
feelings are so much more hazy than the names of sensa- 



280 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

tions. The proper nomenclature of feeling is limited en- 
tirely to the expression of certain general antitheses, such 
as agreeable and disagreeable, grave and gay, excited and 
quiet. . . . This poverty of language in special names 
for the feelings is a psychological consequence of the sub- 
jective nature of the feelings. All the motives of practical 
life which give rise to the names of objects and their attri- 
butes, are here wanting. To infer from this poverty of 
language that there is a corresponding poverty of affective 
qualities themselves, is a psychological mistake, which is the 
more fatal since it renders an adequate investigation of the 
composite processes impossible from the first. 

" In consequence of the difficulties indicated, a complete 
list of simple affective qualities is out of the question, even 
more than is a complete list of simple sensations. Then, 
too, there are still other reasons why it would be impossible 
to make such a list of feelings. The feelings, by virtue of 
the attributes described above, do not form separate sys- 
tems, as do the sensations of tone, of light, or of taste, but 
all feelings are united in a single manifold, interconnected 
in all its parts. In this manifold of feelings it is, however, 
possible to distinguish certain different chief affective se- 
ries, or dimensions, terminating in affective opposites of 
predominant character. Such series, or dimensions, may 
be designated by the two names which indicate their op- 
posite extremes. Each name is, however, to be looked upon 
as a collective name including a great variety of feelings 
differing from one another in certain minor individual 
characteristics. 

" Three such chief dimensions may be distinguished. 
We call them the series of pleasurable and unpleasurable 
feelings (a-b, Fig. 9), that of arousing and subduing feel- 
ings (c-d, Fig. 9), and finally, that of feelings of strain 
and relaxation (e-f, Fig. 9). Any concrete feeling may 
belong to all of these dimensions, or it may belong to 



WUNDT'S TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY 



281 



only two, or even to only one of them. The last-mentioned 
possibility is all that makes it possible to distinguish the 
different directions. The fundamental feeling qualities can 
be represented in the form of a three-dimensional figure 
(Fig. 9), the central point of which (n) is the indifference 



A 



Fig. 9. Representation of Professor Wundt's tridimensional theory of 
the feelings, a, agreeableness ; b, disagreeableness ; c, excitement 
(arousing) ; d, depression (subduing) ; e, strain (tension) ; f, 
relaxation (relief) ; n, indifference point. 



point. Three lines indicating the three dimensions of feel- 
ing pass through this indifference point. A given feeling 
may lie in one or more of these dimensions. 

" Feelings connected with sensations of the general sense 
and with impressions of smell and taste, may be regarded 
as good examples of pure pleasurable and unpleasurable 



282 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

forms. A sensation of pain, for example, is regularly- 
accompanied by an unpleasurable feeling without any ad- 
mixture of other affective forms. In connection with pure 
sensations, arousing and subduing feelings may be ob- 
served best in the case of color impressions and clang im- 
pressions. Thus, red is arousing, blue subduing. Feelings 
of strain and relaxation are always connected with the 
processes of attention. Thus, when we expect a sense im- 
pression, we note a feeling of strain, and on the arrival 
of the expected event, we note a feeling of relaxation. Both 
the expectation and satisfaction may be accompanied at 
the same time by a feeling of excitement or, under special 
conditions, by pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings. These 
other feelings may, however, be entirely absent, and then 
the feelings of strain and relaxation are recognized as 
specific forms were recognized as distinct and separate in 
the examples mentioned before. The presence of more 
than one affective tendency may be discovered in the case 
of very many feelings which are, nevertheless, just as 
simple in quality as the feelings mentioned. Thus, the 
feelings of seriousness and gaiety connected with the sensi- 
ble impressions of low and high tones or dark and bright 
colors, are to be regarded as characteristic qualities which 
are outside the indifference-zone in both the pleasurable 
and unpleasurable dimension and the exciting and subduing 
dimension. We are never to forget here that pleasurable 
and unpleasurable, exciting and subduing, are not names 
of single affective qualities, but of dimensions or series, 
within which an indefinitely large number of simple quali- 
ties appear, so that the unpleasurable quality of serious- 
ness is not only to be distinguished from that of a painful 
touch, of a discord, etc., but even the different cases of 
seriousness itself may vary in their quality. Again, the 
series of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings is united 
with that of feelings of strain and relaxation, in the case 



WUNDT'S TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY 283 

of the affective tones of rhythms. The regular succession 
of strain and relaxation in these cases is attended by pleas- 
ure, the disturbance of this regularity is attended by the 
opposite feeling, as when we are disappointed or surprised. 
Then, too, under certain circumstances the feeling of 
rhythm may be of either an exciting or a subduing 
character." (Wundt, Win. : Outlines of Psychology, 
pp. 90-93.) 

The facts upon which Professor Wundt bases his gen- 
eralizations regarding the dimensions of affections. — 
Almost the best known of psychological generalizations is 
the law that feelings express themselves through definite 
complexes of bodily states. We speak of pictures of the 
emotions, of expressions of our sentiments and feelings. 
On the basis of this well-established generalization, psy- 
chologists have studied the bodily states which accompany 
emotions in order to gain knowledge of the emotions them- 
selves. Those bodily states which may most readily and 
advantageously be observed are the pulse, respiration, knee- 
jerk, secretion of the salivary glands, and muscle tension. 
We shall examine only the relation of the pulse action to 
feelings. And in so doing we shall still further limit our 
statements to those presented by Professor Wundt in sup- 
port of his tridimensional theory. 

Method of studying bodily expressions of the emo- 
tions. — Accurate ways of getting records of the rate and 
character of the heart-beat of a person who is experiencing 
an emotion are numerous and not exceedingly difficult of 
manipulation. Consequently numerous records are avail- 
able. By comparing the rate and strength of the heart- 
beat with the emotions experienced by the subject, Pro- 
fessor Wundt arrives at the following correlation between 
affection and pulse. It should be stated that other ob- 
servers have not succeeded in verifying certain of these 
results. 



284 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

Pleasant feelings pulse retarded and intensified. 

Unpleasant feelings pulse accelerated and weakened. 

Exciting feelings pulse strengthened. 

Depi'essing feelings pulse weakened. 

Tension feelings pulse retarded and weakened. 

Relief feelings pulse accelerated and intensified. 

The peculiar nature of this generalization. — The tri- 
dimensional theory is stated in this chapter not because it 
is generally accepted or even because it has a reasonably 
sound observational basis, but solely because it offers a 
splendid opportunity to call attention to one variety of 
generalization, namely, that which springs from the mind 
of the scientist as the result of certain preexistent ideas 
and logical schemes rather than of observed facts. 

An examination of the three pairs of feelings suggested 
by this scheme reveals at once that provided the pulse 
varies with respect to two characteristics and two only, 
rate of beat and strength or intensity of beat, there are 
eight possibilities: (1) The rate remaining the same, the 
strength may increase; (2) the rate remaining the same, 
the strength may decrease; (3) the strength remaining the 
same, the rate may increase; (4) the strength remaining 
the same, the rate may decrease; (5) both rate and strength 
may increase; (6) both rate and strength may decrease; 
(7) rate may increase and strength decrease; (8) rate may 
decrease and strength increase. But provided the rate 
never varies independently of the strength, there are only 
six possibilities, i.e., numbers (1) and (2) drop from our 
series of possibilities. 

It looks like a logical and convenient scheme rather than 
one which is true to the facts, but it would be utterly un- 
scientific to condemn it upon this basis. It must be ad- 
mitted, however, that it has not stood the test of observation 
very satisfactorily. But even if it should be proved to be 



THE JAMES-LANGE LAW 285 

incorrect in certain respects (and it doubtless is) it may- 
serve to lead us to a correct generalization. For it occurs 
not infrequently that brilliantly imaginative investigators 
present as theories generalizations which stimulate research 
by virtue of their apparent artificiality. The tridimen- 
sional theory is doing excellent service to the science of 
psychology by stimulating the experimental investigation 
of the variation of bodily states in correspondence to varia- 
tions in feelings. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING EMOTIONS 

The James-Lange law. — This law of the relation of our 
emotions to bodily changes is thus phrased by Professor 
James: " Bodily changes follow directly the perception 
of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same changes 
as they occur is the emotion." 

This law serves to identify emotional experiences with 
certain complexes of organic sensations and their accom- 
panying affections. Is the generalization correct? Is the 
emotion merely certain sensations plus certain affections'? 
Certainly it must be if these are the only kinds of con- 
scious elements. 

The statement has the great merit of calling our atten- 
tion to the probable constitution of emotional experience. 
Previously to the James and Lange discussion of the sub- 
ject, the organic sensations were supposed to precede the 
emotion and to be wholly different from it. They are now 
recognized as an important part thereof. As Professor 
James vividly puts it, the emotions would not exist were 
the sensations lacking. " Common sense says, we lose our 
fortune, are sorry and weep ; we meet a bear, are fright- 
ened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and 
strike. The hypothesis here to be defended " — and it is 
to be noted that Professor James does not admit his state- 



286 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

ment to the realm of law—" says that this order of se- 
quence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not imme- 
diately induced by the other, that the bodily manifesta- 
tions must first be interposed between, and that the more 
rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, 
angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and 
not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, 
angry, or fearful, as the case may be. "Without the bodily 
states following on the perception, the latter would be 
purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emo- 
tional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge 
it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to 
strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry." 
(James, Wm. : Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, pp. 
449-450.) 

Law of the relation of emotion to bodily conditions. — 
Every emotion has its definite and fairly constant bodily 
concomitants. It is therefore quite proper to speak of 
the bodily picture of an emotion, meaning thereby the 
complex of physiological conditions which is regularly ac- 
companied by a certain emotion. 

Darwin thus describes the bodily picture of extreme fear : 
" The frightened man at first stands like a statue motion- 
less and breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively 
to escape observation. The heart beats quickly and vio- 
lently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the ribs; but 
it is very doubtful whether it then works more efficiently 
than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all 
parts of the body; for the skin instantly becomes pale, as 
during incipient faintness. This paleness of the surface, 
however, is probably in large part, or exclusively, due to 
the vaso-motor center being affected in such a manner as 
to cause the contraction of the small arteries of the skin. 
That the skin is much affected under the sense of great 
fear, we see in the marvelous and inexplicable manner in 



FEAR 287 

which perspiration immediately exudes from it. This ex- 
udation is all the more remarkable, as the surface is then 
cold, and hence the term a cold sweat; whereas, the 
sudorific glands are properly excited into action when the 
surface is heated. The hairs also on the skin stand erect; 
and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with the 
disturbed action of the heart, the breathing is hurried. 
The salivary glands act imperfectly; the mouth becomes 
dry, and is often opened and shut. I have also noticed 
that under slight fear there is a strong tendency to yawn. 
One of the best-marked symptoms is the trembling of all 
the muscles of the body; and this is often first seen in the 
lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of the mouth, 
the voice becomes husky or indistinct, or may altogether 
fail. 

" As fear increases into an agony of terror, we behold, 
as under all violent emotions, diversified results. The heart 
beats wildly, or may fail to act and faintness ensue ; there 
is a death-like pallor; the breathing is labored; the wings 
of the nostrils are widely dilated; there is a gasping and 
convulsive motion of the lips, a tremor on the hollow 
cheek, a gulping and catching of the throat; the uncov- 
ered and protruding eyeballs are fixed on the object of 
terror; or they may roll restlessly from side to side. . . . 
The pupils are said to be enormously dilated. All the 
muscles of the body may become rigid, or may be thrown 
into convulsive movements. The hands are alternately 
clenched and opened, often with a twitching movement. 
The arms may be protruded, as if to avert some dreadful 
danger, or may be thrown wildly over the head. The 
Rev. Mr. Hagenauer has seen this latter action in a terrified 
Australian. In other cases there is a sudden and uncon- 
trollable tendency to headlong flight; and so strong is 
this that the boldest soldiers may be seized with a sudden 
panic. 



288 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

' ' As fear arises to an extreme pitch, the dreadful scream 
of terror is heard. Great beads of sweat stand on the skin. 
All the muscles of the body are relaxed. Utter prostra- 
tion soon follows, and the mental powers fail." (Darwin, 
Chas. : Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 
pp. 290-292.) 

Law of the relation of the intensity of an emotion to 
its duration. — The more intense an emotion the shorter its 
duration. Extremely strong emotions are fatiguing and 
can not long be sustained. 

Law of the relation of emotions to memory. — The 
more vivid the emotional escort of an experience the longer 
it is likely to be remembered and the more readily and 
clearly it can be recalled. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING SENTIMENTS 

Law of the acquisition of sentiments. — The more fre- 
quently a marked affective experience has come to us in 
connection with a particular person or thing the more 
likely we are to acquire a sentiment — sentimental attitude 
— for the object. I have a sentimental relation to the 
house in which I was born just because of the many varied, 
vivid, and oft-repeated feelings and emotions which are 
associated with my consciousness of the object. For the 
shapeless puppy, which I rather reluctantly accepted as a 
gift, I rapidly acquired a sentimental attachment because 
of the affective experiences which became associated with 
my consciousness of the animal. Feelings and emotions 
spring up spontaneously, suddenly, whenever the conditions 
appear; but sentiments grow. They are, rather, complex 
affective attitudes or prejudices than kinds of affections. 
With reference to the person whom I love it is practically 
impossible for me to be fair in judgment because of my 
general feeling attitude. If I hated the individual it 



LAWS OF ^ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 289 

would be equally difficult for me to be fair or to experience 
agreeable feelings and emotions in connection with the 
person. 

Laws of aesthetic experience. — All of the fine arts de- 
pend upon psychological laws and it is known that they 
succeed in the measure to which they conform to these 
laws. But oddly enough most of the laws have not been 
formulated. The painter strives for a certain effect which 
he calls good. He knows what pleases him, he recognizes 
the beautiful when he sees it, but he can not state a general 
principle which would enable any one to get the desired 
effect. The musician composes according to certain inner 
promptings without the power to put into general terms 
the requirements which his composition must fulfill if it 
is to prove artistic. The milliner, the house decorator, 
the landscape architect work likewise by a more or less 
blind process of trial. Every separate attempt is a law 
unto itself. This should not be the case. There are cer- 
tain fundamental psychological principles which should 
be clearly formulated and recognized by all those who 
strive for pleasing effects. 

Examples of aesthetic laws. — Experiences of red, 
orange, yellow are predominantly exciting, while either 
agreeable or disagreeable. Experiences of green and blue 
are predominantly quieting, soothingly restful, while either 
agreeable or disagreeable. This seems to be true of the ele- 
ments of consciousness. And in every complex of elements 
the laws manifest themselves. For example, to paper a 
room which is intended to be quieting, restful, cool, with 
deep or brilliant red paper is absurd. This is true because 
the color — quite apart from other conditions — has just the 
opposite affective accompaniment from that desired. To 
paper a dark, chilly, cheerless room in dull deep blue is 
equally unsatisfactory, for it adds to the disagreeableness 
of the situation instead of relieving it. 



290 LAWS OF AFFECTION 

For a given individual, similar laws are found to hold 
of auditory sensations. High tones and certain qualities 
of noise, rasping, grating, scraping, are uniformly unpleas- 
ant, cutting, tearing, or chilling. Some seem to pierce the 
organism, others seem to make one's blood run cold. 
Medium tones and certain qualities of noise — snaps, cracks, 
clicks — are uniformly accompanied by a pleasant feeling, 
unless there are other factors entering to render the total 
feeling unpleasant. 

Examination seems to indicate that these laws are capable 
of far more definite formulation for the race than has 
usually been supposed. Our likes and dislikes are less indi- 
vidual, less freakish, more fundamental and more generally 
shared by our fellows than we are wont to think. 

Law of the emotional value of repetition. — Ehythmic 
experiences are more agreeable than those which are 
broken, irregular, non-rhythmic. This too is generally true 
and doubtless fundamental. Irregular sounds or touches 
or flashes of light — irregularities in works of art : in music, 
painting, sculpture, architecture — are to be avoided or com- 
pensated. A certain Kind of regularity is the natural de- 
mand of the organism. Every bodily process is regular 
and many are rhythmic. Doubtless this is the physio- 
logical basis for our appreciation of psychological rhythms. 

Law of unity in relation to agreeableness. — Unity in ex- 
perience is a condition of aesthetic pleasure. If an experi- 
ence is incomplete, inharmonious because of conflicts with 
other experiences, it is unpleasant. 

Independence in experience is a condition of pleasure. 
An experience should be complete in itself, it should not 
reach beyond for something else to finish or supplement 
it, it should not suggest other parts. It must have unity 
and isolation. 



SENTIMENTS' 291 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of certain sentiments. 

(1) Examine your consciousness of a certain food which you 
especially like or dislike. Search consciousness for explanations 
of the sentiment. 

(2) Examine similarly your consciousness of a person whom 
you markedly like or dislike. Describe fully your affective 
consciousness and attempt to discover the chief steps in the 
growth of the sentiment. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titchenee, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 68-74. 
Witmee, L. : Analytic psychology, chapter 3. 
Myers, C. S. : Experimental psychology, chapter 25. 



CHAPTER XXII 

LAWS OF ATTENTION 

" Suppose, then, that I am working or reading quietly, and that 
a telephone message or the entrance of a visitor suddenly demands 
my attention. The first thing that happens is that there is a redis- 
tribution of the entire contents of consciousness. The incoming 
ideas — my friend's business or the subject of the message — drive to 
the center, and everything else, my previous occupation as well as my 
sensory surroundings, are banished to the outskirts. Consciousness, 
in attention, is patterned or arranged into focus and margin, fore- 
ground and background, center and periphery. And the difference be- 
tween the processes at the focus and the processes in the margin is, 
essentially, a difference of clearness: the central area of conscious- 
ness lies clear, the more remote regions are obscure. In this fact 
we have, indeed, the key to the whole problem of attention. In the 
last resort, and in its simplest terms, attention is identical with 
sensory clearness. 

" However, we must confine ourselves to observation, and not antici- 
pate. The attentive consciousness is arranged as clear and obscure: 
so much is evident. Is the consciousness affective? Not necessarily. 
We may greet our friend with an absorbed interest, with pleasurable 
concern or with foreboding of unpleasantness; but we may also give 
him a perfunctory and mechanical attention, which leaves us wholly 
unaffected. Is the consciousness kinesthetic ? Again, not neces- 
sarily. There may be a widespread arousal of kinesthetic sensations, 
or there may be no sensible change in the muscular system: it de- 
pends upon circumstances. So that it appears, even to unaided intro- 
spection, that the redistribution of contents into the groups of clear 
and obscure is the one universal and characteristic feature of the 
attentive consciousness." — Titcheneb, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, 
pp. 266-2G7. 

Mental life, like bodily life, consists of processes. — 

At times in the development of the science of psychology 
there has been a tendency to think of mind as made up of 
a number of more or less independent faculties. For every 
special variety of experience there was supposed to exist 
a creative faculty. Thus attention was considered a condi- 

292 



ATTENTION NOT A FACULTY 293 

tion of mind which results from the activity of the faculty 
of attention ; association, an experience which is indicative 
of the functioning of the associative faculty; memory, a 
result of the exercise of the faculty of remembering. 

This conception of the mind as a bundle of active agencies 
or faculties is now regarded as unprofitable, and in its place 
we have the notion that mental life is a complex collection 
of interrelated processes, similar, in essential respects, to 
the physiological processes which together constitute bodily 
life. Attention from this point of view is but one of the 
multitudinous processes which occur as portions of the life 
of experience. Association is simply one of the varieties 
of change which go to make up our total consciousness. 
Memory is a process which occurs side by side with atten- 
tion, association, perception, thought, and often inextricably 
interwoven with one or more of them. 

There is no faculty of attention, of association, or of 
memory. — No special agent or agents attend to these par- 
ticular kinds of consciousness. They are aspects of con- 
sciousness. At the same instant our experience may present 
attentional, associational, recognitive, and many other proc- 
esses. We must dispel from our minds the idea that there 
is something in us which attends, or associates, or remem- 
bers. To be conscious means to attend, to associate, to 
remember, to perceive, to feel, to will, and many other 
things, but not all of these processes occur at the same time 
or with equal prominence. 

ATTENTION 

What do we mean by attention? — The word has been 
variously defined and often with skill and insight. For 
us it shall mean a condition of a given bit of consciousness 
within the stream of consciousness. It is the clearness, 
vividness, or distinctness of the mental content. That 



294 LAWS OF ATTENTION 

which is clear is attended. Attention varies in degree. At 
any given moment, I am aware of many things, my con- 
sciousness is complex and varied, but I am not aware with 
equal clearness of these several things. Some are vaguely 
before me, others are fairly clear, and still others, or per- 
haps another, are perfectly distinct. These are grades or 
levels of attention. "Where perfect clearness of mental con- 
tent exists, the attention process is at its best. It is func- 
tioning at its maximum efficiency. Where vagueness exists, 
the attention process is functioning partially and incom- 
pletely. Every fragment of experience passes from a mini- 
mum of clearness to a more or less high degree of clear- 
ness ere it fades from consciousness. Only a portion 
of the mass of material which makes up our stream of 
consciousness ever attains the maximum of attention 
value. 

Clearness and sleep. — It is the writer's practice to de- 
scribe consciousness as consisting of at least four levels: 
(1) the subconscious level, (2) the unclear conscious level, 
(3) the introspective level, and (4) the level of maximal 
introspective clearness. 

The study of attention therefore becomes a study of 
clearness and its conditions. — If attention may be de- 
fined as the state of being clear, then the laws of attention 
evidently must be the laws of mental clearness. Accepting 
this conclusion, we shall now attempt to describe in general 
terms the important conditions of mental clearness or atten- 
tion. The question which should remain uppermost in our 
minds the while we examine this subject is, Under precisely 
what circumstances or conditions is a particular bit of 
experience clear? Or, differently expressed, What factors 
seem to determine the degree of clearness of experiences? 
When we have satisfactorily answered this question, we 
shall know what attention is and why it is of so great 
importance in mental life. 



ATTENTIONAL CLEARNESS 295 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING ATTENTION 

Law of the relation of intensity to attentional clear- 
ness. — Other things being equal, the greater the intensity 
of an experience the greater its clearness. Illustration : A 
loud noise, an intense light, a sudden change in temperature 
is accompanied by marked attentional clearness of experi- 
ence. But, of course, there are many other conditions of 
attention and it frequently happens that the intense experi- 
ence is overshadowed by one which is less intense, simply 
because the latter possesses some property which has greater 
importance for attentional clearness than has mere 
intensity. 

Law of the relation of quality of sensation to atten- 
tional clearness. — Those qualities of sensation whose reg- 
ular accompaniment is a disagreeable affection as a rule 
possess a higher degree of clearness than do other sensa- 
tions. Illustration: As Professor Titchener points out in 
" The Psychology of Feeling and Attention," there are 
certain pains, odors, tastes, sounds, sights which are 
urgently, insistently, and importunely clear; they are inti- 
mate, worrying, wicked things. There seems to be some- 
thing about the quality of the sensation itself, quite apart 
from its disagreeable sense-feeling, Avhich renders it in- 
tensely clear. 

Law of the relation of quality of affection to atten- 
tional clearness. — Of two affections whose intensity is the 
same, the disagreeable is clearer than the agreeable. Pain- 
ful experiences compel attention ; pleasurable ones at- 
tract it. 

Law of the relation of suddenness of appearance of 
a sensation or affection to attentional clearness. — The 
more suddenly and unexpectedly a sensation or affection 
breaks in upon the stream of consciousness the clearer it 
is likely to be. Illustration: The sudden flash of light 



296 LAWS OF ATTENTION 

brings its sensation to the height of clearness while a slow 
flash possesses less attentional value. The sudden electric 
shock wholly occupies consciousness for an instant. Per- 
haps, in this connection, suddenness and unexpectedness 
should be separated, for it is well known that a sudden 
stimulus may not compel attention if it is expected. 

Law of repetition. — The repetition of an experience 
tends at first to increase its clearness, but beyond a certain 
limit it tends rather to diminish it. This is probably a case 
of the summation of stimuli and therefore to be considered 
as a matter of increase in intensity. 

Law of change in relation to clearness. — A stimulus 
which changes rapidly or jerkily commands greater clear- 
ness than do others. The moving touch, light, or sound 
attracts attention. A fluctuation in the stimulus seems 
necessary. It is not the intensity of the light which most 
effectively holds the eye but the variations in intensity. 

Law of relation of clearness to usualness. — The less one 
is accustomed to an experience, the clearer it is. Novelty, 
strangeness, rarity, are important conditions of clearness. 
A new sound is startling, especially if heard in strange 
surroundings. A new object compels attention. 

Law of the relation of resemblance in consciousness to 
clearness. — If a new sensation, feeling, or idea happens 
to be like one already in consciousness, the new one is 
clearer than it otherwise would have been. The way seems 
to be prepared for it and it immediately springs to the 
forefront of clearness. This seems to contradict the law 
of novelty and unexpectedness. Does it? How can we 
harmonize the two? 

Law of levels of attention. — For each observer, under 
definite conditions of introspection, a certain number of 
distinguishable grades, degrees, or levels of clearness exists. 
The number differs apparently with individuals as well as 
with conditions of observation. For some there exist only 



THE RANGE OF ATTENTION 297 

two grades: an experience is either clear or unclear; for 
others there are three, four, or more distinguishable degrees 
of clearness. 

The writer recalls in this connection, his introspection 
concerning the feeling of certainty. It seemed to him 
possible, as he attempted to describe from memory a num- 
ber of simple objects, to distinguish from three to five 
grades of certainty and these he felt to be closely related 
to the clearness of his perceptions of the objects. He 
therefore believes that he experiences from three to five dis- 
tinguishable degrees of clearness. 

The reader has but to glance for an instant at a group 
of objects — a store window, the dinner table, a book shelf — 
and then looking away, to attempt to describe what has 
been seen in order to discover the fact of levels of clearness 
and grades of certainty. The introspective experience is 
decidedly worth while. 

Law of the range of attention. — There is a definite 
limit, for a particular observer and under definite condi- 
tions, to the number of items of experience which may at 
a particular moment possess maximal clearness. The old 
query, How many different things may one be conscious 
of at the same time? has been answered by the experi- 
mental psychologist. The number depends upon the nature 
and relations of the experiences. Thus at a given moment 
one may be aware of four, five, or six objects visually, 
factually, or auditorily. The more readily the objects may 
be grasped as a group the larger the number of impressions 
which may be attended to simultaneously. Thus, a word 
is really a single object because its letters so readily fuse 
in the consciousness of meaning. So, likewise, is the series 
of sounds which forms the unit of a rhythm. Tick-tack is 
a single object of experience, not two objects. 

Undoubtedly the span of attention varies greatly with 
individuals and with conditions. One may by practice 



298 LAWS OF ATTENTION 

acquire skill in grasping a large number of impressions 
even though they be difficult to relate to one another. 

Law of the duration of attention. — Nothing long con- 
tinues in consciousness at maximal clearness. Attention 
fluctuates : it is discontinuous, interrupted. As I attempt to 
listen to my watch, I discover that every now and then the 
sounds become unclear or even disappear entirely from 
my consciousness. It is only under special conditions that 
any experience may be held clearly in consciousness for 
more than a few seconds. Normally consciousness is con- 
stantly changing not only in content but in the relative 
clearness of the parts of its content. Now I hear the watch 
tick, now I am conscious of the wind. This fluctuating of 
the attention — variation in the clearness of an experience — 
is one of nature's economies, for it is extremely fatigu- 
ing to attend to anything continuously, or even to attempt 
to do so. 

The conditions of attention. — The generalizations al- 
ready formulated are sufficient to indicate that our most 
direct and profitable approach to attention is through the 
study of the psychological and physiological conditions 
which influence it. 

A number of these conditions, many of which have been 
noted in our laws, are mentioned by Professor Pillsbury 
in his thoroughgoing discussion of the psychology of atten- 
tion. He names as preeminently important factors in at- 
tention (1) intensity of sensation, or of perceptual and 
ideational complexes, (2) change in the intensity of sensa- 
tion, (3) the summation of stimuli, (4) suddenness of 
change in the properties of a sensation, (5) the extensity 
of stimuli (voluminousness of sensations), (6) duration, 
(7) novelty, (8) preparedness, (9) affective elements, (10) 
associations. 

Psychology is apparently on the eve of an experi- 
mental investigation of attention which will vastly in- 



INTROSPECTION OF ATTENTION 299 

crease the scope and accuracy of our knowledge of the 
subject. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. The introspection of attention. (1) Listen 
intently to the ticking of a watch held before the class by the 
instructor. Note any changes in the clearness of the sounds. 
Note also the disappearances of the sounds and the nature of 
consciousness during the intervals. 

(2) Introspect your consciousness of a joke, read by the in- 
structor. How is the clearness of your emotional consciousness 
influenced by your attempts to observe it? 

(3) How long can you attend steadily to a faint sound, a 
picture, an idea of fatigue? How long can you hold clearly the 
image of this morning's breakfast table or of any part of it? 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titcheneb, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 75-84. 
Pillsbury, W. B. : Attention, chapter 3. 

Geissler, L. R. : The measurement of attention. American Journal 
of Psychology, vol. 20, pp. 473-529. 1909. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

" A detailed comparison of visual images of memory and of 
imagination brings out the following differences : memory involves 
eye-movement and general kinaesthesis, imagination involves steady 
fixation and lack of general kinasthesis ; memory images are scrappy, 
filmy, and give no after-images, while images of imagination are 
substantial, complete, and sometimes give after-images; the mood 
of memory is that of familiarity or recognition, intrinsically pleas- 
ant, the mood of imagination is that of unfamiliarity or novelty, 
intrinsically unpleasant; memory implies imitative movement and 
the correlated organic sensations, imagination implies kinesthetic 
and organic empathy; memory images arise more slowly, are more 
changeable in course, and last less long than images of imagination; 
memory implies roving attention and a mass of associative material, 
while imagination involves concentrated and quasi-hypnotic atten- 
tion with inhibition of associations. 

" We thus reach the general conclusion that the materials of 
imagination are closely akin to those of perception. Popular psy- 
chology looks upon memory as a photographic record of past ex- 
perience, and regards imagination as working with kaleidoscopic, 
instable, undependable materials. Precisely the reverse appears to 
be true. The image of memory is stable and fixed in meaning, in 
reference; but it is exceedingly instable as conscious content. The 
image of imagination is the photographic record, a stable formation 
that stands still to be looked at. This state of affairs seems, in- 
deed, after the event, natural enough. It is just because the memory 
image is instable, liable to all sorts of interchange, suppression, 
short-cutting, substitution, telescoping, that it is psychologically 
available for memory; that a mass of past experience can be packed 
into small representative compass. And it is just because the 
image of imagination is stable and unchanging that it is psy- 
chologically available for the artistic purpose, for constructive 
embodiment. If an image could not decay, we should have but 
little memory; if an image could not persist, we should have but 
poor imagination." — Perky, C. W. : An experimental study of im- 
agination. American Journal of Psychology, vol. 21, p. 451. 1910. 

ASSOCIATION 

The meaning of association. — At bottom association 
means that mental processes are related to one another 

300 



GENERAL LAW OF ASSOCIATION 301 

instead of being isolated and relatively independent. They 
tend to run together without losing their identity ; they 
become associated. Sensations and affections become asso- 
ciated in those experiences which we call perceptions. 
Sensory and affective images become associated in ideas. 
Ideas become associated in still more complex ideas or in 
thoughts. There are many kinds of association for which 
terms have been coined. The most intimate of associa- 
tions appears in total fusion of mental processes; the 
least intimate, in the linking of one idea with another 
because they happen to follow one another in experience. 



GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING ASSOCIATION 

General law of association. — When two sensations, affec- 
tions, or other experiences, occur together or successively 
they tend to form a whole and are said to become associated. 
Later the appearance in consciousness of one of the experi- 
ences tends to be followed by the appearance of the 
other. 

The general law of association is thus formulated by Pro- 
fessor Thorndike: " The likelihood that any mental state 
or act will occur in response to any situation is in pro- 
portion to the frequency, recency, intensity, and resulting 
satisfaction of its connection with that situation or some 
part of it and with the total frame of mind in which the 
situation is felt." (Elements of Psychology, p. 207.) 

The associational train. — Happy are those persons who 
are born to introspection and for whom following a train 
of ideas is easy ! But happier far the person who by dint 
of prolonged attention and effort finally succeeds in intro- 
specting his associative processes. In this task, it is a good 
resolution never to become discouraged, for at the least 
expected moment success is likely to come to one. A train 



302 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

of ideas will suddenly stand out clearly before one with 
the relations so plainly exhibited that those who run may 
read. It is joyous surprise that such an experience brings. 
The writer is not a born introspectionist and he has had 
the surprise. Here is one of the fruits of his introspection 
of his associative processes. 

The thought of a physician's office suggested to me a 
chance meeting with an acquaintance at the Harvard Med- 
ical School. I was vividly conscious of the place of meet- 
ing, the details of our surroundings were vaguely visual- 
ized, as was also the man with whom I was talking. I tried 
to think of his name and failed. A moment passed, and 
during that interval the following train of ideas appeared. 
The name Gall (a famous phrenologist) came to mind, but 
I knew that was not the name I sought. It immediately 
brought in its trail the name Spurzheim (also a phrenol- 
ogist), which in turn I recognized as aside from my goal. 
That quickly carried me to a second-hand book shop in 
Boston where a few years ago I chanced to see a volume 
by Doctor Spurzheim. It was the second volume of two, and 
while searching for the first one, I chanced upon a copy of 
Doctor Benjamin Rush's essays on the mind. The instant 
the name Rush came to consciousness I felt relief, elation, 
and partial recognition. I thought at once of the old Phila- 
delphia physician, Doctor Rush, and of what I happened 
to know about the acquaintance whose name eluded me. 
As I was pondering the facts and wondering why I could 
never recall his name when I wanted it, it suddenly flashed 
through my mind that Rush was not his name, that I had 
had just the same experience some months before and had 
even asked a friend whether the Doctor Rush in question 
was related to the famous Philadelphia physician. Upon 
being told that his name was not Rush at all, I had been 
greatly surprised and chagrined. This revival of my 
former strongly affective experience brought to mind the 



AN ASSOCIATIONAL TRAIN 303 

consciousness that the name I sought was Rushworth in- 
stead of Rush. 

The train of perceptions, images, ideas, feelings, and 
thoughts, which I have thus briefly sketched, was so vividly 
and diagrammatically clear when I asked myself how I 
recalled the name that I took great satisfaction in work- 
ing out the course of my ideas and their evident relations. 
Let me suggest the inner relations which I know to have 
been important. 

Gall came to consciousness because only a few hours 
previously I had been reading a psychological book in 
which mention was made of the founder of phrenology. 
It naturally carried me to the book shop where I had 
sought Spurzheim's book on phrenology and had found 
Doctor Rush's on mind. The discovery of my mistake I 
attribute to the highly affective character of my earlier 
mistake. "Why the name Rushworth flashed into conscious- 
ness just when it did I can not explain. But at least I 
have given the prominent links in the chain of ideas which 
led me to it. 

Law of the relation of association to the resemblance 
of things associated. — The tendency of two experiences to 
become associated varies directly with their similarity. 
The face of a stranger calls up in my mind that of a friend 
which is markedly similar. The sound of a foreign word 
calls up a similar word in my own language. Points of 
resemblance condition associations. Like becomes linked 
with like. This is the law of association by similarity. 

Law of the relation of association to temporal con- 
tiguity. — Experiences which appear in consciousness either 
simultaneously or in immediate succession tend to become 
associated. The closer they are together the stronger the 
tendency to association. A sudden flash of light brings to 
mind the roar of thunder because the latter is associated 
with lightning. 



304 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

Laws of frequency, recency, and vividness in associa- 
tion. — The more frequently, recently, or vividly two experi- 
ences have appeared in consciousness either simultaneously 
or in immediate succession the stronger the tendency for 
them to become intimately associated. Illustration: The 
odor of new mown hay brings with it the idea of warmth 
because of the frequency with which the two experiences 
have been presented. The sound of the wind leads me to 
consciousness of beating waves because of a recent experi- 
ence in a storm. The single experience of confusing the 
names Rush and Rushworth, with its vivid emotion of 
chagrin, now causes the former name to suggest the 
latter. 

Law of the relation of association to affection. — The 
more intense and clear the affective accompaniments of 
items of consciousness which occur together the more likely 
they are to become associated. Illustration: A particular 
name is ineradicably associated with a certain scene 
because of an intensely disagreeable emotion once ex- 
perienced. The word weak-fish is associated with Beach 
Haven because of strong agreeable emotions there experi- 
enced. 

Types of association and the individual. — There are 
several types of association. Important among them are 
(1) association by co-ordination — boot-shoe, hat-cap, board- 
plank; (2) association by super-ordination — dog-animal, 
chair-furniture, book-library ; ( 3 ) association by sub- 
ordination — animal-dog, furniture-chair, desk-drawer; (4) 
association by contrast — right- wrong, cellar-attic, black- 
white. 

Professor Myers offers the following classification of 
associations. (Text-book of Experimental Psychology, 
p. 152.) It is logical rather than psychological. Conse- 
quently, a given association may be certainly placed in the 
scheme only in the light of introspection. 



HABIT AND ASSOCIATION 



305 



( in meaning 



Similarity 



co-ordination e.g. baby — infant 
snperordination e.g. soldier — man 



L in sound 



Contiguity ., 



in time 



m space 



subordination 
contrast 

C in letters 
-J or syllables 
L in rhyme 

J cansal 
[ verbal 



e.g. man- 
e.g. peace 



-soldier 
— war 



e.g. port — porter 
e.g. fight — kite 

e.g. lightning — thunder 
e.g. one — two, 

snow — snowball 
e.g. handle — lock 



The best way to master the scheme and at the same time 
to test its value, is by attempting to distribute a series of 
actual associations among the classes. 

Habit and association. — The principle of habit is 
identical with that of association. Habit is usually applied 
to certain forms of behavior ; association to certain forms of 
experience. Instinct is used with equal frequency to desig- 
nate certain inherited combinations of acts, and certain 
inherited connections of sensory and affective experiences. 

Professor Thorndike has combined the laws of habit, 
association, and instinct in one statement thus: " The like- 
lihood that any mental state or act will occur in response to 
any situation is in proportion to the closeness of its inborn 
[instinct] connection therewith, to the frequency of its 
connection therewith, and to the amount of satisfaction 
resulting." (Thorndike, E. L. : Elements of Psychology, 
p. 205.) 

The fundamental importance of association. — Habit, 
instinct, and association are expressions of one funda- 
mental organic principle, the principle of uniformity. 
What has happened tends to happen again. Without in- 
stincts life would be practically impossible ; without habits 



306 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

our lives would be irksome ; without associations they 
would be chaotic, a mere succession of unrelated experi- 
ences. 

In this chapter we have considered under the heading 
association many of the facts and laws which are custom- 
arily discussed under habit. The reason for this is that 
we are concerned primarily with the linking of mental proc- 
esses — psychic association — and not with the linking of 
acts — physiological connections. 

MEMORY 

Memory is a process in consciousness which has a dis- 
tinctive mark. The mark of the remembered experience 
is the feeling of familiarity. So long as there is no feeling 
of " at home " we are not remembering, although we may 
be re-living an experience. One may experience the same 
emotions day after day, yet if they always seem new and 
feel unfamiliar they may not be called memories. We re- 
member when we recognize and identify and place a par- 
ticular experience in its relations to previous experiences. 
The face of the man whom I passed a few moments ago 
I partially recognized for I felt certain that I had seen 
it before, but not until I had definitely located my experi- 
ence of the face by recalling the place and circumstances 
of my previous experience did the complete characteristic 
recognitive feeling of familiarity come upon me. 

The imperfection of memory.— We remember more or 
less perfectly, completely, accurately, clearly. It is seldom 
indeed that a complex experience is re-lived precisely as 
it was originally experienced. As a rule the feeling of 
familiarity comes to us when we recall and definitely place 
in our mental life the essential features of an experience. 
To my friend's query, I quickly reply that I remember a 
particular event, if I can recall anything about it. My 



LAW OF MEMORY 307 

memory may be extremely meager, incomplete, inaccurate. 
Indeed, when I attempt to describe the event it may become 
apparent that I am imagining, borrowing from other more 
or less similar experiences, much more than I am remem- 
bering. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING MEMORY 

Relation of memory to association. — The more numer- 
ous and well established the associational connections of 
an experience the more readily, certainly, and accurately 
can it be remembered. No associative processes, no 
memory. 

Naturally, the conditions which favor the formation of 
associations also favor recall. 

The general law of memory. — Experiences, with repeti- 
tion, tend to acquire an affective accompaniment called the 
feeling of familiarity. 

Law of frequency. — That experience is best remembered 
which has most frequently been presented. Mere repeti- 
tion favors recall. Illustration : I recall my telephone num- 
ber more readily, with a more intimate feeling of familiar- 
ity and more certainly, than I do that of a friend simply 
because I have more frequently seen, heard, pronounced, 
written, and thought it. 

Law of recency. — Other things being equal, that is best 
recalled which was most recently experienced. Illustra- 
tion: I readily and accurately remember what I have 
written to-day, but only with difficulty and uncertainty can 
I remember what I wrote a week ago. Vividly and in detail 
I recall views of the Panama Canal which I experienced 
last summer; but only in vague outline and uncertainly 
can I remember the appearance of a German village which 
I visited ten years ago. The description of Thomas B. 
Aldrich's home at Ponkapog which I read last night, I 



308 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

remember more accurately and readily than a description 
of the Vatican which I read last year. 

Law of vividness. — The more vivid an experience the 
more readily and accurately is it recalled. Illustration: 
The scene of a runaway is clearly before me now — I saw 
it twenty-five years ago under intense excitement. I clearly 
remember a phrase of which I was once vividly conscious, 
although I can not recall the face of the speaker. 

Law of affective accompaniment. — Experiences which 
are markedly agreeable or disagreeable are recalled more 
readily than those which are affectively neutral. Illustra- 
tion : How painfully clear is the memory of a social 
blunder! How vivid the recollection of an unintentional 
injury to a friend! 

Memory, as revival of previous experience depends 
upon: — (1) The number and strength of the associational 
connections which the experience possesses. These in turn 
depend chiefly upon the frequency of its occurrence. (2) 
The clearness or vividness of the experience. This is deter- 
mined by conditions already discussed under Attention. 
(3) The affective value of the experience. 

GENERALIZATIONS CONCERNING LEARNING OR MEMORIZING 

Experimental studies of learning. — Recently the psy- 
chology of learning has been carefully investigated, in the 
cases of the acquirement of skill in making simple move- 
ments (typewriting), memorizing nonsense syllables, poems, 
or pages of prose, and the acquisition of habits involving 
some definite act or acts of discrimination. The following 
generalizations are based upon the results of these studies : 

Law of temporal distribution of practice. — "A lesson 
is better retained when the learning extends over a con- 
siderable period of time, than when the task is learnt by 
the same number of repetitions at a single sitting." Brief 



LAWS OF LEARNING 309 

intervals of practice — repetition for memorizing — are more 
valuable than long-continued practice. Illustration: A 
poem can be more effectively and economically memorized 
by reading it over five times daily on four successive days 
than by reading it twenty times at the first attempt. 

"With such animals as mice, rats, cats, dogs, monkeys, as 
well as with children, it is relatively easy to demonstrate 
that a given habit is more rapidly acquired and longer 
retained if the training be distributed over a few days than 
if it be given all at once. 

Law of complete repetition. — We learn more satis- 
factorily by taking what is to be learned as a whole rather 
than bit by bit. Illustration-. If a complex series of acts, 
as in the typewriting of a sentence, is to be learned it can 
be done more efficiently by going through the entire process 
line after line than by practising first on one word or 
phrase, then on another. If a poem or paragraph of prose 
is to be memorized, it is more economical of time and yields 
more lasting results if the passage be read through from 
end to end each time instead of being taken sentence by 
sentence. 

This is evidently a matter of meaning. We come to 
understand, as a whole, what we are trying to master. 

Law of relation of meaning to learning. — The better 
what is to be learned is understood the better it can be 
remembered. Thus one observer finds " that he can learn 
six stanzas of Byron's " Don Juan " at a single sitting in 
fifty-two repetitions. Each of these stanzas contains about 
eighty syllables in about thirty-six words, when articles, 
prepositions, pronouns, and similar dependent words are 
left out of account. But he has experimentally shown that 
thirty-six senseless syllables require fifty-five repetitions ; 
whereas a single stanza of poetry requires about eight repe- 
titions. We have thus some measure of the astonishing 
saving effected by rational associations in the learning of 



310 LAWS OF ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY 

sensible matter." (Myers, C. S. : Text-book of Experi- 
mental Psychology, p. 179.) 

Other aspects of learning. — The generalizations which 
have been presented are merely examples of the laws of 
memorizing. The psychology of learning is especially im- 
portant in connection with educational methods and we 
shall therefore consider it further in the discussion of 
" Education as control of consciousness " (chapter 
XXXI). 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of associations. 1. The in- 
structor should read off, at the rate of six words per minute, a 
list of one hundred words. As each word is announced, the 
student should write it on a sheet of record paper, together 
with the word which it brought to consciousness (the first asso- 
ciation ) . 

2. After the list of one hundred associations has been ob- 
tained, each member of the class should classify them accord- 
ing to Professor Myers' scheme. 

3. Finally the results should be submitted to some member 
of the class for a general report. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Titcheneb, E. B.: Text-book ©f psychology, §§112-120. 

Myers, C. S. : Text- book of experimental psychology, chapters 12, 24. 

Thorndike, E. L.: Elements of psychology, chapters 13-18. 



PART FIVE 

PSYCHOLOGY AS EXPLANATION AND 
COERELATION 

CHAPTER XXIV 
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

" Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferry 
boat on which I daily cross the river, is a long white pole, bearing 
a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw 
it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these 
reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties 
presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual 
position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, 
or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere two 
vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed 
probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying. 

" I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of such a pole, and 
to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it 
was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats 
carried like poles, this hypothesis was rejected, (b) Possibly it was 
the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations 
made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a 
terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the 
pilot house, (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in 
which the boat is moving. 

" In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was 
lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. 
Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the 
pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the 
boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would 
need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need 
poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more prob- 
able than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion 
that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the 
direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly." 
— Dewey, John: How we think, pp. 69, 70. 

What is meant by "explaining things"? — For every- 
thing which he observes, the scientist seeks an explanation. 

311 



312 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

This we know. But what does seeking an explanation 
mean? Let us examine instances of this scientific pro- 
cedure. As I sit at my desk a peculiar odor suddenly 
attracts my attention and impels me to seek an explana- 
tion. I open the door of my study and the odor becomes 
stronger and is recognized as that of scorching timber. 
This fully arouses me and I rush into an adjoining room 
in order to make sure that two gas flames which are there 
in use are in proper condition. One of them I discover to 
be turned so high that the wood above it is scorching slowly. 
This observation relieves my anxiety by giving me knowl- 
edge of what I call the cause of the odor. My investigation 
has resulted in an explanation of the odor experience and 
I am satisfied because I can now rid myself of it by turning 
down the flame. 

The reader will note that what I have done is to discover 
certain conditions in connection with which the scorched 
odor appears. I know from previous experience that such 
an odor often accompanies the heating of certain objects 
and I immediately jump to the conclusion that there is a 
necessary connection between flame, heat, condition of wood, 
and the odor. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that 
the scorched odor might have been connected with any one 
of many other conditions. For example, an experience in 
my study similar to that I have described might have led 
me to the discovery that an electric arc lamp on the floor 
above me had become so hot as to burn the asbestos about 
it, thus producing a peculiar odor. Evidently there may 
be several different conditions for the same phenomenon — 
even for the same quality of odor. A satisfactory explana- 
tion of anything can be given only when one knows the 
conditions thereof. They need not be the necessary and 
invariable conditions, but they must be real conditions. 

Cause and effect. — Science seeks causes. A given fact 
is observed and the observer immediately asks, What is 



CAUSE AND EFFECT 313 

the cause of this phenomenon? What he presents as a 
cause turns out to be just what we have discovered to be 
a condition of the fact. The cause of the odor of scorching- 
wood is the over-high flame, or the over-heated lamp box. 
Or again, it may be said to be the condition of the wood 
or asbestos. Evidently a series of conditions are involved 
in every causal explanation. Every effect has its cause or 
causes. This is a scientific postulate. Having made an 
observation the scientist is certain that further observation 
will give additional knowledge of the relation of the fact 
to other facts. But, merely to name one event as the 
cause of another is not nearly so satisfying as to describe 
fully and accurately the actual conditions which preceded 
and accompanied the event which we are interested in un- 
derstanding. We have valuable knowledge of a phenom- 
enon only when we are familiar with the circumstances in 
which the phenomenon appears. One, above all the others, 
of these circumstances may be important at this moment, 
but in the long run it is desirable for the observer to 
know the situation in its entirety. 

An effect may have more than a single cause. — Our 
illustration has called to mind the fact that the ' ' scorched ' ' 
odor need not come from a single set of conditions. There 
are many conceivable sets of circumstances ; many, indeed, 
which we have experienced, which would give rise to the 
scorched odor. Given the effect, it is not possible with 
certainty to describe its circumstances. But given certain 
circumstances, we may, if we are sufficiently well versed 
in the knowledge of science, predict a certain effect or 
series of effects. The value of this evidently rests in the 
power which it gives us in the control of events. After 
all, only the scientist is interested in the why of something 
that has happened. The practical man wishes rather to 
know how he can make it happen again or prevent its hap- 
pening. He desires knowledge of the causes of an event 



314 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

and ability to control them, not merely knowledge that 
the event is the effect of such and such causes. 

Examples of physical causation. — It seems almost su- 
perfluous to cite cases of causation in the world of the 
physical sciences, we are all of us familiar with so many 
of them. But for purposes of illustration we may examine 
some one or more of the most commonplace examples of the 
causal relation of events. 

Fire is applied to the powder with which a cannon is 
charged, there is a flash of light, a rush of air, and a ter- 
rific noise, and at the same instant that our ears are 
almost split by the roar we see a large hole torn in an 
embankment a hundred yards away. This is a causal series 
of events. For the fire causes the powder to explode, the 
exploding in turn causes the flash, the roar, and the pro- 
pulsion of the cannon ball, and the ball in its turn causes 
the rent in the earthworks. We may test the relation of the 
different events as often as we will, if we are careful, and 
each time the same relations are found to hold. After 
a time we conclude that the order of events is a necessary 
order: that the powder can not explode before heat is 
applied to it ; that the break in the earthworks can not occur 
before the ball has struck it. In a word, that the cause 
always and necessarily precedes the effect. Note that in 
all nature, in every kind of science, this observation of 
the uniformity of relation between certain events gives 
origin to the notion that one is necessarily the cause or 
condition of another. 

Were the order reversed we should be mightily surprised 
and there would have to be certain important practical 
changes in our relations to our world. But the fact is that 
we have no other warrant for our expectation of uniformity 
than our previous experience. What we have not seen 
happen, we do not expect to witness. The causal relation 
is a great generalization. From the observation, millions 



PHYSICAL CAUSATION 315 

of times repeated, that one event precedes another, we have 
drawn the conclusion that things must happen thus. This 
conclusion is valid and serviceable, so long as it is sup- 
ported by observation, but just so soon as it is contradicted 
we should revise it. It is rather unfortunate that we 
should feel toward this particular generalization a sort of 
reverence. We treat it as though it were Heaven-born, 
sacred. As a matter of fact, it probably has no greater 
claim upon validity than have many other generalizations. 
All are human made and should be held subject to modifi- 
cation. 

Last night the water in my aquarium froze. Why? To 
say that the temperature in the room fell below the freezing 
point is no comfort to me! I wish to know all the condi- 
tions which were contributory to that particular untoward 
occurrence. For in the future, even when the temperature 
does fall to the freezing point, I do not wish to have such 
a result. Indeed, in the past the temperature has many 
times been lower in the room without the formation of ice 
in the aquarium. What then is the cause of this new 
event? Perhaps the current of water through the vessel 
stopped ; perhaps it slowed too much ; perhaps the water 
itself was too cold as it came from the supply tank. 

Evidently there is a large number of facts which I should 
take into account in planning ways of preventing a similar 
occurrence. Often and often the single fact which we 
superficial observers name as the cause of an event is not 
the cause at all. It is merely a possible cause, which, under 
certain circumstances, might have been the real cause. It 
is seldom indeed that casual observation enables us to state 
with certainty that an event is the effect of a particular 
other event. Causation is not so simple. The causal rela- 
tion usually involves a lot of phenomena, not two alone. 

Explanation is merely an extension of description. — ■ 
When description has been carried to its limit, there is 



316 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

nothing more to be said about an object, or event. For 
the description necessarily includes all the relations of the 
object to other things, and knowledge of these relations is 
precisely what the explanations of science offer us. Ex- 
planation is, then, only a kind of description, namely, that 
which presents the conditions contributory to or insepara- 
ble from a phenomenon which we are observing. If I would 
study the exploding of powder, I must have powder to 
explode and ways of making it explode. I must arrange 
certain contributory conditions. And every sane person 
will admit that if my observations are to be long continued 
it will be necessary for me to know a great deal about 
these contributory conditions and to pay careful heed to 
them. The fact is that when one has fully described an 
event in its setting he has presented the relations so that 
every observer knows as much about them as he does. Such 
and such is the order of events — match, explosion, roar, 
break in wall — but who may say that there is anything 
sacred in this order. What if a friend should insist that 
the series of events happened in reverse order! I might 
hold him mentally unbalanced : I might believe that he is 
psychologically differently constituted than I. But, in any 
event, the honest thing — the only scientific thing — for the 
observer to do is to state the facts just as he observed them, 
leaving assumption of necessity or of uniformity aside. 

To know the how of events is open to us, to know the 
why is not. — Description seeks to present the how or the 
manner of occurrence of events. Explanation, as it is usu- 
ally defined, seeks to state why the occurrence happened 
as it did. The latter task in any other sense than as a 
particular extension of description is hopeless. We never 
discover the why of anything. As little in physics, chem- 
istry, physiology, as in psychology, ethics, or sociology, do 
we know why an event appears. I can not tell you why 
a molecule exists, any more than I can tell you why I 



EXPLANATIONS ARE POPULAR 317 

experience a sensation of touch at this instant. The mole- 
cule and the sensation are alike ultimate facts for me. I 
may tell you elaborately, and with high exactitude, of the 
conditions or circumstances under which the one or the 
other is observed by me, but further I can not go. As little 
can we scientists explain our own existence as we can 
explain the universe. We discover day by day more facts 
and more relations, more about the manner of existence 
of this and that interesting feature of ourselves and of 
our surroundings, but of the why of anything, in any other 
sense than this, we are ignorant. 

Nevertheless, science persists in using the term ex- 
planation, and properly. — It is worth while to distinguish 
explanatory description from ordinary simple statement 
of facts. The former reaches further than the latter. It 
deals with a wider range of phenomena. It is a special 
quest. It demands a special interest and attitude on the 
part of the observer. 

In psychology, as in physics, explanations are popular. 
— The love of the why of things springs not more from 
curiosity than from the practical significance of ability to 
control events. Once one knows the why and has learned 
to control the conditions of an event he is master of his 
lot. It has been said that one of the chief differences be- 
tween man and beast lies in the fact that the beast is at 
the mercy of its environment, whereas man is the master of 
his. The earth masters the animal; man masters the earth. 
Eather, we should say man strives for such mastery. Were 
his goal achieved there would be no suffering, no failures, 
no death ! 

There are two ways in which a psychological phe- 
nomenon may be explained. — Either in terms of other 
psychological phenomena, as one should naturally expect 
that it would be, or in terms of the physical conditions 
which accompany it. The former type of explanation is 



318 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

based upon psychical causation ; the latter upon the cor- 
relation of psychical with physiological phenomena. Both 
of these ways of explaining mental happenings are, as a 
fact, now employed, but on the whole the assumption of the 
existence of causal relations between mental phenomena 
seems to be unpopular with psychologists. "Why this is 
the case is not easy to understand. Let us examine 
each of the two possibilities of explaining psychological 
events. 

Psychical causation — the relation of one mental process 
to another. — It would seem natural that the psychologist 
should study, first of all, the nature of mental processes 
and their relations to one another. And further, it would 
seem inevitable that such an inquiry should yield precisely 
that kind of knowledge of these events that the procedure 
of physics, physiology, or anthropology yields concerning 
the physical events with which these subjects are con- 
cerned. Namely, a knowledge of the circumstances or con- 
ditions under which a particular phenomenon appears. 
Why, then, should not this knowledge of mental events be 
called by the same name as is like knowledge of physical 
events ? "Why not speak of psychical causation in precisely 
the same sense that we now speak of physical causation? 
For my part, I can discover no valid objection. In either 
case the knowledge is descriptive in nature and concerns 
relations of phenomena. But evidently we should inquire 
as to whether there are differences in the observed relations 
of psychical and physical events. In the occurrences about 
us there is an observed regularity of sequence, the roar 
always follows the explosion. Perhaps in the mental life 
this is not the case. Possibly psychology has no such 
observable relations as are used in the physical sciences 
for the purpose of explanation. This is a question of fact. 
Let us examine the information at hand, in our search for 
the answer. 



THE SEQUENCE OF MENTAL EVENTS 319 

The sequence of mental events and the regularity 
thereof. — How many hundred times have I observed that 
a certain visual sensation is followed by certain after- 
images? Is there not regularity and uniformity in this 
relation or sequence? May one not expect an after-sensa- 
tion to follow the sensations of sight, sound, touch, and 
may he not expect a definite sequence of varying after- 
images? Given a particular mental content, does one not 
observe time and time again the appearance of a certain 
image, idea, thought? There is just as much orderliness 
in mental events as in physical events, so far as the writer 
is able to discover. The apparent irregularity in the 
former, which so strongly impresses most psychologists, 
is due simply to the fact that we relatively seldom have 
precisely the same set of circumstances repeated. When 
the smell of scorching wood has been once experienced in 
connection with certain other mental processes, it is safe 
to expect it to be re-experienced when the remainder of 
the content is represented. One image definitely and per- 
sistently leads to another; one idea to another; one sensa- 
tion to another ; a particular sensation is uniformly followed 
by a particular feeling, emotion, memory. Are not these 
instances of sequences of events similar to those which 
give the basis for causal explanation in physics? I think 
so. Indeed, I am convinced that the first task of the 
psychologist is to study the nature of psychical events, and 
his second, to study their relations. The explanation of one 
mental process in terms of another is possible. "What psy- 
chology needs is more extensive and accurate information 
concerning the sequences of its phenomena. Too long the 
notion has held sway that psychical events are wayward, 
uncaused; that we are utterly incapable of discovering 
their causes ; or that their true causes are not other mental 
events at all but bodily events. This last view — and no 
other in my opinion has so retarded the development of 



320 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

real psychological insight and information — we must now 
consider in some detail. 

The explanation of mental processes in terms of bodily 
processes. — It is an obvious fact that bodily conditions 
accompany mental processes. The two seem to be inter- 
dependent. Ordinarily we are told that a blow on the 
head modifies or destroys consciousness, that a physical 
stimulus causes a sensation. We have been brought up to 
speak of mental processes as though their only important 
relations are to bodily conditions. This is unfortunate be- 
cause it leads us to overlook or neglect as unimportant the 
relations of mental phenomena to one another. Psychical 
causation, as we investigate it, increases our knowledge 
of these relations and our appreciation of their significance 
for a science of mind. 

Theories of the relation of mind to body. — There are, as 
Professor Strong puts it in his interesting discussion ' ' Why 
the Mind Has a Body," three groups of theories concern- 
ing this problem. They are (1) interactionist theories, (2) 
automatist theories, and (3) parallelist theories. 

" Interactionism regards the brain as an instrument em- 
ployed by the mind in its dealings in the world of objects. 
It accordingly asserts in causation an action of the body 
on the mind (stimulus, bodily processes, sensation), in voli- 
tion an action of the mind on the body (will act, bodily 
process). 

" Automatism conceives the brain process as the physical 
basis or condition of consciousness. It therefore holds that 
consciousness merely accompanies the brain-process with- 
out exerting any influence upon it." According to the 
conscious automaton theory of Huxley, consciousness is an 
effect of certain brain-processes, but it never becomes a 
cause and in its turn modifies the functioning of the 
brain. 

Parallelism maintains, as, for example, in Professor Clif- 



EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 321 

ford's theory, that consciousness and brain-processes flow 
along side by side without influencing one another. 

Professor Strong has most admirably characterized and 
contrasted these three varieties of theory of the relation of 
mind to body. " There are thus," he writes, " three dis- 
tinct theories as to the causal relations between mind and 
body : interactionism, asserting that the causal influence 
runs in both directions — in sensation from the body to 
the mind, in volition from the mind to the body; autom- 
atism, maintaining that it runs in one direction only — al- 
ways from the body to the mind; and parallelism, denying 
all causal influence and holding the relation to be of a 
different nature." (Strong, C. M. : Why the Mind Has 
a Body, pp. 1-3.) 

But how is consciousness to be explained? — It is the 
opinion of the writer that we shall progress most satisfac- 
torily in our study of consciousness if we refuse to tie our- 
selves to any of these theories, but instead study (1) the 
facts of consciousness in their mutual relations; (2) the 
facts of bodily life in their relations; and (3) the correla- 
tion of the two series of events. If hypothesis we must 
have, let it be that each series of events is sufficient unto 
itself for the purposes of description and explanation. The 
physicist who wishes to describe or explain lightning, or 
the physiologist w r ho wishes to describe and explain the 
beating of the heart, does not appeal to psychology for 
causes. He finds in the physical series of events those facts 
which enable him to perfect his accounts of the phenomena. 
Similarly the psychologist who wishes to describe and ex- 
plain a perception may find in the events of consciousness 
the necessary materials for his task. He need not appeal 
to physics or to physiology for aid. 

The proper tasks of the explaining psychologist. — It 
is the first task of the psychologist to study the structure 
of mind as if there were no such thing as body. It is his 



322 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

next task to attempt to explain what he has observed by 
describing the functional relations of mental processes. He 
should work, in the main, as though there were nothing in 
the world except psychic facts. Having learned all that 
he can about mind, he may profitably seek to correlate 
mental with bodily processes. But if with this he begins his 
psychological career, he is almost certain never to get at 
the real facts of psychology. Would it not be deemed 
absurd for the physiologist to attempt to explain bodily 
facts, which he only imperfectly knows, by asserting that 
they are caused by certain mental processes ? Surely. Nev- 
ertheless, this sometimes has been done in physiology, just 
as in psychology the reverse has been done. It is com- 
monly said that psychological explanations of physio- 
logical facts are a cloak for ignorance. The saying is 
equally true of physiological explanations of psychological 
processes. 

I am not arguing against the study of the relations of 
the body and mind: I am arguing for the introspective 
study of mental events in their relations. Body may be 
caused by mind; mind may be caused by body, or each 
may be caused in part by the other. But in any event it is 
the first business of the person who would study either to 
find out as much as possible about it before he tries to 
relate it to the other. To correlate physiology and psy- 
chology seems to be a most interesting and important task, 
but it loses its value when it is permitted by the science 
of psychology to crowd out real psychological explanation, 
for that really is the extension of psychological description 
into the realm of relations. 

The elementary fact is inexplicable. — In a discussion of 
his view of psychical causation the writer was asked re- 
cently, How do you explain a sensation of red? He 
replied, I do not explain it, nor do I attempt to explain it, 
any more than the chemist explains or can explain an atom. 



PSYCHICAL CAUSATION 323 

A sensation is just a psychic fact, an atom is similarly a 
pl^sical fact. Each is useful in enabling us to describe 
and explain more complex phenomena, but neither can be 
explained by the science which makes use of it. 

The complex object or event may be explained. — The 
experience of red can not be explained, but the perceptual 
experience of which it forms a part may be both described 
and explained. The atom can not be explained, but the 
chemical substance of which it is a part may be both de- 
scribed and explained. Description demands properties, 
and explanation demands properties and relations. When 
I have discovered the exact relations of certain sensations 
to one another and to certain affections and images, I am 
able to explain the appearance of a certain perception in 
my stream of consciousness. 

Psychical causation should be studied. — The objection 
that psychology can not give mental causes for its elemental 
facts we have seen to apply equally to the physical sciences. 
It really is not a valid objection. 

We should study psychical causation because mental 
processes really occur in certain definite relations to one 
another, and because it is through a search for causal ex- 
planations that we shall become intimately acquainted with 
these relations. The popular demand for physiological ex- 
planations sidetracks the psychologist and impedes the 
progress of science. 

A warning. — Almost certainly many readers of this 
chapter ivill jump to the conclusion that the writer is not 
interested in physiology or in physiological psychology and 
that he therefore underestimates their importance to the 
general science of psychology. On the contrary, he is keenly 
interested in everything physiological and, if anything, he 
is naturally inclined to value the knowledge of the rela- 
tions of mind to tody more highly than purely psycho- 
logical knowledge as it is yielded by self -observation. 



324 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

The -point is this: this is a text-book of psychology, not 
of physiology or of physiological psychology. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation and psycho-analysis. Introspection of asso- 
ciative consciousness under conditions of voluntary inhibition. 
(The association test.) Materials: Stop watch, or Munsterberg 
chronoscope; 1 two identical paper or wooden boxes — cigar boxes 
will do; two objects or groups of objects to be placed in the 
boxes; a list of forty words, ten of which refer directly to or 
suggest the contents of the one box, ten the contents of the other 
box, and the remainder the contents of neither box. 

The purpose of the test. (1) To give the student an oppor- 
tunity to introspect consciousness under the conditions of the 
voluntary inhibition of an idea; (2) to exhibit the content of 
consciousness of an individual by recording his associations and 
association times. 

This test may be made in many different ways. Ideas con- 
cerning some of these ways may be obtained from the following 
discussions of the method: 

Munsterberg, H. : On the witness stand, p. 82. — Yerkes, R. M., 
and Berry, C. S. : The association-reaction method of mental 
diagnosis. American Journal of Psychology, vol. 20, pp. 22-37, 
1909.— Leach, H. M., and Washburn, M. F. : Some tests by the 
association-reaction method of mental diagnosis. American 
Journal of Psychology, vol. 21, pp. 162-167, 1910. — Jung, C. G. : 
The association method. American Journal of Psychology, vol. 
21, pp. 219-269, 1910. 

The conduct of the test. The two boxes, referred to, with their 
contents properly arranged, should be placed in a room adjoining 
the class-room. The instructor should explain to the assembled 
class the nature and purpose of the experiment. He should then 
select a member of the class to serve as subject for the test. 
That individual should be asked to go into the adjoining room 
and carefully examine the contents of one of the boxes, leaving 

1 In the experience of the writer the Munsterberg chronoscope is a 
very satisfactory instrument for use in this experiment. See Titchen- 
er's Experimental Psychology, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 326, 337, for de- 
scriptions of various kinds of chronoscopes, among them the Mun- 
sterberg instrument. 



INTROSPECTION OF INHIBITION 325 

the other box unopened, and to return to the class-room to be 
tested by the association method. 

Upon the return of the subject, the instructor may proceed 
with the test as follows : The person to be tested should be 
seated facing the instructor and should be told to respond to 
each stimulus word as it is spoken by the instructor by giving 
as quickly as possible the idea which it calls up, but at the 
same time to avoid so far as possible giving associations which 
shall reveal to the instructor knowledge of the box which was 
examined. The instructor, as he utters a stimulus word, starts 
the chronoscope and stops it the instant he hears the associated 
word uttered by the subject. He then records, or has a student 
record for him, the interval which elapsed between stimulus and 
response. This is the association time. The test may be greatly 
facilitated by having members of the class write down the asso- 
ciations as they are given and the reaction times. 

At the conclusion of the test, the subject should write a full 
account of his experiences during the test; the stimulus words, 
associated words, and reaction times should be written on the 
blackboard and they should be carefully examined in an attempt 
to discover whether they give clues as to which box was ex- 
amined by the subject. After this preliminary study of the 
results of the test, the reaction times for the ten words which 
refer to each box and for the twenty words which are not 
supposed to have special significance should be averaged and the 
significance of any differences in these averages should be 
discussed. 

The following typical experiment is given as an example of 
the convenient form which the method may take as well as of 
the results which it has yielded in the hands of the writer. 

In this case one box contained a bottle filled with a white 
powder and labeled plainly, Strychnine — Poison. The other box 
contained a time card and a pocketbook with a ticket from 
Chicago to Ravenswood. 

The following table gives the list of forty words, numbers 1 to 
40, the associations which were given by the subject who was 
tested, and the reaction times. The ten words which were in- 
tended to suggest the contents of the poison box are preceded by 
an asterisk; the ten words which had reference to the railway 
box are followed by an asterisk; the twenty irrelevant words 
are unmarked. At the end of the table are given the average 
reaction times and the average variations for the three groups 



326 PHYSICAL AND PSYCHICAL EXPLANATION 

of words. It is to be noted that the reaction time to the poison- 
box words is very much longer than those to the other groups 
of words. 

An examination of the associations in this test reveals the 
following interesting points. The significant word " bottle," to 
which the association " glass " was given, caused marked delay, 
and the following word " stricken " so strongly suggested the 
contents of the poison box that response was inhibited for al- 
most ten seconds. The word anecdote was understood as anti- 
dote, thus indicating the presence of the idea of poison in the 
miiid of the subject. The nature of these associations, con- 
sidered in connection with the reaction times, clearly indicated 
that the subject had examined the contents of the poison box 
and was ignorant of the contents of the railway box. 



NO. OP 


STIMULUS 


REACTION 


REACTION 


WORD 


WORD 


WORD 


TIME 


1 


Book 


book 


1.90 


2 


Pansy 


flower 


2.27 


3 


Sugar 


sweet 


1.97 


4 


Grass 


green 


1.84 


5 


Umbrella 


rain 


1.76 


6 


Light 


dark 


1.99 


7 


Pen (ten) 


eleven 


1.76 


8 


*Rat 


cat 


1.88 


9 


* Kill 


bird 


2.46 


10 


City * (sitting) 


standing 


4.34 


11 


Coin * 


money 


1.89 


12 


Pillow 


willow 


3.72 


13 


Curtain 


shade 


2.16 


14 


* Bottle 


glass 


4.34 


15 


* Stricken 


licken 


9.70 


16 


* White 


paint 


2.89 


17 


* Deadly 


kill 


2.95 


18 


Hand * 


finger 


2.59 


19 


Time* 


minute 


2.23 


20 


North * 


south 


2.96 


21 


Raven * 


black 


2.05 


22 


Garden 


flower 


2.17 


23 


Lamp 


light 


2.09 


24 


Blue 


green 


2.25 


25 


Cloud 


sky 


3.47 



ASSOCIATION-REACTION METHOD 



327 



NO. OP STIMULUS 




REACTION 


REACTION 


WORD 


WORD 




WORD 


TIME 


26 


* Suicide 




kill 


2.16 


27 


Rug- 




carpet 


2.51 


28 


Yellow 




blue 


1.92 


29 


Coucluctor 


* 


motorman 


2.86 


30 


Tar 




pitch 


2.89 


31 


* Poise 




noise 


3.17 


32 


* Anecdote 


(antidote) 


medicine 


3.02 


33 


Brick 




red 


2.71 


34 


Chicago * 




city 


2.56 


35 


Public * 




private 


1.75 


36 


Ship 




boat 


2.12 


37 


Hammock 




swing 


2.91 


38 


* Glass 




tumbler 


1.91 


39 


Card * 




game 


2.26 


40 


Color 




blue 


2.46 






Irrelevant 


Poison-box 


Railway-box 






Words 


Words 


Words 


Average 


reaction time. . 


2.34 " 


3.45 " 


2.55 " 


Average 


variation 


.40" 


1.43 " 


0.51 " 



SUPPLEMENTARY READING 



Titchener, E. B. : Text-book of psychology, §§ 3, 4, 5, 9. 

Strong, C. A.: Why the mind has a body. 

Munstebberg, Hugo: Psychology and life, pp. 53-68, 191-195. 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE EXPLANATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA: PSY- 
CHICAL CAUSATION 

" The physiological psychologist must avoid the error, an error 
into which too many physiologists have fallen, of neglecting or 
despising the refinements and subtleties of the introspective psy- 
chologists. He must admit the primacy of introspective psychology, 
must recognize that all the objective methods of psychological study 
presuppose the results of the subjective or introspective method and 
can only be fruitful in so far as they are based upon an accurate 
introspective analysis of mental processes. He must recognize, too, 
that introspective psychology is in a much more advanced condition 
than neurology, and that his work must principally consist in the 
application of the results achieved by the former to the elucidation 
of the problems of the latter science, and must not regard his work 
as designed to supplant introspective psychology, but merely as its 
necessary complement. Nevertheless, he will not scruple to push his 
physiological explanations of the conditions of mental processes as 
far as possible, though admitting the hypothetical and speculative 
character that, in the present very imperfect state of our knowledge 
of the nervous system, his explanations necessarily have. 

" In accordance with these principles the following pages will first 
describe in general terms the structure of the nervous system and 
the nature of the nervous processes, and will then attempt to exhibit 
the correlations, and as far as possible the causal relations, between 
the nervous functions and the psychical processes as analyzed and de- 
scribed by the introspective psychologists." — McDougall, Wm. : 
Physiological psychology, pp. 12, 13. 

The essence of the causal relation is uniformity of the 
order of events. — The physical cause always precedes the 
physical effect. It is this that observation reveals to us. If 
even once we should discover two happenings which we 
had previously supposed to be related to one another as 
cause and effect occurring in reverse order, we should at 
once conclude that the one event is not necessarily the 
cause of the other. The fact is that we never observe neces- 
sary uniformity. 

328 



MENTAL SEQUENCES 329 

The important point for present consideration is that of 
observed sequences of events in consciousness. If the sort 
of regularity which we discover in the world about us and 
upon which we have learned to depend in all of the affairs 
of life, does not exist also in mental life, there is no ground 
for a science of psychology similar to the science of physi- 
ology, no ground for the explanation of consciousness in 
terms of mental processes, and no ground for the assump- 
tion that psychical events may be predicted and controlled 
as are physical events. 

Again, the question is one of fact. Do our mental proc- 
esses occur haphazard, now in one order, now in another, 
without uniformity or regularity ? Or does that regularity 
of sequence which forms the observational basis of what 
we call the causal relationship exist for psychology just as 
it does for physics or physiology? The material of this 
chapter, if supplemented by persistent and conscientious 
introspection, should enable every reader to answer this 
question to his own satisfaction. 

Examples of sequences of events in consciousness. — 
The stream of consciousness consists of a bewildering com- 
plexity of phenomena. It is difficult even to discover all of 
them, and almost hopeless is the task of working out their 
complicated relations. Yet, precisely this must be done, 
at one and another point, if we are to learn with certainty 
whether psychical events follow one another in orderly 
fashion instead of unpredictably. It is, of course, con- 
ceivable that the order of events in mental life differs 
radically from that in the physical world. While being 
regular, and describable in generalizations similar to our 
physical laws, it may be more complex and at the same 
time subject to a greater variety of sequences. We should 
not approach the task of studying the order of mental 
events with the idea that the only way to establish the 
existence of a causal relation between mental phenomena 



330 EXPLANATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 

is to prove that the sequences of mental events are precisely 
like those of bodily events. 

To repeat, for emphasis, certain statements of the previ- 
ous chapter — there is no sequence which enables us to ex- 
plain an elementary fact of science. We do not explain the 
products of chemical analysis: the atom, the molecule, the 
ion, the living cell. These are unexplained. For any 
physical event or object all that we can give in the way 
of an explanation is a statement of the conditions which 
are, so far as we can discover, necessary for its existence. 
We never give final causes ; all are proximate and partial. 
This is true also of psychology. We can not explain the 
sensation or affection, or other elementary process. These 
exist as facts for the science. We all accept them as data 
with which to work. As little are we able to explain the 
existence of a physical as of a psychical world. All that 
we can hope to do is account for certain of the manifesta- 
tions in these worlds, for certain of their more or less 
transient phases. 

To the question, What is the cause of this sensation of 
red which I am expeiiencing? the psychologist must an- 
swer, " I no more know than I know the cause of the ulti- 
mate products of chemical analysis. All that I can explain 
is the marvelously intricate and complex mental life which 
results from the interweaving of sensations and affections 
and images; of ideas and emotions and thoughts." 

Some sequences of sensations. — Certain sensations are 
uniformly followed by certain others. The primary sensa- 
tions of color, of light, of sound, of touch, of cold are regu- 
larly followed, under fixed conditions, by certain other ex- 
periences. (It is to be noted, that fixity or constancy of 
conditions is as necessary for uniformity of sequence in 
mental as in physical life.) We call them after-sensations 
or after-images. There is great variation in the appearance 
of these images and to the casual observer they seem to 



REGULARITY OF MENTAL SEQUENCES 331 

occur quite irregularly, at haphazard, and to conform to 
no general law. However, the more carefully one studies 
them the more certain he becomes of a definiteness of se- 
quence in these sense experiences. Indeed, whenever, and 
this is the supreme test of the causal relation in any sphere, 
I wish to experience an after-image of light or color or 
sound I voluntarily so arrange things that a sensation of 
light or color or sound shall appear in consciousness. I 
may have to try several times before I get the after-sensa- 
tion in the precise quality, intensity, vividness that I desire, 
but what additional reason need be asked for this inac- 
curacy of control than the imperfection of my knowledge 
of the relations of psychic processes. 

The matter deserves a fair test. — Subject yourself to in- 
trospection time after time, under external and internal 
conditions which are as nearly constant as you can make 
and keep them, and in the light of the results decide for 
yourself whether there is regularity in the sequence of 
mental events. For myself, I find a surprising degree of 
uniformity in the order and time of appearance of certain 
experiences, when I am sure that the conditions of observa- 
tion have remained reasonably constant. Too often we 
forget that external conditions have changed, that the light 
is no longer the same in intensity, or position, or that new 
stimuli have appeared, and even more frequently we ignore 
those internal changes which we roughly indicate by saying 
that we have become fatigued, that our attention has shifted, 
that a new feeling has come into consciousness. Myriad are 
the modifications in consciousness which may alter the 
sequence of sensations, or of after-sensations. 

But let us suppose that conditions are, from observation 
to observation, kept as nearly constant as is possible to 
human ingenuity, then what happens time after time when, 
after looking for fifteen seconds, no more, no less, at an 
illuminated spot whose color, tint, chroma, and brightness 



332 EXPLANATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 

are precisely the same, I immediately look away to a dark 
surface ? What happens in consciousness ? A visual after- 
image is experienced, and that without fail. May we not 
reasonably think of the sensation, with its concomitant 
experiences, as the condition or cause of this after-sensa- 
tion? Not until we observe the after-sensation preceding 
instead of following the original sensation, shall we have 
good reason to believe that this observation does not con- 
form to the requirements of psychological causation. 

A typical causal series. — " If at the end of 1 min. the 
half -black and half -white card (of the adaptation frame 




''///A//, 




f 



Fig. 10. Adaptation frame. (After Titchener.) 



represented by Fig. 10) is allowed to fall, and there is 
shown in its place a background of uniform gray, the 
observer (whose gaze has been fixed upon the button at 
the middle of the line of contact of the white and black 
fields) will see an intense black where he previously saw 



DENIAL OF PSYCHIC CAUSATION 333 

white, and a brilliant white where he previously saw 
black." (Titchener, E. B.: Text-book of Psychology, 
p. 74.) 

This description of a sequence of mental events, which 
fulfills all of the requirements which we make of causal 
physical sequences, is quoted from a psychologist who de- 
nies the existence of psychical causation, and who claims 
that our only way to explain mental processes is to refer 
them to certain correlated bodily (physical) processes 
which are not their causes! 

Grounds for denying psychic causation in this case. — 
It is claimed that the visual after-images are extremely 
variable and unpredictable and that we may not believe 
the primary sensation to be the necessary condition of a 
particular after-sensation. To this we may reply that the 
first and more important fact is that under definitely de- 
scribable conditions, an after-sensation regularly follows 
a primary sensation. This, surely, is a causal sequence. 
Further, we may reply that if the after-sensation varies 
in its attributes it must be because of changes in the ex- 
ternal or internal conditions. For is it not held by the 
very psychologists who deny the causal relation to psychic 
processes that every such event corresponds to certain 
bodily events? On their own ground they are logically 
forced to admit that each of the many after-sensations 
which one may experience after a given primary visual 
sensation has its own bodily conditions. This, to be sure, 
is to admit that the conditions of observation have not 
remained constant. 

Psycho-physical parallelism forces the acceptance of psy- 
chical causation. 

There are definite observable sequences of sensations 
and these same observed sequences may be used, nay, must 
be, if psychology is to explain its facts after the manner of 
the physical sciences. 



334 EXPLANATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 

All that we claim in this connection is that the same 
bodily conditions are uniformly accompanied by the same 
mental processes. We are misled into thinking mental 
events unpredictable, irregular in occurrence and lacking 
causal relations to one another, because we do not observe 
the changes which occur in bodily conditions and in mental 
content from moment to moment. 

Sequences of sensations and affections. — Certain sensa- 
tions are distinguished by the fact that they call up dis- 
agreeable affections, feelings, or emotions. We come to 
dread these sensations because of this fact. Why should 
we not think of them as the causes of their sequels? A 
particular odor, not in itself unpleasant, is intensively, 
vividly, disagreeable to me because it was once in my life 
associated with a long illness. Have not the odors of iodi- 
form, of ether, or of chloroform feeling-sequels which are 
as uniformly presented as is the effect of pricking a bubble ? 
The sensation is not the affection, but neither is the affec- 
tion inseparable from the sensation. 

The regular and invariable sequence is sensation, af- 
fection.— It is precisely this result of observation within 
the sphere of my mental life that forces me to believe that 
psychical phenomena are orderly, and that with further 
knowledge we shall be in a position to formulate some of 
the laws of this orderliness, just as we have done in the 
case of the physical world. 

Each sensation of a grown-up human being has certain 
observable sequels. Sometimes they are prominent, some- 
times they are overshadowed by other psychic events. It is 
only to careful introspection that they are uniformly re- 
vealed. The affection is only one of many experiences 
which is definitely connected for me with the odor of iodi- 
form. For the present, we are interested merely in the 
occurrence of sequences which may be verified and re- 
peated. The possibility of repetition is important. If I 



SEQUENCES IN IMAGES 335 

wish to experience a particular feeling, for introspective 
purposes, I may seek to do so by gaining a certain sensa- 
tion. That is, I seek a stimulus for the sensation, trusting 
that the feeling will appear in due course. Is not the 
same our procedure in the practical world of physical 
happenings ? Does this not prove that we assume psychical 
causation in daily life? 

Sequences in images. — In the formation of a percept 
certain psychic elements enter into definitely clescribable 
relations of coexistence with certain affections and images. 
The complex constitutes an experience to which we give 
the special name percept. Now, in a very important sense 
the elements which go to make up the percept are causes 
of the percept; without them and their definiteness of 
relation the experience could not come into being. The 
only question is whether they possess uniformity of rela- 
tion. Any one may settle this for himself by observing 
carefully the structure of his consciousness of a particular 
object. A most surprising uniformity is hidden by a 
superficial variability, to which we are wont to give 
attention. My perception of the pen with which I write 
these words I may explain by describing the various 
sensations, affections, images, and the relations which 
they must bear to one another if I am to experience the 
percept. 

What is the cause of a psychical compound or com- 
plex? — The relating of certain elements of consciousness in 
definite ways. Precisely the nature of these ways it is the 
business of the analyzing psychologist to discover. The 
cause of an idea, a memory experience, an emotion, a 
thought, a sentiment may be given only by so describing 
the conditions of its existence that the reasons for its 
appearance at a certain time are clear. 

This is the only strictly psychological explanation of an 
experience that can be given. It is merely an extension of 



336 EXPLANATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 

description, to be sure, but so likewise are all of the ex- 
planations of physical science, for they merely state the 
conditions of an event. 

Sequences of perceptions, ideas, and images in 
thought. — There are no more striking examples of mental 
sequences than the associative trains of ideas. "Who has not 
had one idea " call up another " time and again, until 
it seemed almost as though the one could not be experienced 
without the other? Is this a causal relation? 

The sequence of ideas, as I attempt to recall a face which 
I saw last week, constantly leads, beyond itself. I discover 
by self-observation that there are psychological reasons 
(conditions) for the appearance of images, ideas, feelings, 
thoughts which at first struck me as quite irrelevant and 
mere chance occurrences. 

Take for example the associative train which terminates, 
as previously described, in my consciousness of the name 
Kushworth. At least a dozen times the various steps in that 
associative process have appeared in my consciousness. I 
have come to regard one idea as the cause of the next. Am 
I wrong? 

Surely it is worth while to observe as carefully as we 
may the relations of our experiences to one another, as 
well as to bodily processes. 

It is the writer's belief that precisely as certain physical 
conditions bring about the formation of ice, the vaporization 
of water, the compression of air, so certain mental condi- 
tions bring about the formation of an idea, an emotion, a 
judgment. When we know the conditions in the one case as 
in the other, there will no longer be question about the 
principle of causality in psychology. It is simply our 
ignorance which makes our mental life seem uncaused and 
haphazard. Growth of knowledge enables us to formulate 
laws. The conditions of image formation, I am confident, 
will not appear to us less definite and regular in their rela- 



INTROSPECTION OF ASSOCIATIONS 337 

tion to the experience when we know them intimately than 
do those of the formation of steam, of ice, of coal. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. Introspection of associative complexes. The 
association test continued. Materials: same as for the previous 
exercise, with the substitution of new contents for the two boxes 
and a new list of words, or of the description of a series of acts 
to be carried out by one of the individuals tested. 

For the sake of variety, it may prove desirable instead of 
repeating the association test under conditions similar to those 
previously used, to attempt to discover which of two individuals 
has knowledge of certain facts. 

This has been done by the writer by selecting two members 
of the class and sending them out of the room with an envelope 
containing directions as to certain things which are to be done. 
One of the students — which one should be decided after they 
leave the room — is to carry out the directions; the other should 
know nothing about the contents of the envelope. 

The students later return to the class-room, one at a time, to be 
tested by the association method. 

Upon the completion of the test, each student may be called 
upon to report interesting and important points of introspection, 
in order that the reaction-time results and the associations may 
be given introspective significance for the class. 

The results of the test may be handed to a member of the 
class for detailed study and report. 

To another member of the class, the task of looking up and 
reporting briefly on the literature of the association method may 
profitably be assigned. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Wundt, Wm.: Outlines of psychology, §22. 
Stout, G. F. : Manual of psychology, chapter 3. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES: CORRELATION 

" When I endeavored to learn from the literature more precisely 
how brain anatomy and psychic phenomena are related to one an- 
other in the lower animals, I discovered something very surprising. 
It is true that I found in all the text-books very promising illustra- 
tions of the brains of sharks, frogs, rabbits, and other animals, yet 
I remember as if it were to-day the lively undeception which I experi- 
enced when I found that in all the books, even Wundt's great work, 
the psychological part of the text made no reference to these illus- 
trations. I discovered that psychology had made no further use 
of comparative anatomy than, so to speak, as a means of illustrating 
its texts. I gradually discovered the reason for this. In reality 
anatomy has had nothing to offer to psychology." — Edingee, Ludwig : 
The relations of comparative anatomy to comparative psychology. 
Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, vol. 18, p. 437. 
1908. 

" Since consciousness depends upon organic processes in the brain, 
the sum-total of the changes induced by these processes must form 
an objective symbol of consciousness. The structure of the brain 
statically symbolizes in a certain fashion — just as a machine symbol- 
izes an industry — all that may occur in consciousness, the poten- 
tiality of the particular psyche, and therefore not only symbolizes the 
animal's body itself but also whatever is accessible in the external 
world to the animal and the relationships of action and reaction 
which theoretically link together the environment and the organism. 
If our anatomical knowledge was complete we could deduce from 
the structure of a brain not only the size, form, and the structure 
of the animal to which it belonged, but also the environment in which 
the animal lived, its habits, and the activity it was capable of 
exhibiting. 

" There is no doubt that anatomy, aided by what we know of 
physiology at the present time, defective and disconnected though it 
may be, can answer at least in a general fashion many problems 
of this nature. Conversely, where physiological and psychological 
attitudes are known, the anatomist can account for certain singular- 
ities Avhich some species of animals show in their cerebral cortex. 
Following precisely this parallelism of cerebral anatomy with physi- 
ology and the psychology of certain animals, Gall succeeded in estab- 
lishing the fact that the brain cortex is the particular organ of 
psychic activity." — Ltjgaro, Ernesto: Modern problems in psychiatry, 
chapter 3. " Anatomical Problems," p. 74. 

338 



MIND AND BODY 339 

Two forms of an interesting question. — Psychical and 
physical scientists approach the problem of the relation 
between mind and body from such different points of view 
that they formulate the fundamental question quite differ- 
ently. The psychologist asks, Why has the mind a body? 
The biologist asks, Why has the body a mind? Each form 
of the question has been answered tentatively in most 
diverse ways, but up to the present time no one has pre- 
sented a solution of the problem which suits both psychol- 
ogists and biologists. For the students of mental phenom- 
ena, consciousness is of prime importance and bodily 
existence is of secondary interest. In fact, the psychologist 
studies the body only that he may the better understand 
the mental life. For the students of biology, physical phe- 
nomena are, as a rule, of prime importance and mental 
phenomena are simply troublesome appearances which de- 
mand explanation in terms of bodily processes. The modern 
biologist studies consciousness only in so far as it aids him 
in understanding the physical existence of organisms. To 
be sure there are exceptions on both side. There are psy- 
chologists who adopt a point of view which is strictly 
biological, and there are likewise biologists who grant 
that mental phenomena are not subordinate to bodily 
existence. 

We shall not seek answers to either of the questions pro- 
posed, except in so far as the study of the correlation of 
mental and bodily processes will serve that end. 

The assumptions involved. — The question, Why does 
the mind have a body? seems to imply that the body is 
merely a sort of temporary abode of consciousness. And 
the question, Why does the body have a mind? similarly 
implies that consciousness is only a transient accompani- 
ment of bodily existence. The first question suggests that 
bodily happenings should be accounted for in terms of con- 
sciousness. The second suggests instead that consciousness 



340 BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES 

should be explained in bodily terms. Each form of the 
fundamental query involves an assumption. Many psy- 
chologists, either avowedly or in effect, assume that mental 
processes can not be fully accounted for by biological ex- 
planations, and likewise many biologists assume that they 
can be so accounted for. Now, the point of view from which 
this book is written makes it quite unnecessary, and unde- 
sirable, to accept either of these assumptions. Instead of 
working on the presupposition that mind causes body, or 
that body causes mind, we may more profitably admit to 
ourselves that we do not know whether a causal relation 
exists between the two sets of phenomena. Thus we should 
be free to work toward a solution of the problem, without 
the encumbrance of a philosophical system or of prejudicial 
assumptions. It is this attitude of interested ignorance 
that would seem most favorable to the discovery of the real 
relation between body and mind. It may sometime become 
indisputably clear that body is merely the shell of mind 
and that the latter may exist apart from any organism, 
or it may become as clear that mind is subordinate to body 
and can not exist apart from it. We should rather seek 
facts openmindedly than strive to gain support for one or 
the other of these diverse views. 

A substitute for the above assumptions. — Refusing to 
believe, in the absence of facts, that mind can or can not 
exist apart from body, we may with profit study the mani- 
festations of bodily and mental life with a view to cor- 
relating them. This is the task of explanation through 
correlation. Certain psychologists claim that it is the only 
way open for the explanation of psychical phenomena. 
Each sensation, affection, emotion, thought, they tell us 
must be explained by being referred to the particular bodily 
processes which it accompanies. But these same psychol- 
ogists, for the most part, do not insist that the bodily proc- 
esses cause the mental events. Instead, they claim that we 



CORRELATION AS EXPLANATION 341 

do not know the causes of changes in consciousness; that 
there is no such thing as psychical causality ; that the only 
explanations we have for mental phenomena are their ac- 
companying bodily phenomena. From the previous chap- 
ter it is clear that this view is not acceptable to the writer. 
He prefers, on the basis of introspection as well as logic, to 
place explanation in terms of psychical causality among 
the tasks of the psychologist, and to admit, as one of his 
border-line tasks, connecting physiology and psychology, 
the study of the correlation of mental processes with bodily 
processes. This task yields a subject which is recognized 
as physiological psychology or psycho-physiology, accord- 
ing to the point of view and relative emphasis laid upon 
one or the other aspect of the phenomena. The psychologist 
speaks of physiological psychology, and the physiologist of 
psycho-physiology. 

Consciousness is known to us only in connection with 
bodies. — If any one had succeeded in observing conscious- 
ness apart from a living body the position of the science 
of psychology would be clearly established, for it would 
be rendered independent of biology, so far as the right to 
existence is concerned. But no one really has made such 
an observation, to the satisfaction of scientists. Therefore 
it is that all natural scientists insist that mental life should 
be studied in connection with bodily life. 

The organism is a whole. It possesses a certain form, 
changing from moment to moment; it exhibits manifold 
functions or activities, it also possesses experiences. There 
are, then, three aspects of a living thing which merit care- 
ful study. The first of the general aspects of life is dealt 
with in the well- developed sciences of structure : gross anat- 
omy, histology, embryology, cytology. The second is dealt 
with in the newer sciences of function : general physiology, 
experimental zoology, heredity, animal behavior. The third 
is less satisfactorily dealt with in the psychical sciences: 



342 BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES 

individual psychology, psycho-genesis, social psychology, 
psychiatry, sociology. 

It is the present mode to regard all of these sciences as 
strictly biological because they deal with aspects of organ- 
isms. It remains, as has already been pointed out early in 
this text-book, for us to discover whether consciousness is 
really and necessarily an aspect of bodily existence. Per- 
haps its independent existence may be demonstrated. 

The nature of the task of correlation. — -Correlation 
means for psychology the observation of the bodily condi- 
tions which accompany, and apparently condition or cause, 
a given mental process. It means the study not alone of 
the changes which occur in the various parts of the body 
as consciousness changes from moment to moment, but also 
of the definite changes in the structure of the organism 
which become more or less well established in connection 
with certain forms of consciousness. 

When I experience a sensation of bitter, what is the 
condition of my body? Is there anything definitely con- 
nected with the mental event? Wherein does the condition 
differ from that when, instead, I experience a sensation of 
green ? These are typical psycho-physiological questions. 

The nervous system and consciousness. — First, in seek- 
ing the correlation of body and mind, we are wont to note 
the parts of the body, or organs, with which consciousness 
seems to be associated. Of special importance, so far as 
physiological evidence goes, is the nervous system. Every 
psychologist, after he has really learned what introspection 
means and become familiar witli the important facts and 
principles of mental life, should familiarize himself with 
the structure and functions of the human nervous system: 
the sense-organs (receptors), the nerves (conductors), the 
nerve ganglia (centers), and the organs of motion and of 
secretion (effectors) ; for only in the light of a thorough- 
going knowledge of these biological facts can correlation 



BRAIN AND CONSCIOUSNESS 343 

become significant. Let us then turn first to correlations 
of bodily organs with mental phenomena. 

Structures and mental events which do not exist apart, 
so far as we know. — There are certain commonplaces of 
observation which come under the head of bodily and 
mental correlations. Among them are: no eyes, no visual 
sensations; no ears, no auditory sensations; no nose, no 
smell sensations. These definite parts of the body to which 
sensations are referred are called by the psychologist sense 
organs, and by the physiologist receptors. According to 
the size or degree of development of a given sense organ, 
we infer the degree of importance of a certain mode of 
sensation in the life of an organism. We should, for exam- 
ple, expect the dog, whose sense of smell is highly developed, 
to have a much larger and more elaborate sense organ of 
smell than has the pigeon, whose sense of smell is rela- 
tively simple and unimportant. And this really is the case. 
Thus it is true that the psychologist is not infrequently 
led to assume the presence of certain sensations in the 
mental life of an animal simply because the animal pos- 
sesses the particular organ which appears to be responsible 
for the sensations. To the comparative anatomist a highly 
developed eye or ear suggests that these organs play an 
important role in the life of the organism; to the psy- 
chologist they suggest that the animal experiences a variety 
of visual and auditory sensations. 

It is not alone sense organs which have become signs 
of mental processes. — The presence and degree of develop- 
ment of various portions of the brain and of other groups 
of nerve cells have acquired a similar value because of their 
correlation with certain mental facts. 

It is known, for instance, that a large olfactory lobe — 
that portion of the brain which is most directly connected 
with the sense organs of smell — is possessed by animals 
whose sense of smell is unusually keen, and that the con- 



344 BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES 

verse is true of animals whose smell is poor. Similarly- 
observation has indicated that the presence of the portion 
of the brain which is called the cerebral cortex is likely to 
be accompanied by highly complex ideational life, asso- 
ciative processes, and memories. Hence it has become the 
custom to assume that possession of a cerebral cortex indi- 
cates the possession of intelligence. 

A sound body implies a sound mind. — It is definitely 
known that our ability to do a certain thing depends upon 
the wholeness of certain parts of the body. The destruction 
of small portions of the brain renders one incapable of 
moving his finger, hand, right arm, right leg, upper lip, 
or tongue. Similarly destruction of certain parts of the 
body disturbs one's consciousness. This or that mode of 
sensation may drop out of the mental life of the individual, 
as small parts of the brain are cut away; and the same 
is true of all mental phenomena. Each particular kind 
of experience seems to depend upon a certain bodily organ 
or part thereof. Instances might be multiplied beyond 
number of just such correlations, which have been discov- 
ered by physiologist and psychologist. But the few which 
have been mentioned will suffice to make clear the essentials 
of correlation. The student who really wishes to under- 
stand the nervous system, or any other portion of the living 
body, in its connection with consciousness should go to 
anatomy and physiology for accounts of the structure and 
functions of the nervous system ; to physiological-psychol- 
ogy for an account of the correlations; and to psychology 
proper for the facts of mental life. 

But structures are crude indications of mental proc- 
esses. — A particular bodily organ may undergo slight 
changes with which are connected most radical changes in 
consciousness. For example, although the presence of an 
eye may indicate that I experience visual sensations, only 
the nature of the chemical changes in the organ can enable 



BODILY CONDITIONS OF EMOTIONS 345 

us so to correlate a sensation of green, or white, or purple 
with the bodily condition that the kind of sensation may 
be predicted. Therefore it is that instead of simply 
observing the presence or absence of a particular organ, 
in our attempts to correlate bodily wlth~Taental_m'ocesses, 
we must observe minutely the changes which occur~nT~the 
organ. The retina, the sensitive portion of the eye, is so 
influenced by light that it undergoes a great variety of 
changes. Certain of these changes are associated with 
color sensations, others with light sensations. Could we 
observe the retina with sufficient care and accuracy we 
should be able to say that its condition is such as is accom- 
panied by a sensation of green, or white, or purple. And 
so it is throughout psycho-physiology. The ideal is to 
gain that intimacy of acquaintance with the bodily con- 
ditions which are present when the individual experiences 
a certain mental event, that the two may definitely be cor- 
related so that when the one event is observed we may with 
a high degree of probability expect to be able to observe 
the other. 

The best example of psycho-physical correlation ap- 
pears in connection with emotions. — The bodily picture 
of an emotion is something with which we are familiar, 
and every adult human being has learned with skill to inter- 
pret a person's bodily attitude in terms of his emotion. 
It is just because we have correlated clenched fists, tightly 
closed teeth and lips, flashing eyes, tense muscles, a flushed 
face, and a threatening attitude with anger that we assume 
the presence of the latter experience when we observe the 
bodily conditions described. As was stated in a previous 
chapter, we can not say that the bodily state causes the 
anger, neither can we say that the anger causes the bodily 
expression. The two sets of events exist in correlation but 
not necessarily in causal relation. Nevertheless, our inabil- 
ity to discover the causal relation does not render the cor- 



346 BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES 

relation valueless to science. In practical life we know 
perfectly well that bodily states serve as signs of mental 
events and are acted upon just as if they were the mental 
events. If a man acts as though he were angry, we pre- 
pare for his anger. Yet, we should not do this if we did 
not think him angry! Psycho-physical correlations are of 
indisputable practical importance. Indeed, apart from the 
study of the characteristics of mental life and the prin- 
ciples which it exemplifies, there is nothing more interest- 
ing or more likely to be of practical importance to the race 
in connection with psychology than the correlation of 
bodily with mental phenomena. But one should be an 
expert psychologist, anatomist, and physiologist before he 
attempts such correlation. 

The great difficulty in correlating body and mind. — 
There is one serious practical difficulty in the way of 
psycho-physiology at present. "We are not able to observe 
bodily changes with sufficient exactitude, detail, or thor- 
oughness to enable us to discover correlations that are of 
real value. There is nothing discouraging in this situation. 
It is merely the status of our sciences. 

If when a sense organ of taste is subjected to the action 
of a chemical substance which you and I describe as sweet, 
we could observe minutely the changes which occur in the 
cell, we should obtain knowledge of the important bodily 
processes which accompany the sensation of sweetness. But 
even were our knowledge of the changes in the sense organ 
perfect, may there not be a multitude of changes in other 
portions of the body which are as definitely correlated with 
the sensations as are those in that particular cell? Are 
there not particular changes in the nerves of taste which 
connect the cell with the brain, changes also in certain 
of the cells of the brain itself, and do not these changes 
appear whenever that particular quality of taste called 
sweet is present? This suggests how hopelessly vague and 



IMPORTANCE OF CORRELATIONS 347 

imperfect is our statement that the sensation of sweet is 
correlated with changes in the body — and especially in the 
organs of taste and in the temporal lobes of the brain. 

It is precisely because of this meagerness and incomplete- 
ness of our knowledge of the bodily phenomena which ac- 
company mental phenomena that the writer insists upon 
the thorough study of consciousness, in an introductory 
course in psychology, instead of the study of the super- 
ficially known connections of mind with body. Just so 
surely as we permit ourselves at the outset of our study 
of psychology to turn to psycho-physiology we lose the op- 
portunity of becoming proficient in either field. We should 
determine to understand both bodily processes and mental 
processes before we undertake to study their relations. 

The importance of correlating bodily and mental 
processes. — If it is important that we observe phenomena, 
seek their laws, and strive to explain them from the point 
of view of the psychical scientist, as well as from the very 
different point of view of the physical scientist, then, surely, 
it is also important for us to compare and correlate the 
results which are obtained by the two groups of sciences. 

Throughout this book emphasis has been laid upon the 
desirability of studying objects of scientific inquiry single 
mindedly, whole heartedly, and enthusiastically from one 
point of view. Whether it be the psychical or the physical 
makes no difference unless perchance one wishes to obtain 
psychological information, or physical information. The 
idea underlying this emphasis is that we lose infinitely more 
than we gain, especially as beginners in psychology, if we 
attempt to shift frequently from the point of view of the 
psychologist to that of the physiologist. 

It is now in place to insist that the tasks of psycho- 
physiology are quite as interesting, quite as important, 
and quite as worthy of the scientist's best efforts as are 
those of either the psychologist or the physiologist, and 



348 BODILY AND MENTAL PROCESSES 

that they should not be neglected by the student who is 
well grounded in psychology and physiology. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of the simple reaction con- 
sciousness. Materials: a stop watch, or better, a Miinsterberg 
chronoscope ; a number of bits of cord, each about six inches long 
and knotted at each end. 

Measurement of simple tactual reaction time. If it is con- 
venient, the members of the class may be arranged in a 
circle so that each can, with his right hand, touch the shoul- 
der of his neighbor. The instructor, having directed that eyes 
be closed and that the right hand be placed on the shoulder to be 
tapped, with the forefinger raised ready for reaction, starts the 
series of reactions by quickly and lightly tapping the shoulder 
of the student on his right and at the same instant starting the 
time-measuring instrument (stop watch or chronoscope). The 
student, as soon as he feels the tap on his shoulder, lightly taps 
the shoulder of his neighbor on the right, and so on around the 
circle. The last student in the circle taps the shoulder of the 
instructor, who responds by stopping the time-measuring 
instrument. 

The interval recorded, divided by the number of individuals 
in the group, yields the average simple tactual reaction time. 
The experiment should be repeated ten or twenty times and the 
results should then be averaged. 

Each student should, at the end of the tests, write an account 
of the introspections made during the experiment. The follow- 
ing questions should be answered. Did you think of the ex- 
pected stimulus (tap on the shoulder), or of the movement which 
you were to make? Which attentive consciousness would enable 
you to react the more quickly; the more accurately? 

Another method of passing along the stimulus may be sug- 
gested. Each member of the class may be supplied with a short 
cord, knotted at both ends. The chain is completed by having 
the individuals hold an end of one of these cords in each hand. 
The stimulus is passed along in the following manner. The 
instant the instructor starts the chronoscope he jerks lightly on 
the cord in his right hand. The instant the student holding the 
other end of the cord feels the jerk he similarly jerks on the 
cord held in his right hand, and so on until the last individual 



SUPPLEMENTAEY READING 349 

in the circle is reached. He, instead of pulling a cord with his 
right hand, touches the hand of the instructor as it rests upon 
the key of the chronoscope. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapters 2 and 3. 

McDougael, Wm.: Physiological psychology, chapter 1. 

Edingeb, L. : The relations of comparative anatomy to comparative 

psychology. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 

vol. 18, pp. 437-467. 1908. 
Wundt, Wm. : Physiological psychology, vol. 1. 
Ziehkn, Th. : Physiological psychology. 
Sherrington, C. S. : The integrative action of the nervous system. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

STIMULI, BODILY PROCESSES, AND SENSATIONS 

" Receptors which initiate reflex movements advantageous in re- 
gard to some locus of the surface of the body itself, e.g., removal 
of irritation thence, initiate as sense-organs sensations referred to 
that same locus. Instances might be multiplied, but they have risen 
prominently in several of the foregoing lectures, and are sufficiently 
before our minds now. A practical inference from them is that 
physiology and psychology, instead of prosecuting their studies, as 
some now recommend, more strictly apart one from another than at 
present, will find it serviceable for each to give to the results 
achieved by the other even closer heed than has been customary 
hitherto. 

" Besides this similarity of time-relation and other features between 
the physiological and psychical signs of neural activity, another 
link connects the psychological and physiological for the biologist. 
To the physiology of pure reflexes, that is, reflexes devoid of psychical 
accompaniment so far as introspection can discover, psychological 
interest nevertheless attaches, and on a very distinct ground. This 
ground of connection is seen if inquiry is followed along the animal 
scale in the direction from higher forms to lower rather than by the 
usually more favorable reverse approach. This is partly because we 
directly observe psychical phenomena by introspection only, that is, 
only in ourselves; and the facts discovered by introspection are 
applicable to other beings the more readily the more those beings 
resemble ourselves, namely, are animals ranking near to man." — 
Sherrington, C. S : The integrative action of the nervous system, pp, 
386-387. 

Physiological psychology deals with three groups of 
phenomena. — Observation indicates that sensations are the 
accompaniments of certain processes in the nervous system, 
and that these processes are, in their turn, usually the se- 
quels of certain physical phenomena. We have come, there- 
fore, to distinguish three groups or classes of phenomena: 
(1) physical changes, which serve as stimuli for the organ- 
ism ; (2) physiological processes, which serve as accompani- 
ments of sensations; (3) and psychical processes. 

350 



THE NATURE OF STIMULI 351 

It shall be our task in this chapter to inquire somewhat 
more carefully than we have done heretofore .into the na- 
ture and relations of these three classes of events. 

The nature of stimuli. — We, as living creatures, exist 
in a world of forces. About us, and also within us, changes 
in energy are constantly occurring. One form of energy is 
transformed into another. Chemical energy produces heat ; 
heat in turn is converted into electricity ; electricity becomes 
mechanical energy, and so on endlessly. The energy about 
us, in its varied forms, heat, light, electricity, mechanical 
energy, we speak of as our environment. The energy trans- 
formations of the organism — and some, at least, of the same 
sorts of energy manifest themselves there as in the environ- 
ment — we speak of as physiological processes. As in the 
external world, quite apart from living things, according 
to the assumption of physics, forces are constantly acting 
and producing changes in the amount and distribution of 
a given kind of energy, so within the body forces produce 
similar changes. The environment of a living creature is 
not something constant, static, fixed as to its characters; it 
is a group of energies, whose form and distribution is not 
the same in two successive moments. In the same way 
the organism. itself is constantly undergoing changes. These 
we recognize as waste and repair, growth and decay, activ- 
ity and repose. The body continues to be alive only so 
long as these changes continue in certain definite ways 
which condition self-maintenance. In death there is a 
radical change in the nature of the bodily processes and 
self-repair rapidly ceases. 

Definition of stimulus. — In addition to the changes in 
environment and in the organism which are constantly 
occurring, there are also to be observed definite relations 
between the two sets of changes. The changes in environ- 
ment from time to time influence the processes in the living 
body. Certain of these environmental changes we call ex- 



352 STIMULI, BODILY PROCESSES, SENSATIONS 

ternal stimuli, for they serve to produce certain definite 
changes in the organism the sum of which is known as 
stimulation. Stimuli are physical events which cause or 
condition certain other physical events called the physio- 
logical processes of stimulation. For example, a quantity 
of energy in the form of heat comes into relation to the 
skin of the hand. It acts upon certain organs of the hand 
— the receptors or sense-organs of warmth — and in them 
there occurs a production or transformation of energy which 
in turn causes a more or less extensive change in the form 
and distribution of energy throughout the body. From 
the sense-organ, or organs, of the skin a nerve impulse, 
whose energetic nature is certain, although we are uncer- 
tain as to the exact nature of the energy, passes over the 
nerves to the spinal cord or to the brain. There further 
changes occur by the transformation of the energy into yet 
another form or by the initiation of a new series of events 
which leads to movements of the organism. The train of 
events between the application of heat and the withdrawal 
of the hand may be long and complicated. It is impossi- 
ble for the physicist, the physiologist, or the psychologist 
to describe it completely. But we know that it is a train 
of energetic physical and physiological 1 phenomena and 
that it therefore is material for physical and physiological 
study. With these events as such, the psychologist has 
nothing to do. He attends to them only when he under- 
takes to correlate them with the psychical events which 
are said to be conditioned by or to accompany them. 

The organism is not sensitive to all forms of energy. — 
There are many forms of energy making up the organism's 
environment, but any given organism or type of organism is 
stimulated by only a few forms and amounts of energy. 

1 It is safer, perhaps, not to assume that all bodily processes 
(physiological events) are similar to physical processes. Therefore 
the expression physiological energetic phenomena. 



LIMITATIONS OF SENSIBILITY 353 

Certain human beings are sensitive to sound, heat, cold, 
light, chemical action of a number of kinds, electricity, 
pressure, but their range of sensitiveness is no indication of 
the forms or amounts of energy to which other animals 
are sensitive. The ant is said to be affected by ultra violet 
light — we are not; the mouse is said to respond to tones 
which are inaudible to us. Illustrations might be multi- 
plied to prove that forms and ranges of stimulation which 
noticeably affect you or me do not affect certain other men 
or animals; and that, on the contrary, things which do 
not affect us affect them. A stimulus is, then, a form of 
energy which in certain amounts is capable of bringing 
about a certain change (physiological processes) in a living 
being. What may be a stimulus for one creature may not 
be for another, and what may stimulate an animal to-day 
may not next year. The relation of the body to stimuli 
changes. At birth we are insensitive to forms and amounts 
of energy to which we are keenly sensitive later in life. In 
old age we are insensitive to forms and amounts of energy 
which affected us markedly during earlier life. The dog 
detects odors which are quite beyond our ken. They sim- 
ply do not exist for us. The same world (environment) 
may furnish thousands of stimuli to one type of organism 
and only a score or so to another. Indeed no two human 
beings live in precisely the same world of stimuli. 

Forms of energy which affect normal human beings. — 
There are several varieties of energy which in appropriate 
amounts act as stimuli for most of us. The best known are 
the following: (1) Mechanical energy (motion of pondera- 
ble objects, contact, touch, pressure). (2) Chemical energy 
(chemical action). Certain forms of this energy affect our 
nasal organs, others our organs of taste. Unlike certain 
fishes, we lack chemical sensitiveness in the skin. We can 
neither taste nor smell a substance which is placed upon 
the surface of the body, but certain fishes apparently can do 



354 STIMULI, BODILY PROCESSES, SENSATIONS 

so. Acid burns the skin and certain other chemical sub- 
stances affect any portion of the body to which they are 
applied, but they do not produce effects similar to those 
of true gustatory or olfactory stimuli. (3) Thermal energy 
(cold, warmth). When the body, or part of it, is exposed 
to a condition of temperature which is much higher or 
lower than that of the body itself, stimulation occurs. Be- 
ing exposed to the radiant energy of the sun is not essen- 
tially different in effect upon the temperature organs from 
coming into contact with an object whose temperature is 
higher than that of the body. Each condition produces 
stimulation. (4) Photic energy (light). This form of 
energy affects chiefly our eyes. In the absence of these 
organs we are said to be blind. The frog, however, and the 
toad, are known to be stimulated markedly by light, even 
when they have no eyes. Their skin is sensitive to light, 
as the skin of some fishes is sensitive to chemical action. 
(5) Electrical energy (magnetic disturbances, electric cur- 
rents). Although we have no special sense organs for 
electricity, we are markedly affected by various manifesta- 
tions of this form of energy. Electric shocks are the dread 
of many human beings, and to all organisms powerful 
shocks are dangerous. The whole body is set a-tingling 
by a weak induction shock. It has even been suspected, 
by certain students of physiology, that some animals are 
guided in their migrations by electrical variations in the 
earth or in the atmosphere. It may readily be believed 
that some other creatures are much more sensitive to mani- 
festations of electrical energy than are human beings. 

Sensitiveness determines one's world. — -Evidently the 
nature of an organism's environment depends upon sensi- 
tiveness. If we are not affected by photic energy (light), 
we live in a dark world. If we are not affected by certain 
air vibrations, we live in a silent world. If we are not 
affected by certain forms of chemical energy which are 



THE PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL CHAIN 355 

called gustatory and olfactory stimuli, we live in an odor- 
less and tasteless world. If we are not affected by me- 
chanical energy, we live in an imponderable world. But 
most peculiar of all is that relation of organism to environ- 
ment in which no form or amount of stimulation induces the 
sensation of pain. Human pin cushions are perennial won- 
ders, for they claim that physical events which in you and 
me would be accompanied by intense pain do not in the 
least disturb them. 

Links in the psycho-physiological chain. — Stimulus, 
physiological process, sensation — these are events which the 
scientist seeks to correlate. Intimately concerned with 
these events are those bodily organs which neurologists 
have termed receptors, conductors, centers, and effectors. 

Sense organs are called receptors because they are espe- 
cially adapted for the reception of those physical events 
which act as stimuli to the organism. 

The nerves which conduct impulses from or to receptors 
are called conductors because they obviously serve as means 
of communication between the receptors and other parts of 
the body. 

The muscles and glands, to which many of the nerves 
lead, are called effectors because upon receiving a nerve 
impulse they bring about {effect) some bodily change: 
motor adjustment or secretion. 

Certain portions of the nervous system, which stand as 
stations between receptors and effectors and to which the 
conductors from both of these sets of organs lead, are called 
centers. 

The diagram of Fig. 11 represents these several im- 
portant portions of the sensation-reaction mechanism of 
the human body. 

What bodily processes are necessary for sensation? — ■ 
Processes in the sense organs, in the conductors, and in the 
effectors may occur without the appearance of a sensation 



356 STIMULI, BODILY PROCESSES, SENSATIONS 

at the introspective level. This indeed is true of many 
reflexes. Stimuli are received by certain receptors; im- 
pulses are carried to certain effectors by the appropriate 
conductors, and a reaction takes place, in the absence of 
sensation. A number of our receptors, for example the 
organs of the canals and sacs of the ear, are now thought 



Center (Brain) 
Center f Spinal ganglion) 



^Conductor 
Conductor (Mbtor^or efferent nerve) 

(Sensory or * Nj* 

afferent nerve) 





JF 

Effector (Muscle) 

Fig. 11. Diagram of the sensory-motor mechanism of the nervous 

system. 

to be organs which control reactions, without having any 
corresponding sensations. 

It is probable, however, that all receptors exercise con- 
trol over bodily reactions and possess modes of sensation. 
In some instances the sensations are readily observed; in 
others they are difficult to observe, and in still others they 
have not been observed at all. 

But, in any event, it seems clear that no sensation is 
experienced in connection with a stimulus unless a center 
in the brain is brought into function. ' ' No brain, no sensa- 
tions ; no brain, no consciousness ' ' are statements which one 
frequently hears. They are based upon the observation 



SENSE ORGANS AND SENSE MODES 357 

that centers are always in action when consciousness is 
observable. This observation alone fully justifies the at- 
tempts of physiological psychologists to study the physio- 
logical processes of the nervous system in connection with 
the facts of experience. 

Relation of sense organ to mode or quality of sensation. 
— To each type of sense organ a certain mode of sensation 
corresponds. Thus the retina, whether it be stimulated by 
light, heat, pressure, or electricity yields sensations of 
color or light. The ear (cochlea), no matter how stimu- 
lated, yields sensations of sound. It is quite impossible 
for us to alter this relation. We can not get into the 
way of hearing a tone instead of seeing a light every 
time the eye is stimulated, although we may experience 
the former quite often in connection with the latter sen- 
sation. 

Sensations correspond to stimuli. — It is a commonplace 
observation that every variety of sensation corresponds to 
or accompanies the appearance of a stimulus. The same 
sensation does not necessarily appear always in connection 
with a given stimulus; for their relation depends upon 
the nature of the sense organ upon which the stimulus acts. 
Apparently one might formulate the law, " the same stim- 
ulus acting at intervals upon the same sense organ yields 
the same quality of sensation." But the generaliza- 
tion is not correct for the simple reason that the center, 
as well as the sense-organ and stimulus, must be con- 
sidered. 

Physical processes acting as stimuli produce trains of 
physiological processes and in connection with certain of 
the latter we experience sensations. It is not necessary, in 
the interests of our study of psychology, that we assume the 
sensations to be caused by the physiological processes, but 
it certainly is legitimate to work on the basis of that as- 
sumption, if one so desires. 



358 STIMULI, BODILY PROCESSES, SENSATIONS 

CLASS EXERCISE 

8 elf -observation. Introspection of discrimination conscious- 
ness in the reaction-time test. Materials : Same as for the pre- 
ceding exercise. 

This exercise should serve (1) to furnish each student with 
excellent conditions for the introspective examination of dis- 
crimination consciousness, and (2) to provide measurements of 
the discrimination reaction time, which may be compared with 
those previously obtained for association reaction times and 
simple tactual reaction times. 

Method : With the class arranged in a circle, as in the preceding 
exercise, and with all conditions the same, the instructor should 
ask that two intensities of pressure be discriminated : the one 
heavy, the other light. 

In preparation for the tests, the class may practice the dis- 
crimination of these two tactual stimuli. After skill has been 
acquired in the transmission of a stimulus around the circle 
without change in its intensity, the tests may be begun. 

The instructor directs the members of the class to pass along 
the intensity- — weak or strong — of pressure which is received. 
He then starts the experiment by lightly tapping the shoulder 
of the student on his right. If the stimulus returns to him as 
weak he assumes, unless some member of the class makes a 
statement to the contrary, that it was recognized and properly 
transmitted by each member of the circle. If, instead, it returns 
to him as strong he knows that some one has failed to discrimi- 
nate properly. 

After ten, twenty, or, if time permits, more reactions have 
been recorded for the group in the case of both weak and strong 
pressures, the results may be placed on the blackboard, the 
averages and variations obtained, and the results discussed. Or, 
the recorded measurements may be handed to a member of the 
class for study, in connection with the reading of the following 
literature of reaction time, and report to the class: 

Jastrow, J. : The time-relations of mental phenomena, 60 pp. 
(Bibliography to 1890); Titchener, E. B.: Text-book of psy- 
chology, §§ 121-123; James, Wm. : Principles of psychology, vol. 
1, chapter 3. 



INTROSPECTION OF DISCRIMINATION 359 



SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Ziehen, Th. : Introduction to physiological psychology, chapters 2 

and 3. 
Wundt, Wm. : Physiological psychology, vol. 1, chapters 3 and 6. 
Wundt, Wm.: Outlines of psychology, §7. 
Martin, H. N. : The human body, chapters 30-34. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, AND 
AFFECTIONS 

" The brain stimulation which is caused by the moon is then not 
conceived as a cause for the perception, of the moon any more than 
the perceived object itself was conceived as the cause. The moon is 
the cause of the brain action, but not of the idea. . . . This brain 
excitement, also, is then in no way the cause of the idea and the 
idea in no way the effect of the brain action; even the usual meta- 
phors which say that it is the inside of the brain process, or that 
it is parallel to the brain process, or that they belong together as 
do a concave and a convex surface, are merely practically useful 
expressions for a relation of a strictly logical character which is de- 
rived from epistemological identity. The psycho-physical parallelism 
of brain function and idea does not, therefore, seek at all to explain 
the idea by the physiological process, or vice versa, but merely to 
state that they necessarily belong together, and thus to admit the 
further consequence that whenever the physical process is causally 
produced the parallel psychical idea must be conceived as existing. 
Causality thus connects only the physical objects directly, while the 
psychical ideas are indirectly linked as accompaniments of the 
physiological processes. We have seen that such a physical causal 
connection is in principle a connection of absolute necessity, not 
comparable with the combination suggested by an observed regu- 
larity. So far, then, as the ideas can be understood as counterparts 
of physiological processes which are causally connected, this con- 
vincing necessity binds them, while as merely psychical facts they 
were disconnected members." — Mtjnsterberg, Hugo: Psychology and 
life, pp. 64, 65. 

Again three classes of events appear. — Although for the 
physical phenomena which are often spoken of as conditions 
of affection we have no special name — such as stimuli in 
the case of sensation — the phenomena nevertheless exist and 
are studied in physiological psychology. Without attempt- 
ing to smooth down this description by coining a new term, 
we may examine the physical events which cause those 

360 



PHYSICAL EVENTS AND AFFECTIONS 361 

bodily processes whose most noteworthy accompaniment is 
affection. 

Nature of the physical events which condition affec- 
tions. — Any and every aspect or factor of environment 
which acts upon the organism may under certain circum- 
stances be correlated with affective consciousness. There 
are not, as for sensation, a variety of physical conditions 
each of which affects most markedly some limited region 
of the body and thus produces a definitely localized effect, 
but instead every condition influences the organism as a 
whole, or in general, according to its quality and intensity. 
This influence differs in degree, not in kind, so far as we 
know, for the many factors of environment. Beginning 
with weak light, as the factor which is acting upon the 
body, we note that it produces bodily conditions whose 
obvious accompaniment is agreeable affective consciousness. 
If now the intensity of the light be doubled, the bodily 
processes may radically change and their characteristic ac- 
companiment may be disagreeable affections. 

Both environment and organism are changing. — The 
study of affection in its relations to physical events brings 
out clearly the fact that physiological psychology or psycho- 
physiology studies the organism in its active and ever 
changing relations to a varying environment. Neither the 
one nor the other is static, both change rapidly and con- 
stantly. The task of correlation is twofold, for we have 
first to study physical or environmental facts in their rela- 
tions to bodily facts, and then these same bodily facts in 
their relations to mental facts. The first task is primarily 
physiological or physical, if you like; the second is pri- 
marily psychological, or physiological. The goal of each 
is an understanding of the organism as a self-conscious, 
self-regulating mechanism, which so behaves as to become 
more and more satisfactorily adapted to those conditions. 

The classes of physical conditions. — The above state- 



362 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

ment is perhaps misleading in that it is quite possible to 
classify the chief aspects or factors of environment as pleas- 
ant and unpleasant. There are certain conditions which 
regularly produce or cause those bodily states which ac- 
company disagreeable affections, and there are others which 
as regularly produce the states which accompany agree- 
able affections. It might fairly be urged, therefore, that 
just as there are two chief classes of affections, so there 
are two classes of physical conditions of affections. But 
this classification is unsatisfactory for the simple reason 
that we discover certain factors to condition now one and 
now the other sort of affection. Perhaps the most direct 
way to state the facts is to say that there are two classes 
of bodily states: the one conditioning agreeable affections 
and the other disagreeable affections. Each of these 
kinds of bodily condition is determined either by the qual- 
ity, or the intensity, or both, of the physical condition. 

There are certain factors or features of environment 
which never influence us to the point of agreeableness. 
The odor of carrion, as soon as it is perceived as such, is 
disagreeable. In lower intensities it may be agreeable, 
but it is not then carrion. So even in its highest intensities 
the taste of sugar may be agreeable. In other words, the 
feeling tone which accompanies a given quality of sensa- 
tion may always be agreeable or disagreeable or it may 
shift from one to the other with change in the intensity 
of the sensation. This complicates the facts of affective 
consciousness and increases many fold the difficulties of 
the task of correlating them with bodily processes, and those 
in turn with environmental events. 

The nature of the three classes of physical facts which 
are related to affections. — The three classes of environ- 
mental counterparts of affections may be designated as (1) 
the favorable, (2) the unfavorable, (3) the variable. Con- 
ditions whose effects upon the body are such that agreeable 



ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 363 

affections come into prominence belong in the first class. 
There are many of them. Under no ordinary circum- 
stances do they produce the bodily accompaniments of dis- 
agreeable affections. Conditions whose bodily effects are 
always accompanied by disagreeable affections constitute 
the second class. There are relatively few of these in 
comparison with the number in class one. Certain sounds 
— rasping, scraping, scratching — seem to have this char- 
acter for me. The physical conditions which influence my 
body are uniformly accompanied by disagreeable affections, 
no matter what the intensity of the stimulus. 

Examples might be drawn from every sense field. Cer- 
tain colors, odors, tastes, contacts, or textures are always 
disagreeable to some persons. Peculiarly striking examples 
of these psycho-physical correlations are furnished by cer- 
tain animals. Spiders and many other animals uniformly 
come forth as if to seek certain tones, while they as regu- 
larly avoid certain others. The guinea pig always behaves 
as though it were startled and distressed when metallic 
sounds are produced. The house dog howls miserably when 
certain tones or combinations thereof are produced. The 
young chick and the mouse and rat are markedly disturbed 
by certain shrill sounds. All of these organisms give us 
excellent physiological evidence of being disagreeably, or 
agreeably, affected by certain physical conditions. 

Who of us has not familiarity with one or another en- 
vironmental condition or situation which he dreads, not 
because it produces any violently dangerous or even harm- 
ful effects upon the body, but simply because of its dis- 
agreeable affective accompaniment? One may strongly dis- 
like to talk with a person who has certain mannerisms. 
Or one may acquire an antipathy to a person simply be- 
cause the noise which he makes in eating affects one un- 
pleasantly. 

On the other hand, it is true that physical conditions, 



364 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

which, like most situations, do not appeal especially to any 
one sense organ, produce now the bodily conditions of 
agreeableness, now those of disagreeableness, merely by 
reason of their intensity or vividness. This, the variable, 
would appear to be the largest class of physical conditions 
of affections. It is the inclusiveness of this class which has 
given rise to the common, but erroneous, impression that 
all conditions in our environment tend to act upon us now 
agreeably, now disagreeably. 

Explanations of why one kind of factor should bring 
about the bodily conditions of disagreeableness and an- 
other those of agreeableness. — Apparently we have to 
search far in the history of the organism to discover the 
reasons for the causal relations between physical changes 
and the bodily changes which accompany affections. Nat- 
ural or expected they are not. Why that simple factor of 
environment, red light, should stir many animals to most 
violent activity and in many instances to excitement or 
rage, is not clear. There is something peculiar about this 
effect. A condition which one might expect to be agreeable 
in certain, if not all, of its intensities, turns out to be pro- 
ductive, in many animals, of bodily conditions which in us 
are accompaniments of disagreeable affective experiences. 

Such relations between environment and organism as 
the above can be understood only in the light of evolu- 
tion. Present conditions do not enable us to understand 
them. It would be simple enough could we say, as cer- 
tain physiologists and psychologists have said, that all sit- 
uations are capable of producing either the bodily condi- 
tions of agreeableness or those of disagreeableness merely 
through variation of their intensity. The defect in this 
statement is precisely that of most simple statements in 
connection with science, it is too simple to express the 
truth. The facts are complex and intricately related. In- 
tensity alone does not determine the effect of a situation on 



AFFECTIVE PECULIARITIES OF SENSATIONS 365 

the organism. The body is so organized, by reason of the 
previous action of the condition, that it responds in a par- 
ticular way — and often in a way which we should least 
expect. Perhaps the present effect of red upon the body of 
the frog, the bull, or the turkey is due chiefly to the value 
which this particular factor of enviroment had for the re- 
mote ancestors of those animals. At one time it may have 
been positively unfavorable, or indicative of the unfavora- 
ble, and it still retains the same reactive value for the 
animals although it is no longer unfavorable to life. There 
are many useless reactions in the organism, just as there are 
many useless organs (vestigial). The appendix and the 
pineal gland, for example, are mere survivals. They have 
outlived their usefulness, but they continue to exist. So 
also bodily effects, advantageously produced by certain 
stimuli or situations in the past, continue to be produced 
by the same conditions although they are no longer of 
value to us. Many of our peculiarities of action and feel- 
ing are probably to be accounted for in this way. Our 
antipathies, prejudices, whims are often the psychic ac- 
companiments of inherited tendencies of reaction which 
have lost their reasons for existence. 

It is commonly stated that environmental conditions 
which are unfavorable to life produce those bodily proc- 
esses whose regular accompaniment is disagreeable affec- 
tions; and that environmental conditions which are, on 
the contrary, favorable to life produce bodily processes 
whose accompaniment is agreeable affections. These state- 
ments are extremely indefinite in meaning, however, and 
they are of relatively little value to us until we have defined 
the phrases " favorable to life " and " unfavorable to 
life "; for what is favorable to the life of the race may 
be unfavorable to the life of the individual and that which 
appears to favor the individual's life may prove to be 
unfavorable for the life of the species. 



366 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

Taking into account these facts, we may say that physical 
conditions which tend in the long run to diminish the vital- 
ity of the organism produce the bodily accompaniments of 
disagreeableness, whereas those which generally tend to 
enhance or maintain the vitality of the organism produce 
the bodily accompaniments of agreeableness. 

The why of this correlation is not known, but the guess 
may be risked that any other relation between environ- 
mental and bodily processes would result in the destruc- 
tion of organisms. In fact the establishment of this 
relation seems to be the fundamental thing in organic 
adaptation. 

Nature of the bodily conditions of agreeable affections. 
— Physiology reveals the fact that agreeable affections as 
a rule accompany anabolic bodily conditions. We express 
this crudely and imperfectly by saying that anything which 
stirs us up, without in any sense doing harm to our bodies, 
is agreeable. Many bodily conditions which are uniformly 
accompanied by agreeable affections use up energy, fatigue 
us, cause loss of vitality for the moment, but unless these 
changes are such as to increase the normal processes of the 
self-sustaining organism they are not agreeable. To the 
healthy, vigorous organism anything which heightens vital- 
ity is agreeable. It must stimulate ; it must not depress. It 
is a mistake to suppose that the bodily processes which 
are accompanied by agreeable affections do not involve 
destruction of bodily substance and dissipation of bodily 
energy. The height of agreeableness is reached when this 
destruction reaches its maximum and is yet fully compen- 
sated by increase in the reparative processes of the body. 
It is when the repair (anabolic processes) falls behind the 
waste (katabolic processes) or destruction that agreeable- 
ness changes to disagreeableness. 

Nature of the bodily conditions of disagreeable affec- 
tions. — They are the depleting changes, leaving the organ- 



CONDITIONS OF DISAGREEABLENESS 367 

ism weaker by reason of its activity, instead of stronger. 
They mark diminution of vitality and energy instead of 
increase, or at least an attempt on the part of the organ- 
ism at the maintenance of a balance. Any condition which, 
like strong chemical, electrical, thermal, or photic stimuli, 
tends to destroy the parts of the body or to interfere with 
their normal processes of conduction, expansion, secretion, 
absorption, or excretion is accompanied by disagreeableness. 
Anything that lessens the secretion of the salivary glands, 
the pancreas, the liver, the kidneys, soon brings about condi- 
tions whose accompaniment is disagreeableness of affection. 
These same conditions to be sure may tend to stimulate to 
greater activity the parts affected, but the fact remains 
that so long as function fails of its normal level, we con- 
tinue to " feel badly " or to " feel uncomfortable." 
Agreeableness is usually taken as a subjective index of 
health; disagreeableness of the lack of it. 

Instances of conditions which illustrate these state- 
ments. — Let us suppose that a warm metal rod is applied 
to the skin of the palm of the hand. It produces certain 
changes in the cells of the region with which it comes in 
contact, and some of these changes in turn bring about 
others until a considerable portion of the body is affected. 
The consciousness accompanying this arousal of certain 
favorable activities in the body is predominantly agreeable. 
Now let us suppose the temperature of the rod to be rap- 
idly increased until it begins to cause the protoplasm of 
the cells of the hand to coagulate. This change, too, gets 
itself transmitted to other portions of the body. It stim- 
ulates the organism as a whole, but at the same time it 
robs it of energy and rapidly enfeebles it. The accom- 
panying affection is decidedly disagreeable. 

Wherever positively destructive changes occur in the 
organism their accompaniment in the moral being is 
disagreeableness. There are noteworthy exceptions to 



368 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

this rule in the case of abnormal or pathological organ- 
isms, but those lie beyond the range of our present 
inquiry. 

If the thermal stimulus be still further increased in in- 
tensity and brought into contact with other regions of the 
body, its bodily effects spread correspondingly and the dis- 
agreeable affections intensify and tend more and more to 
monopolize consciousness. Finally, bodily conditions may 
be produced which are correlated with the total disappear- 
ance of introspective consciousness. Physiologically this 
is the condition of extreme shock. In a word we may, by 
increasing the strength of a simple stimulus, pass from 
bodily conditions which are usually accompanied by agree- 
able affections to those which are as regularly accompanied 
by disagreeable affections, and thence to the total disap- 
pearance of introspective consciousness. Under physical 
conditions which are extremely unfavorable to life we faint. 
This is an interesting observation. There are intensities 
of consciousness, indicated by bodily conditions, which we 
can not introspect. 

But to return to our earlier illustrations, why is a par- 
ticular color, sound, or odor disagreeable? Surely it does 
not depress the organism by diminishing the vital processes. 
Why not, we may ask? The probability is that it does 
and that could we observe directly the influence of any 
disagreeable stimulus upon the organism we should dis- 
cover that it acts much as do over-strong stimuli. It is 
not necessary that a stimulus or other condition which is 
to produce disagreeable bodily conditions should do so 
merely by virtue of its capacity for the destruction of 
bodily substance or the dissipation of energy. The color 
red may over-stimulate, it is true, but it may do so in- 
directly instead of directly as does the hot rod. It may 
bring about changes in the nervous system which deplete; 
it may drain the body of its energy of reaction. It may 



NEED OF SEEKING FACTS 369 

over-stimulate the brain itself, rather than the mechanism 
of response. 

Why theorize instead of seeking facts ? — But what do 
we know of all this ? What is the use in discussing the bodily 
processes in their relations to affections, or sensations, or 
thoughts when we do not know intimately the nature of 
these bodily processes? Would it not be wiser for us to 
concentrate upon the study of the facts of physics, physi- 
ology, and psychology until our knowledge is ample for the 
purposes of correlation, instead of attempting to make the 
correlations in our present state of relative ignorance? 
The writer is strongly inclined to reply affirmatively. 

Things we should know about the physiological proc- 
esses in the body. — It is by no means enough to know that 
the organism moves toward or away from a stimulus in 
order to be able to decide whether its consciousness is 
agreeable or disagreeable. Seeking reactions, which have 
often been characterized as agreeable, may or may not 
be such. Avoiding reactions may not be disagreeable. For 
often we note that under violent stimulation the organism 
rushes upon the stimulus. Of the disagreeableness of the 
stimuli which cause the assaults there can be little doubt. 
The insect flies toward the light, and it may continue its 
course even till death from over-stimulation. 

We should know not only the superficial facts of bodily 
condition — respiration, pulse, blood pressure, temperature, 
muscle tension, glandular action, etc. — but we should know 
also the less obvious processes which occur in connection 
with each of these extensive changes. A particular rate, 
form, and strength of pulse can be understood only when 
one knows intimately the physiological conditions of the 
particular circulatory activity. We should, when a stim- 
ulus is applied to the body, be able to describe with accurate 
detail what happens in the cells upon which the stimulus 
directly or indirectly acts; what happens in the cell proc- 



370 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

esses which we call the conductors of the nerve impulse 
that emerge from the receptor; what happens in the nerve 
ganglion to which the impulse travels; what happens in 
the conductors which next come into action ; what happens 
in the effectors. This knowledge would involve a searching 
study of the changes which occur from instant to instant 
in the living cell in its vital functional relations to the 
other cells of the body. Not until we possess accurate 
knowledge of these, and similar facts, can we reasonably 
hope to correlate bodily processes with mental processes in 
a profitable way. Such vague, general, and probably inac- 
curate statements as those which are made in almost all 
text-books which deal with this subject — and this book is 
not an exception! — are valuable only as emphasizing our 
crying need of facts in physiological psychology. 

The value of the two general criteria of affective con- 
sciousness. — There are two generalizations with regard to 
affection which deserve to be restated here. They are first, 
the statement that agreeable affections accompany anabolic 
or generally constructive bodily changes, whereas disagree- 
able affections accompany katabolic or generally destructive 
processes; and second, that agreeable affections accompany 
positive or seeking reactions — the reaching out of the organ- 
ism for more of the physical condition of the bodily state — ■ 
and that disagreeable affections accompany negative or 
avoiding reactions — the withdrawing of the organism from 
the physical condition of the bodily state. 

In the preceding paragraphs it has been stated that 
neither of these generalizations is wholly trustworthy. The 
probability is that we shall have to modify both consid- 
erably before we shall be able to claim great value for 
them. It should not be necessary to insist that these modi- 
fications must be made in the light of ascertained facts con- 
cerning bodily processes, not on the basis of hypotheses. 
It is well enough to conclude that since agreeableness often 



ACCOMPANIMENTS OF EMOTIONS 371 

accompanies positive reactions, the conditions of these re- 
actions are also the conditions of agreeableness, but excep- 
tions which have been observed render this far from satis- 
factory proof of the correctness of the generalization. Sim- 
ilarly, it is worth while to question the value of the general- 
ization that wiienever the body is stimulated to greater 
activity by its environment there is agreeableness of feel- 
ing, and whenever it is stimulated to lessened activity 
there is disagreeableness Doubtless each of these state- 
ments possesses its grain of truth. But what importance 
are we to attribute to the exceptions? 

The bodily accompaniments of complex affections are 
by no means so get-at-able as those of elemental affec- 
tions. — In the bodily expressions of the emotions, senti- 
ments, and feelings we find extreme complexity. It is dif- 
cult at times to discover whether the general activity or 
vitality of the organism is increased or diminished. Yet, 
on the whole, the impression which one gets from careful 
observation of his own experience is fairly convincing. 
How often have we noticed the exhilaration of a joyous 
emotion and the push which it gives us. Because of a letter 
which this morning brought me news of an unexpected 
form of scientific recognition, my whole body seems more 
fully alive and throughout the day I have worked with 
unusual vigor and effectiveness. The emotion certainly 
accompanied a heightened vitality and the effects of this 
were continued and far-reaching. The role of the seeking 
reaction in this instance is obvious, for did I not read and 
reread the letter, whereas I hastily put aside the news of 
a distressing accident. Only the rather morbid person per- 
sistently seeks the physical conditions of disagreeableness. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Observation. The study of the eyes in their relation to facial 
expression. 



372 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS, BODILY PROCESSES, ETC. 

After carefully and repeatedly observing the condition of the 
eyes of a friend (or your own in a mirror) during different 
experiences, answer the following questions as fully and accu- 
rately as you can. 

1. Are the eyes important in facial expressions? 

2. Do they change (a) in color, (b) in size, (c) in shape, (d) 
in position, (e) in size of pupil, (f) in relation to one another, 
during changes in consciousness? 

Why do we describe eyes as " hard," " glassy," " cold," " soft," 
"gentle," "sympathetic"? If these adjectives are applicable 
to the same eye at different times, what changes occur so to 
modify its appearance? 

Are mouth and nose, lips and eyebrows more or less important 
in the facial expression of (a) fear, (b) anger, (c) sorrow, and 
(d) j°y than the eyes? 

The observations for this exercise may best be made out of 
class. The group may discuss the general subject, and some 
member of the class may make a special study of the results sub- 
mitted by the class, and of the literature on facial expression, 
and report to the group. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

James, Wm.: Principles of psychology, vol. 2, chapter 25. 
Myers, C. S. : Text-book of experimental psychology, chapter 25. 
Royce, Josiah: Outlines of psychology, chapters 7 and 14. 
Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapter 7. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

" Nothing is more characteristic of the young of intelligent animals 
than the variety and persistency of their behavior, their sensitive- 
ness to stimuli of many different kinds, their restlessness of swiftly 
changing attention and repose, with occasional pauses of continued 
effort in some special direction. Constantly on the alert, they ex- 
hibit in all its shifting phases behavior which we interpret as 
indicating curiosity, inquisitiveness, love of mischief, destructiveness, 
and so forth. The facts are so familiar to every observer of young 
animals that it is unnecessary to give any detailed illustration. 
Watch a kitten in this stage of its development and carefully note 
its behavior during half an hour; the variety of effort, the roles played 
by trial, failure, and success, the gain of skill and control over 
behavior, will at once be evident. Or devote an equal space of time 
to observing young jays, magpies, or jackdaws. Every projecting 
piece of wire or bit of wood in their cage is pulled at this way and 
that way, from above, from below, from the side. Now one, then 
another, loose object is picked up and dropped, turned over, carried 
about, pulled at, hammered at, stuffed into this corner and into that, 
and experimented with in all possible ways. . . . But in young 
animals such play is, after all, the serious business of their time of 
life. Its import for their future welfare can scarcely be over- 
estimated. 

" And its import is in large degree psychological. If we watch a 
young puppy or kitten learning gradually to deal effectively with 
some difficulty in its extending environment, we see that it puts 
forth its efforts at first in a somewhat random and indefinite 
fashion. It is one of those animals in which intelligence has been 
evolved to supersede and become the more plastic substitute for 
instinct. The random and indefinite movements, are in detail reflex 
responses to stimuli. But whereas, in a piece of highly elaborated 
instinctive behavior, such reflexes are grouped into a whole which is 
coordinate through inherited nervous mechanism, in the case of the 
acts of the puppy or kitten they have to be further coordinated, or 
more elaborately grouped, through experience. To act in one way 
some of the reflexes have to be checked as redundant and not to the 
point; to act in another way other reflexes have to be similarly 
checked; and in a third way, yet others. But in all three some of 
the reflexes are utilized to different ends. Many conscious situa- 
tions contain common elements; and this tends to give unity to the 
developing experience. But they contain also elements and group- 

373 



374 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

ings whi^h afford that diversity without which conscious be- 
havior could not be accommodated to them." — Morgan, C. Lloyd, 
Animal behavior, pp. 251-253. 

Signs of consciousness. — In daily life we have come to 
judge of a being's consciousness by its appearance and be- 
havior. In the measure in which it resembles us in form 
we imagine it to resemble us also in experience. In the 
measure, likewise, in which its acts resemble ours, we im- 
agine its feelings to resemble ours. These two classes of 
inferences concerning consciousness are based upon cor- 
relations of consciousness with the structure of the body 
and with behavior. In this chapter we shall concern our- 
selves wholly with what living creatures do and with the 
relation of their activity to consciousness. 

Both structure and behavior are used as signs of con- 
sciousness. — The reason for this state of affairs is readily 
discovered. I observe that I possess a certain bodily form 
and behave in certain ways. When I see like forms and 
activities in other beings I naturally, and perhaps un- 
critically, infer that like experiences are present. It is 
precisely this process of inference which leads me to say, 
under certain circumstances, that my friend is in agony, 
in sorrow, in amazement, or in ecstasy. I see simply that 
he behaves as I should were I experiencing the emotions. 
Common expression has it that a person acts or behaves as 
though he were in pain, or in sorrow; as though he saw 
a strange sight, or heard an unexpected sound; as though 
he were puzzled, annoyed, or uncertain. Almost every 
statement which we make about one another involves 
the use of inference of facts of consciousness from 
facts of behavior. The matter is summed up in the 
statement that behavior has come to mean for us certain 
experiences. 

The great gulf between ant and man. — When in an or- 
ganism which is as different from us in form as the ant, 



ANT AND MAN 375 

we observe behavior which we should in a fellow man 
interpret as indicative of rage, fear, delight, we are puz- 
zled, for although the behavior itself tempts us to say 
that the animal is having these experiences, its marked 
difference from us in form makes us cautious and we are 
likely either to suspend judgment or to cease to attempt 
to decide. The fact seems to be that most persons do not 
try to understand the ant as conscious. They accept its 
behavior as they would that of an oyster — which they eat 
alive without a thrill or shudder. The ant is living, but 
for them it is not sentient, not conscious. On the other 
hand, those who have studied ants carefully think of the 
creatures as conscious. 

Thus even so critically conservative a scientist as Pro- 
fessor Wheeler, as previously quoted, writes, " after a pa- 
tient, and, I believe, unprejudiced study of ants, I have 
reached the same conclusions as Forel, Wasmann, and 
others, namely, that these insects show unequivocal signs 
of possessing both feelings and impulses. In my opinion 
they experience both anger and fear, both affections and 
aversions, elation and depression in a simple " blind " 
form, that is, without anything like the complex psychic 
accompaniment which these emotions arouse in us." 
(Wheeler, W. M. : Ants, p. 529.) 

It is illuminating to note that the more familiar we 
become with any sort of living thing — man, ant, or jelly- 
fish — the more strongly are we inclined to think of it as 
possessing awareness. An animal tends to become increas- 
ing psychological for us as we become intimately acquainted 
with its life. This is one of the most powerful arguments 
in favor of the study of Animal Psychology in educational 
institutions. We live in a world of living things and it 
is only reasonable that we should seek to understand and 
sympathize with them. Sympathy of the morbid, senti- 
mental sort is baneful : it should be replaced by enlightened 



376 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

rational sympathy, for this alone can make for genuine 
kindness to man and beast, and for rational living. 

Signs of consciousness are constantly used even by those 
persons who have never thought of consciousness. Is it 
not reasonable, then, that we should seek to learn some- 
thing about the basis upon which we attribute conscious- 
ness to other beings? Is it not obvious, in fact, that we 
should systematically study the grounds upon which we 
attribute consciousness to objects? 

Behavior a variety of bodily process. — Facts of bodily 
form and function, of whatever kind, may be correlated 
with mental processes. In the previous chapters we have 
considered especially those bodily processes which, like the 
physiological changes wrought in the body by external or 
internal stimuli, are not readily observed. In the present 
chapter we shall consider, instead, bodily changes which 
are obvious. These are the facts of behavior. When an 
organism moves the whole or a part of its body it exhibits 
activity. This may be of many kinds, as well as of varying 
amounts. After briefly surveying the chief varieties, we 
may seek the facts of correlation of behavior with mental 
phenomena. 

Varieties of behavior. — It will best serve our purpose 
to separate acts into three categories: those of automatism, 
instinct, and will. This is intended as a psychological classi- 
fication of the facts of behavior. 

Automatic acts include bodily reflexes of which familiar 
examples are the heart-beat, respiration, swallowing, wink- 
ing, and acts which have become utterly habitual, so that 
we no longer think about their performance or even are 
aware of doing them. Thus, I quite automatically put 
on my collar and arrange my tie while thinking intently 
about some problem. 

Instinctive forms of behavior are hereditary adaptations 
to situations, as are the instances of automatism just cited, 



AUTOMATISM 377 

but they differ therefrom, it being more plastic or modifia- 
ble, more complex and variable, and most important of all, 
in being accompanied by a peculiar form of affective con- 
sciousness, the instinct consciousness. I act and feel in- 
stinctively, when unexpectedly my hand touches a mouse 
as I am searching for something in the dark. Instinc- 
tively the infant imitates the sounds which are produced 
about it. 

Will acts are those forms of behavior which we find it 
almost impossible to predict. They are relatively slow in 
execution, and they serve to meet the demands of new sit- 
uations for which neither automatic nor instinctive pro- 
visions are at hand. 

Automatism. — Automatic acts are interesting because of 
the lack of conscious accompaniment. They frequently lie 
wholly without our awareness. When we attempt to cor- 
relate them with consciousness we discover, much to our 
surprise, that we know little about them and that it is only 
when some hitch occurs that we become aware of them at 
all. This correlation is negative. Automatic acts are rela- 
tively unconscious. Perhaps it would be safer to say, 
instead, that they are not ordinarily accompanied by intro- 
spective consciousness or awareness. Many of the lower 
organisms appear to be highly automatic, for the objective 
indications of this sort of activity are regularity and con- 
stancy. When consciousness is present, we expect acts to 
vary ; when it is not, we expect them to be stereotyped. 

Two forms of automatic action. — Certain acts are in- 
herited in definite and relatively stable form ; they are the 
primary automatic actions. Examples of this type of activ- 
ity are knee-jerk, winking, heart-beat, and respiration. 
Certain other acts are acquired during the life of the indi- 
vidual and by repetition become automatic ; they are sec- 
ondary automatic actions. As examples of individually 
acquired automatisms may be mentioned the habit of hold- 



378 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

ing one's pen, of making the letter a, of pronouncing one's 
name, of buttoning one's coat. 

There are acts which are uniform, predictable, almost 
invariably automatic from the very first appearance in the 
individual, and there are others which, although lacking 
these characteristics at first, tend to acquire them with 
repetition. Automatic acts may be inherited, they may be 
acquired, they may be partly inherited and partly ac- 
quired. In any event, it is certain that the formation of 
habits means the automatizing of acts by practice. 

Instinctive behavior. — Instinct is one of those historical 
concepts which has been overgrown by meaning. It is so 
encrusted with traditional significance that it is almost 
impossible to use it for the exact descriptive purposes of 
science. In general, it has come to mean acts which are 
not mere automatisms, but which are guided by what the 
psychologist calls instinct consciousness. The acts are- said 
to be due to inheritance more largely than to individual 
experience. An instinct, we are told, is something inborn ; 
a habit is something learned by the individual. I inher- 
ited my ability to express certain emotions, but I learned 
for myself to use the typewriter. 

Instinctive acts differ from automatic acts in that they 
are not quite so stereotyped; they appear to have more 
leeway. They vary more. They differ from will acts in 
being hereditary in their essential features instead of indi- 
vidually acquired. The social insects are marked by the 
possession of a vast number of instinctive acts, whereas we 
are notable for our will acts. Instinct and intelligence 
are often said to be opposed, and it is frequently claimed 
that intelligence grows out of instinct. From the point 
of view of the writer, it would be as sensible to claim that 
our ability to swim grows out of our ability to walk. In- 
stinct and intelligence are two quite different organic quali- 
ties. In some organisms the one, in some the other pre- 



INSTINCT-CONSCIOUSNESS 379 

dominates, but every being possesses both. They are 
fundamental tendencies in living things. Organisms differ 
in degree with respect to both ; they never wholly lack 
either. Neither has sprung from the other. 

The relation of instinctive behavior to consciousness. 
— It is to be noted that the presence of instinct has come 
to mean that the creature is not intelligently aware of 
what it is doing or of why it behaves as it does. When the 
chick, or the baby, instinctively seeks food, in its character- 
istic way, we simply say that it is guided properly by its 
instinct. The man may intelligently, reflectively, rationally, 
meet, with suitable behavior, the same situation to which 
the chick responds instinctively and without consciousness 
of either the how or the why of its behavior. Instinct, 
indeed, is said to be God 's substitute in the brutes for intel- 
ligence or reason. Omitting in them the insight which 
he gave to man, he endowed them with something which 
is thought to take the place of reason. This conception of 
instinct in its relation to intelligence and reason is, in 
many respects, misleading. In the first place, instinct does 
not replace reason or intelligence. Rather, it exists side by 
side with them and only in part does it, or can it, take 
their place. What instinct does in animals, it does also 
in man, but man possesses the power of insight or rational- 
ity as it exists in no other creature. 

Instinctive behavior is not unconscious behavior. — 
There is an instinct consciousness. It is clearly present 
in each of us when we act instinctively. Why should 
we not suppose it to be present likewise in other 
beings. 

" But instincts are more than innate tendencies or dis- 
positions to certain kinds of movement. There is every 
reason to believe that even the most purely instinctive 
action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process, one 
which is incapable of being described in purely mechanical 



380 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

terms, because it is a psycho-physical process, involving 
psychical as well as physical changes, and one which, like 
every other mental process, has, and can only be fully 
described in terms of, the three aspects of all mental process 
— the cognitive, the affective, and the conative aspects ; 
that is to say, every instance of instinctive behavior involves 
a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard 
to it, and a striving towards or away from that ob- 
ject. . . . 

" In the animals most nearly allied to ourselves we can, 
in many instances of instinctive behavior, clearly recognize 
the symptoms of some particular kind of emotion such as 
fear, anger, or tender feeling; and the same symptoms 
always accompany any one kind of instinctive behavior, as 
when the cat assumes the defensive attitude, the dog resents 
the intrusion of a strange dog, or the hen tenderly gathers 
her brood beneath her wings. "We seem justified in believ- 
ing that each kind of instinctive behavior is always attended 
by some such emotional excitement, however faint, which 
in each case is specific or peculiar to that kind of be- 
havior. Analogy with our own experience justifies us, also, 
in assuming that the persistent striving towards its end, 
which characterizes mental process and distinguishes in- 
stinctive behavior most clearly from mere reflex action, 
implies some such mode of experience as we call conative, 
the kind of experience which in its more developed forms 
is properly called desire or aversion, but which, in the 
blind form in which we sometimes have it and which is 
its usual form among the animals, is a mere impulse, or 
craving, or uneasy sense of want. Further, we seem justi- 
fied in believing that the continued obstruction of in- 
stinctive striving is always accompanied by painful feeling, 
its successful progress towards its end by pleasurable feel- 
ing, and the achievement of its end by a pleasurable sense 
of satisfaction. 



INSTINCT-CONSCIOUSNESS 381 

" An instinctive action, then, must not be regarded as 
simple or compound reflex action if by reflex action we 
mean, as is usually meant, a movement caused by a sense- 
stimulus and resulting from a sequence of merely physical 
processes in some nervous arc. Nevertheless, just as a 
reflex action implies the presence in the nervous system of 
the reflex nervous arc, so the instinctive action also implies 
some enduring nervous basis whose organization is inher- 
ited, an innate or inherited psycho-physical disposition, 
which, anatomically regarded, probably has the form of 
a compound system of sensori-motor arcs. 

" We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or 
innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its 
possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a 
certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a 
particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to 
act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to 
experience an impulse to such action." (McDougall, Wm. : 
An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 26-29.) 

Double meaning of the word instinct. — Instinct should 
stand for a certain variety of behavior and for a certain 
kind of consciousness. At present it is used for both, but 
vaguely and not with agreement among authorities. Cer- 
tain psychologists, for example, claim that the term is 
purely biological in its meaning and that there is no con- 
sciousness corresponding thereto. We might of course 
speak of instinctive action and instinct consciousness, but 
that would be awkward. However, the fact remains, as 
Professor McDougall has made clear, that in introspection 
we discover a consciousness which accompanies instinctive 
acts. The instinct consciousness is especially interesting 
because a study of it should give us insight into the mental 
lives of those creatures in which intelligence and rationality 
are overshadowed by instinct. 

It is one of the chief purposes of this discussion to help 



382 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

to eradicate the prevalent false notion that instinct is the 
exclusive possession of brutes and rationality that of man. 
Each possesses both ; and both are important to each. Such 
general statements as are common in popular books on 
animal behavior and intelligence contain, as a rule, just 
enough truth to be misleading. The dog is not merely a 
creature of instinct ; man is not merely a creature of reason. 
The systematic critical investigation of animal behavior 
and consciousness is tending to convince those whose pre- 
conceptions and prejudices are not impassable barriers, that 
many animals possess more of rationality than has ordi- 
narily been supposed, and that man is often merely in- 
stinctive where we are wont to consider him rational. Pro- 
fessor McDougall, whose book on " Social Psychology " 
deserves to be read, instead of quoted, even goes so far 
as to write: " But mankind is only a little bit reasonable 
and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite 
unreasonable ways " (p. 11). Two of these ways in which 
man is moved are the automatic and the instinctive. 

Volitional behavior — Voluntary acts, so-called, or will 
acts are supposed to spring from one's mental life. Man 
is said to possess a will and certain of his acts are supposed 
to be an expression thereof. Thus it comes about that 
in addition to his instincts, certain acts are described as 
signs of volition. But what, we may inquire, are the 
marks of an act of will ? First one notes hesitation, delay, 
variability. The will act is noteworthy in that it fairly 
well suits the situation, even though the latter be new in 
the experience of the person. It is unpredictable, unique, 
not stereotyped or uniform in occurrence. It can be under- 
stood only in connection with the particular situation in 
which it appears, for to that especially it belongs. It may 
never again occur. In this it differs radically from the 
automatic and instinctive acts, for they lack distinctive 
individuality and are in no sense unique. They may be 



HABIT 383 

called into being repeatedly by the presentation of the 
situations to which they are suitable. 

When we observe in an animal uniquely individual acts, 
we infer that it possesses volitional consciousness. The 
correlation is ready-made, we do not have to think it out. 
When I observe a man standing on the street corner look- 
ing now this way, now that, I do not long hesitate in 
attributing to him uncertainty. I take it that he lacks cer- 
tain information, certain conscious processes, which would 
enable him to decide which road to take. I infer that he 
is thinking, reflecting, deliberating, preparing to will. And, 
upon the basis of this inference, I approach him in order 
to offer assistance. I act simply and solely upon the basis 
of what I see him doing. I interpret his behavior in terms 
of consciousness, and my own behavior is determined by 
this interpretation. 

The characteristics of habit. — Given a will act, it may 
with frequent repetitions change in character so that it is 
no longer recognized as voluntary, but, instead, as habitual. 
Last month I had to learn to work the combination of a 
new locker. I have performed the necessary movements of 
opening the door scores of times since then and with this 
result. What at first was vividly conscious and fully occu- 
pied me so that I could neither think nor talk while I was 
trying to open the door, has become almost unconscious. 
For I now do the act automatically or nearly so. All that 
I need to do is start the process and while I am talking 
to a friend or planning the day's work {he series of 
acts gets itself performed and lo ! the door is open 
before me. 

The supreme value of habit. — Were we unable to ac- 
quire habits or to relegate acts to lower levels of con- 
sciousness than the volitional, we should not be able to 
do more than a small fraction of what we now accomplish. 
Our attention would not suffice. As it is, this or that act 



384 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

is gradually relegated to the realm of secondary automatism 
and we are enabled constantly to learn new acts. 

A habit is a will act which has lost its characteristic 
conscious accompaniment, and at the same time become 
more or less stereotyped. A reflex is an act which, so far 
as the knowledge of the individual goes, never has been 
accompanied regularly by volitional consciousness. 

An observer of my behavior with reference to the locker 
would have noticed the hesitation, deliberation, uncertainty 
with which I acted at first and he would almost certainly 
have interpreted my behavior as indicative of thought and 
of volitional consciousness. Indeed, my acts must have 
indicated, must have meant, volition to him. Watching me 
to-day he exclaims, ' ' How machine-like the process of open- 
ing that door has become since I first saw you operate the 
combination last month ! You appear not to have to think 
about what you are doing; you don't even count the num- 
ber of turns ! " This is habit-formation. The above process 
is typical of what is happening in each of us daily. Activ- 
ities, modes of behavior, which at first are accompanied 
by varied and clear consciousness of the volitional sort, 
with repetition gradually lose this accompaniment and 
stand forth as habitual acts — acquired automatisms — in- 
stead of as will acts. 

Two directions of development of activity. — The first 
is toward increasing degree and complexity of conscious 
accompaniment, as indicated by introspection, and the sec- 
ond is toward diminishing degree and complexity of con- 
scious accompaniment. In the voluntary acquirement of 
a new act and in the acquisition of control over instinctive 
acts we discover the first process. In the perfecting of a 
voluntary act beyond the point of accurate adjustment to 
the demands of the situation we discover the second. From 
instinct to intelligence and rationality marks the progress 
from the less complex to the more complex consciousness. 



CORRELATIONS 385 

From volition to habit marks the progress from the more 
complex to the less complex consciousness. 

The task of correlating behavior and consciousness. — 
It is one which has gone on largely without reflective and 
critically intelligent guidance. We simply have grown into 
certain ways of thinking about the relation of behavior to 
consciousness. They now seem to us necessarily correct. 
We are so accustomed to eating live oysters that we are 
first amused, then surprised, when a scientific friend urges 
that it is a case of cruelty to animals. And similarly, we 
are so in the way of thinking of our pet dog as next in 
intelligence to ourselves that it seriously offends us to be 
told that he no more understands what is said to him than 
does the weather vane. 

But obviously this correlation of behavior with conscious- 
ness should be made with scientific care and circumspect- 
ness. It determines our conduct toward one another, and 
it is therefore desirable that we should not have false 
standards of judgment. The only way to render our cor- 
relations scientific is to study the so-called signs of con- 
sciousness thoroughly in order to make as sure as we can 
what their psychic accompaniments really are. It is clearly 
our duty to study with extreme care all of the facts of 
structure and behavior which are in any measure indicative 
of consciousness. This students of Animal Psychology are 
to-day doing. 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Observation. Study of the behavior of a person, with the in- 
tention of interpreting it psychologically. 

After a preliminary explanation of the exercise, the instructor 
should act out before the class some simple thought process. By 
facial expression, gestures, and other motor processes, he should 
attempt to exhibit what is going on in his mind. 

Immediately after completing the " behavior " process, he 
should write an accurate account of his consciousness. At the 



386 BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS 

same time each member of the class should describe the " be- 
havior " and therefrom infer the consciousness which accom- 
panied it. 

The results of this exercise will be most satisfactory if the 
instructor limits his expressive " behavior " to a few seeonds. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

McDougall, Wm.: An introduction to social psychology, chapters 2 
and 3. 

James, Wm. : Principles of psychology, vol. 1, chapter 4; vol. 2, 
chapter 24. 

Morgan, C. Lloyd: Introduction to comparative psychology, chap- 
ters 11 and 12. 

Titcheneb, E. B.: Text-book of psychology, §§ 121-127. 



PART SIX 

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONTROL OF 
MENTAL LIFE 

CHAPTER XXX 

THE PREDICTION AND CONTROL OF EVENTS 

" Modern science, as training the mind to an exact and impartial 
analysis of facts, is an education specifically fitted to promote sound 
citizenship. 

" Our first conclusion, then, as to the value of science for prac- 
tical life turns upon the efficient training it provides in method. 
The man who has accustomed himself to marshal facts, to examine 
their complex mutual relations, and predict upon the result of this 
examination their inevitable sequences— sequences which we term 
natural laws and which are as valid for every normal mind as for 
that of the individual investigator — such a man, we may hope, will 
carry his scientific method into the field of social problems. He will 
scarcely be content with merely superficial statement, with vague 
appeal to the imagination, to the emotions, to individual prejudices. 
He will demand a high standard of reasoning, a clear insight into 
facts and their results, and his demand can not fail to be beneficial 
to the community at large." — Pearson, Kabl: The grammar of 
science, p. 9. 

Knowledge does not imply foresight. — We may know 
a great deal about an event without being able to predict 
its occurrence, or to foresee it. Thus, the sum of our 
knowledge of earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts does not 
enable us to foretell and prepare for them. In such cases 
we are wont to say either that we are unable to explain 
the events or that the facts are so difficult to observe that 
we usually lack the information needful for prediction. 
We are aware of many things which we can not at present 
understand, explain, predict. 

387 



388 PREDICTION AND CONTROL OF EVENTS 

Awareness versus foresight in animals. — Man seems to 
be preeminently the explaining creature. He is not satis- 
fied with the knowledge which suffices for the simple de- 
scription of objects or happenings ; instead, he constantly 
seeks explanations which shall enable him to describe the 
conditions of his observations. Most animals appear to be 
content with awareness ; man demands the power to foresee 
events. In this respect we are in infancy animal-like, 
but as we develop we acquire interest in the conditions or 
causes of things and we pester our parents, teachers, fellow- 
students with questions. Here is excellent reason for the 
fact that science is explanatory and not merely descriptive. 

What enables us to predict events. — Whether or not we 
admit that the goal of science is the control of phenomena, 
we must grant the desirability of foresight and prepared- 
ness. It is therefore worth while to inquire, What sort of 
knowledge gives us control of physical and psychical phe- 
nomena? The question is not difficult. Knowledge of 
the conditions of an event enables us to predict it. But 
the power correctly to predict or foresee events is not neces- 
sarily accompanied by the ability so to alter the conditions 
of the event as satisfactorily to control it. There are 
indeed many things which we can, all too certainly for 
our peace of mind, predict, but over whose occurrence we 
have no control. The dread disease whose symptoms are 
unmistakable and whose invariable termination is death 
may be beyond our control. Helplessly we foresee the 
ending of the life of the individual. If we know the 
causes of the disease we may predict it, but that knowl- 
edge does not necessarily enable us also to control it. 

Professor Stout's opinion concerning explanation and 
the prediction of events. — " The power of explanation 
should involve some power of prediction more or less pre- 
cise. This power is restricted in psychology because of the 
extreme complexity of the conditions of the mental life. 



PREDICTION OF MENTAL EVENTS 389 

But it is not absent. We can, for instance, prove that the 
exclusive use of certain kindergarten methods in the edu- 
cation of young children will arrest the development of 
imagination and lower the general level of intelligence. We 
can predict that close contact of savages with a civiliza- 
tion which they can not assimilate will demoralize them in 
some respects, if not on the whole. We can predict that 
a body seen with one eye at a certain distance from the 
observer will alter its apparent configuration if the dis- 
tribution of light and shade on its surface is altered in 
certain ways. Such examples might be indefinitely multi- 
plied. But it is to be remembered that such prediction 
is nearly always conditional and liable to exceptions, owing 
to the presence of factors which counteract those on which 
the prediction is founded. For instance, we can not by 
altering the distribution of light and shade cause a human 
face to appear concave instead of convex. The ordinary 
appearance is too familiar and habitual for this to be possi- 
ble. ' ' ( Stout, G. F. : The Groundwork of Psychology, p. 12. ) 
Foresight forces the search for control.— The ability to 
anticipate events is naturally accompanied by the desire 
to avoid undesirable and to bring about desirable happen- 
ings. Foresight inspires the striving for control of phe- 
nomena. The misery of helplessness exists only by reason 
of foresight. Animals with keen awareness of what is hap- 
pening about them, but lacking glimpses into the future, 
are not concerned with the control of phenomena, nor can 
they suffer expected misfortune. It is man's ability to 
anticipate events in imagination that renders him both su- 
premely miserable and supremely happy. If " foresight " 
did not lead us to " control," we should indeed be less 
fortunate in our mental lives than are the creatures of 
mere awareness. 

The prediction and control of physical events. — With 
the causal relations of events in the world of physics, our 



390 PREDICTION AND CONTROL OF EVENTS 

physical, as contrasted with our psychical, environment, 
we have familiarity which renders more than passing no- 
tice of the facts unnecessary. So accustomed are we to 
anticipate the snap and flash when a match is quickly 
drawn over sandpaper that we seldom think of our fore- 
sight in the matter. Nevertheless, we are quite capable 
of controlling these same events when we so desire. "We 
may so construct the match that the snap shall not occur, 
or we may, by modifying certain conditions of the events, 
prevent the occurrence of both snap and flash. Indeed, 
day by day we exercise control over a multitude of events 
before which other animals are helpless. Prediction and 
control are commonplaces of our lives and therefore diffi- 
cult to appreciate. 

When the physical cause is immediately followed by its 
effect or effects, prediction seems fairly easy. We observe 
the breaking of a bottle when it is placed in hot water and 
we causally link the events. But we are less likely to 
predict and successfully to control those effects which fol- 
low their causes only after an interval of days, weeks, or 
months. It is the separation of causally related events 
which renders the tasks of prediction and control 
difficult. 

Can mental phenomena be predicted? — No one ques- 
tions our ability to foresee innumerable physical events 
which are of importance in our lives, and to control many 
of them, but many persons seriously doubt whether mental 
happenings can similarly be predicted. What is the truth, 
as indicated by observation? 

Self-observation reveals sequences in mental life. The 
thought which I am now experiencing followed the appear- 
ance in consciousness of certain ideas. The ideas became 
related and I became aware of a thought process. Or, 
suddenly, as I am writing, the sensation of the sound of 
a bell, which I recognize as the fire signal, comes clearly 



PREDICTION OF MENTAL EVENTS 391 

to consciousness. An instant later I experience an image 
of another auditory sensation, that of a shrill whistle, 
which has frequently in my past experience accompanied 
the former sensation. Yet another example may be given 
of psychic sequences. As I was finishing the writing of 
the foregoing sentence the name Francis Galton came to 
consciousness auditorily and verbally, and immediately 
there passed before my mind's eye visual pictures of his 
career. Each picture seemed naturally and inevitably to 
lead to the next. I can imagine the order changed, but 
in order to do so I have to imagine also certain changes 
in the nature of the pictures. 

These are examples of mental sequences, which, if inti- 
mately known, should justify us in maintaining the pre- 
dictability of psychic events. There are a few mental 
events which, in the introspection of each of us, may be 
predicted confidently. There is a multitude of others which 
we are wholly unable to predict. The latter events, as 
truly as the former, are caused or conditioned by certain 
other events, but whereas our scanty knowledge permits us 
to observe the relation of dependence in the one set of 
cases it does not in the other. 

Some events are easy, others difficult, to predict. — 
As in the world of physics there are events whose causes 
are extremely difficult to discover, whereas the conditions 
of others are forced upon the observer, so in mental life 
the obviousness of the causal relation of events varies. 
There is nothing surprising in this, yet many psychologists 
contend that our inability to predict any considerable pro- 
portion of mental events proves conclusively that they are 
not caused by other mental events. The simple fact that 
the stimulus word ■ ' writer ' ' yesterday aroused the psychic 
sequence — consciousness of sound and sight of word 
" writer," visual image of Francis Galton, idea of eugenics, 
image of book on my desk, etc., and to-day the utterly dif- 



392 PREDICTION AND CONTROL OF EVENTS 

ferent series of events — kinesthetic experience of the word 
" writer," visual-verbal image of a student, idea of thesis 
on kinesthetic sensations, auditory memory of name, etc., 
by no means proves that the events are not conditions of 
one another in both instances. 

If we knew the psychic facts intimately and thoroughly 
it would be reasonable to conclude that since " writer " 
is followed now by one idea, now by another it bears no 
causal relation to either. What we too readily overlook 
is the fact that the conditions or causes of events are com- 
plex. The simple stimulus- word " writer " is only one 
of many important conditions of the associated ideas. 

The wonder is that we observe as much regularity in the 
sequence of mental events as we actually do! 

Every event may be assumed to have a cause or causes. 
— Physical scientists work on the assumption that there 
are no uncaused or unconditioned events. The assumption 
would seem to be a serviceable one, as judged by the 
progress which we have made in the prediction and con- 
trol of events through physical research. 

Why may we not make the same assumption in psy- 
chology? We may. Indeed, it is the conviction of the 
writer that we should. Further, the assumption may profit- 
ably take the form that every mental event is caused or 
conditioned by some other mental event or events. 

Physics makes allowance for the apparent variations 
in the effects of a given set of conditions. It does not, 
as psychology has done, abandon the idea of a causal rela- 
tion between events because there appear to be exceptions 
to the rule. Instead, confident of the correctness of its 
fundamental assumption concerning causation, physics 
proceeds to seek for variations in the conditions to account 
for the observed variations in the effects. 

The lesson for the psychologist is obvious. — Instead of 
abandoning the notion of psychical causation because the 



CONTROL OF MENTAL EVENTS 393 

same mental event seems to condition now one and now 
another idea, he should look for differences in the conditions 
which will adequately account for the different effects 

We can predict mental events.— This book has been 
written from beginning to end, on the assumption that 
adequate knowledge of the facts of mental life would enable 
us to predict mental phenomena in precisely the way in 
which we predict physical events. The foregoing para- 
graphs, in defense of this assumption, have prepared the 
reader for the author's answer to the question, Can we 
control mental life? 

The control of mental phenomena.— If mental events 
cause or condition one another, if we can predict them 
and if we have the power to modify the course of these 
events by changing the psychic environment, then the con- 
trol of mental phenomena is possible. 

We must first demolish the ifs. Mental events do cause 
or condition one another. There is psychical causation. 
This matter has been discussed in the light of facts, up to 
the limits of our space. It is necessary now to make state- 
ments dogmatically. But one more word may be said in 
defense and justification of the position which the writer, 
in opposition to most psychologists, assumes. He believes 
that observation indicates psychic causation; he believes 
that the assumption of the existence of this relation between 
mental phenomena will conduce to important developments 
in the science of psychology, and finally, he feels sure that 
the task of controlling mental phenomena demands pre- 
cisely the knowledge which research on the basis of this 
assumption will yield. 

If mental phenomena can be predicted, we may hope to 
gain control over them. Certainly they may be predicted 
if we are capable of discovering their conditions and if 
these same conditions are observable prior to the event 
or events which they condition. Again the ifs disappear 



394 PREDICTION AND CONTROL OF EVENTS 

before a dogmatic statement. We can predict mental 
events. Our success is meager as yet, but that fact is 
readily explained. The power of prediction depends wholly 
upon the scope of our knowledge. As we learn more about 
mental phenomena our ability to predict events of mind 
correspondingly increases. 

The most serious of all the ifs remains. If we have the 
power to modify the course of mental events we can con- 
trol them. Have we this power? 

Can mind be controlled? How? — We have the power 
to control mental life, within certain limits, just as we 
have also the ability to control bodily life. It has been 
said by the physiologist Professor Jacques Loeb that the 
goal of the biological sciences is the control of the phe- 
nomena of life. Following his line of thought, we may say 
that the goal of psychology is the control of mental 
phenomena. 

Always in attempting to control consciousness we mod- 
ify the environmental influences which are acting upon 
the organism. This is done systematically in education 
and in eugenics. 

The remaining chapters of the book suggest ways in 
which mind may be modified and controlled. The discus- 
sion is necessarily brief and incomplete. Its purpose is 
to make clear the possibility and desirability of control in 
the individual and in the race, not to enumerate all the 
possible modes of control 

CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. Introspection of thought processes. Mate- 
rial : a set of five questions, prepared in advance by the in- 
structor, to be read to the class. After each question, sufficient 
time should be allowed for the writing of a full report of 
introspection. 

Suggested questions. 

Who is Jumbo? 



INTROSPECTION OF THINKING 395 

How long is the Panama Canal? 

Can you speak French? 

What is the date of to-day? 

A boy is to a man as a book is to ? 



SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Judd, C. H. : Psychology, chapter 15. 
Peaeson, K. : Grammar of science, chapter 1. 
Thobndike, E. L. : Elements of psychology, chapter 21. 



CHAPTER XXXI 
EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

" What we think and what we do about education is certainly in- 
fluenced by our opinions about such matters as individual differ- 
ences in children, inborn traits, heredity, sex differences, the special- 
ization of mental abilities, their interrelations, the relation between 
them and physical endowments, normal mental growth, its periodic- 
ities, and the method of action and relative importance of various 
environmental influences. For instance, schemes for individual in- 
struction and for different rates of promotion are undertaken largely 
because of certain beliefs concerning the prevalence and amount of 
differences in mental capacity; the conduct of at least two classes 
out of every three is determined in great measure by the teacher's 
faith that mental abilities are so little specialized that improve- 
ment in any one of them will help all the rest; manual training 
is often introduced into schools on the strength of somebody's con- 
fidence that skill in movement is intimately connected with effi- 
ciency in thinking; the practical action with regard to co-educa- 
tion has been accompanied, and doubtless influenced, by arguments 
about the identity or the equality of the minds of men and women; 
the American public school system rests on a total disregard of 
hereditary mental differences between the classes and the masses ; 
curricula are planned with some speculation concerning mental 
development as a guide. It is thus easy to find cases where educa- 
tional practice depends upon opinions about our group of topics. It 
is still easier to note a similar dependence in the case of educa- 
tional theory." — Thorn dike, E. L. : Educational psychology, pp. 1-2. 

Education is two-fold: physical and psychical. — The 
practice of speaking of the education of the body and the 
education of the mind as though they are distinct is justi- 
fied by the methods and results of educational practice. 
Physical education, it is true, always influences the mind; 
and, conversely, psychical education modifies the body. 
There is much truth in the statement that a sound body 
and a sound mind belong together. 

In this chapter we shall discuss only psychical educa- 

396 



EDUCATION IS AN ART 397 

tion, and that merely in certain of its important relations 
to the science of psychology. 

Education, an art. — Briefly and inadequately, but suf- 
ficiently for our immediate purposes, education may be de- 
fined as systematic endeavor to promote, direct, and control 
the development of mind in the individual. The body of 
educational practice, the educational system, constitutes an 
art because it is used to bring about certain psychological 
developments which are deemed desirable. Education is 
intensely practical, not assthetic. There is a popular notion 
to the effect that education is synonymous with knowledge 
or learning. The notion is incorrect. Education aims 
rather at mental efficiency than at knowledge. It is truer 
to say efficiency is power than to say " knowledge is 
power." The art of education should, and does, bring 
knowledge to the individual, but far more it should draw 
out, foster, and strengthen his mental capacities. 

The scientific basis of the art of education. — Every 
well developed art has a scientific basis. It is in the light 
of this basis that its products may be predicted. For, in 
its most highly developed form, an art is the skillful appli- 
cation of scientific knowledge. Now the scientific basis 
of the art of psychical education is psychological. Mental 
phenomena can be effectively controlled only in the light 
of accurate knowledge of the facts and laws of conscious- 
ness. 

Educational systems are traditional. — At present our 
systems of education are largely the products of social 
tradition and of more or less happy guesses concerning 
events. They are reasoned, but not rational, for the ma- 
jority of their practices are not based upon definite knowl- 
edge of the laws of mind. The teacher, not less than the 
engineer, should be able to predict with a fair degree 
of accuracy and certainty, the probable effects of his 
methods. 



398 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

Efficiency. — Efficiency depends upon the rationalizing 
of methods. The efficient workman is the one who has 
thought out his ways of doing things; compared way^ 
with way, eliminated the worse, perfected his skill in the 
employment of the better. In a word, he is the man who 
works in the light of a relatively adequate knowledge of 
facts. " Scientific management " in industry means sim- 
ply the selection of the fit, suitable, efficient, economical 
way of working and the abandoning of all less efficient 
ways. 

Everywhere thought makes for efficiency. The person 
who thinks out his methods of work and acquires habits 
of basing even the simplest acts upon systematic knowl- 
edge of the possible ways of acting leads in the struggle 
for accomplishment. It is indeed the glory of man that 
he is capable of substituting thoughtful for blind hit or 
miss reactions ; brain for brawn ; insight for learning by 
trial and error. 

Psychology and education. — It is perfectly obvious that 
psychology should furnish the scientific basis for the edu- 
cation of mind, and it is equally obvious to all who are 
concerned with educational practice, that it has as yet done 
so only very incompletely and unsatisfactorily. There is 
no reason to condemn or criticize educators, for they are 
eagerly seeking and intelligently using whatever facts and 
laws of consciousness are made available. 

The whole of the science of psychology should be brought 
to bear upon the problem of educational efficiency. But it 
must suffice now to call attention, by way of illustration, 
to a few aspects of the control of consciousness which are 
receiving the attention alike of educators and psychologists. 

Education and the senses. — From birth till death our 
senses demand intelligent care. They may be so developed 
as to be efficient contributors to the stream of conscious- 
ness, or they may be dwarfed, impaired, distorted so that 



EDUCATION OF THE SENSES 399 

their contributions to consciousness are either of slight 
value or positively baneful. 

One of the tasks of education is to control the develop- 
ment of the senses. This control must begin in the home; 
it must be continued and extended in the schools; it must 
be maintained by the intelligent individual throughout 
life. 

Physical defects of the sense organs require attention, 
for normal sensitiveness resides only in the normal health- 
ful body. To attempt to train the vision or touch or hear- 
ing of a child without first making sure that the sense 
organs are normal and in good condition is a waste of 
time. 

The apparently stupid child is not seldom found to lack 
normal sensations of sight or hearing. With the removal 
of the cause of the sensory defect there occurs rapid de- 
velopment of mind. Scores of instances of the impor- 
tance of normal sensitiveness for mental development 
might be cited. We shall content ourselves with a single 
case. 

At the age of fourteen a boy was brought to Professor 
Witmer for examination. He was a chronic bad speller 
and read very poorly. A careful study of his physical 
and mental characteristics revealed the following sense 
peculiarity as the chief cause for his mental backward- 
ness. He suffered from a peculiar visual defect which 
caused objects to appear double. It was only at the cost 
of strenuous and fatiguing effort that this boy could see 
clearly the letters of a word. Neither parents nor teachers 
had discovered this sense defect during the early discour- 
aging years of the boy's school life. He had not spoken 
of it because he had no ground for supposing that any 
one else saw differently, and as a consequence his mental 
development was hopelessly dwarfed. 

Of this sad case — and there are many like it in our 



400 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

Softools — Professor Witmer writes: " If the mother or 
teacher had possessed the knowledge and experience that 
the study of cases like his will give, he would have been 
sent early in life to the oculist, his defect of vision could 
have been entirely corrected, and he would have made 
normal progress through the grades. His history shows 
the presence of ocular deficiency from the first school 
year. Not having been then removed, by the time he had 
reached fourteen years of age it was too late for him to 
make up all he had lost. He never acquired normal facility 
in reading and spelling." (Witmer, L. : The Psycho- 
logical Clinic, vol. 1, p. 62. 1907.) 

That the senses are educable has been amply demon- 
strated, but we seldom can select with certainty the most 
efficient method of improving them. It is one of the 
important tasks of psychology to discover at what periods, 
under what conditions of life, and by what means our 
senses should be trained. 

Education and perception. — Nature endows us with the 
tendency to perceive. Education supervises the manifesta- 
tion of this tendency and determines whether we become 
able, mediocre, or poor perceptually. 

The isolated human being would experience percepts. 
The uneducated person seems to get along fairly well with 
his untrained experiences. But these observations do not 
convince us that perceptual education is valueless. Under 
the tuition of practiced, skilled, and sensible teachers we 
acquire perceptual habits which are of incalculable impor- 
tance for our mental development. In a very true sense 
of the expressions, we learn to see, to hear, to touch, to 
taste. The educational influences under which our " learn- 
ing process " occurs make of us either keen or dull, relia- 
ble or unreliable, penetrating or superficial, thorough or 
careless, honest or dishonest observers. It is the duty of 
the psychologist so to formulate the facts and laws of our 



EDUCATION AND THE WILL 401 

perceptual processes that the possibilities of controlling 
them may be studied to advantage. 

Education and the will. — Each of us comes into the 
world provided with a fund of adjustments to environ- 
ment and capable of receiving certain experiences in con- 
nection with the development of these adjustments. We 
call these provisions of Nature instincts. Instinct may 
not inappropriately be defined as the Will of Nature ex- 
pressing itself through us. 

It is the function of environment — the whole of which 
is education — so to develop each of us that the human type 
of will comes into existence beside instinct. Life is for 
every human being, first and foremost, a process of ac- 
quiring self-control. If the practices of education do not 
further this process with maximum efficiency, they are 
unsatisfactory. It is perfectly obvious that we know too 
little about mind and its growth to be able to estimate the 
value of most of the educational methods which are in 
common use. 

Education and habit-formation. — In advance of ade- 
quate knowledge of ways of controlling the process, we 
have recognized the importance of the principle of habit. 
Something like one-third of our lives is " instinct," as 
much is " habit," and the remainder is in process of be- 
coming the one or the other ! No wonder then that educa- 
tion demands a scientific basis for the direction of habit- 
formation. 

It is encouraging to note that recently the phenomena 
of habit have been so investigated that we have much in- 
formation about the nature of the process ; and it is not less 
interesting to note that attempts are being made to meas- 
ure the value of methods of influencing habit-formation. 
We know, for example, that a few repetitions of a sentence 
at intervals of a few hours more satisfactorily establishes 
the process of recall than does an equal number of repeti- 



402 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

tions at one time. For the acquisition of any habit, we know 
that there are conditions which are favorable, others which 
are unfavorable, and we know that the same is true of 
the retention of habits. The question which is being at- 
tacked experimentally is " What is the most efficient 
method for establishing a certain habit 1 ' ' 

Instead of setting out blindly by a hit or miss method, 
or even by means of a method which has been in use for 
centuries but whose efficiency has never been compared 
with that of other possible methods, to establish a certain 
habit of mind in ourselves or in others, we should seek 
first definite knowledge of the values of all the methods 
which are available. 

From an admirable experimental study by Professor 
Book of the process of learning to use the typewriter the 
following analysis of the habit complex involved, and of 
certain results of the investigation are quoted. 

" In learning typewriting two groups of special habits 
are formed: (1) Habits of manipulation, or the specific 
psycho-physical associations involved in the mastery of the 
writing itself. (2) Habits of control, certain more general 
or more purely mental habits formed in conjunction with 
the habits of manipulation — habits that are not involved 
in the writing directly, but rather preside over the forma- 
tion of the special typewriting habits. In other words, 
in learning to typewrite the learners acquire in addition to 
the habits of manipulation (the typewriting habits which 
enable them to deal more and more directly and econom- 
ically with the particular problems presented by the writ- 
ing), certain other habits which enable them to deal more 
and more successfully with the problems involved in the 
learning itself. Specifically the subjects learn: (a) How 
to " short circuit," or acquire to advantage the kind of 
habits which the mastery of the subject requires; (b) How 
to meet and successfully overcome the many special dif- 



LEARNING TO TYPEWRITE 403 

Acuities which are characteristic of the learning of type- 
writing; (c) How to acquire and maintain a helpful atti- 
tude of feeling; (d) How to keep attention focused always 
on the writing; (e) How to use attention more and more 
effectively when applied to the writing. How better to 
use and economize voluntary effort, etc." (Book, W. F. : 
The Psychology of Skill, p. 168.) 

" The special typewriting associations or habits of 
manipulation are all developed and perfected in a definite 
manner. The earliest associations employed in the writing 
are formed from the masses of familiar associations and 
activities which the learner brings with him to the work. 
In the beginning the learner's attention and effort can not 
be applied to the writing in a direct and economical way. 
Under the influence of the strong desire to succeed in the 
new task there are called up masses of old and easy asso- 
ciations and forms of activity, most of which are not 
directly serviceable for the writing. From these associa- 
tions and activities is built up by the double process of 
elimination and selection the first elementary, step-by-step, 
blundering associations used. By a further process of 
elimination and a simultaneous one of recombination, called 
into action by the extreme exertions of the learners in their 
eager desire to reach a higher speed and greater facility, 
their first elaborate and circuitous methods of writing are 
simplified, refined, changed, until, sheared of some of their 
accessories, they enter into and form the easiest and most 
direct method of work yet attained. Throughout the learn- 
ing there is, if one may so phrase it, a sort of unconscious 
struggle for existence among many modes of action and 
methods of work, ending in the survival of the one most 
direct and economic way of reaching the goal. Some of 
the early habits called forth by the learning exist but to 
be eliminated, others enter into and constitute the first 
simple and direct habits used in the writing. These ele- 



404 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

mentary habits are in turn modified and reorganized, as 
practice continues, as parts of higher and more economical 
groupings, in which their identity is gradually merged, 
while these higher groupings in turn are worked over into 
yet higher complexes by essentially similar processes " 
(p. 170). 

" The most important factors influencing the formation 
of the special habits involved in typewriting are the fluctua- 
tions in attention and effort, which occur throughout the 
course of the learning, and the mistakes fallen into, and 
changes in feelings and attitude which regularly accompany 
both of these " (p. 173). 

" Besides determining the special habits of every kind 
and order involved in the mastery of typewriting and 
showing concretely, by a minute history of the learning 
process, how these habits were developed and perfected 
as successively organized and recombined into associations 
and habits that bring the learner always more directly and 
economically to his goal, this study has shown the important 
role played in the leprning, by effort and hygiene. Two 
facts stand out above all the rest: (1) All special habits and 
associations involved in the mastery of typewriting must 
be carefully perfected. (2) They must then as rapidly as 
possible be outgrown and give way to higher and more 
direct habits of writing. Bryan and Harter were right 
when they said : ' We believe that by no device is it possi- 
ble to gain freedom in using the higher-order habits until 
the lower have been so well mastered that attention is not 
diverted by them.' They suggested a truth of still greater 
importance when they added: ' It is, nevertheless, wise 
at all times to practice with the highest units possible, 
and thus learn all the units in their proper setting.' 
{Psy. Rev., vol. 6, p. 368, 1899.) The older elementary 
habits tend naturally and strongly to persist and must be 
left behind as rapidly as possible to prevent arrest. To 



LEARNING TO TYPEWRITE 405 

try to crowd ahead before the elementary habits are suf- 
ficiently mastered to make safe the taking of a forward 
step, or to fail to perfect the elemental associations which 
must be combined to form the higher and more direct 
methods of writing, is fatal to progress or interest. To be 
caught by the law of habit and continue to think or 
work on a low plane when new possibilities of improve- 
ment lie ahead is just as fatal. It is, therefore, imperative 
that the learner should always practice with the highest- 
order habits he can use. But he must not try to go too 
fast. Great effort wrongly or carelessly applied is even 
more detrimental to progress than a simple lapse in atten- 
tion and effort. Since all the special habits to be formed 
must be religiously guarded in the last stages of their 
development to be thoroughly mastered, and since these 
habits are developed simultaneously and literally perfect 
each other, and since intense effort is required to make a 
forward step, the vital problem in learning resolves itself 
into making the right use of attention and determining 
how fast to push ahead. The tendency to slight the asso- 
ciations in the last stages of their development and to 
push ahead too "fast, can, of course, best be overcome, in 
typewriting, by not always practicing at maximum speed, 
for the effort for speed usually means that attention de- 
serts the details of the work. To perfect carefully the 
elemental associations it will, therefore, be found better 
practically, to practice most of the time for accuracy alone 
and only a small part of the time for speed, a custom gen- 
erally followed by the best typewriting schools. This 
would insure the perfection and mastery of the elemental 
associations and habits. But it is just as essential for 
progress that the learner should push along as fast as he 
can and so develop all the habits in their proper setting 
and avoid falling into a habit of laziness " (pp. 178, 179). 
" It is not what the learner would like to do, but what 



406 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 

his mental and physical condition at the time of study 
or practice will let him do, that is important for deter- 
mining his progress. The process of learning typewriting 
is something like mowing a field. The farmer takes out 
his machine to cut his grass. He can only keep his ma- 
chine in good condition and vigorously applied to the 
work; the machine does all the rest. It does its own work 
in its own way. How well it works depends upon the 
nature and condition of the machine. So with a learner 
in typewriting; he begins to learn to use the typewriter. 
How well he does the work, how rapidly he improves, 
depends, (1) upon how strenuously he keeps himself ap- 
plied to the task, (2) upon the learner, the mental and 
physical condition of his organism. He must keep himself 
in perfect condition and strenuously applied to the work; 
the organism does all the rest. He needs but to consciously 
lay hold of and make proper use of the adaptations that 
are unconsciously fallen into, the habits and associations 
formed. All this suggests that if one wants to improve 
at the most rapid rate, he must work when he can feel good 
and succeed, then lounge and wait until it is again profita- 
ble to work. It is when all the conditions are favorable 
that the forward steps or new adaptations in learning are 
made. Whether the older associations are at such a time 
also more rapidly perfected or whether monotonous prac- 
tice will answer as well in stimulating their growth we can 
not say " (pp. 180, 181). 

The significance for education of such studies as Pro- 
fessor Book's. — By the experimental study of the learning 
process in its various aspects and by careful measurement 
of the effects of educational conditions upon the process, 
and thus alone, can the best methods of controlling con- 
sciousness and of directing mental development be selected. 

Professor Book's work has been quoted at great length 
because it is a splendid example of the type of research 



EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUALITY 407 

which the art of education demands in order that it may 
safely and sanely be based upon scientific knowledge of 
mental life and of its control. 

Education and individual differences. — Alike mentally 
yet sufficiently different to demand varied modes of edu- 
cative treatment, we human beings present in equal meas- 
ure to psychologist and teacher special and individual 
problems. The psychologist may not safely assume that 
two individuals are alike in type of reproductive memory; 
nor may the teacher assume that a training method will 
affect both alike. 

Recently there has come into use the expression " the 
psychology of individual differences." This is clearly 
indicative of the degree of importance of the matter and of 
the attention which is being given it. In education, like- 
wise, effort is now concentrated on the needs of the indi- 
vidual, and especially on the relations of educative meth- 
ods to the physical and psychical traits of the individual. 

Status of the control of mind in the individual. — At 
present we do not, can not, to any marked degree, control 
the mental processes in the individual. The status of the 
matter is encouraging rather because of the widespread 
realization that control is possible and that it must be at- 
tained than because of achievement. Investigation is rife : 
progress is thereby assured. Psychologists on the one hand 
are diligently studying consciousness and eagerly seizing 
upon results which appear to have value for the art of edu- 
cation. Teachers, on the other hand, are striving for 
efficiency through the testing of methods and the observa- 
tion of individual differences. 

There is a rapidly growing body of knowledge, known 
as educational psychology, from which much may be ex- 
pected in the future for the control of mind. 



408 EDUCATION AND MENTAL LIFE 



CLASS EXERCISE 

Self -observation. Introspection of reasoning process. Mate- 
rials: some simple object or part of an object, the use of which 
no member of the class is likely to know with certainty. 

Having explained to the class the nature of the introspective 
task and rendered the explanation concrete by a description of 
some simple process of reasoning (examples may be found in 
Dewey's How we think), the instructor should for a few 
moments pi'esent to view the object whose use is to be reasoned 
out. 

Whether or not a self -satisfying conclusion is reached in the 
reasoning, each member of the class should carefully and fully 
describe the steps in the reasoning process. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Thobndike, E. L. : Educational psychology, chapters 2, 10, 11. 
Whipple, G. M. : Manual of mental and physical tests, chapters 1 and 

2. (Bibliography.) 
James, Wm. : Talks to teachers, chapters 1, 3, 4, 7. 
Scott, W. D. : The psychology of advertising, chapters 1, 2, 6, 9. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

EUGENICS AND MENTAL LIFE 

" Eugenics is the study of agencies under social control that may 
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either 
physically or mentally. 

" The fact that the laws of heredity apply to man equally with 
the lower animals and plants, and that the mental functions are 
subject to the same laws of heredity as the physical ones, has yet 
to be taken to heart by the public. 

" The salutary effects of natural selection in preventing the de- 
generacy of a race are so largely interfered with, and sometimes 
even inverted, by civilization, that another form of prevention is 
peremptorily demanded. 

" If we apply the general word degenerate to the insane, to the 
imbecile, to the habitual criminal, and to those who are naturally 
liable to some of the more serious diseases, it is found that a 
' degenerate ' is no less fertile than a normal person, apparently a 
little more so, and that such persons frequently marry." — Saleeby, 
C. W. : Parenthood and race culture, p. 374. (Quoting Francis 
Galton.) 

A definition of eugenics. — Eugenics has been defined as 
the science of race improvement. It might more appro- 
priately be termed the art of race improvement. Its task 
is that of modifying the physical and mental constitution 
of races by means of the knowledge which the biological 
sciences, and especially heredity, furnish. We shall limit 
our present discussion to the bearings of eugenics upon 
mental life. 

Education and eugenics contrasted. — Education deals 
directly with the mind of the individual. It directs its 
development, modifies its activities, leads it to efficiency. 
Eugenics deals instead with mind in the race. It directs 
the course of phylogenesis by controlling inheritance, and 
it thus makes for increased efficiency in the individual. 

409 



410 EUGENICS AND MENTAL LIFE 

Inheritance: scope and significance. — " Like tends to 
produce like." This is as true of mind as of body. The 
mental traits of father and mother, as well as of more 
remote ancestors, appear more or less clearly in the chil- 
dren. This fact is recognized by education and by eu- 
genics. The former, accepting the hereditary constitution 
of the individual, strives to make the best of the possi- 
bilities of development, strives ultimately to lead the indi- 
vidual to highest mental efficiency. The latter works, 
through the principles of heredity, toward a more desirable 
constitution in the individual. Education accepts as its 
starting point what eugenics seeks to control. It is there- 
fore evident that the achievements of the art of education 
are conditioned by those of its infantile sister, eugenics. 

Examples of psychic inheritance. — The clearest and 
most convincing cases of the direct inheritance of mental 
traits are those of mental defects. 

From a recent report of studies on " Heredity of Fee- 
ble-mindedness " by Doctor Godclard the following cases 
are selected. They are representative of the family his- 
tories of hundreds of individuals whose sad inheritances 
render them pitiable objects of care in our training schools, 
hospitals, and reformatories. The facts are horrible to con- 
template, but we may not ignore them. 

A brother and sister, both feeble-minded, were discov- 
ered to have three brothers and one sister, all mentally 
deficient. The father and mother were feeble-minded. In 
the mother's family there were two girls and one boy, all 
defective. In the father's family there wer& four feeble- 
minded children. The maternal grandparents of the chil- 
dren in question were feeble-minded, but of the paternal 
grandparents the grandfather was not mentally defec- 
tive, although the grandmother was known to be feeble- 
minded. 

Chart B, Fig. 12, briefly tells the story of these children, 



INHERITANCE OF MENTAL DEFECTS 



411 



for whom birth was a misfortune too distressing to dwell 
upon. 

Another case is thus reported by word and chart (A, 
Fig. 12). 

This history " shows a marked instance of the defect 



o 



hj6 



6 1 1 6 1 6666- 1 -66666 1 6 l ' ' l 



1 > > '44664 I Ob 



Husband 

D- 



O-rJ 



Mi iTC 



Qnd, 
Husband 

D ■ 1 • 



STttl 44' '1444' ' ' 



D- 



"^T*" 



-444444 



444444 



666666 
1 '444' 



Fig. 12. Charts indicating the inheritance of feeble-mindedness. 
These charts are somewhat simplified from Doctor Goddard's. 
( Circles represent females ; squares represent males ; light circles 
and squares represent individuals who were not feeble-minded; 
black circles and squares represent those who were feeble-minded. ) 

skipping a generation. The maternal grandmother was 
feeble-minded, her husband was alcoholic, but not one of 
their children was defective. Indeed, four of them were 
distinctly normal. However, the mother of our child [in 



412 EUGENICS AND MENTAL LIFE 

the Vineland Training School] had had St. Vitus dance, 
a brother is alcoholic, a sister had had St. Vitus dance, 
and another hysteria, but mentally they were not de- 
fective." (Goddard, H. H. •. Heredity of Feeble-minded- 
ness, American Breeders Magazine, vol. 1, p. 169. 1910.) 

Yet a third case is represented in Chart C of Fig. 12. 
Its meaning, as those of Charts A and B, is explained by 
the legend below the figure. 

These are not exceptional cases. — Daily, social workers 
in settlements, hospitals, charitable institutions, physicians 
in their practice, neurologists, and psychologists are brought 
face to face with precisely such appalling instances as the 
above of man 's inhumanity to man. Human sympathy and 
justice demand that society take measures to control the 
conditions which produce mental degeneracy. 

Contrasts in psychic inheritance. — A comparison of the 
history of two well-known families: the one famous, the 
other infamous, affords, writes Mr. Boies, " this impressive 
illustrative contrast between the heritage of good and bad 
parentage, during substantially the same one hundred 
seventy-five years of the same American environment." 
(Boies, H. M. : The Science of Penology, p. 326 — 
quoting A. E. Winship.) The families referred to and 
thus summarily described are those of Jonathan Edwards 
and the Jukes. 

The Edwards family. — "Jonathan Edwards, born East 
Windsor, Conn., in 1703 : 1,394 of his descendants were 
identified in 1900 ; of whom 295 were college graduates ; 
13 presidents of our greatest colleges ; 65 professors in col- 
leges, besides many principals of other important educa- 
tional institutions; 60 physicians, many of whom were 
eminent ; 100 and more clergymen, missionaries, or the- 
ological professors; 75 were officers in the army and navy; 
60 prominent authors and writers, by whom 135 books of 
merit were published and 18 important periodicals edited; 



EDWARDS AND JUKES 413 

33 American States and several foreign countries and 92 
American cities and many foreign cities have profited by 
the beneficent influence of their eminent activity ; 100 and 
more were lawyers, of whom 1 was our most eminent pro- 
fessor of law; 30 were judges; 80 had held public offices, 
of whom 1 was vice-president of the United States; 3 were 
United States senators; several were governors, members 
of Congress, framers of State constitutions, mayors of 
cities, and ministers to foreign courts; 1 was president of 
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company ; 15 railroads, many 
banks, insurance companies, and large industrial enter- 
prises have been indebted to their management. 

Almost if not every department of social progress and 
of the public weal has felt the impulse of this healthy and 
long-lived family. Penology and prison management have 
occupied their attention and been improved by its mem- 
bers. It is not known that any one of them was ever con- 
victed of crime." 

The Jukes family. — " ' Max,' the progenitor of ' the 
Jukes, ' was born in 1720. He was a drunkard who would 
not work; about whom little else is known. 

"Of his descendants 1,200 were identified as having 
been occupants of penal and charitable institutions, previ- 
ous to 1874; none of whom were ever elected to office, 
served in the army or navy, or contributed anything to the 
public welfare; but on the contrary they cost society over 
$1,000 each; or a total of $1,250,000; 310 were in poor- 
houses, 2,300 years in all; 300, or over one in four, died 
in childhood; 440 were viciously diseased; 400 physically 
wrecked early by their own wickedness; 50 were notorious 
prostitutes ; 7 were murderers ; 60 habitual thieves, who 
spent an average of 12 years each in prison; 130 were 
convicted more or less often of crimes. 

" The Jukes family never mingled any good blood with 
its own. The Edwards family has instinctively protected 



414 EUGENICS AND MENTAL LIFE 

its blood from degeneration by careful and prudent mar- 
riages. The Jukes family is fortunately becoming extinct; 
although " the mills of the gods grind slow." The Ed- 
wards family bless the world with numerous children. If 
the records of the female side of the house could be col- 
lected the contrast would doubtless be doubled. It is im- 
possible to compute, almost so to overestimate, the value 
of such citizens to the State." 

Psychic inheritance in royalty. — As Doctor Frederick 
A. Woods has convincingly shown, royalty furnishes numer- 
ous instances of the transmission of mental peculiarities. 
Of these instances few are as instructive as the group of 
which Isabella of Spain, to whom Columbus owed so much, 
is the center. 

Queen Isabella was the daughter of an imbecile father 
and an insane mother. But, far from being mentally 
deficient, she was renowned for her intellectual gifts. She 
married Ferdinand who, although not her equal intellectu- 
ally, was mentally sound and of fair ability. One of their 
daughters was Joanne " the mad." In her the defects of 
the maternal grandparents reappeared. Another daughter, 
Mary, was not defective. Joanna married Philip, mentally 
a weakling, and to them was born Charles V, a victim of 
melancholia, and Catherine, who was mentally sound. 
Mary married Emanuel, also a weakling, and of their chil- 
dren, a daughter, Isabel, was normal, and a son, John III, 
was a weak-minded individual. He married his cousin 
Catherine, and their daughter, Mary, later married Philip 
II, the morose and cruel son of Charles V and his wife, 
who was also his cousin, Isabel. To Philip II and Mary was 
born Don Carlos, one of the most depraved and cruel of men. 

This history is but one of many of which civilization has 
abundant reason to be ashamed. 

A fundamental consideration. — Man's success in the 
struggle for perfection depends upon mind. In the brute, 



THE GOAL OF EUGENICS 415 

strength spells success ; in man mental initiative and rea- 
oning power are its substitutes. It therefore behooves us 
to seek that control of mind which shall enable us to im- 
prove the race. Not content with Nature's way, for it is 
often extremely wasteful, indirect, and slow, we should 
strive, by the scientific study of the facts of inheritance, 
to learn how to control consciousness. 

The goal of eugenics. — In the words of the late Sir 
Francis Galton, the founder of this immeasurably important 
social movement, eugenics " is the study of agencies under 
social control that may improve or impair the racial quali- 
ties of future generations either physically or mentally. ' ' 

Eugenic methods. — For every reader of this book who 
refuses to grant the desirability of the goal toward which 
eugenics moves, there will be scores who frankly admit 
that they can see no way of approach to the goal. 

The problem of methods or means for race improvement 
is difficult. Fortunately we need not attempt to solve it 
now. It will suffice to indicate certain possible eugenic 
methods which are at hand and may readily be perfected. 

There are in reality two tasks for eugenics. The first 
is the prevention of race deterioration through inheritance. 
The second is the improvement of the race. The first is 
merely negative, but it conditions progress. The second is 
positive and therefore of infinitely greater importance. 
Nevertheless, the first task is the one which most urgently 
demands attention. 

Mental degeneracy and its prevention. — Feeble-minded- 
ness and mental defects of many kinds are definitely 
heritable. In the face of positive knowledge of this fact 
it is obviously the duty of society to prevent the marriage 
of individuals who are not mentally sound. Justice to 
those who support its burdens as taxpayers, philanthropists, 
social workers, and to children yet unborn whose chances 
of normality are slight, demands that society prevent the 



416 EUGENICS AND MENTAL LIFE 

marriage of imbeciles, of idiots, of' simpletons, of slaves 
to alcohol or any other poisons whose effects upon body 
or mind are known to be heritable. The cure for race 
deterioration is the selection of the fit as parents. 

Mental evolution and its factors. — It is not so easy to 
point a practicable way to the production of a higher, more 
efficient, type of mind than now exists in the human race. 
Theoretically the problem seems fairly easy of solution; 
practically it proves to be extremely difficult. 

It is said by the theorist, " since mental traits are herita- 
ble, all that is needful is to select as parents those individ- 
uals in whom the desirable traits appear markedly and in 
proper relation to other characteristics." There is nothing 
simpler, it is said, than to breed for intelligence. The 
difficulty arises from the fact that selection can not be 
practiced in the case of man, even for good reasons, as it 
is practiced by breeders of plants and of domestic animals. 
There is, however, no alternative method to suggest. If 
mind is to be improved it must be by the selection of the 
eminently fit as parents. 

Control the result of science. — Control is the outcome, 
albeit not the avowed goal, of scientific research. The 
greatest of physicists, chemists, biologists, sociologists, and 
psychologists have regarded as belittling the suggestion that 
they sought knowledge for its usefulness. This attitude is 
admirable, but it fortunately does not lessen the practical 
value or usefulness of the discoveries of these disinterested 
investigators. 

Psychology is not the science of mental control. It 
merely makes possible in increasing measure this control. 
It is the science upon which both education, the art of 
the control of mind in the individual, and eugenics, 
the art of the control of mind in the race, must be 
founded. 



INTROSPECTION OF THOUGHT 417 



CLASS EXERCISE 

Self-observation. Introspection of consciousness of meaning. 
Materials : A number of words and sentences prepared in ad- 
vance by the instructor. 

In explaining what is expected in this exercise the instructor 
shouid give from his own experience, or from the literature on 
" thought," instances such as the following: (1) Professor South- 
ard states that doubt is symbolized for him by the image of 
two dog ears pointed forward. (2) Professor Titchener tells us 
that he sees " meaning " as the blue-gray tip of a kind of 
scoop, which has a bit of yellow above it (presumably a part 
of the handle), and which is just digging into a dark mass 
of what appears to be plastic material. (3) The descriptions 
of ways in which the meaning of the sentence " infinity broods 
over all things " (as quoted from Professor Colvin in Titchener's 
Text-book of psychology, pp. 517-518). 

Suggested stimulus words and sentences. 

All 

Gigantic 

Glory 

Omniscience 

Knowledge is power. 

" The darkness falls from the wings of night." 

Certainty replaces doubt. 

SUPPLEMENTARY READING 

Galton, Francis: Hereditary genius. 

Woods, F. A.: Heredity in royalty. 

Thompson, J. A.: Heredity. 

Ribot, Th. : Heredity. 

Saleeby, C. W. : Parenthood and race culture. (Excellent bibliog- 
raphy. ) 

McKim, W. L. : Heredity and human progress. 

Dugdale, R. L. : The Jukes. 

Goddabd, H. H. : Heredity of feeble-mindedness. American Breeders 
Magazine, vol. 1, pp. 165-178. 1910. 



INDEX 

OF SUBJECTS AND NAMES 



Abnormal psychology, 17 

Achromatic sensations, 119; 
diagram of, 122; number of, 
124 

Action, relation to feeling, 277 

Activity, development of, 384 

Acts, automatic, 376; instinc- 
tive, 376; volitional, 376 

Adaptation, law of, 263 ; sensory, 
139 

Adult psychology, 18 

Advertisements, experiments 

with, 170, 187; memory of, 209 

^Esthetic experience, 289 

Affection, definition of, 78, 147; 
modes of, 151; duration of, 
154; clearness of, 154; par- 
ticular properties of, 155; 
laws of, 275 

Affections, as elements, 147 ; 
classification of, 148; condi- 
tions of, 149 ; properties of, 
153, 174; criteria of, 370 

Affective organs, 150 

Affective value, of sounds, 132; 
of colors, 156 

After-image, relation to sensa- 
tion, 331 

After-images, 144; visual, 133; 
positive, 144; negative, 144; 
law of, 264 

After-sensations, 144 

Agreeableness, 79; conditions of, 
364 

Aldrich, 307 

Analysis, 26, 27; psychological, 
73, 75; in chemistry, 74; in 
biology, 74; and synthesis, 84; 
procedure, 86 

Anatomy and psychology, 338; 
and the senses, 97 



Angell, 10, 104, 116, 146, 172, 
252 

Animal behavior, 46 -< 

Animal psychology, 17, 18, 375; 
mind, observation of, 244 

Animals, classification of, 232; 
mental lives of, 231; their 
senses, 100 

Ant, psychology of, 374 

Applications, of knowledge, 49; 
of psychology, 89 

Art of education, 397 

Association, laws of, 300; intro- 
spection of, 310; types of, 304; 
test, 324, 337 

Associational train, 301 

Assumptions of psychology, 339 

Atoms, psychic, 82 

Attention, relation to affection, 
277; laws of, 292; definition 
of, 293; conditions of, 294, 
298; range of, 297; introspec- 
tion of, 299 

Attributes of things, 103 

Auditory sensations, 129 

Automatism, 320 3 377 

Awareness, in animals, 388 

Backwardness, mental, 399 

Baldwin, 104, 105, 255 

Behavior and consciousness, 373 

Behavior, of organisms, 235 ; 
varieties of, 376; instinctive, 
378; volitional, 382; interpre- 
tation of, 385 

Bentley, 84, 92 

Berkeley, 73 

Berry, *324 

Biological sciences, 341 

Biology, 20; analysis in, 74 

Black, sensation of, 119 



419 



420 



INDEX 



Blind, imagery of, 204 

Bodily processes and sensations, 
350, 355 

Body and mind, 36, 320 

Boies, 412 

Book, 402 

Bradley, colored papers, 127, 
156 

Brain, functions of, 21; and 
consciousness, 35 ; and psy- 
chology, 338 

Branches of psychology, 17, 18 

Brightness, of colors, 127; sen- 
sations, 122 

Bryan, 404 

Byron, 309 

Calkins, 9, 10, 25, 38, 72, 79, 
92, 135, 172, 197, 227 

Causation, physical, 34, 314; 
psychical, 34, 328 

Cause, 312 

Causes of events, 32 

Cerebral cortex and intelligence, 
344 

Chain, the psycho-physiological, 
355 

Characteristics of things, 103 

Chemical stimuli, 353 

Chemistry, analysis in, 74 ; syn- 
thesis in, 85; typical laws of, 
247 

Chess game, 189 

Child psychology, 18 

Childhood, psychology of, 217 

Chroma, 127 

Chromatic sensations, 125 

Chronoscope, 324, 348 

Class exercise, 10, 24, 38, 48, 
58, 71, 83, 91, 101, 115, 133, 
145, 156, 170, 187, 209, 225, 244, 
255, 273, 291, 299, 310, 324, 
337, 348, 358, 371, 385, 394, 
408, 417 

Class experiment, 8 

Classification, of experiences, 
70; of sensations, 95 

Clearness, 277, 293; of affection, 
154; of sensation, 107; facts 
about, 112; grades of, 112; 
law of, 266 

Cold sensations, 142 



Collective psychology, 18 

Color, affective value of, 156; 

after-image of, 145; sensations 

of, 119, 125; terminology, 127; 

pyramid, 129 

Colored papers, Bradley, 127, 

156 
Combinations of sensations, 89 
Common properties, 103 
Complementary colors, 259 
Complete repetition, law of, 309 
Composition of objects, 85 
Compounds, psychical, 71 
Conation, definition of, 78 
Conditions, of affections, 149; of 

attention, 294, 298 
Conductors, 342, 355 
Conscious objects, 16, 42 
Consciousness, objects of, 16; 
analysis of, 27 ; description of, 
28; genetic description of, 28; 
and brain, 35; introspection 
of, 41; signs of, 42, 343, 374; 
discovery of, 61; as knowing, 
63; as remembering, 64; as 
feeling, 66; as will, 69; ele- 
ments of, 73; of objects, 167; 
changes in, 213; of infant, 214; 
history of, 228; of structure, 
374; instinct, 379; and neu- 
rology, 22. 
Constitution of objects, 85 
Contiguity, 303 

Contrast, laws of, 260, 269; in- 
trospection of, 273 
Control, 6, 26; of activity, 384; 
of events, 389; goal of science, 
416; of habits, 402; of mental 
events, 393; in the individual, 
407; of mind, 36; of phe- 
nomena, 51 
Co-ordination, 304 
Correlation, 338, 385; nature of 
task, 342; psycho-physical, 35 
Creative imagination, 206 
Criteria of affections, 370 
Cutaneous sensations, 142 

Darwin, 286 

Defects, mental, 399; inheritance 

of, 410 
Definition of psychology, 12, 57 



INDEX 



421 



Degeneracy, mental, 415 
Degeneration, mental, 225 
Dermal sensations, 142 
Description, 6, 25, 26; of con- 
sciousness, 59; of sounds, 113; 

as explanation, 315 
Development, of individual, 55; 

of race, 56; of sensation, 112 
Dewey, 408 

Differences, individual, 101, 407 
Dimensions, brighter-duller, 122; 

lighter-darker, 122; of feelings, 

280 
Disagreeableness, conditions of, 

364 
Discrimination consciousness, 358 
Divisions of textbook, 5 
Dog, sight of, 100; consciousness 

of, 240 
Dreams, images in, 196 
Dugdale, 417 
Duration, of affection, 154; of 

sensation, 107, 112 

Ebbinghaus, 24, 141, 169 

Edinger, 338, 349 

Edlemann whistle, 101 

Education, an art, 397 ; and 
eugenics, 409; and habit for- 
mation, 401 ; and learning, 
406; and individual differences, 
407; of perception, 400; and 
psychology, 52, 398; of senses, 
398; of the will, 401 

Edwards family, 412 

Effect, 312 

Effectors, 342, 355 

Effects, psychological, 89 

Efficiency, mental, 397 

Effort, feeling of, 79 

Electrical stimuli, 354 

Elementary facts, inexplicable, 
322 

Elements, classes of, 81; chemi- 
cal, 74; of consciousness, 73, 
78; psychical, 71 

Emotion and perception, 68, 181 

Emotions, 177; bodily pictures 
of, 345 ; expressions of, 183, 
283; duration of, 288; grades 
of, 182; rise of, 179 

Energy as stimuli, 352 



Environment, changes in, 361 
Eugenics, definition of, 409; goal 

of, 415; methods of, 415 
Events, prediction of, 388 
Evolution, of mind, 55, 229 ; proc- 
ess of, 228; mental, 416 
Exercises, 9 

Exhaustion, law of, 269. 
Experience, aesthetic, 289; varie- 
ties of affective, 276; concrete, 
62; growth of, 84 
Experiences, classification of, 62, 
70; new and old, 192; per- 
ceptual and ideational, 166; 
presentative and representa- 
tive, 193 
Experiment, synthetic, 84, 91 
Experimental method, 45, 47 
Explanation, 25, 32; and corre- 
lation, 6, 26; in psychology, 
• 311 
Expression, of emotions, 283; 

facial, 371 
Extensity of sensation, 104, 108 
Eyes and expression, 371 

Fact, definition of, 249; examples 

of, 250 
Faculty psychology, 293 
Familiarity, feeling of, 193 
Fear, description of, 286 
Feeblemindedness, heredity of, 

410 
Feeling, 62, 66, 68; simple, 87; 

and sensing, 148. 
Feelings, 173; list of, 151; re- 
active, 152; receptive, 152; 
varieties of, 174; theory of, 
279 
Feeling-tone of sensation, 109, 

147 
Ferdinand, 414 
Foresight, 388 
Formula?, structural, 86 
Frequency, law of, 304, 307 
Fusion, of ideas, 168; law of, 
269; of odors, 261; of sensa- 
tions, 254, 259 

Gall, 302 

Galton, 49, 58, 92, 102, 115, 162, 
198, 391, 409, 415, 417 



422 



INDEX 



Galton whistle, 101 

Geissler, 299 

Generalization, 6, 26, 29; psy- 
chology as, 245 

Generalizations, examples of, 252 

Genetic description, 6, 26, 28, 55, 
211 

Goddard, 410, 417 

Gray, sensation of, 120 

Group psychology, 17, 18 

Gump, 207 

Gustatory sensations, 137 

Habit, 305, 309; characteristics 
of, 383; formation of, 401; 
special, 402 

Hallucination, 170 

Harmony, psychological, 88 

Harter, 404 

Hearing, 117; upper limit of, 
101; sensations of, 117, 129 

Heredity, of feeblemindedness, 
410; in royalty, 414; psychic, 
410 

History, 6, 26 ; of consciousness, 
211, 228; of mind, 57; of psy- 
chology, 19 

Hoffding, 72 

Holt, 274 

Hue, definition of, 127 

Human faculty, 49 

Human psychology, 18 

Huxley, 320 

Hypothetical elements, 81 

Ideals of psychology, 49 

Ideas, fusion of, 168; and per- 
ceptions, 161 

Ideational types, 197 

Illusion, 169 

Image, definition of, 78, 169, 
193; in dreams, 196; visual, 
200 

Imagery, 162, 198; mental, 198; 
of the blind, 204; of the 
months, 200; uses of, 204 

Images, 70; and meaning, 417; 
sequences of, 335 

Imagination, 189; characteristics 
of, 206; materials of, 206 

Imagining, 62, 65, 205 

Imperfections of memory, 306 



Impression, 169, 193 
Individual differences, 14, 101 ; 
psychology, 17, 18, and educa- 
tion, 407 
Individuals, imagination in, 208 
Infancy, psychology of, 211, 214 
Inheritance, its significance, 410 
Inherited tendencies, 365 
Inhibition, law of, 263 
Insects, psychology of, 236 
Instinct, 236, 305, 378; con- 
sciousness, 380 
Intellect, 63 
Intelligence, of animals, 373; 

grading of, 244 
Intensity, of affection, 153; of 
color sensation, 127 ; laws of, 
262; relation to clearness, 295; 
of sensation, 106; series, posi- 
tion in, 111; visual sensations, 
121 
Tnteraetionism, 320 
Interpretation of behavior, 385 
Introspection, 41, 91; of memory, 
10, 38; of ideas, 24; human 
and animal, 45 ; of sensations, 
48, 115; opportunities for, 69; 
of extensity, 108; of sounds, 
113; of achromatic sensations, 
123; of chess imagery, 189; of 
imagery, 200; of contrast, 273; 
of sentiments, 291; and clear- 
ness, 294; of attention, 299; 
of associated ideas, 302; of 
associations, 310, 324, 337; 
place of, 322; importance of, 
328; of discrimination, 358; of 
thought processes, 394; of 
\ reasoning processes, 408; of 

meaning, 417 
Isabella, 414 
Isomerism, 86 

James, 72, 103, 105, 108, 109, 
160, 17/3, 188, 215, 286, 358, 
372, 686, 408 

James-Lange law, 285 

JastroW, 358 

Jennings, 234 

Joanna, " the mad," 414 

Johnston, 147 

Joints, sensations from, 144 



INDEX 



423 



Judd, 58, 83, 92, 146, 219, 278, 

349, 372, 395 
Judgments, distribution of, 171, 

186 
Jukes family, 413 
Jung, 324 

Keller, 93, 205 

Kinsesthesis, 59 

Kirkpatrick, 244 

Knowing, 62, 63 

Knowledge, practical value of, 

91 
Koenig, 113 
Kiilpe, 135 

Lange, law of feeling, 285 
Language, development of, 141 
Latent period, law of, 264 
Law, of adaptation, 263 ; of after- 
images, 264; of clearness of 
sensation, 266; of least resist- 
ance, 271; of localization, 266; 
of latent period, 264; of inhibi- 
tion, 263; of supplementation, 
272; James-Lange, 285; of fre- 
quency, 307; of recency, 307; 
of repetition, 296; of practice, 
308; of vividness, 308 
Laws, 29 ; of psychology, 30, 253 ; 
nature of, 246; definition of, 
247 ; of contrast, 260 ; of smell, 
261; of intensity, 262; of min- 
imal differences, 262 ; of 
science, 25 ; formulation of, 
255; of sensation, 256; of re- 
lations of sensations, 258; 
complementary colors, 259; of 
sense-feelings, 268; of thresh- 
old, 268; of exhaustion, 269; 
of mixture, 269; of fusion, 
269; of life span, 269; of per- 
ception, 271; of negative after- 
images, 265; of affection, 275; 
of aesthetic experience, 289 ; 
of attention, 292; of clearness, 
295; of association, 300; of 
frequency, 304; of recency, 
304; of vividness of memory, 
300, 307 ; of learning, 308 
Leach, 324 



Learning process, 402; studies 

of, 308 
Levels of consciousness, 294 
Life span, law of, 269 
Lightness and brightness, 123 
Liquidity, synthesis of, 84; and 

wetness, 84 
Localization, law of, 266 
Loeb, 394 
Lugaro, 338 

MacDougall, R., 227 

Martin, 359 

Maturity, psychology of, 223 

Maximal sensation, 111 

McDougall, W., 188, 328, 349, 
381, 386 

McKim, 417 

Meaning, relation to learning, 
309; introspection of, 417; and 
perception, 270 

Measurement of reaction time, 
348, 358 

Mechanical stimuli, 353 

Mechanism, sensation-reaction, 
355 

Memory, 189; of chess game, 190; 
images, 195; of advertisements, 
208; relation to emotion, 288; 
characteristics, 199, 306; im- 
perfections of, 306; relation to 
association, 307 ; laws of, 300, 
307 

Mental degeneracy, 415 

Mental evolution, 416; tree of, 
241 

Mental imagery, 198 

Mental life, beginning of, 213; 
end of, 213 

Mental measurements, 348 

Mental processes, relations of, 
318, 319 

Method, scientific, 39 ; psychologi- 
cal, 40; naturalistic, 45; ex- 
perimental, 45, 47 

Methods, of psychology, 39; of 
grouping sensations, 97; of ex- 
plaining, 317; of eugenics, 415 

Mind, evolution of, 229 ; types of, 
230 

Mind and body, 36, 320; control 
of, 36 



424 



INDEX 



Mixture, law of, 269 
Modes, of affection, 151; of sen- 
sation, 96, 136, 357 
Moods, 182 

Morgan, C. L., 228, 244, 374, 386 
Movement, sensation of, 144 
Miinsterberg, 58, 82, 83, 104, 105, 

107, 116, 172, 324, 327, 360 
Murray, 136 

Muscles, sensations from, 144 
Myers, 48, 102, 135, 172, 291, 
304, 310, 372 

Naturalistic method, 45 

Natural sciences, aim of, 25, 26 

Negative after-images, laws of, 
265 

Nervous system, 356; and con- 
sciousness, 342 

Neurology, 22 

Noises, 131; affective value of, 
132 

Normal psychology, 17 

Number forms, 200; diagrams of, 
201 

Number of elements, 79 

Objects, perception of, 166; con- 
sciousness of, 167; self-con- 
scious, 42; conscious, 42 

Observation, and generalization, 
245; of behavior, 385; psy- 
chological, 45 

Odors, classes of, 139; fusion of, 
261 

Olfactory sensations, 138; laws 
of, 261 

One-celled organisms, psychology 
of, 233 

Ontogenesis, 212 

Organism, changes in, 361 

Organs, affective, 150 

Pain, sensation of, 136, 142, 143 

Panama Canal, 307 

Parallelism, 320, 333; psycho- 
physical, 35 

Paramecium, consciousness of, 
234 

Parts of book, 6 

Passions, 182 

Pearson, 247, 255, 395 



Perceptions, in children, 219; 
classification of, 163; composi- 
tion of, 168; double, 271; edu- 
cation of, 400; and emotion, 
181; growth of, 88, 169; and 
meaning, 270; multiple, 272; 
tactual, 163; taste, 165; of 
time, 225; of things, 166; vari- 
eties of, 162; visual, 164 

Perky, 300 

Penology, 412 

Philosophy, 20 

Photic stimuli, 354 

Phrenology, 302 

Phylogenesis, 228 

Physical and mental events, 333 

Physical explanation, 312 

Physical sciences, 20 

Physics, generalizations of, 252 ; 
laAVS of, 30; and physiology, 
117 

Physiological, processes, 369 ; 
psychology, 23, 323, 350 

Physiology, 21; of the senses, 
117; and the senses, 97 

Pillsbury, 299 

Plan of text-book, 5 

Plant psychology, 17, 18 

Plants, minds of, 232 

Poincare, 248, 255 

Practice, law of, 308 

Prediction, of events, 388; of 
mental events, 393 

Presentative experiences, 193 

Pressure sensations, 142 

Preyer, 227 

Primates, psychology of, 240 

Principle and law, 248 

Principles of science, 25 

Problems of psychology, 25 

Processes, physiological, 369 

Prodigies, mathematical, 204 

Properties, of affection, 150, 276; 
classes of, 103; common, 103; 
lists of, 104; particular, 103, 
109, 155; of sensations, 150; 
of sense feelings, 174; of 
things, 103 

Psychical, atomism, 82; causa- 
tion, 323; complexes, 160; com- 
pounds, 335; explanation, 317 

Psycho-analysis, 324 



INDEX 



425 



Psych ogenesis, 211 

Psychologist, 11; tasks of, 321; 
physiological, 328; and biolo- 
gist, 339 

Psychology, outline of, 3; man- 
ual of, 4; popular idea of, 11; 
subject matter of, 12, 43; 
scope of, 15 ; divisions of, 17 ; 
branches of, 17, 18; history of, 
19; relation to physical 
sciences, 20; relation to bi- 
ology, 20; and the brain, 21; 
problems of, 25; aim of, 26; 
laws of, 31; causes in, 34; 
tasks of, 25-37; methods of, 
39; objects of, 42; of self, 44; 
human and animal, 45; values 
and ideals, 49; and education, 
52; definition of, 57; of 
thought, 59; applications of, 
89; and self-observation, 118; 
of sensation, 119; of infancy, 
214; of childhood, 217; of 
youth, 221; of maturity, 223; 
of senility, 224; of one-celled 
organisms, 233; of insects, 236; 
of primates, 240; as generali- 
zation, 245; law of, 253; ex- 
planation in, 311; and an- 
atomy, 338 ; and the brain, 
338; assumptions of, 339; of 
ant, 374; and education, 398; 
of skill, 403 

Psycho-phylogenetic tree, 242 

Pulse, relation to feeling, 284 

Qualities of color sensation, 127 
Quality, of affection, 153; of sen- 
sation, 99, 105 
Questions as aids, 7 
Quiescence, 177 

Raccoon, behavior of, 46 

Range, of attention, 297; of 

hearing, 130 
Rationality of animals, 239 
Reaction time, 326; experiment, 

324; simple, 348; tactual, 348; 

measurements, 358 
Reaction word, 325 
Reactive feelings, 152 
Reasoning, introspection of, 408 



Recapitulation, theory of, 230 
Recency, 304 ; law of, 307 
Receptive feelings, 152 
Receptors, 342, 355 
Recognition, consciousness, 193; 

erroneous, 194; failures in, 

195 
Regularity of mental events, 319 
Relations, of mental processes, 

319; of sensations, 113 
Remembering, 62, 64, 194 
Repetition, value of, 290; law of, 

296 
Representative experiences, 193 
Reproductive imagination, 206 
Restlessness, 177 
Ribot, 417 

Royalty, inheritance in, 414 
Royce, 151, 159, 256, 372 
Rules for observation, 93 
Rush, 302 
Rushworth, 304 

Saleeby, 409, 417 

Sanford, 10, 217, 227 

Schafer, 146 

Science, causal, 33; and causes, 
312; reasons for existence, 49; 
teleological, 33; and utility, 51 

Sciences, physical, 20 

Scientific basis of education, 397 

Scientific method, 39 

Scientists, ideals of, 49 ; imagery 
of, 199 

Scope of psychology, 15 

Scott, 408 

Seashore, 3, 10, 134, 145, 159 

Seeing, 62 

Selection, 416 

Self-consciousness, development 
of, 60 

Self-knowledge, 53 

Self-observation, 10, 38, 48, 71, 
83, 91, 101, 115, 133, 145, 156, 
187, 209, 225, 255, 273, 291, 
299, 310, 324, 337, 348, 358, 
394, 408, 417; and psychology, 
118 

Senility, psychology of, 18, 224 

Sensation, definition of, 78 ; ob- 
servation of, 93; modes of, 96; 
and sense organs, 97; elements, 



426 



INDEX 



Sensation ( Cont . ) 

98; qualities of, 99; properties 
of, 103; extensity of, 103, 108; 
quality of, 105 ; intensity of, 
106; clearness of, 107; duration 
of, 107; voluminousness of, 108; 
value of, 109; particular prop- 
erties of, 109; facts about, 110; 
threshold of, 110; minimal, 
110; maximal, 111; develop- 
ment of, 112; psychology of, 
119; terminology of, 140; laws 
of, 256; law of clearness of, 
266 

Sensations, introspection of, 48; 
as elements, 82, 93 ; pure, 87 ; 
combinations of, 89 ; classifica- 
tion of, 95 ; organic, 95 ; sys- 
tems of, 96, 118; list of, 96; 
ways of classifying, 97 ; rela- 
tions of, 113; properties of, 
115; of sight, 117; of hearing, 
117; visual, 119; achromatic, 
119; chromatic, 125; visual, 
number of, 129; auditory, 129; 
gustatory, 137; olfactory, 138; 
fusion of, 254, 259 ; law of re- 
lations of, 258; summation of, 
263; sequences of, 330; and 
stimuli, 350 

Sense-feelings, 174; kinds of, 
175; laws of, 268 

Sense, meaning of, 96 

Sense modes, list of, 99 

Sense organs, and sensation, 97; 
list of, 95, 355 

Senses, 64; special, 94; of ani- 
mals, 100; education of, 398 

Sensible elements, 81 

Sensing and feeling, 148 

Sensitiveness, 354 

Sensory motor mechanism, 356 

Sentiment, 185, 288, 291 

Sequences, 334; of mental events, 
319; in thought, 336 

Series, causal, 332 

Sherrington, 349, 350 

Shinn, 211, 227 

Sight, 117, 119 

Signs of consciousness, 42, 343, 
374 

Similarity, 303 



Skill, psychology of, 403 

Skin, sensations from, 142 

Sleep, 294 

Smell, laws of, 261 ; sensations 
of, 138; sense organs of, 343 

Social psychology, 381 

Sounds, affective value of, 132; 
color of, 115; introspection of, 
113 

Southard, 189, 417 

Special senses, 94, 95 

Spectrum, 125 

Spelling, 399 

Spiritualism, 11 

Spurzheim, 302 

Stern, 113 

Stimuli, list of, 99 ; of affections, 
149; and sensations, 350; 
nature of, 351 ; varieties of, 
353; mechanical, 353; chemi- 
cal, 353; thermal, 354; photic, 
354; electrical, 354 

Stimulus, definition of, 351; and 
sensation, 97 

Stimulus word, 325 

Stop watch, 324, 348 

Stout, 38, 274, 275, 337, 388 

Strong, 320, 327 

Structure and consciousness, 374 

Subconsciousness, 294 

Sub-ordination, 304 

Sully, 10 

Summation of sensations, 263 

Super-ordination, 304 

Superstitions, 32 

Supplementary reading, 9 

Supplementation, law of, 272 

Sympathy, 53 

Synthesis, 26, 27; in psychology, 
84; chemical, 85; procedure, 86 

Systems, 118; of auditory sensa- 
tions, 129; educational, 397; 
of sensations, 96 

Tactual, perceptions, 163; reac- 
tion time, 348 

Tasks of psychology, 25-37, 321 

Taste, sensations of, 137; per- 
ceptions, 165 

Tastes, classes of, 137 

Temperaments, 183 

Temperature sensations, 142 



INDEX 



427 



Tendons, sensations from, 144 

Terminology, for colors, 127; of 
sensation, 140 

Terror, description of, 287 

Theories, of relation of mind to 
body, 320 

Theory, of feeling, 279 

Thermal stimuli, 354 

Things, properties of, 103; per- 
ception of, 166 

Thorndike, 9, 70, 72, 102, 181, 
244, 301, 305, 395, 408 

Thought, 65, 408; psychology of, 
59 

Thought processes, introspection 
of, 394 

Threshold, of affection, 153; law 
of, 268; of sensation, 110; of 
difference, 111 

Timbre, 113 

Time, perception of, 225; estima- 
tion, 225 

Tint, 127 

Titchener, 10, 11, 24, 38, 39, 48, 
59, 83, 92, 94, 102, 104, 116, 
122, 123, 126, 128, 135, 139, 
144, 146, 151, 155, 159, 172, 
265, 277, 292, 327, 358, 386, 
417 

Tone sensations, 130 

Tones, consciousness of, 77; com- 
binations of, 89 

Traits, psychological, 58 

Tree of mental evolution, 241 

Trial and error, 90 

Tridimensional theory, 281 

Types, of association, 304; idea- 
tional, 197 

Typewriting, learning of, 402 



Unity, value of, 290 

Urban, 227 

Utility and science, 51 

Value of sensation, 109 

Values of psychology, 49, 52 

Variator of Stern, 113 

Vertebrates, higher, 239; lower, 
238 

Vision, after-images of, 133; de- 
fective, 399 

Visual perception, 164 

Visual sensations, 119; number 
of, 129 

Vividness, or clearness, 107, 304; 
law of, 308 

Voice, peculiarities of, 133 

Volitions, 185 

Voluminousness, 103; of sensa- 
tion, 108 

Warmth sensations, 142 

Washburn, 244, 324 

Weber-Fechner laAv, 31, 262 

Wetness and liquidity, 84 

Wheeler, 237, 375 

Whipple, 10, 39, 408 

White, sensation of, 119 

Will, 69; education of, 401 

Winship, 412 

Witmer, 172, 291, 399 

Woods, 414, 417 

Wundt, 24, 48, 71, 83, 87, 102, 
104, 108, 121, 122, 151, 159, 
185, 245, 279, 337, 349, 359 

Youth, psychology of, 221 

Ziehen, 349, 359 



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